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South African law does not recognise an inherent right to the existing, unobstructed 
view from a property. Nevertheless, seemingly in disregard of this general principle, 
property owners often attempt to protect such views and courts sometimes in fact 
grant orders that provide such protection. This dissertation aims to establish whether 
South African law does indeed not acknowledge a right to a view and whether there 
are any exceptions to the general rule against the recognition of the right to a view. 
The principle that the existing view from a property is not an inherent property right is 
rooted in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. This principle was received in early South 
African case law. Inconsistency in the application of the principle in recent case law 
renders its development uncertain. An analysis of recent decisions shows that the 
view from a property is sometimes protected in terms of servitudes or similar 
devices, or by virtue of legislation. In other instances, property owners attempt to 
prevent the erection of a neighbouring building that will interfere with their existing 
views, based either on a substantive right or an administrative shortcoming. When 
the protection of view is based on a limited real right (servitudes or similar devices) 
or legislation, it is generally effective and permanent. Conversely, when it is founded 
on a substantive right to prevent building on neighbouring land or an administrative 
irregularity rendering a neighbouring building objectionable, the protection is indirect 
and temporary.  
A comparative study confirms that the position regarding the protection of view is 
similar in English and Dutch law. Constitutional analysis in terms of the methodology 
developed by the Constitutional Court in FNB indicates that cases where view is 
protected are not in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. The investigation concludes with an evaluation of policy 
considerations which show that the position with regard to a right to a view in South 
African law is rooted in legitimate policy rationales. 
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Opsomming 
„n Inherente reg op die bestaande, onbelemmerde uitsig vanaf „n eiendom word nie 
deur die Suid-Afrikaanse reg erken nie. Desnieteenstaande poog eienaars dikwels 
om die uitsig vanaf hul eiendomme te beskerm en soms staan die howe bevele tot 
dien effekte toe. Dit skep die indruk dat die Suid-Afrikaanse reg wel die bestaande 
uitsig vanaf „n eiendom as „n inherente eiendomsreg erken of dat sodanige uitsig 
minstens onder sekere omstandighede beskerm kan word. Hierdie verhandeling het 
ten doel om onsekerhede betreffende die algemene beginsel oor „n reg op uitsig uit 
die weg te ruim en om lig te werp op gevalle waar „n onbelemmerde uitsig wel 
beskerm word. 
Die Romeinse en Romeins-Hollandse reg het nie „n reg op uitsig erken nie. Hierdie 
posisie is deur vroeë regspraak in die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel opgeneem. „n 
Ondersoek na latere Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak toon egter aan dat howe wel onder 
sekere omstandighede, skynbaar strydig met die gemeenregtelike beginsel, 
beskerming aan die onbelemmerde uitsig vanaf eiendomme verleen. „n Eerste 
kategorie sake behels gevalle waar die uitsig vanaf „n eiendom deur „n beperkte 
saaklike reg, in die vorm van „n serwituut of „n soortgelyke maatreël, of ingevolge 
wetgewing beskerm word. In „n tweede kategorie sake word die beskerming van „n 
uitsig deur middel van „n aanval op die goedkeuring van „n buureienaar se 
bouplanne bewerkstellig. Sodanige aanval kan óf op „n substantiewe reg óf op „n 
administratiewe tekortkoming berus. Die onderskeie kategorieë verskil wat betref die 
doelmatigheid en omvang van die beskerming wat verleen word. „n Saaklike reg of 
wetgewing verleen meestal effektiewe en permanente beskerming. Hierteenoor het 
„n aanval op die goedkeuring van „n buureienaar se bouplanne hoogstens indirekte 
en tydelike beskerming van die uitsig tot gevolg. 
Regsvergelyking bevestig dat die Engelse en Nederlandse reg die Suid-Afrikaanse 
posisie ten opsigte van „n reg op uitsig tot „n groot mate eggo. Grondwetlike analise 
aan die hand van die FNB-metodologie dui daarop dat die gevalle waar uitsig wel 
beskerming geniet nie strydig is met artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet van die 
Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1996 nie. Bowendien regverdig beleidsgronde die 
behoud van die huidige beginsel in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
 
1 1 Introduction 
In a recent decision by the Eastern Cape High Court, Ndlambe Municipality v Lester 
and Others,1 (“Ndlambe Municipality”) the court ordered the demolition of the first 
respondent‟s primary residence that obstructed the views from the third 
respondent‟s2 property. The order is the latest in years of litigation between the first 
and third respondents, arising from the third respondent‟s discontent with its 
neighbour‟s (the first respondent‟s) building works. In an attempt to prevent the 
obstruction of the existing, unobstructed view from its property over the Bushman‟s 
River and the Indian Ocean, the third respondent made numerous applications to 
have the approval of the first respondent‟s building plans set aside and, once 
building had commenced, to have the building demolished. These applications were 
not directly based on an alleged inherent right to the existing view from the third 
respondent‟s property. However, it is clear from the decision that the third 
respondent‟s efforts to have the approval of the relevant building plans set aside and 
to have the building demolished relied on a number of strategies to prevent or at 
least limit the obstruction of the panoramic views from its property.  
The application for the demolition order was made after the first respondent had 
failed to comply with an earlier court order, directing him to submit amended building 
                                                          
1
 Ndlambe Municipality v Lester and Others (92/2011) [2012] ZAECGHC 33 (3 May 2012). 
2
 The third respondent is a registered private company that is the owner of a property adjoining that of 
the first respondent. 
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plans that comply with the applicable building and zoning requirements.3 The court 
focused its decision on two aspects: firstly the unlawfulness of the first respondent‟s 
building, and secondly his neighbour‟s right to challenge the approval of the relevant 
building plans to protect its existing view.4 On the first aspect the court decided that 
the first respondent‟s building was an unlawful structure on the basis that he failed to 
submit amended building plans that comply with the applicable building regulations 
and zoning scheme, despite previous decisions ordering him to amend the plans.5 
Secondly, regarding the question of whether the third respondent (neighbour) had a 
right to challenge the approval of the first respondent‟s building plans to protect the 
existing views from its property, the court accepted, without analysing the authority 
on this issue, that the neighbour was entitled to attack the approval of the relevant 
building plans because interference with the views from its property would be 
unlawful in neighbour law.6 The court therefore apparently assumed that a property 
owner is entitled to object to the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans not only 
because those plans failed to comply with the applicable building regulations and 
zoning scheme, but also purely on the basis that the building works that are 
proposed in such plans would block the existing views from the aggrieved owner‟s 
property.  
Having established that it had a discretion in a matter where a demolition order 
is sought, the court considered whether or not granting such an order would satisfy 
                                                          
3
 Ndlambe Municipality v Lester and Others (92/2011) [2012] ZAECGHC 33 (3 May 2012) paras 35-
45. 
4
 The issue of demolition of an unlawful structure is not discussed here. In this regard, see J Strydom 
A hundred years of demolition orders: a constitutional analysis (2012) unpublished LLD dissertation 
University of Stellenbosch. 
5
 Ndlambe Municipality v Lester and Others (92/2011) [2012] ZAECGHC 33 (3 May 2012) paras 33-
36, 51, 53, 76, 92, 101, 104, 109, 111, 112, 116 and 117. 
6
 Ndlambe Municipality v Lester and Others (92/2011) [2012] ZAECGHC 33 (3 May 2012) paras 15, 
21, 22, 34, 39, 86, 88, 90, 92, 111 and 117. See n 10 and n 11 below regarding authority confirming 
that a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing view from her property and that a 
property owner does not usually have a right to be informed of an application for the approval of a 
neighbour‟s building plans. 
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the requirements that it may not cause disproportionate prejudice and that it must be 
lawful.7 It ruled that a demolition order would not cause disproportionate hardship 
and prejudice to the first respondent8 and that it would give effect to the law and 
public policy.9 On the one hand the first respondent acted in flagrant disregard of the 
applicable building regulations, and on the other the building conflicted with the 
common law principle that a property owner may not act in such a way as to interfere 
with the reasonable use and enjoyment of a neighbour‟s property. Additionally, the 
first respondent‟s building constituted an unlawful structure that, if not demolished, 
would permanently deprive the third respondent of “reasonable views from, and 
lawful use of, his own property”.10 Accordingly, the court granted a demolition order. 
Ndlambe, like many similar preceding cases, concerns a property owner‟s 
attempt to prevent or at least restrict the erection of a neighbouring building that 
would obstruct the existing view from her property. Courts are often still approached 
to protect such views regardless of a series of decisions11 indicating that in terms of 
the common law, a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing, 
unobstructed view from her property. Attempts to protect existing, unobstructed 
views from properties are mostly cast in the form of objections against building works 
                                                          
7
 Ndlambe Municipality v Lester and Others (92/2011) [2012] ZAECGHC 33 (3 May 2012) paras 77-
118. 
8
 Ndlambe Municipality v Lester and Others (92/2011) [2012] ZAECGHC 33 (3 May 2012) paras 78-
102. 
9
 Ndlambe Municipality v Lester and Others (92/2011) [2012] ZAECGHC 33 (3 May 2012) paras 102-
118. 
10
 Ndlambe Municipality v Lester and Others (92/2011) [2012] ZAECGHC 33 (3 May 2012) para 117. 
The court‟s reasoning indicates, without analysis, that it either ignored or rejected the case law, 
mentioned in n 11 below, that confirms that a property owner does not have an inherent right to the 
existing view from her property. It also suggests that a property owner has a right to be informed of a 
neighbour‟s application for the approval of building plans, despite several authoritative preceding 
judgments to the contrary. See Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 
45, 55-56 and 130 and the discussion of this case in 3 2 1 and especially Ch 3 n 22. 
11
 Myburgh v Jamison (1861) 4 Searle 8; Van der Heever v Hanover Municipality 1938 CPD 95, and 
Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C), discussed in Ch 2 and Clark v Faraday 2004 (4) 
SA 564 (C) 575-577; Muller NO v City of Cape Town 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 72-74 and De Kock v 
Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 2006) paras 36-
39, discussed in Ch 3. 
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on neighbouring properties. The aim of these objections is usually that a challenge 
against approval of the building plans would, if successful, have the effect of 
preventing or at least temporarily stalling building works that may interfere with the 
view from a neighbouring property.12 Accordingly, issues regarding the protection of 
the existing view from a property still arise and it seems as if the established 
principle that South African law does not recognise a right to the existing view from a 
property is often either simply ignored or strategically evaded with attacks against 
the approval of building plans for a neighbouring property. Despite decisions that 
have established and confirmed the common law principle that the existing view from 
a property does not flow naturally from the right of ownership, the uncertainty 
regarding (or perhaps merely attempts to avoid) the position of a right to a view in 
South African law therefore persists. The brief discussion above of the Ndlambe 
decision shows that the confusion is probably continued or even exacerbated by the 
fact that these attacks do not clearly distinguish between objections against building 
works based purely on the mistaken assumption of an inherent right to preserve an 
existing view and objections that are founded in procedural problems with the 
approval of building plans. 
 
1 2 Research question 
Case law suggests that at common law, a property owner does not enjoy an 
inherent, protected property right to continued enjoyment of the existing view from 
her property, unless that right is secured by way of a registered servitude or a similar 
                                                          
12
 Case law discussed in Ch 3 indicates that property owners in South African law often attempt to 
protect the existing views from their properties with attacks on the procedures followed when 
neighbours‟ building plans were approved. 
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right deriving from contract or legislation.13 However, decisions such as Ndlambe 
create the impression that if the existing, unobstructed view from a property 
contributes to the use, enjoyment or value of the benefiting property, it may be 
protected against obstruction by a neighbouring owner‟s building work, even in the 
absence of a servitude or similar right specifically created to protect that right. These 
decisions often do not explain how the objecting neighbour could in effect acquire a 
right of view over the adjoining land without a servitude or similar device. 
If the right to an existing view is protected by a servitude or another similar 
device, litigation concerning obstruction of the view would usually focus on the 
validity or interpretation of the servitude or the relevant legislation. However, in the 
absence of a servitude or similar device, litigation usually assumes the form of an 
attack against approval of the neighbour‟s building plans. In a number of cases, 
courts have faced the possibility of indirectly acknowledging the right to a view by 
way of attacks against the approval of building plans on the grounds of non-
compliance of the plans or the building with applicable building and zoning 
regulations, or attacks based on procedural irregularities or on the basis of a 
particular interpretation of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building 
Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (“National Building Act”).14 The 
grounds on which many of these cases were argued and decided suggest that it 
might be possible, counterintuitively, for a property owner to rely on a right to protect 
her unobstructed view over neighbouring land even when that view is not protected 
by a servitude or similar device, in other words to do indirectly what cannot be done 
directly. There clearly are some instances where a property owner may succeed in 
protecting the view from her property, at least temporarily, by either relying on a 
                                                          
13
 See n 11 above. 
14
 See n 12 above. 
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substantive right (for example the right to be informed of a change in zoning) or 
enforcing procedural rights with regard to the approval of building plans. If a property 
owner in South African law does not have an inherent right to the existing view from 
her property, she may therefore nevertheless successfully protect such a view with 
alternative strategies involving procedural attacks on the administrative approval of 
building plans relating to neighbouring buildings. 
The question, for purposes of this dissertation, is whether this position 
regarding the indirect protection of the existing view from a property is tenable. To 
answer this question, several sub-questions must be investigated. Firstly, is it correct 
that South African common law does not recognise or protect a right to an existing 
view, unless such a right is specifically protected by a servitude or a similar device? 
And secondly, if this is indeed the common law position, should it be possible to 
protect an existing view indirectly through procedural attacks on the approval of 
building plans? Thirdly, if such an indirect protection of an existing view is possible, 
when could it work and what are the limits of such protection? 
The first step in determining whether the position regarding the protection of the 
existing view from a property in South African law is tenable is to confirm that at 
common law, a property owner is indeed not entitled to continued enjoyment of the 
existing, unobstructed view from her property. This question includes the issue of 
whether the common law position provides the opportunity to prevent the obstruction 
of the existing view from a property through the creation of a servitude or a similar 
device. A further question is whether this position was adopted in early South African 
law and whether this position is still applicable. Accordingly, the reception of Roman 
and Roman-Dutch principles in South African law is first considered to ascertain 
what the current South African common law position is. Secondly, it is necessary to 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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establish whether the courts have strictly and consistently enforced the common law 
position in cases concerning the protection of an existing view from a property. An 
important question in this regard is why the common law position is sometimes 
disregarded or circumvented and whether the common law position has perhaps 
been either replaced with a new principle, or effectively changed with the application 
of numerous exceptions to the original position.  
The possibility of protecting the existing view from a property indirectly through 
an attack on the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans is specifically considered in 
this regard. Apart from possible misstatements or misunderstandings of the common 
law position, case law creates the impression that many recent efforts to protect an 
existing view assume the form of attacks that focus on the procedure followed in 
approving building plans, rather than on an inherent right to continue enjoying the 
existing view.15 The question in this regard is whether this switch to procedural 
attacks has had any substantive effect on the common law position. For this 
purpose, recent case law that seems to ignore or amend the common law position 
has to be analysed in order to establish whether the procedural attacks on offending 
building works have had any substantive effect. 
Following on from the analysis of the common law and recent case law, it is 
also necessary to establish whether and to what extent the modern South African 
law position regarding the protection of the existing view from a property is echoed in 
other legal systems. A comparative analysis could assist in evaluating firstly whether 
the South African position protects competing property interests effectively and 
secondly whether policy shifts are required or indicated.  
                                                          
15
 See n 12 above. 
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The next step involves a constitutional analysis of the position in modern South 
African law. If the default position is indeed that the existing view from a property is 
not inherently protected as a property right, but it turns out that an existing view may 
nevertheless be protected by way of a registered servitude, a similar device, or 
indirectly by procedural attacks on the approval of building plans, then the protection 
of a view will inevitably constitute a restriction of a neighbouring owner‟s right to 
develop (build on) her property. The protection of the existing, unobstructed view 
from a property by way of any of these strategies may cause a deprivation of a 
neighbour‟s right to build and such a deprivation has to be justified in terms of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the protection of the view from one 
owner‟s property and the effect that it has on another owner‟s property entitlements 
must satisfy the requirements for a constitutionally valid deprivation of property. 
Constitutional analysis is therefore required to determine whether any amendments 
of the common law position should and can be justified in terms of section 25. 
Finally, policy rationales that may support and explain the common law position 
and exceptions to this position are examined and the possibility of departing from the 
general rule in specific circumstances is explored. 
 
1 3 Chapter outline 
Addressing the apparently continuing uncertainty regarding the protection of an 
existing, unobstructed view from a property first of all requires clarification of the 
position at common law. Judging from the preliminary evidence in case law and 
despite the position adopted in decisions like Ndlambe, the South African common 
law does probably not acknowledge an inherent right to the existing view from a 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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property. This hypothesis is explored in chapter 1, where a legal-historical 
perspective is adopted to establish the common law position pertaining to a property 
owner‟s right to a view over adjoining property. This issue is discussed with 
reference to Roman and Roman-Dutch law as well as the adoption of the common 
law principle in early South African case law. More recent South African decisions 
are analysed to determine whether the common law principle is still applicable in 
modern South African law and if it is, to establish how it has developed since it was 
adopted in early case law. The origin, adoption and development of devices such as 
servitudes and restrictive covenants that may specifically be created to entitle a 
property owner to prevent the obstruction of the existing view from her property are 
also investigated in the context of Roman, Roman-Dutch, early and modern South 
African law. The dissertation does not involve a complete legal-historical analysis. 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law is only investigated briefly and superficially to 
establish whether the South African position regarding the protection of the existing 
view from a property is grounded in historical roots and whether these roots may 
assist in the clarification and development of the principles regulating the protection 
of an existing, unobstructed view in modern South African law. 
Recent South African decisions indicate that courts seemingly ignore, 
misinterpret or circumvent the general common law principle that a property owner is 
not inherently entitled to the continued existence of the unobstructed view from her 
property, since they are apparently willing to protect the existing view from a property 
in the absence of a clear right, in the form of a servitude or a restrictive covenant, to 
prevent the obstruction of the owner‟s view. Furthermore, this unsubstantiated 
protection often occurs in circumstances where a property owner attacks the 
approval of a neighbouring owner‟s building plans on the basis of administrative 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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shortcomings, which creates confusion regarding the basis of the protection. An 
analysis of recent case law considers the reasons for the apparent uncertainty and 
investigates whether an attack on the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans may 
effectively and substantively protect the continued enjoyment of the existing view 
from a property. 
Judging from decisions like Ndlambe, it seems as if a property owner may have 
the opportunity to protect, at least temporarily but perhaps even permanently, the 
existing undisturbed view from her property either by enforcing an apparent 
substantive right to prevent building works on a neighbouring property, or 
alternatively with an attack on the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans, either 
because the approval process did not comply with building and zoning regulations, 
or because the plans were approved in terms of an objectionable procedure.  
According to these premises, a property owner (A) would have a substantive 
right to protect the existing view from her property against obstruction caused by 
building works on a neighbouring property (B) when there is a registered servitude or 
a similar device that prevents B from developing her property in a way that would 
obstruct A‟s existing view. A would also be entitled to temporarily or even 
permanently protect the existing view from her property if she has a pre-existing 
property right that entitles her to postpone or even prevent the erection of buildings 
on B‟s property.16 For purposes of this dissertation, a property owner (A) who attacks 
the approval of a neighbour‟s (B‟s) building plans with the aim of preventing B from 
building in a manner that would interfere with the existing view from her (A‟s) own 
property is using what may be considered as an alternative (as opposed to 
substantive) strategy to protect the existing, unobstructed view from her property. In 
                                                          
16
 See 3 2. 
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chapter 3, these alternative strategies are divided according to the different grounds 
on which they are based, because these grounds probably play a role in how 
effectively the various attacks protect the existing view from a property.  
In some instances, an attack on the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans is 
based on a property owner‟s clear substantive right, in terms of a registered 
servitude or restrictive covenant, to prevent building works on such a neighbour‟s 
property.17 In other cases, such an attack relies on a pre-existing property right to be 
informed of, to comment on and sometimes to prevent building on a neighbouring 
land that would interfere with the existing view from her property.18 Such a pre-
existing right exists when an application for the approval of building plans includes 
an application for the removal or amendment of a restrictive condition, the re-zoning 
of a property, a departure from the applicable building regulations or zoning scheme, 
or if the building plans contravene any applicable legislation. If building plans that 
involve any of these additional applications or that would contravene legislation were 
approved without informing an affected property owner or without giving her the 
opportunity to comment on or to consent to the approval of the relevant application, 
she may attack the approval of the plans on the ground that she was denied an 
opportunity to exercise her substantive right to be part of the approval process. 
Consequently, if a property owner has a pre-existing right to be involved in the 
approval of a neighbour‟s building plans she may effectively rely on a substantive 
ground to prevent the obstruction of her existing view either temporarily or 
permanently. Unlike a servitude and a restrictive covenant that clearly and directly 
protect the existing view from a property, an attack on the approval of a neighbour‟s 
building plans, although it is based on a substantive right, will protect the existing 
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 See 2 3 2. 
18
 See 3 2. 
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view from a property indirectly and often only temporarily. Nevertheless, attacks on 
the approval of a neighbouring owner‟s building plans that are based on one of these 
substantive rights to prevent or postpone the approval of the relevant plans differ 
from other attacks that are purely based on procedural shortcomings in the approval 
process and yet others where the exercise of a local authority‟s discretion to approve 
the plans is attacked.  
An attack which is purely based on a procedural irregularity concerns the 
approval of building plans in the absence of a specific procedural requirement, for 
example where building plans were approved while there was no building control 
officer employed by the local authority that approved the plans.19 Conversely, an 
attack based on the exercise of a local authority‟s discretion to approve the relevant 
plans relies on a specific interpretation of section 7 of the National Building Act.20 
Chapter 3 analyses applicable legislation and case law to determine whether there 
are instances where the existing view from a property may be protected on any of 
these substantive or procedural grounds and, if such protection is possible, what it 
entails and what remedies it provides. 
From the analysis of recent case law and applicable legislation, the overview in 
chapters 2 and 3 should indicate whether it is at all possible to protect an existing 
view against obstructing building works on neighbouring land. In terms of the 
hypotheses on which the dissertation is based, such protection should mostly 
succeed when the view is protected substantively by a registered servitude or a 
similar device. Apparently, the protection can also sometimes succeed, often 
probably only temporarily, when the objection is based on a substantive right to be 
informed of (or to object against) departures from the existing legal situation required 
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 See 3 3 2. 
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 See 3 3 3. 
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to make the building possible. In other situations, where the objection against 
building is based purely on procedural grounds unrelated to any substantive property 
rights, it seems unlikely that an attack against the building will have more than an 
incidental, temporary effect of protecting an existing view. 
Corresponding problems regarding the protection of an existing view from a 
property exist in foreign legal systems. A comparative analysis of English and Dutch 
law is undertaken in chapter 4 to determine whether and how these jurisdictions 
provide for the protection of the right to a view. The comparative investigation 
specifically focuses on these two jurisdictions because they are representative of the 
two main legal traditions, namely civil law and Anglo-American law. Furthermore, 
English law, which is an example of an uncodified common law system, appears to 
be useful because of case law on the topic of a right of view that is comparable to 
South African case law, while Dutch law represents a different modern embodiment 
of the Roman law tradition that forms the basis of the South African Roman-Dutch 
law. However, since Dutch law differs from South African law in the sense that it is a 
codified system, it would be interesting and useful to determine to what extent the 
Dutch civil code preserved the historic principles relating to the protection of the 
existing view from a property. 
For the sake of demarcating the scope of this dissertation, it is primarily 
concerned with the position of a right to a view in South African law. English and 
Dutch law are only discussed insofar as they specifically correspond with or 
elucidate an aspect that is considered in the discussion of South African law. The 
comparative analysis undertaken in chapter 4 does not therefore give a complete or 
even an extensive account of the position of a right to a view in English or Dutch law, 
or of specific features of the law in these jurisdictions, such as easements, restrictive 
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covenants, nuisance, praedial servitudes, general provisions of the Dutch civil code, 
the doctrine of abuse of rights or planning procedures. These features are only 
considered to the extent that they indicate whether and how the existing view from a 
property may be protected in the legal systems considered.  
Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, is aimed at 
the constitutional protection of property. If the existing, unobstructed view from a 
property is not protected as an inherent property right in terms of the common law, 
any substantive right or alternative strategy that may result in the effective protection 
of one owner‟s existing view inevitably implies that a neighbouring owner‟s right to 
develop or build on her property is thereby limited. If such a limitation constitutes a 
deprivation of property as contemplated in section 25(1) of the Constitution, the 
effect that protection of view has on neighbouring owners is regulated by and should 
be justified in terms of section 25(1). Chapter 5 evaluates the validity of such 
deprivations in terms of the methodology developed by the Constitutional Court in 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance21 (“FNB”). 
The chapter specifically focuses on the different forms that may be adopted by a 
deprivation caused by the protection of an existing view from a property. The 
protection of the existing view from a property through servitudes; restrictive 
conditions that prohibit or restrict building; zoning plans; building regulations and 
statutory provisions that prohibit or restrict building and procedural attacks on the 
approval of building plans may all restrict a property owner‟s right to build on her 
property. These restrictions may amount to different forms of deprivations of property 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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interests, and each of them must of necessity comply with the section 25(1) 
requirements for constitutionally valid deprivations.  
Servitudes of view, servitudes not to build higher, and similar restrictive 
covenants will directly protect the existing view from a property through a real right, 
based on an initial agreement, that restricts the owner of the servient tenement‟s 
right to develop her property. Nevertheless, because the owner of the servient 
tenement initially agreed to the creation of the servitude or the restrictive covenant, 
the restriction that it places on her right to develop her property does probably not 
constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.22 A building regulation may directly or incidentally prevent the 
obstruction of the existing view from a property, for example in Muller NO and Others 
v City of Cape Town and Another23 (“Muller”), where the applicants had the 
opportunity to permanently or temporarily prevent building works on a neighbouring 
property that would obstruct the existing view from their property because the 
neighbour‟s proposed building would exceed the lawful height limitation.24 The 
limitation that a building regulation places on an owner‟s right to use her property, for 
instance the restriction on the neighbour in Muller‟s right to build as high as he 
wanted to, must be analysed in terms of the FNB test, with specific emphasis on the 
aims of the applicable regulatory deprivation. Statutory provisions may also protect 
the existing view from a property through limitations or prohibitions on building works 
in a specific area. In Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties25 (“Transnet”), the first 
respondent‟s right to development of her property was restricted by virtue of section 
74 of the National Ports Act 12 of 2005 (“National Ports Act”), which created a duty 
                                                          
22
 See 5 2 3 1. 
23
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 27, 31 and 36. 
24
 See the discussion of this case in 3 2 2 3 and 5 2 2 2. 
25
 Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008). 
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on the National Ports Authority to maintain adequate and efficient lighthouses. 
Chapter 5 considers whether a statute like the National Ports Act that limits a 
property owner‟s right to develop her property (to protect the existing view to or from 
a specific property or object) deprives that owner of property in a way that is 
inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution.26 Furthermore, chapter 5 
investigates whether a property owner who relies on the expectation that the existing 
views from her property will continue to exist insofar as they are protected in terms of 
the applicable building regulations and zoning scheme suffers a deprivation if there 
is a change in the relevant building regulations or zoning scheme and, if she does, 
whether such deprivation is valid in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.27 The 
temporary or permanent protection of the existing view from A‟s property through an 
attack on the approval of B‟s building plans may also cause a deprivation of B‟s right 
to build, for example in Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v 
Harrison,28 where the first respondent‟s right to build was temporarily rendered 
ineffectual because the applicants objected against the approval of her building 
plans. In chapter 5 it is established whether the (temporary or indefinite) restriction of 
B‟s right to use (to build on) her property that is caused by A‟s objection to B‟s 
building plans amounts to a deprivation of B‟s property rights. The chapter also 
considers whether such a deprivation would be justified in terms of section 25(1) of 
the Constitution.  
Chapter 6, the final chapter, provides an overview of the conclusions that were 
reached in the previous chapters, and briefly considers policy justifications for the 
principle that the existing, unobstructed view from a property is generally not 
                                                          
26
 See 5 2 3 3. The decision in Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 
155 (5 September 2008) is discussed in 3 2 2 4, 3 2 3, 5 2 2 2 and 5 2 3 3. 
27
 See 5 2 3 4. 
28
 Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison [2010] 2 All SA 519 (SCA). 
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protected as an inherent property right. Policy considerations mentioned or 
discussed in South African and foreign case law, as well as considerations 
developed in Law and Economics literature, serve as bases to explain that the 
principle concerning the protection of the existing view from a property in South 
African law is rooted in legitimate and rational policy grounds that justify the negative 
effect that enforcement of the principle has on aggrieved owners deprived of their 
view over adjoining land.  
South African courts are reluctant to protect the existing view from a property 
as an inherent property right because such protection would be in conflict with 
certain policy rationales. According to these rationales, a property owner should not 
have an inherent right to the existing view from her property because the enjoyment 
of a beautiful view from a property is generally perceived as a merely incidental 
benefit of property and protection of that incidental benefit would adversely affect 
neighbouring owners‟ inherent right to build on their properties. Furthermore, the 
principle that the right to a view does not flow naturally from ownership ensures the 
most efficient allocation of resources in terms of Law and Economics theory. In 
addition to explaining the results from the preceding chapters in terms of these policy 
considerations, chapter 6 explores the possibility of protecting the existing view from 
a property in exceptional circumstances where the view contributes to the use and 
enjoyment of the property. 
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1 4 Qualifications and definitions 
The terminology that is used in this dissertation reflects the phraseology that is used 
in literature concerning the view from a property.29 The terms “prospect”, “view” and 
“outlook” are used alternately in the dissertation. All of these terms refer to the view 
from an owner‟s property, unless it is specifically indicated that reference is made 
either to one owner‟s view onto the property of another, or to the view to a specific 
(piece of) property. Descriptions like “pleasant prospect”, “undisturbed view” and 
“pleasing outlook” are sometimes used when the view from a property is considered 
as an attribute of that property. 
This dissertation mainly focuses on the view from an owner‟s property over the 
property of neighbours. “Property”, as it is used throughout the dissertation, is mostly 
immovable property, with or without a building, and from which an undisturbed view 
can potentially be enjoyed. However, the relevant property may also be movable or 
immovable property with a specific function, which requires that the view to it (the 
property) remains unobstructed, for example an advertising board or a lighthouse. 
Issues regarding the overlooking of private property and interference with privacy are 
not considered extensively, since the dissertation is mainly concerned with the 
protection of the existing view over – and not onto – neighbouring properties. The 
aim is to establish whether a property owner is generally or in specific circumstances 
entitled to an unobstructed view without interference by building works on 
neighbouring properties. It is therefore concerned with the preservation of a specific 
state of affairs (no or limited building) on a neighbouring property for the purpose of 
                                                          
29
 For example, P Gane The selective Voet being the commentary on the Pandects Vol 2 (1955) 452 
translates the word prospectus, as used in Voet 8 2 12, as “outlook”, while M Nathan The common 
law of South Africa Vol 1 (2
nd
 ed 1913) 510 translated prospectus as “view”. 
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being able to look over or across such neighbouring land and not because such state 
of affairs on the neighbouring property itself is the object of the enjoyable view.  
The undisturbed flow of light, air, the rays of the sun and radio waves to a 
property relates to an unobstructed view over or across neighbouring properties, in 
the sense that interference with any of these attributes of a property may also 
deprive an owner of a previously enjoyed benefit. The flow of light and air to a 
property is discussed briefly in chapter 2, insofar as it explains the relationship 
between the perception of and possible protection of an existing, unobstructed view 
from a property in the context of Roman and Roman-Dutch law. However, the 
undisturbed flow of the rays of the sun and radio waves are not considered in this 
dissertation, because, although there may be similarities between the protection of 
an undisturbed flow of sun and radio waves to a property and the protection of an 
existing view from a property, these similarities would not be useful in determining 
the position regarding the protection of an existing view from a property in South 
African law and the possibility of protecting such a view. 
South African administrative law and planning law is only referred to where it is 
applicable to a specific argument or a particular aspect of the dissertation. Similarly, 
Law and Economics theory is considered only for purposes of indicating how it may 
be applied to explain and justify the principles that underlie the position of the 
protection of the existing view from a property and possible exceptions to these 
principles. This theory is therefore not explained or applied in a detailed or complete 
manner.  
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Chapter 2:  
The right to a view under the common law 
 
2 1 Introduction 
In principle, South African law does not recognise an inherent right to the existing 
view from a property, because a beautiful view is considered a mere incidental 
advantage, and since the recognition of a natural right to the view from a property 
would interfere with neighbouring owners‟ rights to build on their properties. Despite 
the absence of a natural right to the existing view from one‟s property, such view 
may be protected by way of a servitude or a similar device.1 Recent case law 
indicates that courts are sometimes reluctant to apply the principle that the existing 
view from a property is not inherently protected as a property right when they have to 
determine whether or not to protect the undisturbed view from a property against 
building works on neighbouring land.  
This chapter focuses on clarifying the South African common law position with 
regard to the protection of the existing view from a property. It does so by 
investigating the Roman and Roman-Dutch origins of the justification for both the 
principle that the existing view from a property is not recognised as an inherent 
property right and the exception that view may be protected with a servitude or a 
similar device. Furthermore, reference is made to the application of this rule in South 
African case law. Although case law shows that this principle is still applicable, it also 
                                                          
1
 In Myburgh v Jamison (1861) 4 Searle 8 a condition was inserted in the transfer deed of a property 
that prohibited the erection of buildings that would obstruct the view from the appellant‟s adjacent 
property. Similarly, a contractual device was employed to protect the unobstructed view over certain 
properties in Lewkowitz v Billingham & Co (1895) 2 Off Rep 36.  
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indicates that, as is suggested in commentaries2 on Roman sources, an incidental 
benefit such as the pleasant view from a property deserves to be protected in certain 
circumstances. 
 
2 2 No inherent right to a view 
2 2 1 View as an incidental advantage 
2 2 1 1 South African law 
In South African law, the view from a property is categorised as a “source of 
delight”.3 Church and Church4 state that interferences with certain sources of delight, 
for example interference with an aesthetically pleasing attribute, are not recognised 
as nuisance, although they may amount to interference with the comfort of human 
existence. Consequently, the loss of a pleasant view from a property because of the 
erection of an unsightly or visually unpleasing structure does not give rise to an 
actionable nuisance, unless it can be proven that the obstruction of the view causes 
otherwise actionable damage for the affected owner.5  
The decision in Dorland and Another v Smits6 (“Dorland”) confirms that the view 
from a property is considered an attribute that is not inherently protected as part of 
an owner‟s right of ownership. In this judgment, the court considered the possibility 
of protecting visually appealing attributes of properties and concluded that purely 
                                                          
2
 In D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die 
negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 226-233. 
3
 J Church & J Church “Nuisance” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC Harms (eds) The law of South 
Africa Vol 19 (2
nd
 ed 2006) para 193. 
4
 J Church & J Church “Nuisance” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC Harms (eds) The law of South 
Africa Vol 19 (2
nd
 ed 2006) para 193.  
5
 J Church & J Church “Nuisance” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC Harms (eds) The law of South 
Africa Vol 19 (2
nd
 ed 2006) para 193. See also the discussion of Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 
(5) SA 374 (C) that follows. 
6
 Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C). 
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aesthetic considerations are irrelevant in common law relating to neighbours and 
nuisance.7 The Cape Provincial Division was faced with the question whether or not 
aesthetic considerations should be regarded as important factors within the context 
of neighbours and nuisance.8 This question arose from a dispute about the erection 
of an electrified security fence, which the appellants erected as a security measure 
aimed at the protection of their property. The respondent, who lived on the property 
adjacent to that of the appellants, contended that the fence constituted a nuisance in 
the sense that it posed a potential danger and that it was aesthetically unpleasing.9 
After the court a quo granted an order in favour of the respondent (then 
applicant), obliging the appellants (then respondents) to remove the security fencing, 
the appellants appealed to the full bench. Comrie J endeavoured to establish the 
South African legal position with regard to upholding a property‟s aesthetic 
attributes.10 Unable to find authority that expressed the view that aesthetics is 
relevant at all, Comrie J warned that, as a matter of policy, courts should not venture 
into the area of aesthetics.11 Accordingly, the court concluded that in the common 
                                                          
7
 Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) 383. 
8
 Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) 383.  
9
 The respondent (then applicant) applied to the court a quo for an order seeking to oblige the 
appellants (then respondents) to remove the security fencing. She was successful. The 
appellants appealed to the full bench. This discussion will focus on the consideration that the full 
bench gave to aesthetics in the context of neighbours and nuisance.  
10
 Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) 383.  
11
 Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) 383. Neither counsel for the respondent nor 
Comrie J was able to find authority to confirm that aesthetics are relevant. The judge partly 
ascribed this to the influence that English law had in this sphere. Comrie J mentioned that 
neither the ratio of Vanston v Frost 1930 NPD 121, nor that of Paolo v Jeeva NO and Others 
2002 (2) SA 391 (D) directly relates to the present matter. According to Comrie J, because of the 
subjective and personal nature of aesthetics, courts should steer clear of adjudicating upon such 
considerations. He made reference to the idea of gustibus non est disputandum, translated by 
VG Hiemstra & HL Gonin Trilingual legal dictionary (3
rd
 ed 1992) 175 as “tastes differ”. The 
Afrikaans translation, “oor smaak val daar nie te twis nie”, gives a wider definition, indicating that 
since tastes differ, it is not worth fighting about. Comrie J also referred to the decision of the 
California Court of Appeal, third district, in Oliver et al v AT&T Wireless Services et al (1999) 76 
Cal App 4th 521 (90 Cal Rptr 2d 491), where it was explained why it is undesirable for aesthetic 
considerations to enjoy protection:  
“Otherwise, one person's tastes could form the basis for depriving another person of 
the right to use his or her property, and nuisance law would be transformed into a 
license to the courts to set neighborhood aesthetic standards.”  
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law relating to neighbours and nuisance, purely aesthetic considerations are 
irrelevant.12 The decision in Dorland confirms the general position in South African 
law regarding the protection of the view from a property, namely that a property 
owner does not have a right to the existing, unobstructed view from her property. It 
also provides one of the justifications for not recognising an inherent right to the view 
from a property, namely that view is a purely aesthetical attribute of property that 
courts should refrain from adjudicating upon for fear of imposing unreliable 
subjective impressions by force of law. 
Knobel13 criticises the Dorland decision for excluding the possibility that 
interferences with purely aesthetic property attributes may constitute nuisance. He 
argues that there may be instances, for example where a property owner specifically 
builds on her property to obstruct the view from her neighbour‟s property, where 
South African courts should adjudicate the matter on aesthetical considerations. In 
such circumstances, the lawfulness of interference with a property owner‟s visual 
enjoyment of her property should be determined by considering whether the conduct 
that caused the interference was objectively unreasonable. Scott14 supports Knobel‟s 
criticism of the judgment on the point that the ruling deemed aesthetic considerations 
irrelevant in the context of neighbour law and nuisance. She agrees that aesthetic 
considerations may in some instances form a basis for nuisance liability and that 
reasonableness should be the deciding factor when determining the lawfulness of 
interferences with aesthetic property attributes. 
                                                          
12
 Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) 383. The appeal succeeded. Although this 
discussion only focuses on the issue regarding aesthetics and nuisance, the court‟s decision to 
order that the appeal should succeed was based on the argumentation of other submissions as 
well. 
13
 JC Knobel “Inbreukmaking op die estetiese as oorlas: Dorland v Smits 2002 5 SA 374 (K)” (2003) 
66 THRHR 500-505. 
14
 S Scott “Recent developments in case law regarding neighbour law and its influence on the concept 
of ownership” (2005) 16 Stell LR 351-377 at 356. 
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2 2 1 2 Roman law 
The idea that certain aspects of a property are purely delightful attributes or benefits 
originated in Roman law, where a distinction was made between acts that cause 
damage for a property owner and acts that merely interfere with an incidental 
advantage of property. This distinction resulted in the recognition of certain 
exceptions to the rule that acts that have a detrimental effect on others are unlawful, 
which were based on the logic that not all property attributes form an integral part of 
property ownership. By this logic, not all interferences with property are necessarily 
unlawful. For example, interference with the flow of water or light to a neighbouring 
property was seen as depriving a property owner of a mere incidental benefit not 
forming part of the core rights inherent in property ownership that, despite previous 
enjoyment, was therefore regarded as lawful.15 
According to the Digest, the natural flow of water to a property was purely a 
benefit for the property owner, the loss of which was not actionable.16 This is 
illustrated by the fact that, although a property owner in Roman law could institute 
the actio aquae pluviae arcendae when acts performed on a neighbouring property, 
for example the erection of a building, interfered with the natural flow of water to her 
property,17 she could only institute this action if the interference with the flow of water 
would cause damage to her property. For example, this action would be available if 
an interference caused water to flow faster or stronger and consequently cause 
                                                          
15
 D 39 2 26 and 39 3 1 21. 
16
 D 39 3 1 21 and D 39 2 26; see D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat 
uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 220. 
17
 The actio aquae pluviae arcendae is treated in D 39 3 1. D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 1982) 3-20 gives a detailed discussion 
of this action, while M Kaser Roman private law (transl R Dannenbring, 2
nd
 ed 1968) 98 refers to it as 
part of the law that governs neighbour relations that originated during the early Roman period. 
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damage to a property, but not if the interference merely prevented the water to reach 
(and therefore benefit) such a property. 
A Roman property owner also had the cautio damni infecti18 at her disposal. 
This remedy protected the owner of immoveable property against danger that might 
stem from a derelict neighbouring property.19 It allowed an owner to obtain security 
from her neighbour if she feared that a dilapidated building on her neighbour‟s 
property posed a threat to her own property. Nevertheless, this protection was not 
available to an owner who feared that she might suffer damage because of 
interference with the supply of natural light to her property.20 The justification given 
for this exception is that the supply of light to a property was merely an incidental 
benefit that the owner enjoyed. An act through which the supply of light to a property 
was cut off was not unlawful since it only ended the enjoyment of a prior incidental 
benefit and did not cause damage.21  
Despite the fact that there is no clear indication of a specific principle regarding 
the protection of the existing view from a property in Roman law, landowners could 
not build structures purely to obstruct a view. A constitutio that Justinian issued in 
                                                          
18
 D 39 2 deals with the cautio damni infecti.  
19
The remedy of cautio damni infecti afforded a property owner protection against a defective building. 
M Kaser Roman private law (transl R Dannenbring, 2
nd
 ed 1968) 98-99 discusses the application and 
operation of the cautio damni infecti. He explains that, in instances where a neighbour refused to give 
security for possible damage that might be caused by her dilapidated building, the praetor granted the 
owner of the threatened property detention of the dilapidated land (missio in possessionem). The 
owner of the threatened property would further be granted bonitary ownership if the neighbour 
continued to refuse to give this stipulation and, should the neighbour then resist this possessive taking 
(his taking possession), the owner of the threatened property would be granted an action for 
damages. JAC Thomas The Institutes of Justinian: Text, translation and commentary (1975) 213-214 
argues that, in Justinian‟s time, a distinction was drawn between contracts of private law and 
praetorian stipulations. He defines the cautio damni infecti as a praetorian stipulation that was 
available in instances where an owner feared that the dilapidated state of another‟s property 
threatened to cause damage to her property. In terms of a stipulatio damni infecti, as Thomas refers 
to the cautio damni infecti, the owner who feared damage to her property could demand from the 
owner of the ruinous building a stipulation to compensate for any damage that actually occurred. 
Should the latter owner refuse to give such a stipulation, the complainant could seek an interdict to 
enter upon the offending land. See also A Rodger Owners and neighbours in Roman law (1972) 41. 
20
 D 39 2 26. 
21
 D 39 2 26. D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, 
ongeag die negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 222. 
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537 is an example of an instance where the view from a property was indeed 
protected in Roman law. This provision stipulated that a fine of ten pieces of gold 
could be imposed on a person who erected a structure in Constantinople with the 
purpose of inconveniencing her neighbour by obstructing her view to the ocean.22 It 
was aimed at the protection of the view from one owner‟s (A‟s) property in instances 
where a neighbour (B) abused the right to build on her property only to harm A by 
obstructing her view.23 
 
2 2 1 3 Roman-Dutch law 
Roman-Dutch jurists received and applied the Roman law distinction between acts 
that cause damage for a property owner and acts that merely deprive owners of 
previously enjoyed incidental benefits.24 This is illustrated by the fact that in Roman-
Dutch law, like in Roman law, the remedies operis novi nuntiatio and cautio damni 
infecti did not apply in instances where a property owner suffered the loss of a 
merely incidental benefit that she previously enjoyed, for example when the natural 
flow of water or light to a property was disturbed.25 Voet explains this position as 
follows: 
                                                          
22
 N 63; see D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of 
Pretoria 1982) 81 and D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard 
regmatig is, ongeag die negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 222. 
23
 D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 
1982) 81 adds that the idea of an “abuse of right” is apparent in such an instance. This comment 
confirms that it is not so much the interference with the one owner‟s comfortable enjoyment of her 
property (the obstruction of her view of the ocean) that is prohibited, but rather the other owner‟s 
abuse of the right to make use of her property in an ordinary sense. 
24
 W Freedman “Paradise lost? The obstruction of a pleasant view and the law of nuisance” in SV 
Hoctor & PJ Schwikkard (eds) The exemplary scholar: Essays in honour of John Milton (2007) 162-
184 at 165-167. 
25
 Voet 39 1 1. According to Voet 39 2 5, an owner whose flow of water or natural light to her property 
has been interfered with by a neighbour‟s actions did not have a right to claim security for anticipated 
danger under Roman-Dutch law. 
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“If a person when building on his own ground darkens the lights of a neighbour to 
whom he owes no servitude, he is understood to have acted rightfully. So also it 
is if by digging a well on his ground he cuts the springs of water which provide 
water for the well of another, and thus the position of his neighbour is worsened. 
The reason is that one ought not to be regarded as incurring damage when he is 
prevented as it were from enjoying a benefit which he was hitherto enjoying; and 
it makes a great difference whether a person incurs damage, or is prevented from 
enjoying a benefit which he was hitherto receiving. The enforcement of a right 
which one possesses involves no wrong.”26 
The beautiful view from a property was not specifically categorised as an incidental 
advantage in Roman law, but there are indications that the enjoyment of an 
unobstructed view from a property was indeed considered a merely incidental benefit 
in Roman-Dutch law. Although the obstruction of a pleasant view is not explicitly 
mentioned when Voet refers to the diversion of the natural flow of water and the 
elimination of air or light to a property as the loss of benefits that property owners 
previously enjoyed,27 he encourages one to apply the same principles to a servitude 
of prospect as those applicable to a servitude of the free flow of light and air:28  
“The servitudes of outlook and of not having outlook obstructed (prospectus, et 
ne prospectui officiatur) correspond in most things with the right of letting in 
openings for light and air and of not having such openings obstructed.”29 
Furthermore, Voet categorises the blocking of openings for light and air together with 
outlook when he discusses the servitus altius tollendi.30 This shows that Voet 
probably reasoned that the same rules that applied to openings for light and air 
should apply to the existing view from a property and that the obstruction of a 
                                                          
26
 Voet 39 1 1, as translated by P Gane The selective Voet being the commentary on the Pandects 
Vol 6 (1957) 2.  
27
 Voet 39 1 1. 
28
 Voet 8 2 12. 
29
 Voet 8 2 12, as translated by P Gane The selective Voet being the commentary on the Pandects 
Vol 2 (1955) 452.  
30
 Voet 8 2 6. 
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pleasant view was, like the diversion of the flow of water and the elimination of the 
supply of light to a property, merely an interference with a previously enjoyed benefit. 
The Roman law distinction between the loss of a merely incidental advantage 
that a property owner enjoys and real damage that she may suffer was thus received 
and applied in Roman-Dutch law. The Roman-Dutch rule that the view from a 
property is, like the flow of water, air and light, considered a mere delightful attribute 
of property applies in South African common law. Because of this categorisation, 
view is not inherently protected in South African law and consequently its obstruction 
is not actionable. 
 
2 2 2 The right to build higher 
2 2 2 1 Roman-Dutch law 
The recognition of a general right to the protection of existing, undisturbed views 
from properties in Roman-Dutch law would have created difficulties for the exercise 
of a landowner‟s right to use her property for building purposes. According to 
Grotius, the right to build on one‟s property had a very wide scope: 
“The air vertically above his own land every one may lawfully use for building 
purposes without any limit as to height, but in length and breadth not beyond his 
own land.”31 
He corroborated in a later passage:  
“For by the common law every one may build on his own ground to any height he 
pleases, even though his neighbour may be inconvenienced thereby.”32  
                                                          
31
 Grotius 2 1 23, as translated by AFS Maasdorp The introduction to Dutch jurisprudence of Hugo 
Grotius (3
rd
 ed 1903) 43. 
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In principle, this was an unrestricted entitlement that inherently formed part of 
property ownership. This entitlement implied that a property owner did not have a 
right to the existing view from her property, since her neighbour was entitled to erect 
structures even if they would interfere with such a view. Nevertheless, this freedom 
could be limited by servitudes33 and therefore the principle that a property owner 
may build as high as she wanted to on her property did not place an absolute 
prohibition on the protection of the existing view from a property.  
 
2 2 2 2 South African law 
In Van der Heever v Hanover Municipality,34 Jones J held that a property owner 
could build as high as she wants on her property and that she may plant trees if that 
is her desire. In this case the Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division was faced with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
32
 Grotius 2 34 19, as translated by AFS Maasdorp The introduction to Dutch jurisprudence of Hugo 
Grotius (3
rd
 ed 1903) 149. This rule flows from the maxim cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum 
et ad inferos. According to PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law 
of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 92, this rule can be translated as “the owner of the land is the owner of the 
sky above and everything contained in the soil below the surface…” and it reflects the idea that 
ownership is an unrestricted right, a plena in re potesta. In CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal The law 
of things and servitudes (1993) 104-105, Van der Merwe defines the cuius est solum maxim by 
stating that “[i]n terms of the … maxim … a landowner is deemed to be not only owner of the surface 
of the land but also of the space above the land and anything attached to or beneath the surface of 
the land”. (Van der Merwe mistakenly uses the word interos, and not inferos like Badenhorst, Pienaar 
and Mostert). With regard to this principle, Van der Merwe refers the reader to Grotius 2 1 23 and to 
Rocher v Registrar of Deeds 1911 TPD 311, where, at 315, Mason J applied this principle to the case 
before him. The principle superficies solo cedit relates to the cuius est solum principle. According to 
the rule superficies solo cedit, a building forms part of the land that it was erected on. M Kaser Roman 
private law (transl R Dannenbring, 2
nd
 ed 1968) 111 argues that this principle, which originated in 
Roman law, illustrates that a composite thing forms a whole, which is capable of vindication, because 
the principle implicates that a landowner can only vindicate the building together with the land. PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 147 
define superficies solo cedit as a common law principle in terms of which “buildings and other 
structures become the property of the owner of the land on which they have been built or erected”. M 
Kaser Roman private law (transl R Dannenbring, 2
nd
 ed 1968) remarks that, contrary to the classical 
superficies solo cedit rule, Western vulgar law in the post-classical period of Roman law allowed for a 
person, who built on the private property of another with the consent of the landowner, to become 
owner of the building she erected. 
33
 At the end of Voet 39 2 5 it was stated that the free flow of natural light and the flow of springs of 
water to one‟s well could be protected by servitudes. A servitude altius non tollendi could have 
prohibited the owner of a servient tenement to build higher, while a servitude prospectus, et ne 
prospectui officiatur might also have had this effect in order to serve its aim of protecting the prospect 
from the dominant tenement. 
34
 Van der Heever v Hanover Municipality 1938 CPD 95. 
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a question pertaining to the natural flow of light to a home. Although the judgment 
concerns the flow of light to a property and not the enjoyment of the view from a 
property, the ratio decidendi may have certain implications for a property owner‟s 
legal position with regard to the view from her property. Jones J argued: 
“It is perfectly clear that the owner of property ... is entitled to build as high as he 
likes on his land, and he is entitled to plant trees on the land, and if the building 
or trees exclude light or sunshine from the property of another person, it seems to 
me that that person is remediless, unless it can be shown that his rights have 
been in some way or other infringed upon ... ”35 
This excerpt confirms that a property owner may use her property as she sees fit, 
and that she may specifically build as high as she desires. It also clarifies the 
opposing rights and entitlements of neighbouring owners by stating that the owner 
whose property is deprived of light or sunshine because of building works on the 
neighbouring land is remediless. By implication, the entitlement of an owner to use 
(build on) her property trumps the potential entitlement not to be deprived of light or 
sunshine to one‟s property. The natural flow of light or sunshine to a property may be 
analogous to the view from a property. However, the similarities between these 
property attributes are not considered in this dissertation, except by analogy in 
instances where such a comparison is necessary for the sake of argument. For the 
purpose of establishing the position in South African law, discussion of these 
similarities is limited to pointing out that neither the view from a property nor the 
natural flow of light or sunshine to a property is an entitlement that implicitly flows 
from the right of ownership.36 By ruling that the affected property owner has to prove 
that her rights have been infringed upon, Jones J effectively confirmed a property 
                                                          
35
 Van der Heever v Hanover Municipality 1938 CPD 95 at 96 per Jones J. 
36
 See 1 4. 
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owner‟s right to build as high as she wants to and thereby gave a subordinate 
position to the entitlement or right that might have been affected thereby.  
The decision in Clark v Faraday and Another37 (“Clark”) confirmed that South 
African law acknowledges the principle that the owner or occupier of land may use 
her property in an ordinary and natural manner.38 In this case, the court considered 
the erection of a building on a property, which complied with the applicable building 
regulations, as an ordinary and natural use of a property owner‟s land.39 The 
applicant and first respondent were neighbouring owners of properties situated on 
the back slope of Table Mountain with views over Hout Bay. After the local authority 
approved the first respondent‟s building plans on 3 April 2003, she started with the 
erection of a house on her property. The applicant, being concerned about the 
building work and particularly the blocking of the views from his property, 
approached the Cape High Court about six months later. He applied for an urgent 
interdict to prohibit the first respondent from continuing with the building work 
pending the finalisation of an application for the review and setting aside of the local 
authority‟s decision to approve the building plans. 
The applicant disputed the local authority‟s approval of the building plans and 
alleged that, once the first respondent‟s house was finished, it would block the views 
from his (applicant‟s) property and would thereby cause a material diminution in the 
market value of his property.40 He reasoned that the local authority was therefore 
                                                          
37
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C). 
38
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) 577. The court explained that, should the owner 
or occupier of property use her property in an ordinary and natural manner and still cause damage to 
the property of another, she would not be guilty of causing the affected party injuria or nuisance. 
39
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) 577. 
40
 The applicant relied on the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s decision in Paola v Jeeva NO and 
Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA), where it was obiter held that s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National 
Building Act prohibits the approval of building plans if the execution of the proposed plans will 
cause the obstruction of the view from a neighbouring property, which will cause a derogation in 
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obliged by section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Regulations and 
Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (“National Building Act”), which prohibits a local 
authority to approve building plans if it is satisfied that the proposed building will, 
inter alia, “probably or in fact derogate from the value of adjoining or neighbouring 
properties”,41 to refuse the approval of these building plans.42  
Van der Westhuizen AJ rejected this application.43 He subsequently 
contemplated the scope of section 7(1)(b)(ii) and held that it must be interpreted 
restrictively and with regard to its purpose and rationale.44 A narrow interpretation, he 
argued, is desirable to prevent this section from having the effect of prohibiting the 
erection of a building purely because it would cause the obstruction of the view from 
a neighbouring property. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the 
common law rules that regulate the creation and extinction of praedial servitudes, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the value of such neighbouring property. See Ch 3 for a discussion of Paola v Jeeva NO and 
Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). 
41
 Section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act. 
42
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) 572-573. The respondent‟s husband argued 
(see point 18 at 572) that since there was no servitude or title deed restriction that regulated the 
matter, and because any sensible person would have realised that a building (within the limits 
posed by building regulations) might be constructed in front of her property, the value of the 
applicant‟s property would not be diminished should the respondent construct the building within 
the confines of the relevant building regulations. This point was picked up and later decided in 
De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 
2006) and Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 
February 2009). 
43
 Van der Westhuizen AJ, in Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) 575-576, argued 
that the decision in Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) was based on the 
unlawfulness of the process that was followed when the plans were approved (the fact that the 
local authority did not comply with the requirement that, in terms of ss 5(1), 6(1) and 7(1) of the 
National Building Act, a building control officer‟s recommendations must be considered be fore 
the approval of such plans). However, the decision was not based on the fact that the local 
authority failed to consider the impact that the approval of the plans would have on the value of 
the appellant‟s property due to the loss of the view from it.  Van der Westhuizen AJ concluded 
that the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s interpretation and application of this section did not form 
part of that judgment‟s ratio decidendi and was therefore not binding. See also AJ van der Walt 
The law of neighbours (2010) 367-368. 
44
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) 576. Van der Westhuizen AJ held that the 
provisions of the National Building Act should be interpreted and understood within the context 
of legal principles and rules regulating the development of urban areas.  
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especially the servitus prospectus and the servitus altius non tollendi.45 Furthermore, 
it would contradict the common law rule that an owner may build as high as she 
wants to on her own property even if such building work would be to the detriment of 
a neighbour.46 
According to the Clark court‟s interpretation of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the 
National Building Act, a local authority is compelled to reject building plans if the 
value of a neighbouring property would diminish because of the specific nature or 
appearance of the proposed building. However, building plans do not have to be 
rejected because of the mere presence of a building, even if it would obstruct a 
neighbour‟s view from her property. The Clark judgment therefore confirmed that a 
property owner does not commit a nuisance if she erects a building in terms of 
approved building plans, even if such a building would block her neighbour‟s view.47  
 
2 2 2 3 The implications of the servitus altius tollendi for the right to build 
The servitus altius tollendi is a category of servitude that creates a right of raising a 
building higher.48 The possibility of creating such a servitude seems to be in conflict 
with the principle that a property owner is inherently entitled to build as high as she 
                                                          
45
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) 577. The servitus prospectus gives the dominant 
property owner a right to an unobstructed view, while the servitus altius non tollendi prohibits the 
owner of the servient tenement to build higher. See 2 3 for a discussion of the servitudes that can be 
created to protect the view from a property. 
46
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) 577. With regard to the principle that an 
owner or occupier of property may use the property even if it causes damage to the property of 
another, the court referred to Malherbe v Ceres Municipality 1951 (4) SA 510 (A), where it was 
held that such an owner or occupier would not commit an injuria or nuisance as long as the land 
is used in an ordinary or natural manner. Reference was also made to Regal v African 
Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (A) and Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C), 
where the respective courts agreed with this principle. 
47
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property  (5
th
 ed 
2006) 127-128 refer to the decision in Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) when 
they discuss the rules applicable to the protection of a South African owner‟s right to the existing 
view from her property. 
48
 Voet 8 2 5. See D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis 
University of Pretoria 1982) 122-124 and 137-139. 
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wants to on her property and therefore creates the impression that the view from a 
property may naturally be protected against building works that have not been 
“authorised” with a servitus altius tollendi. 
D van der Merwe discusses the extensive controversy regarding this 
servitude.49 He contends that this controversy can be attributed to the fact that the 
servitus altius tollendi seems to contradict the principle of freedom of ownership.50 In 
terms of this principle, an owner inherently has the right to do on her property as she 
pleases and is under no obligation to endure any interference with her property. At 
first glance it is therefore strange that the Romans acknowledged the servitus altius 
tollendi, since the seemingly obvious interpretation is that it gives an owner the right 
to build higher on her property, implying that the right to build higher on one‟s 
property does not naturally flow from ownership. If this is the correct interpretation, it 
would mean that the existence of the servitus altius tollendi contradicts the principle 
                                                          
49
 D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 
1982) 137-139 gives an account of the different interpretations that was given to the servitude altius 
tollendi by the sixteenth to eighteenth century‟s European writers. Van der Merwe distinguishes the 
works of these writers from that of the Roman-Dutch writers. W Freedman “Paradise lost? The 
obstruction of a pleasant view and the law of nuisance” in SV Hoctor & PJ Schwikkard (eds) The 
exemplary scholar: Essays in honour of John Milton (2007) 162-184 at 166-167 specifically discusses 
the interpretation that the Roman-Dutch institutional writers gave to a servitude of building higher 
(servitus altius tollendi). He argues that Roman-Dutch jurists overcame the problem of interpreting a 
servitude altius tollendi by arguing that this servitude had one of two functions. Either it vested the 
owner of the dominant tenement with the power to ignore height limitations imposed by building laws; 
or it conferred on the owner of the dominant tenement the right to raise the height of a building on the 
servient tenement. Voet prefers the latter explanation, arguing that a servitude altius tollendi did not, 
as other Roman-Dutch jurists argued, confer on the owner of the dominant tenement a right to raise a 
building on her own property, because she was already entitled to do so by mere virtue of her 
ownership. 
50
 D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 
1982) 121-122 mentions that the Commentators, in imitation of the Glossators, acknowledged the 
principle that every owner has the freedom to do on her property as she likes and explains that this 
principle implied that an owner did not have to endure any infringement on her property, unless such 
an infringement was in accordance with an act or permitted in terms of a servitude. D van der Merwe 
“‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die negatiewe gevolge 
daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 230 reasons that the difficulty that the European writers on 
Roman law had in interpreting the servitus altius tollendi is ascribable to the fact that they considered 
this servitude to give an owner a right that was (already) inherent to her right of ownership.  
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of freedom of ownership.51 However, according to D van der Merwe, all the 
interpretations of the servitus altius tollendi were aimed at leaving the freedom of 
ownership principle intact.52  
Voet53 discussed three different interpretations of the servitus altius tollendi.54 
In the first instance, he referred to the generally accepted opinion that the meaning 
of this servitude is that neighbours agree to the relaxation of legislation that places 
height restrictions on buildings.55 The other two interpretations respectively entail 
that this servitude gives the owner of the dominant tenement the right to build higher 
on the servient property56 or that it obliges the owner of the servient tenement to 
build higher on her own property57 – in both instances the buildings are raised to 
benefit the owner of the dominant tenement. The first interpretation is the most 
contentious. This discussion will only focus on the controversies regarding this (first 
mentioned) interpretation. 
                                                          
51
 D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 
1982) 122-124, 137-139 and 203-205 mentions that the confusion regarding the interpretation of the 
servitus altius tollendi is apparent in the work of the Commentators, the sixteenth to eighteenth 
century European writers on Roman law and Roman-Dutch writers. Although many Roman-Dutch 
writers wrote during the sixteenth to eighteenth century, D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 1982) 136 and 157-158 makes a 
distinction between sixteenth to eighteenth century European writers on Roman law and Roman-
Dutch writers whose work dates from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He notes that the 
latter group often includes writers whose work were not limited to Roman-Dutch law, but also included 
deliberation of the European ius commune. Their works were based on Roman law with a specific 
focus on the legal practice of the times in which they lived. 
52
 D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 
1982) 139 and 205. 
53
 Voet 8 2 5, 8 2 6 and 8 2 7. See also D 8 2 1, 8 2 2, 8 3 2 and 8 4 7. 
54
 These interpretations can be summarised as follow: The owner of the dominant tenement is 
allowed to build higher than the height restrictions imposed by law (Voet 8 2 5), the owner of the 
dominant tenement has the right to build (higher) on the property of the servient owner (Voet 8 2 6), or 
the owner of the servient tenement is obliged to build higher on her own property (Voet 8 2 7). 
55
 Voet 8 2 5. Voet did not support this interpretation.  
56
 Voet 8 2 6. 
57
 Voet 8 2 7. 
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Vinnius,58 amongst others, supported the interpretation that the servitus altius 
tollendi is an agreement between neighbours to relax legislation that restricts the 
height of buildings. He was of the opinion that, in instances where the law imposed 
certain limitations on building work with regard to its height, neighbours could create 
a servitus altius tollendi through which the one would give the other the liberty to 
build higher than the limit that was prescribed by law.59  
Van der Linden60 agreed that, through the creation of a servitus altius tollendi, 
one owner could give her neighbour the right to disregard legal restrictions on the 
height of buildings by building higher. He reasoned that, since legally instituted 
building regulations61 were aimed at favouring neighbouring owners, it was possible 
for the favoured neighbour to surrender such a benefit by allowing her neighbour to 
build higher than the legally prescribed limitation.62 The effect of such an agreement 
would not be that a public right would be opposed, but merely that a privilege that 
was brought in to favour an owner would not be utilized.63 Voet64 rejected this 
                                                          
58
 Vinnius ad Institutiones 4 6 2 n 5, referred to in Voet 8 2 5. See also Van der Linden ad Voet 8 2 5 
and D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 
1982) 203. 
59
 Voet 8 2 5. 
60
 Van der Linden ad Voet 8 2 5, 8 2 6 and 8 2 7. 
61
 Van der Linden ad Voet 8 2 5 argued that the servitus altius tollendi presupposes a law, an edict or 
ordinances of the emperors and that an owner who wished to build higher than the limitation 
prescribed by one of these laws would need to get the consent of her neighbour (in the form of a 
servitus altius tollendi). 
62
 Van der Linden ad Voet 8 2 5 reasoned that one is allowed to make agreements in terms of which a 
private right would contradict a public right. He referred to D 39 1 1 10 together with D 2 14 7 14 in 
this regard. D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of 
Pretoria 1982) 138 and 204, referring to n 8 of Donnellus Commentarius 11 5 14, criticises the idea 
that the servitus altius tollendi was available to reverse legal provisions that placed certain restrictions 
on an owner‟s freedom to build. He rejects this interpretation, arguing that it is strange that legislation 
can be reversed by an agreement between two individuals. Although it was possible to disregard 
legislation by making a private agreement, he further argues that an enactment that restricted the 
height of buildings was more probably aimed at the preservation of the character of a city or town than 
at protecting a property owner against the erection of buildings on neighbouring properties that would 
cut off the flow of light to her tenement. Furthermore, a provision that was instituted by law cannot be 
abolished by an agreement between private individuals.  
63
 Van der Linden ad Voet 8 2 5. Referring to D 2 14 38 and D 50 17 27, Van der Linden noted that it 
is not allowable to make an agreement that is contrary to a public right where such a right directly 
touches a public interest. Although the laws that regulated building works mainly promoted public 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
interpretation of the servitus altius tollendi. He argued that a statutory measure that 
limits an owner‟s absolute freedom to build is already a servitude, which means that 
an agreement to disregard such a statutory servitude is not a further servitude, but 
merely an agreement to restore the owner‟s original freedom to build.65  
D van der Merwe criticises the argument on which Voet relies for rejecting this 
interpretation of the servitus altius tollendi.66 According to Van der Merwe, Voet 
creates the fiction that legislation that imposes building restrictions creates 
servitudes because such a construction enables him to conclude that an agreement 
to build higher (therefore, an agreement to disregard a statutory servitude) is not a 
servitus altius tollendi, but merely a way of restoring an owner‟s freedom to build. 
Van der Merwe suggests what he describes as a “more meaningful” criticism of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
interests, the predominant concern was that one owner‟s building works would expose her neighbours 
to danger. 
64
 Voet 8 2 5. 
65
 Voet 8 2 5. In order to illustrate that a law that imposes building restrictions is actually a servitude, 
Voet compared it to a law that Justinian imposed to prohibit a landowner from building in such a way 
that her neighbour who has a threshing-floor would suffer damage because the wind that is necessary 
to separate the chaff from the grain would be hindered from reaching the threshing floor. According to 
Voet, such an act is similar to a servitude, because it limits one owner‟s “natural freedom” to freely 
use her property in order to benefit or protect another owner‟s property. See also D van der Merwe 
Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 1982) 203. 
Interpreting the servitus altius tollendi as an agreement to reverse a statutory servitude would, 
according to Voet, be wrong. Voet 8 2 5 argued that the rule (natural right) that every landowner is 
entitled to build higher on her property, even if such building work will block her neighbour‟s openings 
for light or air or would obstruct her outlook, should be indicative of the way that one should interpret 
the servitus altius tollendi. He rejected the opinion that this servitude entitles a landowner to build 
higher on her own property (despite legally imposed height restriction that prohibits her to build 
higher), arguing in Voet 8 2 6 that, since a landowner already has the natural freedom to use the air 
above her land for building purposes, such an interpretation of the servitus altius tollendi is erroneous. 
See the explanation of Voet‟s argument by D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg 
(unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 1982) 203-204 and 78. According to Van der Merwe, 
Voet uses the legal concept of a statutory servitude to criticise the idea that the servitus altius tollendi 
gives an owner the right to build higher than what the building regulations, imposed by authority, 
prescribe. Voet regarded a regulation that imposed such limitations on an owner‟s absolute freedom 
to build as a statutory servitude and any agreement to reverse such a servitude not as a further 
servitude, but rather as an agreement to restore the natural freedom to build. Van der Merwe defines 
the concept of a statutory servitude as a limitation on an owner‟s free exercise of her rights of 
ownership that is created to the benefit of a neighbouring tenement and similar to a servitude, except 
that it is imposed by an authority instead of being created through an agreement between the parties.  
66
 D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 
1982) 204 reasons that it was unnecessary for Voet to construct legislation that imposes height 
restrictions as statutory servitudes. He describes Voet‟s argument as “forced”. 
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interpretation of the servitus altius tollendi.67 His criticism is that this interpretation is 
wrong, because an agreement between two private individuals cannot undo 
legislation. He also rejects Van der Linden‟s68 opinion that because a statute that 
prescribes certain height restrictions is specifically aimed at protecting a landowner 
against certain acts by her neighbour, it is possible for the neighbour to whose 
advantage the height restrictions were imposed to relinquish this protection.69 D van 
der Merwe70 reasons that a public law rule can only be amended by another public 
law rule and that it is therefore incorrect to contend that an agreement between 
private individuals (state subjects) can lead to the abolition of a state-imposed 
enactment. An agreement between private individuals cannot abolish a public law 
rule even if such a rule is only aimed at benefitting the person who wishes to abolish 
it and its abolition would therefore not affect an interest of the public as a whole.  
D van der Merwe71 concludes that the servitus altius tollendi does not introduce 
an incongruity to the principle of freedom of ownership, since all of the interpretations 
given to it are aimed at preserving the principle of freedom of ownership. If his 
contention is correct, namely that all interpretations of the servitus altius tollendi aim 
to keep the principle of freedom of ownership intact, no interpretation of this 
servitude can have the effect of indirectly protecting the view from an owner‟s 
property against obstruction by building work on a neighbouring property.  
 
                                                          
67
 D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD thesis University of Pretoria 
1982) 204; D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, 
ongeag die negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 230. 
68
 Van der Linden ad Voet 8 2 5. 
69
 See n 62. 
70
 D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD dissertation University of 
Pretoria 1982) 203-205. 
71
 D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD dissertation University of 
Pretoria 1982) 205. 
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2 3 Protection of an undisturbed view through servitudes 
2 3 1 Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
Roman law provided for the protection of the view from a property through 
servitudes. A property owner had the opportunity to create a servitus ne prospectui 
officiatur72 that would protect the view from her property against any form of 
obstruction, or she could create a servitus altius non tollendi73 to ensure that her 
view is not blocked by the erection of a new or the raising higher of an existing 
building on the servient tenement.74 
The same servitudes were available under Roman-Dutch law. Voet75 referred 
to the servitus prospectus, et ne prospectui officiatur as the servitude of outlook and 
of not having outlook obstructed. He discussed it, together with the servitude of 
having no outlook, the servitus non prospiciendi, within the context of urban 
servitudes.76 Although the discussion of the servitude of outlook and of not having 
outlook obstructed is limited, Voet noted that they closely correspond with rights 
regarding openings for light and air:77  
                                                          
72
 D 39 1 5pr. 
73
 D 39 1 2. 
74
 D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD dissertation University of 
Pretoria 1982) 53 mentions that both the servitus ne prospectui officiatur and the servitus altius non 
tollendi are negative servitudes. M Kaser Roman private law (transl R Dannenbring, 2
nd
 ed 1968) 119 
discusses these two servitudes as examples of urban servitudes in Roman law and CG van der 
Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 498 categorises the servitus ne prospectui officiatur and the servitus 
altius non tollendi as urban servitudes (huisdiensbaarhede in Afrikaans) and argues that urban 
servitudes concerning light and view played an important role in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. 
75
 Voet 8 2 12. 
76
 Voet categorised this servitude with the servitus altius tollendi (the servitude of raising a building 
higher), discussed in Voet 8 2 6; the servitus altius non tollendi (not raising a building higher), 
discussed in Voet 8 2 8; the servitus luminum or luminis immittendi (making openings for light and air 
in a neighbour‟s wall), discussed in Voet 8 2 9; the servitus luminis non aperiendi (not making such 
openings in one‟s own wall so as to overlook the property of another), discussed in Voet 8 2 10; and 
with the servitus ne luminibus officiatur (not making such openings in one‟s own wall) that is 
discussed in Voet 8 2 11. 
77
 Voet 8 2 12. The rights pertaining to openings for light and air, as mentioned in this title, refer back 
to Voet 8 2 9, Voet 8 2 10 and Voet 8 2 11, and includes the right of not having such openings 
obstructed.  
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“The servitudes of outlook and of not having outlook obstructed (prospectus, et 
ne prospectui officiatur) correspond in most things with the right of letting in 
openings for light and air and of not having such openings obstructed. There is 
this exception that outlook mainly asserts its place in the lower part of a refectory, 
and openings for light and air in the upper part; also that outlook is broader and 
fuller than that of such openings. And opposed to this servitude also is that of 
having no outlook onto the site of another, which is otherwise permitted by 
natural law.”78 
The comparison between the servitus prospectus, et ne prospectui officiatur and the 
right of having openings for light and air enlightens the inquiry about the protection of 
a view by way of servitude.79 According to Voet, the servitus prospectus, et ne 
prospectui officiatur differs from the right to have openings for light and air 
concerning what part of the building is affected thereby and the scope of the 
respective servitudes.80 A servitude that protects outlook mainly applies to the lower 
part of a building, as opposed to servitudes relating to openings for light and air, 
which mainly concern the upper parts of buildings. Furthermore, the servitude of 
outlook is more extensive and comprehensive than those protecting openings for 
light and air.81  
Other Roman-Dutch writers also commented on servitudes that protect the view 
from a property. Grotius82 described the servitudes that protect owners‟ right to free 
                                                          
78
 Voet 8 2 12 as translated by P Gane The selective Voet being the commentary on the Pandects Vol 
2 (1955) 452. 
79
 See M Nathan The common law of South Africa Vol 1 (2
nd
 ed 1913) 510 for a discussion of the 
comparison that Voet draws between the right to openings for air and light and the servitus 
prospectus, et ne prospectui officiatur.  
80
 Voet 8 2 12. 
81
 The ancient Romans and even the civilisations to which the Roman-Dutch law originally applied 
depended on the specific construction of buildings to ensure a free flow of light and air. Modern 
civilisations are not to the same degree dependent on actual openings for the free flow of light and air, 
since technological developments have improved living conditions in this regard. See D van der 
Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD dissertation University of Pretoria 1982) 
41 regarding the detriment that a Roman would have suffered if her supply of sunlight was cut off by 
her neighbour. 
82
 Grotius 2 34 20. 
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light (jus ne luminibus officiatur)83 or free prospect (jus prospectus) as the right to 
prohibit a neighbour from erecting buildings or planting trees that will prevent one‟s 
enjoyment of light, or to interfere with one‟s open view. He added, like Voet, that a 
right to a view is something more than a right to a free flow of light.84  
Huber85 listed the right not to be deprived of light or prospect as a house-
servitude of sorts. His discussion of the servitude of prospect (uitzicht)86 correlates 
with Voet‟s discussion thereof. Similar to Voet, Huber also distinguished between the 
flow of light to a property and the view from a property by arguing that light comes 
from above and nearby, compared to prospect, which is below or on level. He further 
commented that prospect extends further than light, which means that, if a servitude 
of prospect is registered, even a person who lives far from the dominant tenement 
can be subject thereto. Grotius87 and Van Leeuwen88 also grouped the right of free 
light with that of free prospect (jus ne luminibus officiatur and jus prospectus) and, 
like Voet and Huber, added that the right to a free prospect is something more than a 
right to access of light. 
                                                          
83
 The servitus ne luminibus officiatur prohibits an owner from obstructing or interfering (with) the flow 
of sunlight to her neighbour‟s property, which ensures that the owner of the dominant tenement is 
entitled to a full supply of light through her window. 
84
 Voet 8 2 12 considered the servitude of outlook (that gives an owner a right to a view) to be 
“broader and fuller” than the right to have openings for a free flow of light and air. Schorer ad Grotius 
2 34 20 stipulated that the servitudes altius non tollendi, prospectui and luminibus non officiendi 
cannot be acquired through negative prescription. These servitudes have a negative character in the 
sense that they prohibit certain actions. The fact that an owner abstains from performing one of these 
prohibited actions does not mean that her neighbour acquires a right to prohibit her from performing 
these actions at a later stage. Schorer argued that the raising of one‟s building or the planting of trees 
on one‟s own ground is a matter of means. A landowner‟s abstention from building or planting within a 
certain period of time can therefore not cause her to be deprived of her right to do so in future. 
However, if a landowner‟s attempt to build higher was actively opposed by her neighbour and the time 
required for prescription has elapsed after such opposition, the neighbour will have acquired a 
servitude by way of prescription. See Voet 48 4 5 in this regard. 
85
 Huber Heedensdaegse rechtsgeleertheyt 2 42 15. 
86
 Huber Heedensdaegse rechtsgeleertheyt 2 42 23. 
87
 Grotius 2 34 20. 
88
 Van Leeuwen Het Rooms-Hollandsch recht 2 20 14. 
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Aside from protecting the view from one‟s property, it was also possible to 
prevent another from having a view onto your property by registering a servitude non 
prospiciendi in aream alterius. This servitude prohibited the owner of the servient 
tenement from having a view onto the property of the dominant tenement. Voet89 
mentioned that the right to have an outlook onto the site of another flowed from 
natural law. He referred to the servitude of not having a view onto the property of 
another as one which opposes the servitus prospectus, et ne prospectui officiatur. 
According to Grotius,90 the servitus non prospiciendi (gezichtverbod) was noted and 
described as the right to forbid a neighbour from looking onto the property of 
another. Grotius added, like Voet, that in the absence of such a servitude everyone 
may look onto the property of another. Nathan91 refers to the servitude non 
prospiciendi in aream alterius as a special servitude that was mentioned by Voet. He 
describes it as a servitude that prohibits the owner of the servient tenement from 
overlooking the yard, court or garden of the dominant tenement and comments that 
this servitude is “practically obsolete at the present times”. One would expect that a 
servitude that was considered to be practically obsolete in 191392 would be in 
complete disuse by now. However, a servitude that protects a landowner‟s privacy 
by prohibiting another property from overlooking her site is perhaps not all that 
outdated. Nathan‟s comment probably reflects the focus on urban expansion and 
development that characterised the turn of the previous century. It is doubtful 
whether a servitude that protects a landowner‟s privacy against overlooking would be 
seen as archaic today. However, in the context of South Africa‟s need of housing, 
the protection of privacy, like the preservation of the delightful view from a property, 
                                                          
89
 Voet 8 2 12. 
90
 Grotius 2 34 27. 
91
 M Nathan The common law of South Africa Vol 1 (2
nd
 ed 1913) 510 
92
 The second edition of Nathan‟s book, M Nathan The common law of South Africa Vol 1 (2
nd
 ed 
1913), was published in 1913. 
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is an attribute that only a small percentage of landowners would spend time and 
resources on. 
Apart from the servitus prospectus, et ne prospectui officiatur and the servitus 
non prospiciendi in aream alterius, which were specifically aimed at the protection of 
(or prevention of) the view from a property, it was also possible for a landowner to 
protect the view from her property by creating a servitus altius non tollendi. This 
servitude prohibited a neighbour from building higher and could therefore have 
prevented the obstruction of openings for light and air or could have been aimed at 
some other benefit.93 
Nathan94 mentions that according to Voet, the servitus ne luminibus officiatur 
often implies the servitus altius non tollendi, since the flow of light to one‟s property is 
often attributable to the fact that there is no structure on a neighbouring property that 
obstructs it. If such an obstructing building would be erected or built higher, it would 
necessarily interfere with the flow of light (and therefore the servitus ne luminibus 
officiatur.)95  
Despite the absence of an inherent right to the existing view from one‟s 
property, a Roman-Dutch property owner therefore had the opportunity to protect the 
existing view from her property with a servitude. She could create a servitus 
prospectus that would prohibit the obstruction of a specific view. She also had the 
option of creating a servitus altius non tollendi, which would place a limitation on the 
                                                          
93
 Voet 8 2 8. The prospect from a property could probably be seen as a possible “other benefit” to be 
protected by the servitus altius non tollendi. The servitus altius non tollendi was also mentioned in 
Grotius 2 34 18. 
94
 M Nathan The common law of South Africa Vol 1 (2
nd
 ed 1913) 508. 
95
 See D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die 
negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 229-230 for a discussion of the way that A 
Rodger Owners and neighbours in Roman law (1972) 38 explains the application and effects of the 
servitus altius tollendi and the servitus altius non tollendi in Roman law. 
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neighbour‟s right to build higher and could therefore have had the effect of 
preventing the obstruction of her pleasant view. 
 
2 3 2 South African law 
A South African property owner may protect the view from her property with a 
negative servitude.96 She has the option of creating a servitus prospectus, which will 
prohibit the owner of the servient tenement from performing an act on her property 
that will obstruct the view from the dominant property. She can also create a servitus 
altius non tollendi to specifically prevent the owner of the servient tenement from 
erecting a building on her property, or from raising an existing building higher so as 
to obstruct the view from the dominant tenement.97 A servitus prospectus may be 
created in respect of two properties that are not adjacent to each other.98 These 
servitudes originated in Roman law and were received in Roman-Dutch law. Case 
law indicates that these servitudes are still applicable in South African law as a way 
to create a right to a view.99 Therefore, it is possible for a property owner to protect 
the existing, unobstructed view from her property by registering a servitude. 
In Myburgh v Jamison100 the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope had to 
give effect to a condition in the deed of transfer of a property that prohibited the 
erection of buildings that would obstruct the view from a specific adjacent property. 
                                                          
96
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
127. In Erasmus v Blom 2011 JDR 0321 (ECP) para 36 it was confirmed that in South African law a 
negative servitude (either a servitus prospectus or a servitus altius non tollendi) may be registered to 
protect the existing view from a property against lawfully built obstructions.  
97
 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal The law of things and servitudes (1993) 207 explain that a 
servitude of view gives the owner of the dominant tenement the right to an open view by restricting 
the owner of the servient tenement‟s right to obstruct such a view with trees, buildings or both and 
that a servitus altius non tollendi prohibits the owner of the servient tenement from building higher on 
her land. 
98
 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 470 and 480. 
99
 Myburgh v Jamison (1861) 4 Searle 8; Lewkowitz v Billingham & Co (1895) 2 Off Rep 36 and 
Kruger v Downer 1976 (3) SA 172 (W). 
100
 Myburgh v Jamison (1861) 4 Searle 8.  
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The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the terms of this condition by planting 
trees that obstructed the view from his property. Counsel for the plaintiff urged the 
court to give effect to the purpose of the condition, namely to protect the view from 
the plaintiff‟s property. It was submitted on behalf of the defendant that a servitude of 
prospect was odious because it hinders development and therefore contravenes 
public policy.101 This argument was raised in support of the defendant‟s request that 
the court should give a strict interpretation to the condition‟s wording. The court 
acceded to the defendant‟s demand, holding that the trees did not obstruct the 
plaintiff‟s view in a way forbidden by the condition.102  
The Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope interpreted the condition in the 
deed of transfer103 that prohibited the erection of buildings that would obstruct the 
view from the plaintiff‟s property as equal to a servitus altius non tollendi. It held that 
this condition was specifically meant to protect view against obstruction by later 
building works.104  
                                                          
101
 A similar argument was made by Lord Hardwicke in Attorney-General v Doughty (1752) 2 Ves Sen 
453. In Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24F Lord Blackburn referred to Lord Hardwicke‟s 
observation that the right of prospect should only be regarded as a matter of delight, since the 
development of towns and cities would be inhibited if it (the right of prospect) was regarded as a 
necessity.  
102
 The court gave a narrow interpretation to the wording of the servitude by deciding that the 
servitude specifically forbids the obstruction of the plaintiff‟s view by the erection of a building and that 
trees that blocked the plaintiff‟s view did not constitute such a prohibited act. In Kruger v Downer 1976 
(3) SA 172 (W), the plaintiff applied for a court order to compel the defendant to remove the part of a 
house that obstructed the plaintiff‟s view. The plaintiff, who bought property from the defendant, 
alleged that both parties intended to include a servitude of prospect against the defendant‟s land. 
Margo J considered both parties‟ version of the facts and the prohibition against building inside certain 
boundaries that were prescribed in the title deed. He held that, although there clearly was an intention 
to preserve view, the servitude was completely ineffective and couldn‟t be justified by a meaning that 
the language did not support. 
103
 This condition prohibited the erection of a building on the one property so as to obstruct the view 
from the other property. There is no clearer indication regarding the wording of this condition or 
whether it was constructed as a specific type of servitude or not. Although this condition constitutes a 
restrictive condition, it is discussed here since the court interpreted it as equal to a servitus altius non 
tollendi. It therefore illustrates that South African courts recognise a servitus altius non tollendi as a 
way to prevent the obstruction of the view from one‟s property.  
104
 This was the interpretation that counsel for the defendant proposed. Voet referred to the servitus 
altius non tollendi in Voet 8 2 8 and Voet 8 2 11. It was argued for the plaintiff that the condition‟s 
wording did not convey the meaning of the party to whose advantage it was inserted accurately. 
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The dispute in Lewkowitz v Billingham & Co105 also involved the protection of 
an undisturbed view over certain properties. The respondent leased an advertising 
wall from the appellant, subject to the condition that either party could cancel the 
contract if a building that would obstruct the view to the wall was constructed during 
the lease period.106 Shortly after the conclusion of the contract, a wooden structure 
was erected that obstructed the view to the leased wall. The appellant exercised his 
cancellation right. He was consequently ordered, in the court a quo, to pay damages 
for breach of contract, since the presiding magistrate adopted the respondent‟s view 
that the contract could only be cancelled if the wall was obstructed by a building. The 
wooden screen that was erected was not considered to be a building.  
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the Transvaal per Kotze CJ reversed the 
decision of the court a quo and ruled in favour of the appellant. Kotze CJ 
emphasised that the reason for the condition against the construction of a building 
was to prevent the obstruction of the advertising wall.107 He consequently interpreted 
the word “building” to include any structure that would obstruct the view to the wall. 
Both the Myburgh and the Lewkowitz decisions concerned instances where 
views have been obstructed by structures other than buildings. Contrary to the 
narrow interpretation that the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope gave to the 
terms of the condition in the Myburgh case, the Supreme Court of Transvaal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
According to the plaintiff‟s counsel, it was clear that the intention was to save the view. Contrary to 
this argument, the defendant‟s counsel wished the court to focus on the fact that servitudes, and 
especially servitudes of prospect, are regarded with disfavour by the law. In light of this argument, the 
court was asked to give a strict interpretation to the wording of the condition. Counsel for the plaintiff 
therefore urged the court to give effect to the intention or aim of the condition (to protect the view from 
the property), whereas the defendant‟s counsel demanded a narrow interpretation which focused on 
the specific wording of the condition (prohibiting the obstruction of view only when it is caused by the 
erection of a building).  
105
 Lewkowitz v Billingham & Co (1895) 2 Off Rep 36. 
106
 Although this condition does not constitute a servitude to protect the view from one‟s property, the 
decision shows how courts may interpret conditions, and also servitudes, that are aimed at preventing 
the obstruction of a specific view. 
107
 The condition in the lease agreement was not registered as a servitude. However, it was aimed at 
the protection of an undisturbed view to a specific object (an advertising wall).  
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interpreted the word “building” widely in the latter case. While the Supreme Court of 
the Cape of Good Hope held that the wording of the condition specifically prohibits 
the erection of a building (and not trees), the Supreme Court of Transvaal ruled that 
in the specific context of the relevant contract, the word “building” includes any 
structure which would obstruct the view to the property. The Myburgh and Lewkowitz 
decisions show that a South African property owner can protect the view from her 
property with the creation of a contractual agreement, which could be registered as a 
servitude, or a similar device, such as a title deed restriction. 
 
2 4 The possibility of protecting view in the absence of a servitude  
2 4 1 A casuistic approach 
The rigid application of the principle that a South African property owner does not 
have an inherent right to the existing view from her property does not necessarily 
give an accurate reflection of the value that the view from a specific property may 
have. For example, there may be instances where a group of properties were 
developed in a certain way to enhance the views from each of the buildings 
individually. The views enjoyed from such buildings may be considered as significant 
aspects of the use and enjoyment of the properties and not as merely incidental 
benefits.  
D van der Merwe investigates the Roman origin of the argument that 
interferences with the free flow of water or light to a neighbour‟s property should not 
be regarded as unlawful, and its justification, namely that the natural flow of water 
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and light to a property are merely incidental advantages.108 He rejects the argument 
insofar as it suggests that the free flow of water and light to properties was always 
treated as incidental advantages in the Roman legal system.109 Instead, he refers to 
texts that show that Romans followed a casuistic approach in this regard. Levy,110 for 
example, concludes that, with regard to the flow of water, the main concern is the 
unreasonable or abnormal way in which an owner uses it and thereby causes 
detriment for her neighbour. In the context of the Roman Empire with its different 
provinces, Levy cites the discussion of one Agennius Urbicus, who noted that 
disputes about water were treated differently in different parts of the empire.111 
Accordingly, the use of the actio aquae pluviae arcendae was probably not 
prohibited in all instances where there had been interference with the natural flow of 
water.  
Furthermore, there are indications that an interference with the flow of light to a 
property was also not in all cases considered to cause a mere loss of an incidental 
advantage. Rodger112 and D van der Merwe113 both criticise the orthodox view that a 
property owner under Roman law did not have the right to a flow of light to her 
property and argue that the excessive blocking of light was indeed unlawful in 
classical Roman law. Both these writers refer to a contradiction between D 39 2 25 
                                                          
108
 D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die 
negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 218-222. 
109
 D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die 
negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 226-233. 
110
 E Levy “West Roman vulgar law, the law of property” in Memoirs of the American philosophical 
society Vol 29 (1951) 117-118. D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard 
regmatig is, ongeag die negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 227 discusses 
and agrees with Levy‟s argument. 
111
 E Levy “West Roman vulgar law, the law of property” in Memoirs of the American philosophical 
society Vol 29 (1951) 117-118. 
112
 A Rodger Owners and neighbours in Roman law (1972) 38-89. 
113
 D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die 
negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 228-229. 
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and D 39 2 26.114 In D 39 2 25, Paul quoted Trebatius, who was of the opinion that a 
person suffers damage if the supply of light to her house is cut off:  
“Trebatius says that he also sustains damage who has the lights of his house cut 
off.”115 
In the context of D 39 2, Trebatius‟ statement would mean that the cautio damni 
infecti was available to an owner whose supply of natural light was cut off, because 
the loss of a supply of light to a property caused damage.116 However, in D 39 2 26, 
Ulpian states Proculus‟ conflicting opinion: 
“Proculus says that when anyone erects a building on his own land, which he has 
a right to erect there, even though he has promised indemnity for threatened 
injury to his neighbour, he will still not be liable under this stipulation ... For 
although ... you divert my water and, ... you intercept my light, I will, nevertheless, 
not be able to sue you ... because he should not be considered to have 
committed an injury who prevents another from enjoying some benefit, which, up 
to that time, he had been accustomed to enjoy; and it makes a great deal of 
difference whether anyone causes damage, or whether he prevents another from 
enjoying a benefit which he had hitherto been accustomed to enjoy. The opinion 
of Proculus appears to me to be correct.”117 
According to Rodger, Trebatius‟ opinion118 indicates that the excessive blocking of 
light was unlawful in classical Roman law.119 D van der Merwe argues that it is not 
possible or necessary to reconcile D 39 2 25 with D 39 2 26.120 He reasons that the 
contradiction in these two texts confirms that the Romans followed a casuistic 
                                                          
114
 A Rodger Owners and neighbours in Roman law (1972) 53 and D van der Merwe D van der Merwe 
“‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die negatiewe gevolge 
daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 228-229. 
115
 D 39 2 25, as translated by SP Scott The civil law: The digest or pandects Vol 8 (1932) 335. 
116
 See 2 2 1 2 above for a discussion of the meaning and application of the cautio damni infecti. 
117
 D 39 2 26, as translated by SP Scott The civil law: The digest or pandects Vol 8 (1932) 335-336. 
118
 D 39 2 25. 
119
 A Rodger Owners and neighbours in Roman law (1972) 89. Rodger supports his argument by 
referring to D 8 2 10, D 8 2 11 and the existence of the servitus altius tollendi. 
120
 D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die 
negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 228. 
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approach to determine what should be considered as damnum for purposes of 
instituting an action based on the cautio damni infecti.  
D van der Merwe121 concludes that the rule that interference with the free flow 
of light or water to a property does not cause damage for a landowner originated in 
Roman law and was received in Roman-Dutch and later in South African law. 
However, the original scope and application of this rule is not accurately reflected in 
Roman-Dutch and South African law, because the specific context in which these 
rules originated and were applied in Roman times was not considered by the 
European Romanist jurists who received and applied them in Roman-Dutch law. 
According to D van der Merwe, these rules were not applied rigidly in Roman law 
and their application in modern law should therefore reflect their original casuistic 
nature.122 Therefore, the rule that the free flow of water and light are merely 
incidental benefits and that interferences with them are not actionable is not a rigid 
principle and should be applied as a guideline to consider each case individually. If 
this rule is applied as a guideline instead of a principle, there may be instances 
where the flow of light or water to a property is considered more than a merely 
incidental benefit to a property. In cases where the view from a property forms part of 
the property‟s use and enjoyment and is considered more than a merely incidental 
advantage to the property, the principle that interferences with the existing view from 
a property is not actionable should probably not apply. 
 
                                                          
121
 D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die 
negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 220-233. 
122
 In D van der Merwe “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die 
negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233 at 226-227. 
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2 4 2 South African law 
The court in Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 
CC and Others123 seemingly acknowledged, without explicitly deciding, that in some 
instances a property owner has a substantive right to the view from her property, 
without such view being specifically protected with a servitude or a restrictive 
condition. In this case the applicants owned a holiday house on the banks of the 
Vaal River. Some thirteen years after they had purchased the property, the 
respondents, who subsequently became owners of a neighbouring property, erected 
a thatched-roof structure over their jetty. This structure obstructed the applicants‟ 
view of the river and they consequently applied for an interdict to have the structure 
removed and to prevent the local authority from approving any plans for it.  
The applicants acknowledged that a property owner does not have a 
substantive right to a view and therefore based their interdict application on an 
actionable nuisance allegedly caused by the first respondents.124 Besides this 
                                                          
123
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004). 
124
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) 
[2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 7. The applicants contended that the first respondents 
unreasonably infringed upon their normal use and enjoyment of their property. At paras 32-33, 
Rampai J made a clear distinction between the complaint made by the respondent in Dorland and 
Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) and the objection raised by the applicants in the Waterhouse 
Properties case. The difference between the complaints was, according to Rampai J, that the 
respondent in Dorland complained of the installation of an electrical fence that was merely “something 
very ugly”, as opposed to the applicant in the Waterhouse Properties case who complained of the 
erection of a structure on a neighbouring property that had a material and negative influence on the 
normal use and enjoyment of the property. The judge continued that the similarity between these two 
judgments is the fact that in both cases the complaints entailed a “sense of sight”. Rampai J regarded 
the obstruction of the applicant‟s view in the Waterhouse case as a more serious infringement of 
property rights compared to the installation of a merely “ugly” fence in Dorland, the latter being, 
according to this judge, “a purely aesthetic issue which in our law is not accorded the status of a 
right”. This distinction is not satisfying, since no property owner has the right to a view from her 
property. Therefore, neither the erection of something that is visually unpleasing, nor the obstruction 
of that which is visually pleasing should in principle be regarded as a wrongful act. See AJ van der 
Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 370 for a discussion of why the court in Waterhouse Properties 
considered the obstruction of the applicant‟s view in this case to be different from the interference with 
the respondent‟s aesthetical attributes in Dorland. 
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substantive basis for their application, the applicants also raised a procedural ground 
for such an interdict.125 
In order to determine whether or not the erection of the structure caused an 
actionable nuisance for the applicants, the court considered whether this act was an 
unreasonable infringement of the applicants‟ normal use and enjoyment of their 
property. The court reasoned that the specific locality of and purpose for which the 
property was improved by the applicants indicated that the view of the river formed 
an integral part of the normal use and enjoyment of this property.126 
Rampai J considered the litigants‟ conduct in terms of the requirements for the 
granting of a final interdict. The following questions were asked in this regard: Did 
the first applicant have a clear right that was affected by the first respondent‟s 
conduct?127 Was the applicants‟ right to ownership infringed upon by the 
unreasonable conduct of the first respondent?128 And, was there an alternative 
remedy at the applicants‟ disposal?129  
                                                          
125
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 7. The applicants contended that the 
erection of the structure did not comply with s 4(1) of the National Building Act, since it was 
constructed without the prior consent of the relevant local authority.  
126
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) paras 9-19. Before focusing on the 
requirements for an interdict, the court discussed the interplay between the rights of 
neighbouring property owners. This discussion formed part of the court‟s deliberation of the 
argument that the first respondent‟s conduct constituted a common law nuisance. In terms of the 
objective test for reasonableness, a property owner‟s conduct would only be considered 
unreasonable and therefore a nuisance if the harmful consequences that it had for a 
neighbouring owner were more than what a normal individual in the applicant‟s circumstances 
could be expected to endure. See CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 187-197; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property  (5
th
 ed 2006) 
112-113 and J Church & J Church “Nuisance” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC Harms (eds) The 
law of South Africa Vol 19 (2
nd
 ed 2006) paras 173-185 for discussions of the principle that a 
property owner may not use her property in a way that unreasonably interferes with a 
neighbouring owner‟s use and enjoyment of her (the neighbour‟s) land.  
127
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Propert ies 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 22.  
128
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 35.  
129
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 58.  
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In the light of specific circumstances regarding the applicants‟ property, such as 
the reason why it was bought, improved and used for, and especially its location, the 
court decided that the view from the property formed part of their right of ownership. 
Rampai J regarded the applicants‟ enjoyment of the view of the river as an important 
part of the way in which they used their property. Therefore, the obstruction of its 
view was an actionable interference with the first applicant‟s ownership rights to the 
use, enjoyment and convenience of their property that should be regulated by the 
same common law principles that apply to other instances of nuisance.130 
Concerning the effect that the first respondent‟s act had on the applicants‟ 
rights, the judge considered both the detriment that it caused for the applicants and 
the social use it had. The court found that the structure was so big that it would 
dramatically and permanently obstruct the applicant‟s view of the river, whereas it did 
not benefit the first respondent substantially and there was no evidence that it 
promoted public welfare. The effect that the erection of the structure had on the 
applicants‟ use and enjoyment of their property was therefore far greater than the 
advantage it had for the first respondent. Based on this conclusion, Rampai J 
decided that the first respondent‟s conduct was objectively unreasonable and 
therefore unlawful.131 
Rampai J finally considered whether the applicants could make use of any 
other remedy in order to protect their rights. After dismissing the first respondent‟s 
                                                          
130
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) paras 22-34. 
131
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) paras 35-53. 
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contention that an action for damages could have been instituted,132 he mentioned 
that an interdict has to be granted in instances  
“where the injury caused by the respondent's objectively unreasonable 
interference cannot be adequately compensated or is so serious and material, as 
in this case, that the restoration of things to the state of affairs before the 
interference is the only appropriate method by which justice between neighbours 
can adequately be done...”133 
With regard to the first two requirements for a final interdict that the court considered, 
it was established that the applicants had a substantive right that was infringed by 
the first respondent‟s unreasonable conduct. The court was mainly concerned to 
establish whether these prerequisites for a final interdict existed, while it confirmed 
the applicants‟ rights by deciding that no other remedy would adequately protect 
these. In its deliberation, the court also mentioned the first respondent‟s non-
compliance with section 4(1) of the National Building Act because of its failure to 
submit building plans prior to the erection of the structure.134 For these reasons, the 
court granted a final interdict, ordering the first respondent to demolish and remove 
the thatched-roof structure.135 
The Waterhouse decision is unique in the modern South African jurisprudence 
regarding the obstruction of a view. The court‟s ruling that the respondent‟s conduct 
was objectively unreasonable implied that a property owner does have the right to an 
unobstructed view from her property, at least under certain circumstances. The 
                                                          
132
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 60. Rampai J held that an action for 
damages would not adequately protect the applicants‟ rights.  
133
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 60.  
134
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others  
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) paras 54-56. 
135
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others  
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 65.  
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circumstances that played a role in this case were apparently the property‟s location 
and use. It was located on the banks of a river and used as a retreat from which the 
beautiful views of the river could be enjoyed. Since the river was considered to be 
the main feature of the area, the court regarded the applicants‟ unobstructed view to 
the river as an important part of the use and enjoyment of their property. Therefore, 
according to the court‟s reasoning, the circumstances was of such a nature that the 
applicants‟ view should be protected against obstruction.136 
Freedman criticises this judgment for not contributing to the development of a 
more sophisticated jurisprudence in the area of a landowner‟s right to a view.137 He 
argues that the court followed the wrong methodology when it considered the rights 
of the applicants and the alleged interference with it. In order to determine the scope 
of the right of ownership, the court applied an objective test for reasonableness. In 
terms of this test, the court took into account the opinion of a reasonable person in 
the applicants‟ position. According to Freedman, this is the wrong point of departure 
when determining the scope of the right of ownership. Instead, one should depart 
from the relevant Roman-Dutch law principles by applying them in accordance with 
the Constitution and in a manner that meets the demands of a modern society.138 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
In terms of the general principle regarding the existing view from a property, a South 
African property owner does not inherently have a right to the existing view from her 
                                                          
136
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) 
[2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) paras 28-29. 
137
 W Freedman “Paradise lost? The obstruction of a pleasant view and the law of nuisance” in 
SV Hoctor & PJ Schwikkard (eds) The exemplary scholar: Essays in honour of John Milton  
(2007) 162-184 at 184. 
138
 W Freedman “Paradise lost? The obstruction of a pleasant view and the law of nuisance” in 
SV Hoctor & PJ Schwikkard (eds) The exemplary scholar: Essays in honour of John Milton  
(2007) 162-184 at 184. 
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property. This rule is based on the argument that a pleasant view is an incidental 
advantage and not an actionable right. The idea that some property attributes are 
merely incidental benefits while others are rights originated in Roman law, where a 
distinction was made between instances where a property owner suffers damage 
and instances where she is merely deprived of an incidental advantage that she 
previously enjoyed. This distinction was received in Roman-Dutch law and confirmed 
in the South African case of Dorland and Another v Smits,139 in the sense that the 
court held that the view from a property is an aesthetic attribute that is not inherently 
protected as part of an owner‟s right of ownership. The existing view from a property 
is also not generally protected as an inherent property right, because the recognition 
of such a right would be in conflict with the rule that a property owner may build on 
her property as she pleases. Roman-Dutch sources discuss the principle that a 
property owner may use her property as she sees fit, while the decision in Clark v 
Faraday and Another140 confirms that this principle is part of South African law. 
Earlier decisions, such as Myburgh v Jamison141 and Lewkowitz v Billingham & 
Co,142 illustrate the fact that an unobstructed view can be protected by way of an 
agreement or the creation of a servitude between property owners. These decisions 
indicate that it is possible for a property owner to protect a pleasant view from her 
property, like it was possible for a Roman-Dutch property owner to protect her 
unobstructed view, with a servitude. Case law therefore confirms the position that, 
generally, a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing view from 
her property, unless such a view is protected with a servitude or some other 
contractual agreement.  
                                                          
139
 Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C). 
140
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C). 
141
 Myburgh v Jamison (1861) 4 Searle 8.  
142
 Lewkowitz v Billingham & Co (1895) 2 Off Rep 36. 
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By contrast, the judgment in Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v 
Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others143 suggests that, in exceptional 
circumstances, courts may depart from these general rules regarding the protection 
of the view from a property. In these cases the existing view from a property may 
apparently be protected if the circumstances indicate that enjoyment of the view was 
an inherent element of the use and enjoyment of the property. 
 
                                                          
143
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others 
(2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004). 
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Chapter 3:  
Alternative strategies to protect the unobstructed, existing 
view from a property 
 
3 1 Introduction  
A South African property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing view 
from her property in terms of the common law.1 Nevertheless, a property owner has 
the opportunity to protect the existing undisturbed view from her property with a 
servitude,2 and there are also (inconclusive) indications that the view from a specific 
property may inherently be protected in exceptional circumstances where it forms an 
integral part of the use and enjoyment of the property.3 Apart from these well-
established principles, case law indicates that there are other, alternative ways in 
which property owners have attempted (sometimes successfully) to protect the 
existing views from their properties. These strategies are either based on the 
enforcement of a substantive right that has the effect of protecting the existing view 
from a property, or they are cast in the form of attacks on procedural irregularities 
that may have the same effect, albeit temporarily. 
                                                          
1
 In Ch 2 it was established that a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing view 
from her property, since the pleasant view from a property is considered an incidental advantage and 
because the recognition of an inherent right to the existing view from a property would be in conflict 
with the principle that a property owner may build on her property as she pleases. See 2 2 for a 
discussion of these justifications for not acknowledging a right to a view. 
2
 In Erasmus v Blom 2011 JDR 0321 (ECP) para 36 it was confirmed that in South African law the 
existing view from a property can only be protected against lawfully built obstructions if a negative 
servitude (either a servitus prospectus or a servitus altius non tollendi) is registered to protect such a 
view, or if a restrictive condition or the provisions of a town planning scheme or other building 
legislation prevents such obstruction. See 2 3 2 for a discussion of how a servitude may be used to 
protect the existing view from a property, and 3 2 2 1, 3 2 2 2 and 3 2 2 3 regarding the protection of 
an existing view from a property in terms of restrictive conditions and zoning schemes. 
3
 See the discussion of Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and 
Others (2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) in 2 4 2. 
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Apart from servitudes that prohibit building works or prevent the obstruction of 
specific views, there are other substantive rights, based on pre-existing property 
rights, that may entitle the rights holders to prevent the erection of buildings on 
neighbouring properties. Every affected property owner is for instance entitled to 
prevent the erection of a building on a neighbouring property if such a building is 
prohibited by a restrictive condition; if the area has to be re-zoned to accommodate 
the proposed building; if the proposed building would depart from the applicable 
zoning scheme; or if legislation creates a right or duty to prevent the erection of such 
a building. Building plans indicating that the proposed building will contravene a 
restrictive condition or any applicable legislation; depart from the applicable zoning 
scheme or building regulations;4 or that will require the re-zoning of an area may only 
be approved if neighbouring owners have given their prior permission. Therefore, a 
property owner has an inherent right to the existing view from her property insofar as 
such a view is protected in terms of restrictive conditions, the applicable building 
regulations and zoning scheme and any applicable legislation. Her existing view, as 
it exists within the parameters of these “devices” may only be obstructed by the 
erection of a neighbour‟s building if she agrees to such building works.5  
Procedural strategies that are used to prevent the erection of a building that 
would obstruct the view from a property are different from the substantive-right 
strategies set out above to the extent that they are purely founded on irregularities in 
the process through which building plans were approved. These strategies involve 
                                                          
4
 In this chapter, the phrase “departure from zoning scheme” refers to the subdivision of property, or a 
departure from the zoning scheme in terms of a “consent use”, or a deviation from the applicable 
building regulations. J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 352-353 defines “consent use” and 
“departures”.  
5
 Strategies based on a substantive right to prevent building are discussed in 3 2. 
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either an attack on a purely procedural shortcoming in the approval process, or an 
attack on the decision maker‟s discretion to approve the plans.6 
Property owners use these alternative ways to protect the existing views from 
their properties in the absence of an inherent right to a view. Reliance on these 
alternative strategies confirms that, as was concluded in chapter 2, the right to an 
undisturbed view from one‟s property does not naturally flow from the right of 
ownership. Each of these alternative strategies (substantive and procedural) is 
explained and assessed in the two subsections below in terms of the remedies that 
they offer and with reference to their application in case law. 
 
3 2 Strategies based on a substantive right to prevent building 
3 2 1 Basis of the right to prevent building 
A property owner (A) has a “substantive” right, which flows from her right of 
ownership, to be informed of – and sometimes to prevent – the approval of a 
neighbour‟s (B‟s) building plans when these plans involve the removal or change of a 
restrictive condition;7 when the application for the approval of her building plans 
includes an application for the re-zoning of her property8 or for a departure from the 
zoning scheme that affects her property;9 or if the building plans are in conflict with 
any applicable legislation. If A‟s substantive right is created by legislation or a 
restrictive condition that prohibits any or a particular form of building on B‟s property, 
no building may be erected on B‟s property in conflict with that condition without A‟s 
permission, unless some state body (the local or provincial government or a court) 
                                                          
6
 These strategies are examined in 3 3. 
7
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 351, 355, 357, 394 and 396. See 3 2 2 1. 
8
 See 3 2 2 2. 
9
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) para 130. See also J van Wyk 
Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 354, 357 and 396 and the discussion in 3 2 2 3. 
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has the authority to qualify or override A‟s right to object. If her right is based on a 
restrictive condition, a zoning scheme or building regulations that prohibit the 
erection of buildings in a certain spot, or of a certain height or kind, B may not erect 
any building that would be in conflict with these limitations without allowing A an 
opportunity to object or,10 in some cases, without A‟s consent.11 In some instances, a 
state body such as the local or provincial government or a court can qualify or 
override A‟s right to object and if they do, B may erect a building despite A‟s 
objections.  
In the absence of permission and unless a building authority or a court 
overrides A‟s right, the effect can be that although A does not have a right to a view 
as such, she, as the beneficiary of the substantive right, can prevent building on 
neighbouring land that would interfere with the existing view from her property. The 
protection of this substantive right has been implemented in various instances 
(discussed in the next subsections below) as a strategy to avoid the obstruction of 
the existing views from the beneficiary properties.12  
A substantive right to prevent the erection of a building on a neighbouring 
property can in certain cases amount to an actual veto that prevents any form of 
building. For example, if the substantive right originates in legislation that places a 
duty on a specific landowner (B) not to build (at all or in a specific location or 
manner) on its property, such a person or authority must refrain from the erection of 
                                                          
10
 An application for the re-zoning of land; a departure from the applicable zoning scheme; or the 
removal of a restrictive condition in terms of the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967 may not be 
granted if affected property owners have not been informed of the application and have not been 
given an opportunity to raise objections. 
11
 A restrictive condition may not be removed in terms of the common law if its beneficiaries have not 
granted their permission. See 3 2 2 1. 
12
 See the discussions of Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others  
2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) A; Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 
415 (C) and Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 
September 2008) in 3 2 below.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
62 
any buildings that will interfere with the duty, and the beneficiary (A) can enforce 
compliance with that duty. An example of such legislation is the National Ports Act 
12 of 2005 (“National Ports Act”), which determines that the National Ports Authority 
is, inter alia, responsible for maintaining adequate and efficient lighthouses to assist 
in the navigation of ships. This provision places a duty on the National Ports 
Authority to protect the views to lighthouses and therefore entitles and compels it to 
prevent the obstruction of such views by building on any property in the vicinity of 
lighthouses. In this case the effect of the substantive right is that no building may be 
erected without the right holder‟s (the National Ports Authority‟s) approval and the 
right holder has an absolute right to prohibit the erection of any buildings that may 
interfere with the visibility of a lighthouse.13 Although it is in principle possible that the 
right holder can give permission for building works in conflict with this duty, it is 
unlikely that such permission would ever be granted, and (in the absence of 
impropriety) it is equally unlikely that another state body would ever be able to qualify 
or override the Port Authority‟s right to object. In this case, the right to prevent 
building on B‟s land is therefore an absolute veto. 
However, a substantive right to prohibit the erection of a building on a 
neighbouring property would not necessarily veto any form of building on the 
neighbouring property, since such a right may be subject to qualification or removal. 
If the substantive right originates from zoning legislation, it can be qualified or 
removed by the responsible local authority (or by a court) in terms of the same 
legislation.14 If it originates in a restrictive condition, it may be qualified or removed 
                                                          
13
 See the discussion of Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties  (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 
(5 September 2008) in 3 2 2 4. 
14
 In Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others 2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) 268 
the court qualified property owners‟ right to prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbouring 
property, since it ruled that, despite the fact that the property owners (beneficiaries of the substantive 
right) did not consent to the subdivision of their neighbour‟s property, the approval of the subdivision 
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by a court or, in some instances, by the responsible planning authority.15 However, in 
some instances it is more exceptional to remove or qualify a substantive right to 
prevent building against the beneficiary‟s will than in others. If the right to prevent 
building on neighbouring land originates in an agreement that had been registered 
as a limited real right (restrictive covenants and certain categories of restrictive 
conditions) it is more unusual and therefore more difficult to have the right removed 
or qualified, while rights that originate in planning legislation (building regulations) 
can be qualified or overridden more easily.16 Irrespective of whether such a right is 
qualified or removed by a court or a local authority, removal or qualification of the 
right will only be possible if it is in the public interest to do so (for example to remove 
a restrictive covenant with a racially discriminatory foundation), and not merely to 
benefit the owner wanting to build.17 Because the beneficiary has a substantive right, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
should not be set aside. However, it ordered that the responsible local authority should consider 
imposing height limitations on current and future buildings on the subdivided property. The 
beneficiaries‟ substantive right did therefore not amount to a veto of their neighbour‟s building works 
but was qualified in the sense that the court ordered the local authority to consider imposing height 
restrictions that would limit his right to build. See the discussion of this case in 3 2 2 2. 
15
 See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 354-356 and J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 345 and 351. 
16
 See 3 2 2 1 for a discussion of the removal of restrictive conditions. PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H 
Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 354 argues that a restrictive 
covenant can be modified or removed by agreement, since it is created in terms of an agreement.  
17
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
356, referring to Camps Bay Ratepayers Association v Minister of Planning Western Cape 2001 (4) 
SA 194 (C) and Hayes v Minister of Finance and Development, WC 2003 (4) SA 598 (C), explain that 
an application for the removal of restrictions lodged with the Premier may only be granted if it serves a 
positive advantage, such as the public interest, and that the applicant‟s personal interest in such an 
application is irrelevant. They reason that proper notice of such an application must be given to all 
neighbouring owners who will be directly affected by its approval, to avoid procedurally unfair 
administrative action. In Nowers NO v Burmeister (EL 1038/08, ECD 2338/08) [2011] ZAECELLC 8 (2 
August 2011) paras 50-51 the court established that zoning schemes are aimed at protecting 
community interests. In a discussion of this judgment, AJ van der Walt “Property” (2011) 3 Juta’s 
Quarterly Review para 2 3 2 reasons that the court in Nowers upheld counterclaims involving alleged 
unlawful building works on the ground that courts have a duty to enforce compliance with the 
requirements set out in zoning schemes and other planning legislation because these legislative 
measures protect the rights of others. 
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she may in any event be entitled to attack such a qualification or removal of her right 
in terms of section 25 of the Constitution.18 
Strategies to protect the existing view from a property that are based on 
substantive rights to prevent building often only feature once building has started, 
even though the principle is in fact that the beneficiary has a right to object or that 
prior permission should be obtained before the building plans are approved. 
However, building permission is sometimes granted without prior consultation, and 
then the beneficiary of the right to prevent building must attack the granting of 
building approval on procedural grounds. This creates confusion with purely 
procedural strategies. The reason for this confusion is that building approval is 
sometimes granted without complying with the requirements that protect the 
substantive rights of neighbouring owners, for example when approval is granted for 
a building that would contravene an applicable restrictive condition without the 
permission of the neighbour (beneficiary of the substantive right) who benefits from 
the condition. In such a case, the attack on the approval of the building plans 
typically focuses on the administrative blunder in granting building approval without 
the consent of an affected neighbour. However, it remains important to distinguish 
between substantive and purely procedural strategies. The strategy to protect an 
existing view that is based on a substantive right to prevent building emerges from a 
pre-existing substantive right that entitles a property owner to prevent (or at least 
object against) the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans. If this strategy is 
                                                          
18
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 356, 
referring to Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C), explains that a restrictive 
condition is considered “property” for purposes of s 25(1) of the Constitution, since it is classified as a 
praedial servitude. The removal of a restrictive condition therefore amounts to a deprivation of 
property in terms of s 25(1). Also see the discussion of Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 
(2) SA 136 (C) in PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 355-356 and in 3 2 2 1 below. Constitutional aspects regarding the right to a 
view are examined in Ch 5.  
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followed, the attack should be focused on the fact that an administrative decision has 
been taken in conflict with a substantive property right. Purely procedural strategies 
have a different origin. They arise when there is no substantive right to prohibit 
building in the first place, but an administrative error was made in the granting of 
permission to build generally, for example if there was no building control officer 
employed (as is required) when the responsible local authority approved the plans.19 
Consequently, if the approval of building plans is attacked on the basis of a purely 
procedural irregularity, the attack can only focus on the administrative irregularity in 
the process of approving the plans because there is no substantive right (apart from 
the right that procedures be followed) underlying the attack. 
The confusion between how and where the two different strategies apply is 
apparent from case law such as Walele v The City of Cape Town and Others20 
(“Walele”) and True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another21 (“True Motives 84”). 
These cases appear to concern purely procedural battles, but in fact, there are two 
issues involved in both of them. The first issue is whether permission to build was 
granted in conflict with a substantive right. Therefore, although the attack on the 
approval of the building plans has an administrative basis (namely an administrator‟s 
decision to approve building plans), it actually concerns a substantive right because 
the building permission was granted without obtaining the necessary consent, in a 
situation where such consent was required. The second question that arises is 
whether section 7 of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 
                                                          
19
 In Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) the respondent‟s building plans were 
approved at a time when there was no building control officer employed by the responsible local 
authority that approved the plans. The plans were therefore approved in conflict with s 5(1), 6(1) and 
7(1) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977. This case is 
discussed in 3 3 2 1. 
20
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC).  
21
 True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another (Ethekwini Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 
2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA). 
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103 of 1977 (“National Building Act”) creates a substantive right (in addition to the 
other substantive rights mentioned earlier) to prevent building on a neighbouring 
property. The conflicting decisions in Walele and True Motives 84 adopted different 
points of view regarding the latter question. 
In Walele the Constitutional Court confirmed that property owners do not have 
a right to be informed of or to comment on an application for the approval of building 
plans relating to neighbouring land when such plans comply with the normal building 
regulations and the applicable restrictive conditions and zoning scheme.22 This 
principle obviously relates only to instances where there is no substantive right, 
deriving from legislation, the zoning scheme, building regulations or a registered 
restrictive condition, that would entitle the beneficiary to be informed of building plans 
that conflict with the right. The case concerned a landowner‟s attempt to have the 
approval of his neighbour‟s building plans set aside.23 Since the complainant did not 
have any of the categories of substantive rights already mentioned above, the court 
confirmed that there was no right to be informed of or to object against building plans 
relating to neighbouring land. In effect, the decision highlights the second question, 
                                                          
22
 In Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 45, 55-56 and 130 the court 
confirmed that a neighbouring property owner does not have a right to be heard in (or to inspect) an 
application for the approval of building plans. In this respect Jafta AJ confirmed the decision in 
Odendaal v Eastern Metropolitan Local Council 1999 CLR 77 (W) (“Odendaal”) and rejected the ruling 
in Erf 167 Orchards CC v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 CLR 91 (W) (“Erf 167 
Orchards”). In Erf 167 Orchards it was held that neighbouring owners indeed have a right to be heard 
before a local authority approves building plans. See paras 43-45 of Walele for the Constitutional 
Court‟s discussion of the conflicting judgments in Erf 167 Orchards and Odendaal. AJ van der Walt 
“Regulation of building under the Constitution” (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 33 reasons that the 
Constitutional Court in Walele confirmed that, because s 7 of the National Building Act adequately 
protects the rights of neighbouring landowners, this Act “does not confer on neighbours a blanket right 
to be heard before building plans are approved”. He further argues that neighbours may indeed have 
a right to be heard if an application for the approval of building plans involves an amendment of the 
existing zoning scheme or if the prescribed procedures were not followed when the plans were 
approved. See also AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 347.  
23
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) para 1. The applicant applied to 
the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Cape High Court. The 
Cape High Court dismissed his application for an order to review and set aside the City of Cape 
Town‟s decision to approve his neighbour‟s building plans for the erection of a four -storey block 
of flats. 
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namely whether section 7 of the National Building Act (“the Act”) creates a further, 
additional kind of substantive right to prevent the erection of buildings on the 
neighbouring property, or whether reliance on this provision amounts to a purely 
procedural strategy to prevent such building works.  
Section 7(1)(a) of the Act provides that a local authority must approve building 
plans if it is satisfied that the plans comply with all the requirements of the Act and 
any other applicable law. Section 7(1)(b)(ii) determines that a local authority shall 
refuse to approve building plans if it is satisfied that the proposed building will, inter 
alia, cause depreciation of adjoining or neighbouring properties.24 In Walele, the 
relevant building plans complied with the applicable zoning requirements and 
legislation and therefore met the requirements set out in section 7(1)(a) of the Act. 
(This fact, together with the absence of conflicting legislation and restrictive 
conditions, explains why the neighbouring owners do not have a substantive right to 
be informed of or to object against the building plans.) However, compliance with 
section 7(1)(b) and specifically the question whether the relevant local authority was 
obliged to give neighbouring owners an opportunity to be heard before the approval 
of the building plans, was in dispute.25 In terms of the court‟s interpretation of section 
7, a decision maker may not approve building plans unless she is satisfied that the 
necessary legal requirements are met and that none of the disqualifying factors will 
be triggered by the erection of the proposed building.26 It implies that an applicant is 
only required to prove “to the satisfaction of the reviewing court” that the erection of 
the proposed building on a neighbouring property will reduce the value of her own 
property. This approach sets a low benchmark for rejecting building plans and places 
                                                          
24
 The wording of s 7(1) of the National Building Act is set out in n 90. 
25
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 46 and 56. 
26
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) para 55. 
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a light burden of proof on property owners wanting their neighbour‟s building plans 
set aside on review. The court reasoned that this approach adequately protects the 
interests of neighbouring property owners and makes it unnecessary for them to be 
afforded an opportunity to raise their objections to such plans prior to their 
approval:27 
                                                          
27
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 30-32, 35, 39 and 55-56. The 
Constitutional Court held that the consideration that a local authority must give to the interests of 
neighbouring owners in terms of s 7 of the National Building Act protects their interests in such a way 
that it would be unnecessary to give a neighbour the opportunity to object to an application for the 
approval of building plans prior to their approval. Despite the fact that the Constitutional Court 
considered it unnecessary for neighbouring owners to be afforded an opportunity to participate in the 
process of the approval of building plans, it held that section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) provided such an opportunity. In terms of this provision, an aggrieved 
party would have the right to have an administrative action reviewed if it detrimentally affected her 
existing rights or a legitimate expectation. Regarding the requirement that an existing right must have 
been affected by an administrative action, the court held that the applicant‟s contention is that the 
erection of the building (block of flats) would have caused the value of his property to decrease and 
therefore would have triggered one of the disqualifying factors in s 7(1)(b)(ii). However, even if such a 
decrease in the property‟s value could be proven, it would not be the local authority‟s decision to 
approve the building plans (the contested administrative action), but the subsequent erection of the 
building, that would affect the applicant‟s alleged “right”. The court continued that, in terms of s 7 of 
the National Building Act, the erection of a building that causes a neighbouring property‟s value to 
diminish is already a ground for review. Referring to Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 
(SCA), where the Supreme Court of Appeal held (obiter) that a local authority may not approve plans 
if their execution will cause neighbouring properties‟ values to decrease, the court in Walele held that 
if the applicant (in Walele) had proven that the execution of the plans devalued his property, he could 
have succeeded in having the approval of the plans set aside on that basis only. Similarly, the 
applicant would have had the right to have the approval reviewed in terms of s 3 of PAJA if he had 
proven that he had a legitimate expectation to such a remedy because of an express presentation 
made by the local authority or in terms of a pre-existing practice. An example of such a pre-existing 
practice would be if the relevant local authority regularly gave neighbouring owners an opportunity to 
participate in the process prior to approval. Such a practice might create the (legitimate) expectation 
that it will be continued in future. The minority judgment in Walele (see specifically Walele v City of 
Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 88, 129-130 and 136) supported the majority‟s 
decision that the applicant was not entitled to a hearing prior to the approval of his neighbour‟s 
building plans. However, its reasoning differed. According to O‟Regan ADCJ, who delivered the 
minority ruling, a building plan may only be rejected in terms of s 7 of the National Building Act if the 
proposed building will probably or in fact result in one of the disqualifying factors. It may not be 
rejected if there is merely a possibility that one of these outcomes will ensue. In terms of this 
interpretation, s 7 does not provide property owners with the protection against neighbouring building 
works that the majority‟s approach suggests it does. Nevertheless, the minority‟s interpretation 
confirms that neighbouring owners are not entitled to be heard before building plans are approved. 
O‟Regan ADCJ argued that zoning and town-planning schemes impose legitimate limitations on the 
right of ownership. A zoning scheme limits the rights of all owners in a specific area, yet at the same 
time entitle them “to require that neighbouring owners comply with the applicable zoning scheme”. J 
van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 354, referring to O‟Regan ADCJ‟s reasoning in Walele, explains 
that, since property owners within a specific area are all required to comply with the applicable zoning 
scheme, they have a right to require each other to comply with such a scheme and they are entitled to 
be heard when a neighbour wants to depart from it. Therefore, when a property owner wants to depart 
from a zoning scheme, or when land in a specific area is re-zoned, neighbouring owners‟ rights are 
affected and they have the right to be informed of the departure or the re-zoning. However, since an 
application for the approval of building plans that complies with the applicable zoning scheme does 
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“On this interpretation, section 7 creates an adequate self-contained protection 
which safeguards the rights of owners of neighbouring properties. As a result it 
becomes unnecessary for such owners to be heard before the approval is 
granted. The presence of a disqualifying factor precludes the granting of the 
approval and where the approval is granted despite a disqualifying factor, the 
process becomes invalid and can be set aside on that ground. Therefore the 
entitlement to a pre-decision hearing will not arise in such a case, as nobody is 
entitled to claim a hearing prior to an invalid exercise of public power.”28  
Van der Walt29 argues that in Walele, the Constitutional Court‟s interpretation of 
section 7 of the Act creates the impression that a landowner has the right to have the 
approval of building plans reviewed (therefore, that a landowner may have the right 
to prevent building) if she alleges that the erection of the proposed building will 
detrimentally affect the market value of her property.30 In effect, this would mean that 
section 7(1)(b) provides affected neighbouring owners a substantive right to be 
protected against building that might affect the value of their properties. However, 
the decision makes it clear that the obligation placed upon the building authority to 
reject building plans that might have such a negative effect provides sufficient 
protection to neighbours and that the affected neighbours themselves therefore do 
not have to be afforded a right to be informed of and to object against the plans. It 
can therefore not be deduced from the decision that section 7(1)(b) provides 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
not materially or adversely affect the rights of a neighbouring property owner, neighbouring owners 
are not entitled to inspect building plans if they do not propose a departure from the zoning scheme or 
the re-zoning of an area. O‟Regan ADCJ, in Walele at para 136, explained as follows: 
“[A]n owner of property in an urban setting knows that his or her neighbours will be 
entitled to develop their property in line with the relevant zoning plans. It cannot be said 
therefore that the approval of building plans that are consistent with the applicable town-
planning scheme is such as would give rise to a legitimate expectation of a hearing.” 
28
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) para 56. 
29
 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 352-353. 
30
 In terms of the interpretation of s 7(1)(b) of the National Building Act that the majority of the 
Constitutional Court suggested, a local authority has to reject building plans when it is 
concerned that the building might have one of the negative outcomes that is provided for in s 
7(1)(b)(ii). Therefore, a local authority may not approve building plans when there is a (mere) 
possibility that the proposed building would, for example, affect the market value of neighbouring 
properties. 
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landowners with an independent, substantive right to be informed of and to object 
against building plans relating to neighbouring land purely on the basis that the 
building works, once completed, might have a negative effect on their properties. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected the Constitutional Court‟s interpretation 
of section 7(1)(b) in True Motives 84.31 In the latter decision the appellant challenged 
the approval of building plans in terms of which the first respondent made certain 
renovations. It was argued that the approval was inconsistent with section 7(1)(b)(ii) 
of the Act, since the execution of the plans would have harmful consequences for 
neighbouring properties.32 Considering the proper scope of the duties that section 
7(1)(a) and (b) of the Act imposes on local authorities, the majority concluded that 
these two subsections make provision for different tests. In terms of section 7(1)(a), 
the relevant local authority is obliged to refuse approval of plans when it is satisfied 
that the plans do not comply with the Act or any other applicable law, or when it is 
doubtful whether or not there is such compliance.33 Heher JA determined that a local 
authority should only consider the requirements set out in section 7(1)(b) if it is 
satisfied that the relevant building plans do comply with the Act and other applicable 
law.34 Should section 7(1)(b) indeed be applicable, the relevant local authority would 
                                                          
31
 In True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another  (Ethekwini Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 
2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) paras 21-23, 33 and 35-39 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 
Constitutional Court‟s interpretation of s 7 of the National Building Act in Walele was obiter. It 
specifically mentioned that paras 32, 63 and 55 of the Walele judgment contained wrong 
statements in law and were obiter. 
32
 True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another (Ethekwini Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 
2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 7. True Motives alleged that the building works would overshadow 
and intrude upon the privacy of its property.  
33
 True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another (Ethekwini Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 
2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) paras 17-19. Heher JA stated that a local authority would doubt whether 
building plans comply with the National Building Act or other applicable law if it is either not 
satisfied that the plans breach the applicable law or not satisfied that the plans are in 
accordance with such a law. Section 7(1)(a) of the National Building Act was therefore regarded 
as laying down a test that only permits a local authority to approve building plans if it is 
positively satisfied that the plans do comply with the Act as well as with other applicable 
legislation. 
34
 True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another (Ethekwini Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 
2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 20. Heher JA argued that the conjunction “or” after s 7(1)(b)(i) 
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in terms of section 7(1)(b)(ii) be compelled to refuse the approval of the plans if it is 
satisfied that the erection of the proposed building will or will probably cause one of 
the undesirable outcomes mentioned in section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(aaa)-(ccc) or 
7(1)(b)(ii)(bb). However, the local authority may not refuse such approval if there is 
merely a possibility that one of the undesirable outcomes will eventuate – such an 
outcome must at least be “probable”.35 The Supreme Court of Appeal in True 
Motives 84 dismissed the appeal because the appellant in that case was unable to 
prove that the local authority had made a mistake in the legal interpretation or factual 
application of section 7(1)(b)(ii). There was therefore no basis for the court to 
interfere with the local authority‟s discretion.36 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
indicates that the inquiry in terms of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa) and (bb) should only be undertaken if the 
building plan complies with the National Building Act and other applicable law (in terms of the 
requirement set out in s 7(1)(a)). 
35
 True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another (Ethekwini Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 
2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) paras 21-22. 
36
 See True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another  (Ethekwini Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 
2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) paras 70-91 and 93-97 for the minority interpretation of s 7 of the 
National Building Act. Jafta JA rejected the majority interpretation because he did not accept 
that a decision maker is only compelled, in terms of s 7(1)(b), to refuse the approval of building 
plans if it is satisfied that the erection of the building will definitely or probably lead to harmful 
consequences. Instead, he followed the approach that a decision maker must reject building 
plans even when the consideration of the relevant facts merely makes her doubt whether or not 
to approve. Although Jafta JA followed a different interpretation than the majority, he also 
concluded that there was compliance with s 7 of the National Building Act.  The difference 
between the majority and the minority approaches in True Motives 84 has certain implications 
for neighbouring owners‟ involvement in the approval process of building plans. Cameron JA 
argued that the majority approach to s 7 of the National Building Act would have the practical 
effect of freeing building approvals from potential statutory challenges. These challenges are a 
result of the requirements set out in s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa). While s 7(1)(a) deals with statutory 
requirements that are “generally capable of sure application”, the application of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa) 
requires a more subjective evaluation, since it deals with the nature and appearance of a 
proposed building. (Cameron JA referred to s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aaa), but in the context of what he 
discussed, he probably meant to refer to s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)). Since the majority interpretation 
entailed that a local authority must approve building plans unless it is satisfied that one of the 
undesirable outcomes will definitely or probably eventuate, a neighbouring owner would only be 
able to attack such an approval if she can prove that one of these proscribed outcomes will or 
will probably eventuate. Therefore, a local authority would be able to consider proposed building 
plans, having regard to both the statutory requirements and the nature and appearance of the 
building, without having to deal with the input of neighbouring owners. The amicus argued that 
such an interpretation is essential if the legislation is to be “practically workable in hard -pressed 
local authority town-planning departments”. Conversely, the minority interpretation implies that a 
neighbour can succeed with a review application directly to court if she can objectively prove 
that a prohibited outcome exists. See AJ van der Walt “Constitutional property law” (2009) 1 
Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2 2 3. Van der Walt, referring to para 64 of True Motives 84, 
describes how the Supreme Court of Appeal was split in two with this decision. Heher, Scott, 
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The respective interpretations given to section 7(1)(b)(ii) by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in True Motives 84 and the Constitutional Court in Walele, were 
summarised as follows by Brand AJ in Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ 
Association and Another v Harrison and Another:37 
“[A]ccording to Walele the local authority cannot approve plans unless it positively 
satisfies itself that the proposed building will not trigger any of the disqualifying 
factors referred to in section 7(1)(b)(ii). If in doubt, the local authority must 
consequently refuse to approve the plans. According to True Motives, on the 
other hand, a local authority is bound to approve plans unless it is satisfied that 
the proposed building will probably, or in fact, trigger one of the disqualifying 
factors referred to in section 7(1)(b)(ii). If in doubt, the building authority must 
consequently approve the plans.”38 
The Constitutional Court‟s interpretation of section 7 of the National Building Act in 
Walele suggests that a decision maker may only approve building plans when it is 
satisfied that the relevant legal requirements have been adhered to, and that none of 
the disqualifying factors in section 7(1)(b)(ii) will ensue once the proposed building 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cameron and Combrinck JJA opted for a restricted interpretation of the Constitutional Court‟s 
decision in Walele, whereas Jafta JA followed a more expansive interpretation of that decision. 
Nevertheless, all five judges concluded that the appeal should be dismissed. Jafta JA followed a 
purposive approach to the matter, while he referred to the interpretation given by the majority as 
literal. He rejected the application of a literal approach, reasoning that this would defeat the 
purpose of s 7(1)(b)(ii) of the National Building Act and that it would not comply with the 
obligation that s 39(2) of the Constitution imposes on courts.  
37
 Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and Another v Harrison and Another  2011 
(4) SA 42 (CC) para 33. This decision was the Constitutional Court‟s response to (dismissal of) 
an appeal application. The matter was originally heard by the Western Cape High Court, 
reported as PS Booksellers (Pty) Ltd v Harrison 2008 (3) SA 663 (C), and later by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, reported as Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v 
Harrison and Another [2010] 2 All SA 519 (SCA).  
38
 Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and Another v Harrison and Another  2011 
(4) SA 42 (CC) para 33 (footnotes omitted). The applicants requested the Constitutional Court to 
clarify what approach should be followed when applying s 7(1) of the National Building Act. 
However, it was s 7(1)(a) of the Act that was applicable in this case, whereas the uncertainty 
that existed specifically concerned the interpretation of s 7(1)(b)(ii). AJ van der Walt 
“Constitutional property law” (2010) 4 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2 3 argues that despite the 
fact that this decision does not provide a solution for the problem that was created by the 
diverging judgments in Walele and True Motives 84, it may indicate how similar matters will be 
approached in future cases. 
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has been erected.39 Furthermore, the approval of any plans that facilitate the 
erection of a building that will cause one of the unwanted outcomes may be set aside 
on review. The Walele decision implies that a property owner who wants to object 
against building on a neighbouring property only has to prove that the erection of the 
proposed building will diminish the value of her property to trigger this obligation on 
the local authority‟s side. However, this approach to section 7 assumes that the 
obligations of the building authority sufficiently protects the interests of neighbouring 
property owners and makes it unnecessary for them to have an opportunity to be 
informed of and raise their objections to building plans prior to their approval.40 
According to this interpretation, the right of landowners affected by building on 
neighbouring land is a purely procedural right that can only surface once the building 
plans had been approved and building has commenced; the objection will assume 
the form of review of the decision to approve the building plans.  
Conversely, the Supreme Court of Appeal in True Motives 84 determined that a 
local authority may only reject building plans if it is satisfied that, once the proposed 
building is erected, it will definitely or probably have one of the undesirable effects. In 
terms of this approach, a neighbouring owner will also be able to object against 
approval of the plans after the fact, but the burden of proof is higher in the sense that 
the objector must show that one of the undesirable effects will in fact eventuate (as 
opposed to the mere possibility that it might come about).  
The Walele judgment therefore leaves a wider scope for a property owner to 
object against approval of building plans on a neighbouring property, since it implies 
                                                          
39
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 54-55. 
40
 The Constitutional Court held that the consideration that a local authority must give to the 
interests of neighbouring owners in terms of s 7 of the National Building Act protects their 
interests in such a way that it would be unnecessary to give them the opportunity to object to an 
application for the approval of a building plans. 
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that an owner will more easily succeed if she can prove that the proposed building 
works might possibly cause one of the undesirable outcomes.41 In terms of the 
Constitutional Court‟s interpretation of section 7 of the National Building Act in 
Walele, a decision maker may only approve building plans when it is satisfied that 
the relevant legal requirements have been adhered to, and that none of the 
disqualifying factors in section 7(1)(b)(ii) will ensue once the proposed building has 
been erected.42 Furthermore, the approval of any plans that facilitate the erection of 
a building that will cause one of the unwanted outcomes may be set aside on review. 
This interpretation only allows for the approval of building plans when such plans will 
definitely not have an undesirable effect in terms of section 7(1)(b). However, in 
terms of the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s conflicting interpretation of section 7 in True 
Motives 84, a local authority may only reject building plans if it is satisfied that, once 
the proposed building is erected, it will definitely or probably have one of the 
undesirable effects. If this latter interpretation is followed, building plans may only be 
                                                          
41
 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 347 argues that it was established in Walele that 
“[i]f approval of the building involves an amendment to or deviation from the normal 
building regulations or the zoning scheme, or an amendment or removal of restrictive 
conditions registered in favour of the neighbours, the neighbours should have an existing 
right in terms of section 3 of PAJA and they should qualify to inspect and object to the 
plans prior to approval.” 
Therefore, the Walele decision established that neighbours do not have a right to be informed of or to 
comment on an application for the approval of building plans, unless such an application involves an 
amendment to or a departure from the applicable zoning scheme or an amendment or removal of 
restrictive conditions registered in their favour. Subsequent case law has confirmed a property 
owner‟s right to participate in the process prior to the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans when 
such plans would affect an existing right of hers. In Tergniet and Toekoms Action Group and 35 
Others v Outeniqua Kreosootpale (Pty) Ltd and Others unreported case no 10083/2008 (23 January 
2009) (C), the court ruled that property owners, as members of a community, have the right to enforce 
regulatory legislation and applicable zoning scheme provisions in order to protect their rights. This 
principle was confirmed in Camps Bay Residents and Ratepayers Association and Others v 
Augoustides and Others 2009 (6) SA 190 (WCC) para 16, with specific regard to instances where 
building plans depart from prescribed regulations. In the latter decision, the court ruled that the 
relevant local authority should have rejected the first respondent‟s building plans because no 
application was made or approval granted for the departure from the zoning scheme regulations. In 
Van Rensburg and Another NNO v Naidoo and Others NNO; Naidoo and Others NNO v Van 
Rensburg NO and Others 2011 (4) SA 149 (SCA) paras 29 and 36-41 the court held that in terms of 
the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967, neighbours and other owners who are favoured by a 
restrictive condition have to be given notice if building work is to be conducted in conflict with such a 
condition. See AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 342. 
42
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 54-55. 
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rejected if there is a strong possibility that it may result in one of the undesirable 
effects mentioned in section 7(1)(b). As was argued earlier, neither of these 
interpretations creates a substantive right because neither implies that the affected 
neighbouring owner may insist on being informed of and be allowed to object to 
building pans prior to their approval. Both interpretations allow only for a procedural 
objection to approval of the building plans, after the fact, but the Constitutional 
Court‟s interpretation arguably makes it easier to succeed with such an objection 
because the mere possibility that one of the negative effects will ensue should be 
enough to warrant review of the decision. 
Despite the conflicting interpretations of section 7 of the National Building Act in 
Walele and True Motives 84, these decisions do provide an answer to the question 
of whether section 7 creates a substantive right to prevent buildings on neighbouring 
properties. Read together with other case law concerning the meaning of the phrase 
“detrimental effect on the value of property”,43 these judgments indicate that an 
attack on the discretion exercised by a decision maker who approved building plans 
(that do not otherwise conflict with substantive rights originating in legislation, the 
zoning scheme, building regulations or restrictive conditions) is a purely procedural 
strategy that cannot prevent (but could delay) the erection of buildings on a 
neighbouring property. In such instances, the right to object against (and possibly 
delay) the erection of buildings on a neighbour‟s property emerges from the exercise 
of an administrative discretion and not from a previously existing substantive right. 
                                                          
43
 New Adventure Investments 193 (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for the time being of the SAS Trust [2002] 3 
All SA 544 (C); Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D); Clark v Faraday and Another 
2004 (4) SA 564 (C); De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 
(28 November 2006) and Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 
(13 February 2009). See the discussion of these cases in 3 3 3 1. 
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Therefore, courts are correct when they refuse to grant a property owner a 
substantive right, based purely on section 7, to prevent building works.44 
 
3 2 2 Application 
3 2 2 1 Restrictive conditions 
J van Wyk refers to restrictive conditions as 
“conditions registered in title deeds during the process of township establishment 
by the township developer in terms of which restrictions are placed on the use of 
land, separate from town planning or land use schemes.”45 
A restrictive condition can create a substantive right to prevent (or at least object 
against) the erection of buildings on a neighbouring property that would affect an 
existing view from the dominant property. Restrictive conditions in title deeds can, for 
example, restrict the erection of buildings within a specific distance from the street 
line; place height restrictions on buildings erected on a specific property; limit the 
area of a property that may be built on; and restrict the use of a property to a single-
story dwelling.46 These limitations may protect the existing, unobstructed view from a 
neighbouring property47 and if they do, will result in the effective, substantive 
                                                          
44
 The courts in Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D); Clark v Faraday and Another 
2004 (4) SA 564 (C) and De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] 
ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 2006) rejected the argument that s 7 of the National Building Act grants a 
property owner a substantive right to prevent building works on a neighbouring property in the sense 
that it prohibits a local authority from approving building plans that will cause one of the unwanted 
outcomes mentioned in s 7(1)(b). These decisions are discussed in 3 3 3. 
45
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 309. 
46
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 68 and 306-307.  
47
 In Myburgh v Jamison (1861) 4 Searle 8, a condition in the transfer deed of a property prohibited 
the erection of buildings that would obstruct the view from a specific adjacent property. This 
constituted a restrictive condition that protected the existing view from a property. See 2 3 2 for a 
discussion of this case. 
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protection of the view, since building works that contravene such a restrictive 
condition are unlawful.48  
Protection of the existing view from a property in terms of a restrictive condition 
of this kind can only be limited or forfeited if the neighbouring owner who is 
prevented from building in terms of the restrictive condition successfully applies for 
the amendment, qualification or removal of the condition. However, the interests of 
the beneficiaries of such a restrictive condition are protected against the unwanted 
alteration or removal of such a condition and it is unlikely that conditions of this 
nature will be removed or amended purely for the benefit of the affected owner who 
wants to build.49  
In Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC50 the court ruled that restrictive title 
deed conditions are similar in character to reciprocal praedial servitudes and that the 
registration of such servitutal rights and obligations amounts to the creation of real 
rights in property.51 The rights and duties created by the registration of a restrictive 
condition will be terminated when the condition ceases to exist, with the result that 
the removal or amendment of a restrictive condition will affect property rights inter 
                                                          
48
 See Van Rensburg and Another NNO v Naidoo and Others NNO; Naidoo and Others NNO v Van 
Rensburg NO and Others 2011 (4) SA 149 (SCA) para 18 and J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 
315. See also Resnekov v Cohen 2012 (1) SA 314 (WCC), which concerned an (applicant‟s) attempt 
to enforce a restrictive condition that restricted the use of a (respondent‟s) neighbouring property to a 
single-storey dwelling. This limitation on the respondent‟s right to build on his property, which was 
allegedly inserted to benefit the applicant‟s tenement, possibly had the effect of protecting the existing 
view from the applicant‟s property. However, the court dismissed the applicant‟s case, on the basis 
that the condition was a personal servitude that only benefitted the person who owned the property 
when the condition was inserted, and that the applicant did therefore not have locus standi. This 
decision indicates that the effectiveness of a restrictive condition that is aimed at preventing the 
erection of buildings that will obstruct the view from a property may be affected by the way in which 
the condition is interpreted. See the discussion of this case in J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 
68-69. 
49
 The consent of the beneficiaries of a restrictive condition is required for the removal or amendment 
of such a condition if it is removed or amended in terms of the common law, while the removal or 
modification of a restrictive condition in terms of the provisions of the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 
of 1967 is only allowed if the beneficiaries of the condition had the opportunity to raise objections. 
50
 Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C). 
51
 Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 4. 
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se.52 The court decided that the loss of property rights due to the removal of a 
restrictive condition amounts to a deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) of 
the Constitution.53 It therefore decided that, in order to comply with the constitutional 
requirements for a valid deprivation of property, the removal of restrictive conditions 
in terms of the common law must be accompanied by effective notice to affected 
neighbours and may not be granted without the consent of all the affected parties.54  
Restrictive conditions can also be amended or removed in terms of legislation 
such as the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967 (“RORA”), which regulates the 
administrative removal and modification of restrictive conditions. The consent of 
affected property owners is not required when a restrictive title deed condition is 
removed in terms of RORA.55 Nevertheless, RORA prescribes procedures to ensure 
the enforcement of affected owners‟ rights to be informed of and to object to 
applications for the amendment or removal of restrictive conditions that affect their 
land.56 Therefore, as was established in Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC, 
restrictive conditions create property rights that, according to the requirements for 
the removal or amendment of a restrictive condition in terms of the common law or 
                                                          
52
 Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 5. 
53
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 
2003 (2) SA 136 (C) paras 19-20. 
54
 Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) paras 6 and 20. See the discussion of 
this decision in PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 
(5
th
 ed 2006) 355-356. 
55
 In Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 21 the court explained that 
RORA “enables the administrative amendment or deletion of title deed restrictions”. The court 
reasoned that this statute is law of general application for purposes of s 25 of the Constitution that 
allows a limitation of a praedial servitude holder‟s common law rights to the extent that it does not 
require the consent of affected owners for such an amendment or deletion.  
56
 Section 2(1)(aa) and (dd), read together with ss 2(4)(a)-(c), 3(6), 5(2)(b)(ii) and 5(4) of RORA, 
determine that affected persons shall be informed of the proposed alteration, suspension or removal 
of a restriction or obligation that is applicable to a landowner in terms of a restrictive condition. In 
effect, these provisions confer a right on an affected owner who is the beneficiary of such a condition 
to be informed of an application for the amendment or removal of a restrictive condition. If such an 
amendment or removal is approved without notice being given in the way prescribed by section 2(4) 
of this Act, an affected owner is entitled to appeal. In Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) 
SA 136 (C) para 21 the court reasons that RORA requires the relevant state functionary “to consider 
what service should be effected on affected property owners”. See J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 
2012) 330 and 333-335.  
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RORA, may only be removed if affected property owners have at least been given an 
opportunity to object to the removal or amendment. A restrictive condition that places 
a limitation on a property owner that prevents her from building in a manner that 
would obstruct the existing view from a neighbouring property therefore confers a 
substantive right on the neighbouring owner to protect her view in the sense that she 
may enforce the restrictive condition. Furthermore, the possibility of removal or 
amendment of such a restrictive condition does not derogate from the substantive 
protection that is provided by a restrictive condition, since such a condition may not 
be removed or amended without giving affected property owners an opportunity to 
raise objections. Arguably, the negative effect that removal of the restriction and 
ensuing building on the neighbouring land may have on their properties (including 
removal of the existing view) may in certain circumstances be a relevant 
consideration in the adjudication of their objections. 
 
3 2 2 2 Re-zoning of land 
In the Walele decision, O‟Regan ADCJ confirmed that neighbours have a right to be 
consulted when an application for the re-zoning of land is considered.57 She argued 
that a zoning scheme limits an owner‟s right of ownership, but also gives an owner 
the right to expect other neighbours to comply with the scheme. Therefore, if a 
property owner wants to use her property within the parameters of the applicable 
zoning scheme, the rights of neighbouring owners are not materially affected and 
they do not have to be consulted or heard during the approval of the plans. However, 
if a property owner submits building plans that require a departure from the scheme, 
or if the land has to be re-zoned to make approval possible, the rights of 
                                                          
57
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) para 130. 
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neighbouring owners are indeed negatively affected and they are entitled to be heard 
before the plans are approved.58 If a zoning scheme has the effect of protecting the 
existing view from an owner‟s property, she has a substantive right to prevent the 
obstruction of such a view against building on a neighbouring property in the sense 
that she may expect her neighbours to comply with the zoning scheme and she may 
have the right to be informed of and to raise objections when her neighbours apply 
for departure from the zoning scheme or the re-zoning of their land.  
The applicants in the earlier case Richardson and Others v South Peninsula 
Municipality and Others59 (“Richardson”) attacked the approval of the subdivision of 
the second respondent‟s property on the ground that the approval process did not 
comply with the provisions of section 24(2)(a) of the Land Use Planning Ordinance 
15 of 1985 (“LUPO”) since the local authority approved the plans without advertising 
the subdivision that was involved in approval of the plans.60 The applicants therefore 
                                                          
58
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 130 and 136. See also J van 
Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 354, 357 and 396. 
59
 Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others 2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) 
268. 
60
 Section 24(1) and (2)(a) of LUPO deals with the application for subdivision of property and provides 
as follows: 
“24 
(1) An owner of land may apply in writing for the granting of a subdivision under 
section 25 to the town clerk or secretary as the case may be. 
(2) The said town clerk or secretary shall – 
(a) cause the said application to be advertised if in his opinion any person 
may be adversely affected thereby”. 
In Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others 2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) 
272 Yekiso AJ reasoned that the use of the word “shall” in s 24(2) of LUPO indicates that the 
provisions in this subsection are peremptory and not permissive. He subsequently found that the 
local authority‟s (first respondent‟s) failure to advertise the application for the approval for 
subdivision also meant that it was not successful in its duty to follow the procedure prescribed in 
s 24(2)(a) of LUPO. After referring to the constitutional princ iple of just administrative action and 
emphasising the importance of administrative legality, Yekiso AJ concluded that the process 
leading to the approval of the resolution was unlawful. This meant that a right to challenge the 
validity of the administrative decision accrued to the persons who were adversely affected 
thereby. AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 364 n 107 also argues that the 
requirement of advertising that is set out in s 24(2)(a) of LUPO is compulsory.  
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had a substantive right61 that, if enforced successfully, would prevent the erection of 
buildings that would obstruct the existing view from their property.62 The second 
respondent opposed this application, arguing that the applicants only acquired the 
property after the impugned resolution was adopted and that they were therefore not 
“affected persons” in terms of section 24(2)(a) of LUPO at the time when the 
decision was taken. The court rejected this argument and held that an owner‟s right 
to apply for appropriate relief when she is affected by unlawful and procedurally 
unfair administrative action is incidental to the right of ownership. Therefore, the right 
to apply for appropriate relief against unjust administrative action is transferred with 
the ownership of property.63 The court ruled that the first respondent‟s failure to 
advertise the proposed subdivision amounted to a breach of its duty to ensure lawful 
and procedurally fair administrative action, because it deprived persons who could 
be adversely affected by such an application of the right to object or make 
representations.64 However, the court considered an order setting aside the approval 
                                                          
61
 This substantive right is the right of neighbours and other affected owners to have an opportunity to 
object to an application for subdivision, as provided for in s 24 of LUPO.  
62
 Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others 2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) 268 and 
269. The first applicant feared that the second respondent would construct a second storey on her 
(second respondent‟s) existing residence. The first applicant emphasised that the existing view from 
the trust‟s property (of which she, as well as the second, third and fourth applicants are trustees) was 
the principal reason why they had bought it. However, although the applicants never proposed the 
potential obstruction of the view from their property as a cause of action, they clearly aimed to protect 
this view, since they stated in their affidavit that the loss of this “spectacular” view would cause a 
derogation of their property. These fears prompted her to instruct her attorneys to inspect the validity 
of certain plans pertaining to the dwelling on the second respondent‟s property.  
63
 Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others  2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) 274 
and 275. The right of action actually accrued to the applicants‟ predecessor in title because she 
was an “affected person” in terms of s 24(2)(a) of LUPO. The Richardson court decided that, as 
new owners of the property, the applicants now had this right of action. Yekiso AJ held that the 
previous owner of Erf 4551 Hout Bay had the rights to lawful and procedurally fair administrative 
action in terms of s 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 
(“Interim Constitution”) (which was applicable at the time the administrative decision was taken) 
and, in terms of s 7(4) of the Interim Constitution, the right to have standing to apply to an 
appropriate court if these rights were infringed upon. These rights  were considered to be 
incidental to ownership and were therefore transferred to the applicants when ownership of the 
property passed. See AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 364. 
64
 Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others  2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) 272 
and 275. The local authority‟s decision to dispense with the advertising of the subdivision 
application contravened s 24(2)(a) of LUPO. Section 24(2)(a) requires that an application for 
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of the subdivision to be an inappropriate remedy.65 Instead, it ordered that the matter 
should be remitted to the first respondent to consider imposing height restrictions on 
the present and future buildings of the subdivided land.66 Van der Walt considers this 
decision as an example of courts‟ “willingness to consider a compromise” if the 
illegality of a building is the result of a “bona fide mistake or oversight”.67 He argues 
that the applicants had an opportunity to protect the view from their property 
indirectly, because of an irregularity in the approval of subdivision.68 It should be 
clear, however, that the objection in this case (although it was focused on the right to 
just administrative action) was based on a substantive right to be informed of and to 
object against the subdivision, and not purely on an administrative oversight. 
In Walele it was established that a property owner may expect her neighbours 
to comply with the applicable zoning scheme. This was confirmed in the Richardson 
judgment, which showed that a property owner is entitled to be informed of and to 
comment on or object against an application for the re-zoning of land. A property 
owner may therefore rely on the protection of the existing view from her property 
insofar as the applicable zoning scheme prevents a neighbouring owner from 
erecting buildings that will interfere with such a view, since she has a substantive 
right to enforce compliance with, or at least to object against the amendment of such 
a scheme. The Richardson decision also indicates that a successor in title who 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
subdivision should be advertised, whereas s 24(2)(b) makes provision for the owner who seeks 
subdivision to comment on the recommendations and objections of persons that might be 
affected by the proposed subdivision. 
65
 Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others  2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) 
277. The court held that an order to set aside the approval for subdivision would cause immense 
financial consequences for the parties involved because a substantial amount of money had 
been spent in the course of developing the erven since the subdivision of the original erf had 
been approved (a dwelling had been erected on Erf 4553 and Erf 7905 had been transferred to 
new owners). 
66
 Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others  2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) 
278. 
67
 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 350. 
68
 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 349 and 364. 
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wishes to rely on a substantive right to prevent building as a way to protect the view 
from her property has the right to do so, because the right to lawful and procedurally 
fair administrative action is inherent to the ownership of land and is therefore 
acquired by a successor in title.69  
 
3 2 2 3 Departure from a zoning scheme 
In Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another70 (“Muller”), the 
applicants succeeded with an application for the review and setting aside of a 
neighbour‟s approved building plans, on the ground that these plans contravened the 
applicable zoning scheme.71 The plans provided for alterations to a building that 
would, once constructed, obstruct the view from the applicants‟ property. The 
applicants showed that the first respondent should not have approved the plans, 
since they proposed a building that would exceed the lawful height restriction;72 
would derogate from the value of their property;73 and because they, as affected 
                                                          
69
 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 364. 
70
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
71
 The applicants were co-trustees of a trust that owned immovable property in Bloubergstrand. The 
second respondent was a close corporation that owned property that directly adjoined that of the 
applicants. The building plans were drawn up for the alteration and extension of the existing house on 
the second respondent‟s property. The first respondent was the local authority, the City of Cape 
Town, which approved the building plans. 
72
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 27, 31 and 
36. The applicants contended that the building plans contravened s 7(1)(a) of the National 
Building Act because the proposed building works would exceed the lawful height limitation. The 
height limitation was prescribed by zoning scheme regulations that were considered to be “any 
other applicable law”. Non-compliance with this limitation therefore implied that the plans did not 
comply with s 7(1) of the Act, in terms of which building plans must comply with applicable law . 
73
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 32. The 
applicants argued that the obstruction of the view from their property would mean that the 
building plans were unlawfully approved since s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the Nat ional Building Act 
provides that a local authority shall refuse to approve an application for building plans if it is 
satisfied that the proposed building will probably or in fact derogate from the value of adjoining 
or neighbouring properties. According to the applicants‟ reasoning the obstruction of the view 
from their property would cause its value to decrease and therefore, in terms of s 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc), the local authority should not have approved the plans. The argument that 
the building plans should not (have) be(en) approved, since they may have resulted in the 
interference with a neighbour‟s enjoyment of her property and consequently have caused her 
property to depreciate is discussed in 3 3 3. Nevertheless, this decision is also partly discussed 
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owners, were denied an opportunity to see and object to the plans.74 On the 
supposition that their neighbour would comply with the applicable zoning 
requirements and specifically the prescribed height limitation, the applicants were 
unconcerned when their neighbour commenced with alterations to the existing 
buildings on its property. However, when the building works reached what the 
applicants considered an unacceptable height, they caused investigations to be 
conducted into the approval of their neighbour‟s building plans.75 They discovered 
that the local authority that approved the plans used the wrong method for 
determining the height that the building works would reach and that it therefore did 
not realise that the proposed alterations would cause the buildings to exceed the 
relevant height restriction as laid down in the zoning scheme.76 Building works that 
exceed the prescribed height limitation constitutes a departure from the applicable 
zoning scheme. Neighbouring owners have a right to be informed of and to object to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
here, as an example of a substantive right to prevent the erection of buildings that can be used 
as an alternative strategy to protect the existing view from a property.  
74
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 5, 20, 33, 62, 
68 and 76. The applicants argued that they were denied an opportunity to object to or comment on 
the relevant plans, despite the fact that the first respondent initially advised them that they will have 
such an opportunity. In response to the question why they did not afford the applicants an opportunity 
to comment on the plans, the first respondent commented that they found the plans to be compliant 
with the applicable zoning scheme regulations. The court held that the approval of the plans without 
giving the applicant‟s an opportunity to object or comment, in circumstances where they ought to have 
been given such an opportunity, was procedurally unfair. This procedural irregularity was one of the 
court‟s grounds for ruling that the plans were wrongly approved. The applicants‟ complaint that they 
were not given notice of the application for the approval of the plans does not seem to be based on 
the ground that the plans‟ departure from the relevant zoning scheme entitled them to an opportunity 
to be heard. Instead, it is based on the reasoning that they should have been given an opportunity to 
be heard because the potential effect that the proposed construction would have on the amenity 
enjoyed on the applicants‟ property was evident.  
75
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 11. 
76
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 55, 57, 58, 
61, 64, 67 and 68. The zoning scheme regulations that applied to the property in question  
expressly provided a method for the measuring of a building‟s height. However, this method was 
not used by the local authority when it considered the second respondent‟s building plans. The 
use of an incorrect method to determine the height of the proposed constructions constituted a 
formal shortcoming in the process through which these building plans were approved. The 
Muller decision is therefore also discussed in 3 3 2 as an example of a case where a formal 
shortcoming in the approval of building plans stalled the erection of a building that would 
obstruct the existing view from a neighbouring property.  
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building plans that propose such a departure.77 The applicants, who were denied the 
opportunity to see and object to the plans, therefore had a substantive right to attack 
their approval. Consequently, they had the opportunity to protect the view from their 
property either temporarily or permanently. If the approval of their neighbour‟s 
building plans was reviewed but confirmed to be lawful, the existing view from their 
property would only have been protected for the time that it took for the appeal 
proceedings to be conducted (therefore temporarily). However, if the applicants 
could indicate that there were sufficient reasons why the plans should not have been 
approved and should never be approved, their appeal would succeed and the 
approval would be set aside permanently. The court held that there indeed were 
enough reasons indicating that the plans should not have been approved.78 
Consequently, the applicants succeeded in having the approval of their neighbour‟s 
building plans set aside and therefore permanently prevented the construction of 
unlawful buildings that would obstruct the existing view from their property. Their 
view was therefore protected insofar as the applicable zoning scheme prevented 
buildings that would exceed the prescribed height limitation.  
 
3 2 2 4 Legislation prohibiting building works 
The decision in Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties,79 (“Transnet”) introduced 
the possibility of using “statutory duty” as a basis for the (possibly permanent and 
absolute) protection of an existing view. In terms of section 74 of the National Ports 
Act, the National Ports Authority is, inter alia, responsible for maintaining adequate 
and efficient lighthouses to assist in the navigation of ships. In Transnet the first 
                                                          
77
 See 3 2 1 for a discussion of a neighbouring owner‟s right to be heard when building plans that 
depart from the applicable zoning scheme are considered for approval. 
78
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 76-78. 
79
 Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008). 
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respondent‟s development of its property posed a threat to the applicant‟s duty to 
assist in the navigation of ships because the finished building works would have the 
effect of obstructing a lighthouse signal. The court considered the applicant‟s 
statutory duty to operate and maintain the lighthouse as an indication of the fact that 
it had a clear right not to have the view to the lighthouse signal obstructed.80 The 
statute therefore created a (substantive) legal right or duty to keep the line of sight to 
the lighthouse clear. Accordingly, the applicant was entitled to prevent neighbouring 
owners from building (higher) in a way that would obstruct the view to its property.81 
This judgment illustrates that courts may be willing to recognise that a property 
owner has a substantive right to an unobstructed view if she has a statutory 
obligation to protect a direct line-of-view to a specific property.82  
 
3 2 3 Remedies  
The existing view from a property is at least protected insofar as normal building 
regulations, the applicable zoning scheme and restrictive conditions prevent the 
erection of buildings that may obstruct it. Therefore, in a situation where a property 
owner plans to erect or has erected a building that does not comply with these 
requirements or limitations, neighbouring owners have a right to be informed of and 
                                                          
80
 Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008) 
paras 11 and 13. 
81
 This case is distinguishable from the other cases discussed in this chapter, because it involves the 
obstruction of the view to, and not from, a property. Nevertheless, it corresponds with the other cases 
in the sense that it concerns the right to protect an existing, unobstructed view against obstruction 
caused by another owner‟s building works. 
82
 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 373 discusses Transnet in the context of case law on 
sunlight, natural light, the free flow of air and privacy. He considers direct line-of-sight views, together 
with access to direct sunlight and free flow of air, to play an important role in the modern day use of 
land for sun or wind power and contends that lighthouse signals rely on direct line-of-sight views. He 
argues that the modern day uses of views require a reconsideration of the Roman-Dutch law 
conception that a view is only an incidental advantage of landownership.  
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to object to the departure. The Muller decision83 shows that in instances where a 
substantive right is used to prevent building works that do not comply with these 
regulations the existing view from a property may be protected to the extent that the 
applicable building regulations, zoning scheme or restrictive conditions prohibit 
building works that would interfere with such a view. However, if the procedural 
irregularity is attributable to a bona fide mistake or oversight, courts will probably try 
to reach a compromise to ensure that neighbours‟ interests are indeed (at least 
partly) protected, despite the fact that they had not been given an opportunity to 
comment on or object against the plans before they were approved. In Richardson,84 
the process of approving building plans that involved the subdivision of a property 
was not repeated to enforce affected owners‟ right to be heard, but their interest in 
preventing the subdivision, namely that it would result in the erection of buildings that 
would obstruct the view from their property, was nevertheless protected to a certain 
extent. The court ordered that the relevant local authority should consider imposing 
height restrictions on the existing and future buildings on the subdivided land.85 Such 
height limitations would prevent the obstruction of the existing view from the affected 
neighbours‟ property. 
Furthermore, the Transnet judgment86 indicates that in instances where a 
property owner has a statutory right or duty to protect the undisturbed view to or from 
her property, courts may be prepared to enforce such a right or duty, even if it would 
prevent neighbouring owners from exercising their right to develop their properties 
                                                          
83
 See the discussion of Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) 
in 3 2 2 3. 
84
 Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others 2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C), 
discussed in 3 2 2 2. 
85
 Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others 2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) 278. 
See the discussion of this judgment by AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 349-350.  
86
 Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008), 
examined in 3 2 2 4. 
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within the parameters provided by restrictive conditions, zoning schemes and 
building regulations. 
Therefore, a property owner (A) can prevent the erection of a neighbour‟s (B‟s) 
building works that would obstruct the existing view from her property with a 
substantive right in terms of which she was entitled to be informed of, to comment 
on, and sometimes required to consent to the relevant building plans, but was denied 
such an opportunity. In some cases, A‟s right to object can amount to a veto,87 while 
in other instances her objection may be overruled either by a court88 or by a local 
authority.89 If A insists on having an opportunity to see, object against or grant 
permission to the approval of B‟s building plans, courts have to enforce A‟s right to 
see, object or consent to the relevant plans if the approval involves removal or 
amendment of a restrictive condition, amendment of the existing zoning scheme or 
compliance with statutory duties or obligations. Accordingly, they have to ensure that 
the correct procedure is followed, implying that the approval process has to be 
repeated and that this time around, neighbours have to be informed of the 
application, and must be given an opportunity to see, comment and in some cases, 
to approve of the proposed building plans. If the neighbours then provide sufficient 
reasons why the plans should not be approved, for example why the applicable 
zoning scheme should not be departed from, or if they have to consent to the 
approval, but withhold such permission, the obstruction of the views from their 
                                                          
87
 A‟s right to object may amount to a veto of the approval of B‟s building plans if A has a statutory 
duty to prevent the obstruction of a line of view to a lighthouse, or if B applied for the removal of a 
restrictive condition in terms of the common law. Instances where an affected owner may prevent the 
erection of buildings on a neighbouring property are discussed in 3 2 1, 3 2 2 1 and 3 2 2 4. 
88
 A‟s objections against B‟s building plans may be overruled by a court or another state functionary if 
B‟s application included an application for the removal of a restrictive condition in terms of RORA, 
since it was held in Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 21 that the 
removal of a restrictive condition in terms of RORA may be granted notwithstanding objections that 
were raised by affected landowners. See 3 2 2 1. 
89
 A‟s objections would, for example, be overruled by a local authority if it grants B‟s application for a 
departure from the relevant zoning scheme despite her (A‟s) objections. 
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properties will be prevented permanently. If they do not provide sufficient reasons, or 
if they are not entitled to veto the approval, the plans may be approved, possibly with 
qualifications or restrictions. In the latter instance, the neighbours could at least have 
succeeded in stalling the building works that would obstruct their views until the 
plans were properly approved, unless the unlawful building works have already 
reached a height that obstruct their views.  
 
3 3 Procedural strategies 
3 3 1 Basis of procedural strategies to prevent building 
Case law indicates that South African property owners have used provisions in the 
National Building Act to prevent the erection of buildings on neighbouring land in 
instances where they did not have substantive rights to prevent such building works, 
in the sense that the proposed building complies with and does not depart from any 
existing legislation, the zoning scheme or restrictive conditions. Very often, these 
strategies rely on purely procedural shortcomings in the process of considering and 
granting permission to build. Section 5(1), read together with sections 6(1) and 7(1) 
of the National Building Act, for example requires that a building control officer must 
be appointed and compels a local authority to consider such an officer‟s 
recommendations in the process of approving building plans. If a building plan has 
been approved without complying with the obligatory provisions set out in sections 
5(1), 6(1) and 7(1), the irregularity in the administrative process through which the 
plans were approved would render such a decision (approval) unlawful. An attack on 
the approval procedure could thus be used to frustrate or delay the erection of 
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building works that might interfere with an existing view, even though the objector 
had no substantive right to be informed of or object against approval of the plans. 
The procedural strategies often rely on section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the National 
Building Act, which provides a list of factors that, if present, would disqualify building 
plans from approval.90 Section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) specifically directs a local authority 
to refuse to approve an application for building plans if it is satisfied that the erection 
of the proposed building “will probably or in fact derogate from the value of adjoining 
or neighbouring properties”. This provision gives a local authority a discretionary 
power and has been applied to attack the approval of building plans that would allow 
the erection of buildings that are otherwise completely lawful but will interfere with 
the existing views from neighbouring properties. Two different strategies, based on 
these provisions in the National Building Act, have been employed in attempts to 
protect hitherto undisturbed views. 
                                                          
90
 Section 7(1) of the National Building Act reads as follows:  
“7. Approval by local authorities in respect of erection of buildings.  
 (1) If a local authority, having considered a recommendation referred 
to in section 6(1)(a) – 
  (a) Is satisfied that the application in question complies 
with all the requirements of this Act and any other applicable law, it shall 
grant its approval in respect thereof; 
  (b) (i) Is not so satisfied; or 
   (ii) Is satisfied that the building to which 
the application in question relates –  
    (aa) is to be erected in such 
a manner or will be of such nature or appearance that – 
     (aaa) the area 
in which it is to be erected will probably or in fact be 
disfigured thereby; 
     (bbb) it will 
probably or in fact be unsightly or objectionable;  
     (ccc) it will 
probably or in fact derogate from the value of 
adjoining or neighbouring properties; 
    (bb) will probably or in fact 
be dangerous to life or property, such local authority shall 
refuse to grant its approval in respect thereof and give 
written reasons for such refusal”. 
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One strategy is to contest the approval of building plans on the basis of 
irregularities in the approval process. Such irregularities may include instances 
where a property owner builds without any building plans; situations where a building 
is constructed in terms of building plans, but the plans have not been approved 
properly or in accordance with the applicable zoning scheme; and cases where there 
are properly approved building plans, but the buildings are not constructed according 
to the approved plans. If one of these procedural irregularities occurs, the erection of 
the building or structure is unlawful and the construction can thus be delayed through 
a procedural attack on the approval process. However, these procedural 
irregularities can usually be corrected if the plans are again submitted for approval 
and the correct procedure is followed. Therefore, the success of such a purely 
procedural attack on the approval of building plans that would allow the construction 
of buildings that will interfere with an existing view is mostly temporary.  
A second strategy in which the provisions of the National Building Act are used 
to prevent the construction of building works is where an owner questions the 
discretion exercised when a decision maker decides to approve building plans that, 
once executed, would obstruct the existing views from her property. When a litigant 
attacks a decision maker‟s discretion in an attempt to protect the existing view from 
her property, she would typically argue that the view from her property contributes to 
the property‟s market value and that the decision maker was therefore, in terms of 
section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc), obliged to refuse the approval of the building plans that 
proposed the erection of buildings that would obstruct such a view.91 This argument 
                                                          
91
 The way in which a court interprets s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act plays an 
important role in its decision about whether or not such an application should be successful. In 
this regard, see Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 54-56, 
where the Constitutional Court interpreted this section, and see True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v 
Madhi and Another (Ethekwini Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) paras 20-
24, 33-39, 46-48 and 94-97, for the interpretation given by the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
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might seem to suggest that section 7 of the National Building Act creates a 
substantive right to prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbouring property. 
However, according to case law there is no reason why a decision maker should 
acknowledge the enjoyment of the existing views from neighbouring properties as a 
substantive right when considering an application for the approval of building plans 
that otherwise comply with all applicable legislation and the zoning scheme.92  
Conflicting decisions such as Walele93 and True Motives 8494 created some 
confusion regarding the interpretation of section 7.95 Case law shows that, in 
principle, a substantive right to prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbouring 
property only exists where the beneficiary had a substantive property right to be 
informed of, to object against, and in some cases to withhold permission for the 
approval of a neighbour‟s building plans.96 Conversely, other cases indicate that the 
right to object against a neighbour‟s building works in terms of section 7 only comes 
into existence once a local authority has exercised its discretion in a certain way 
(namely to grant approval of such building plans), which shows that an attempt to 
prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbouring property in terms of this section 
amounts to a strategy that is purely based on procedural considerations.97 
                                                          
92
 See the discussions of Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D); Clark v Faraday and 
Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) and De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] 
ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 2006), discussed in 3 3 3 1 and 3 3 3 2. 
93
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC). 
94
 True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another (Ethekwini Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 2009 (4) 
SA 153 (SCA). 
95
 See the discussion of these decisions in 3 2 1. 
96
 The discussions of Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) in 
3 2 2 3; Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others 2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C) in 
3 2 2 2 and Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 
2008) in 3 2 2 4 indicate that these decisions show examples of instances where property owners 
have pre-existing, substantive rights to prevent the erection of buildings on neighbouring properties. 
97
 In Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D); Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 
564 (C) and De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 
November 2006) property owners wanted to object against the approval of their neighbours‟ building 
plans, in terms of section 7 of the National Building Act, on the ground that the relevant local 
authorities should not have approved the plans. These decisions are discussed in 3 3 3 1 and 3 3 3 2. 
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If a property owner attacks a potential threat against her existing view on the 
basis of irregularities in the process for approving a neighbour‟s building plans, she 
only has to prove that there was non-compliance with a prescribed procedural 
requirement and that the approval was therefore unlawful.98 Conversely, if she 
attacks a decision maker‟s exercise of a discretion in approving the building plans, 
interpretation of the provisions that grant the decision maker such a discretion comes 
into play. 
 
3 3 2 Procedural shortcomings 
3 3 2 1 Application 
The Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Paola v Jeeva NO and Others99 (“Paola”) 
concerns a property owner‟s attempt to attack a purely procedural shortcoming in the 
approval of a neighbour‟s building plans as a strategy to prevent building works that 
would obstruct the existing view from his property.100 The approval of the building 
                                                          
98
 The National Building Act prescribes certain prerequisites for the construction of a building to 
be valid. This includes that building plans must be submitted for approval by the relevant local 
authority (s 4) and that the local authority shall either grant or refuse approval of the plans after 
considering recommendations made by a building control officer (ss 5 to7). In Paola v Jeeva NO 
and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) an application for setting aside a local authority‟s decision to 
approve a neighbour‟s building plans was successful because there was no building control 
officer in the local authority‟s service when the application was approved. Therefore, the process 
did not comply with the requirements set out in ss 5(1), 6(1) and 7(1) of the National Building 
Act. 
99
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). The court a quo’s decision is discussed in 
3 3 3.  
100
 This case came before the Supreme Court of Appeal as an appeal against the dismissal of the 
appellant‟s application for the review and setting aside of the third respondent‟s decision to approve 
building plans for a neighbouring property. The building plans were submitted by the first and second 
respondents, who were the trustees of a trust that owned a property adjacent to that of the appellant. 
Originally, in Paolo v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D), the appellant (then the applicant) 
attacked the third respondent‟s (local authority‟s) approval of the building plans on the following 
grounds: Firstly, the appellant contended that in terms of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building 
Act, the third respondent may not have approved the plans, since the proposed building‟s size and 
position would probably or in fact cause the value of the appellant‟s property to decrease. Secondly, it 
was maintained that the relevant official failed to apply her mind properly when she gave 
consideration to the plans. Thirdly, it was argued that the plans did not comply with the town planning 
regulations regarding requirements that are set for rear spaces. After the dismissal of the application 
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plans contravened section 5(1) of the National Building Act, which requires local 
authorities to appoint building control officers, and sections 6(1) and 7(1) that further 
require a local authority to consider the recommendations of such an officer, since 
no building control officer was employed by the relevant local authority at the time 
when the plans in question were approved.101 The court held that the appointment of 
a building control officer and a local authority‟s consideration of such an officer‟s 
recommendations constitute jurisdictional facts that are prerequisites for the lawful 
exercise of the statutory power to approve building plans.102 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal consequently set the approval of the building plans aside on the ground that 
they were approved in terms of an unlawful administrative process.103 
Kidd discusses Paola inter alia with regard to the implication of the 
administrative irregularity.104 Dealing with the court‟s assessment of the validity of 
the building plans, he argues that the court should have taken the intention of the 
legislature into account. He reasons that the objective of regulating the appointment 
and functions of a building control officer in sections 5 and 6 of the National Building 
Act is to maintain building standards. This objective will be served equally well 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in the court a quo, the appellant discovered that the third respondent did not have a building control 
officer employed when the first and second respondents‟ building plans were approved. 
101
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) paras 6-7. 
102
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) paras 11-16. In terms of s 5(1) of the 
National Building Act a local authority must appoint a building control officer. Section 6(1)(a) of 
the Act provides that one of the functions of a building control officer is to make 
recommendations to a local authority regarding building plans, while s 7(1) requires a local 
authority to consider such recommendations when deciding whether or not to approve an 
application for building plans. In Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and 
Another v Harrison and Another 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC) paras 14 and 34, Brand AJ followed the 
reasoning in Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 11. The judge 
commented that s 7(1) of the National Building Act “requires a recommendation by the  building 
control officer as a precondition for any decision to be taken by the City on an application for 
approval in terms of s 4”. Brand AJ also referred to the fact that in both Walele v City of Cape 
Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) para 55 and True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and 
Another 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 21 the majority and the minority judgments accepted that 
in terms of a decision taken under s 7(1) of the National Building Act, “recommendation” is a 
jurisdictional fact. 
103
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 16.  
104
 M Kidd “„The view I behold on a sunshiny day‟: Paola v Jeeva NO” (2005) 122 SALJ 556-
562 at 556-558. 
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whether recommendations made by a building control officer or by a person with the 
same skills and expertise as a building control officer are considered before building 
plans are approved. The fact that the building plans in Paola had not been 
considered by a building control officer did therefore not necessarily constitute the 
absence of a jurisdictional fact that rendered the building plans invalid. He concludes 
that the Supreme Court of Appeal probably followed a too rigid approach in Paola, 
since the administrative process for the approval of the building plans did indeed 
serve the objective of maintaining building standards.105  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Paola set the local authority‟s decision to 
approve the first and second respondents‟ building plans aside on the basis that 
there was a procedural shortcoming. Consequently, the first and second 
respondents could not continue with the erection of the proposed building. This 
effectively prevented the obstruction of the existing view from the appellant‟s 
property. However, because it was merely a procedural irregularity that temporarily 
stalled the approval of the building plans, the prevention of the interference with the 
existing view from the appellant‟s property was only temporary, since the 
shortcoming can be rectified and the plans could subsequently be approved lawfully, 
without the neighbours being able to object.106 This would be true of most, if not all, 
purely procedural attacks of this kind. 
 
                                                          
105
 M Kidd “„The view I behold on a sunshiny day‟: Paola v Jeeva NO” (2005) 122 SALJ 556-562 at 
557-558. 
106
 M Kidd “„The view I behold on a sunshiny day‟: Paola v Jeeva NO” (2005) 122 SALJ 556-562 at 
558. 
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3 3 2 2 Remedies 
The Muller decision,107 like the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s decision in Paola,108 
shows that a procedural shortcoming in the process of approving building plans may 
prevent the obstruction of the existing view from a property.109 In both these 
judgments, the courts set the approval of building plans aside because procedural 
irregularities rendered the approval processes unlawful. The courts‟ rulings had the 
same effect in both cases, namely that the view from a neighbouring property was 
indirectly protected because the building plans, in terms of which a building that 
would interfere with such a view would be erected, were set aside. However, 
although these orders resulted in the protection of the existing views from the 
respective properties, such protection was only temporary since the procedural 
irregularities could be rectified. In a case where a court sets the approval of building 
plans aside on a mere formal shortcoming, it may, as was the case in Paola, 
temporarily prevent interference with the existing view from a neighbour‟s property. 
However, such an irregularity can be rectified and the neighbour whose view will be 
affected by the proposed construction will still neither have the right to be informed if 
the plans are resubmitted nor will she have the right to object against such plans, 
provided they comply with all the formal and procedural requirements. Therefore, in 
cases where there has been a formal irregularity but where no substantive right of 
another person was affected, plans may be resubmitted and approved without 
informing neighbours of the “repeat procedure” or giving them the opportunity to 
                                                          
107
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
108
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA), discussed in 3 3 2 1. 
109
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 55, 57, 58, 61, 
64, 67 and 68. The court in Muller set aside the approval of the second respondent‟s building plans, 
inter alia, on the ground that the local authority that approved the plans used the wrong method for 
determining the height of the proposed building works. The Muller decision is more extensively 
discussed in 3 2 2 3 as an example of a neighbouring owner‟s right to be heard when a building plan 
involves a departure from the applicable zoning scheme, and in 3 3 3 as an illustration of the 
argument that the existing view from a property contributes to the property‟s value. 
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participate in the (second) approval process. This means that the benefits that 
neighbours may derive from building plans being set aside because of purely 
procedural irregularities will probably at most result in the temporary “protection” of 
an existing view.  
 
3 3 3 Questioning a decision maker’s discretion 
3 3 3 1 Application 
The court in New Adventure Investments 193 (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for the time being 
of the SAS Trust110 (“New Adventure Investments”) indirectly indicated that the view 
from a property is a factor that contributes to the property‟s value. The plaintiff 
instituted action against the defendant for cancellation of a deed of sale since the 
defendant sold him a piece of property without informing him that a development was 
planned for the property right in front of the object of the sale. He also argued that a 
prospective buyer of a sea fronting property would be influenced by the fact that a 
development that would obstruct the views from such a property is planned for a 
neighbouring property.111 He alleged that the defendant‟s fraudulent non-disclosure 
of this information constituted a sufficient basis for cancellation of the contract.112  
The court concluded that the view from the sale property was of great 
importance to a prospective purchaser and to the plaintiff in particular.113 It decided 
                                                          
110
 New Adventure Investments 193 (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for the time being of the SAS Trust  
[2002] 3 All SA 544 (C). 
111
 The property in this case was situated in Sea Point and had a magnificent view of the Atlantic 
Seaboard. 
112
 New Adventure Investments 193 (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for the time being of the SAS Trust 
[2002] 3 All SA 544 (C) paras 1-3. 
113
 New Adventure Investments 193 (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for the time being of the SAS Trust 
[2002] 3 All SA 544 (C) paras 6 and 35-37. The court had to determine whether there was a 
legal duty on the defendant to inform the plaintiff that an application was lodged for the proposed 
development. It further had to decide whether or not the non-disclosure of this information 
constituted fraudulent misrepresentation. According to the court‟s reasoning, fraudulent non -
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that the erection of the proposed block of flats would seriously impede this view and 
that the plaintiff‟s decision to contract would have been affected if he had knowledge 
of the fact that there was a real possibility of such a development. The non-
disclosure was therefore considered to be germane to the sale of the property.114 
The court granted judgment in favour of the plaintiff on the grounds that the 
defendant deliberately and with the intention of inducing him to conclude the 
contract, withheld certain material facts from him, and that the defendant failed in his 
legal duty to disclose this information.115 The court therefore acknowledged that the 
existing view from a property may be of significant importance in cases where the 
value of the affected property is at stake. In view of the wording of section 7(1)(b)(ii) 
of the National Building Act, this decision might create the impression that an attack 
on the approval of building plans could be construed around the argument that the 
plans may not be approved if the building will derogate from neighbouring properties‟ 
value by destroying their existing views. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
disclosure can give rise to the cancellation of a contract if, inter alia, the fact that is not 
disclosed is material to the contract. In determining whether knowledge of the application for the 
proposed development was material to the contract, the court considered the circumstances of 
this specific case. It focused on the question whether the disclosure of this information before 
the conclusion of the contract would have prevented the plaintiff from concluding the contract.  If 
the court decided in favour of the plaintiff, in other words, if the court concluded that there was a 
legal duty on the defendant to disclose the information about the proposed development to the 
plaintiff and that the non-disclosure thereof constituted fraudulent misrepresentation, the 
defendant‟s counterclaim (defendant counterclaimed breach of contract on the side of the 
plaintiff or, in the alternative, repudiation of the contract by the plaintiff) would fail. However, if 
the court‟s decision was against the plaintiff, the court would have had to determine whether the 
plaintiff‟s actions amounted to a breach of contract or repudiation of the contract.  
114
 New Adventure Investments 193 (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for the time being of the SAS Trust 
[2002] 3 All SA 544 (C) paras 37, 42 and 43. Moosa J stated that, in order to determine the 
materiality of the non-disclosure in this particular case, the court had to determine whether or 
not the non-disclosure of the application for proposed development was germane to the sale of 
the property. He concluded that the information that the defendant failed to disclose was indeed 
a material fact. Moosa J considered the plaintiff‟s conduct, namely that he cancelled the contract 
when he became aware of the potential threat to the panoramic view, as a confirm ation of the 
fact that the non-disclosure was germane to the sale of the property.  
115
 New Adventure Investments 193 (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for the time being of the SAS Trust 
[2002] 3 All SA 544 (C) para 69. This discussion only focuses on the court‟s consideration of the 
materiality of the information that was not disclosed to the plaintiff. The focus is on this aspect of 
the judgment because the information that was not disclosed concerned the potential obstruction 
of the view from a property.  
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In the a quo decision in Paola v Jeeva NO and Others,116 the Durban and 
Coast Local Division considered the possibility of protecting the view from one 
owner‟s property against obstruction caused by the erection of a building on her 
neighbour‟s property.117 The applicant maintained that view is a factor that should be 
taken into account when determining the value of a property118 and that the approval 
of the respondents‟ building plans was inconsistent with section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the 
National Building Act (“the Act”) because the execution of the plans would cause the 
obstruction of the view from his property and consequently cause the property to 
depreciate. According to the applicant‟s interpretation of this provision, the value of a 
property includes a value that is attributable to the view from the property. Therefore, 
a local authority should consider whether or not a proposed building would obstruct 
the view from a neighbouring property before approving the relevant building plans. 
Conversely, the respondents argued that view has no value for planning purposes 
and that the development of the first and second respondents‟ property should 
therefore not be prohibited in order to preserve the applicant‟s view. The 
respondents also considered the application of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the Act 
and contended that this provision concerns the general effect that the erection of a 
building would have on neighbouring or adjoining properties, and not only its effect 
on a specific property.119 
The court rejected the applicant‟s interpretation of section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, 
reasoning that if the applicant‟s interpretation was followed, property owners would 
                                                          
116
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D). 
117
 The first and second respondents were the trustees of a trust that owned property adjacent to 
the applicant‟s property. The local authority was the third respondent. The applicant in this case 
lodged an application for the first and second respondents‟ building plans to be set aside. These 
building plans, which were approved by the local authority, provided for the construction of a 
double-storey residence on the first and second respondents‟ property.  
118
 Paolo v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D) 395. 
119
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D) 403-404. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
100 
be treated according to the order in which their respective properties were 
developed.120 Such an interpretation would result in the arbitrary treatment of owners 
and would therefore be inconsistent with the constitutional demands for the 
promotion of equality and rationality.121 The court approved of the respondents‟ 
argument that protection of the right to an existing view122 would cause chaos and 
confusion in the world of property development.123 Furthermore, the protection of the 
right to a view may harm the effective administration of justice by creating a new 
category of claims. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.124 
The applicant in the court a quo‟s decision in Paola did not have a substantive 
right to protect the existing view from his property, since this view was not protected 
with a servitude or a restrictive condition and he was not aware of any procedural or 
substantive irregularities regarding the approval of his neighbour‟s building plans. 
Consequently, he relied on the argument that the erection of a building that will 
obstruct the existing view from his property will affect the property‟s market value.125 
When the court rejected this argument, the applicant instituted appeal 
                                                          
120
 If s 7(1)(b)(ii) of the National Building Act is interpreted the way in which the applicant 
suggested, namely that view attributes to the value of a property, it would have the effect that an 
owner who develops her property first would be able object to the building plans of an owner 
who wants to develop her property later, since it would be difficult for a developer later in time 
not to cause a decrease in the value of the first developer‟s property.  
121
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D) 404 and 406. Kondile J referred to S v 
Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 156, where Ackermann J concluded that  
“Arbitrary action or decision-making is incapable of providing a rational explanation 
as to why similarly placed persons are treated in a substantially different way.”  
122
 The applicant‟s interpretation of s 7(1)(b)(ii) of the National Building Act effectively promoted 
a right to a view. 
123
 This was the professional opinion of architect Elphick, who was instructed by the first and 
second respondents. See Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D) 397 and 406. A 
similar argument was made by Lord Blackburn in the English case Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 AC 
740 (HL) 24 para C (“Dalton v Angus”), who reasoned that prospect should not be acquired 
through prescription because such a way of acquiring the right to have a view would inhibit the 
development of towns. According to Lord Blackburn, the acknowledgment of a right to a view 
would have a negative effect on urban development. The decision in Dalton v Angus is 
examined in Ch 4. 
124
 Paolo v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D) 406. 
125
 This argument was based on s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act, which prohibits a 
local authority to approve building plans if their execution will cause a neighbouring property to 
depreciate. 
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proceedings.126 During the appeal, it became apparent that there was indeed a 
purely procedural irregularity that rendered the approval of the plans unlawful from 
the outset. The Supreme Court of Appeal set the approval of the second 
respondent‟s building plans aside because of this procedural irregularity. However, 
the court also commented on whether or not building plans that propose a building 
that would obstruct the existing view from a neighbouring property cause a 
“derogation from the value” of a neighbouring property that renders them (the plans) 
unfit for approval in terms of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the Act.127 The court was 
of the opinion that the word “value” should be given its ordinary meaning of market 
value and that the wording used by the legislature cannot be understood to exclude 
the value that flows from a view that can be enjoyed from a property. Therefore, if it 
is clear that the execution of certain building plans will cause a depreciation of an 
adjoining property, the plans should, according to the wording of section 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the Act, not be approved.128 This interpretation of section 7 of 
the Act, namely that a local authority may only approve building plans if it is satisfied 
                                                          
126
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). The appeal decision is discussed in 
3 3 2. 
127
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) paras 17, 19 and 20. The court was 
requested by counsel for all the parties to give its opinion on this matter. The appellant‟s 
argument was that, in terms of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act, the third 
respondent may not have approved the proposed building plans. The reason for this was that 
the position and height of the proposed building would impair upon the view from the appellant‟s 
property and thereby cause its value to decrease. The court mentioned that it was emphasised 
by appellant‟s council that the appellant did not contend to have the  right to a view. Rather, he 
argued that he had the right that plans for a neighbouring property may not be passed unless all 
the necessary statutory requirements have been complied with. The first and second 
respondents argued that the obstruction of the view from a property should not be taken into 
account for the purpose of establishing whether or not a proposed building would cause 
neighbouring properties to depreciate. The respondents further relied on the fact that the 
appellant did not have a servitude of prospect registered over the property of the first and 
second respondent and that the proposed building plans for the latter‟s property complied with 
the requirements that were set out in the town planning regulations.  
128
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 23. This opinion contravened the 
finding of the court a quo in Paolo v Jeeva 2002 (2) SA 391 (D) 406. Kondile J, in the court a 
quo, dismissed the notion that the pleasurable view from a property should be afforded 
protection because it may attribute to the value of a property. He reasoned that if the view from 
a property was afforded such protection, it may have the unwanted effect of leading to a 
multiplicity of actions. 
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that none of the undesirable outcomes mentioned in section 7(1)(b)(ii) will eventuate, 
may therefore have created the impression that a property owner has an indirect 
right to the existing view from her property. 
Van der Walt129 submits that the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s decision in Paola 
is often mistakenly cited as authority for the proposition that South African courts 
regard the view from a property as an actionable right. In fact, the court did not make 
a binding ruling on this issue, since the ratio of the decision concerned the purely 
procedural shortcoming regarding the non-appointment of a building control 
officer.130 Kidd argues that the decision in Paola does not “constitute a radical new 
direction for neighbour law”.131 According to Kidd, there are certain instances where 
the “social utility of a development should outweigh the market value of a particular 
property”.132 He argues that, in terms of the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s judgment in 
Paola, section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the Act compels a local authority to reject 
building plans if such plans will have a negative effect on the market value of a 
neighbouring property. The decision to reject such plans will therefore take place 
without any consideration being given to the wider social interests that may be 
                                                          
129
 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 364. 
130
 In True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another  (Ethekwini Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 
2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) paras 25-35 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the remark made by 
the court in Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) regarding the protection of the 
view from a property was obiter. In Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) 
[2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 February 2009) para 13 the Cape High Court agreed that the judgment 
in Paola did not establish a right to an existing view. In this regard, see AJ van der Walt The law 
of neighbours (2010) 366, 371 and 376. PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 127 cites Paola as authority for the principle that 
a property owner is not entitled to claim a right to a view. However, KM Kritzinger “Right to a 
view? Re Paola v Jeeva Case no 475 / 2002 SCA” (2004) 67 THRHR 150-153, reasons that 
Paola established that a property owner does have the right to protect the view from her 
property. 
131
 M Kidd “„The view I behold on a sunshiny day‟: Paola v Jeeva NO” (2005) 122 SALJ 556-
562 at 556. 
132
 M Kidd “„The view I behold on a sunshiny day‟: Paola v Jeeva NO” (2005) 122 SALJ 556-562 
at 562. 
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served by the development.133 Since the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s consideration of 
section 7 of the Act merely resulted in an obiter remark, this ruling did not establish 
the possible obstruction of the existing view from a neighbouring property as a factor 
that must be taken into account when a local authority decides whether or not to 
approve building plans. The decision can therefore not be considered authority for 
the proposition that section 7 creates a substantive right to prevent the erection of a 
building on a neighbouring property. This conclusion is underlined by subsequent 
decisions. 
The applicant in Clark v Faraday and Another134 (“Clark”) also argued that the 
relevant local authority should have refused to approve his neighbour‟s building 
plans, since section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act prohibits a local 
authority from approving building plans if it appears that the execution of those plans 
may cause a neighbouring property to depreciate.135 The court ruled that section 
7(1)(b)(ii) should be interpreted restrictively to prevent it from having the effect of 
prohibiting the erection of a building purely because it would cause the obstruction of 
the view from a neighbouring property.136 According to Van der Westhuizen AJ, the 
(indirect) protection of the right to a view would be in conflict with the rules and 
                                                          
133
 M Kidd “„The view I behold on a sunshiny day‟: Paola v Jeeva NO” (2005) 122 SALJ 556-562 at 
561. Kidd proposes that this potential problem should be dealt with in the following ways: Firstly, 
“value of adjoining properties” should be interpreted as the value of the community as a whole. 
Secondly, the National Building Act should be amended to ensure that a decision maker considers the 
social utility of a proposed development as a positive factor to be weighed against the negative impact 
that the development may have on the market value of a particular neighbouring owner‟s property. He 
comments that his first proposition is not a good solution, since it is a “strained” interpretation and 
does not give effect to the plain meaning of the words. 
134
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C). 
135
 The neighbour whose building plans were approved was the first respondent and the local 
authority that approved the plans was the second respondent. AJ van der Walt The law of 
neighbours (2010) 367 argues that the applicant‟s argument, namely that the approval of the 
building plans should be set aside because building plans may not be approved if it appears that 
the proposed building would cause the value of a neighbouring property to decrease, is based 
on the obiter part of the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s decision in Paola. 
136
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) 576. The court ruled that the provisions of 
the National Building Act should be interpreted and understood within the context of legal 
principles and rules regulating the development of urban areas.  
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regulations regarding the creation and extinction of praedial servitudes. Moreover, he 
reasoned that such protection would impair an owner‟s common law right to build as 
high as she likes, within the formal restrictions laid down by law and in the applicable 
zoning and building regulations. The application for an urgent interdict to halt the first 
respondent‟s building works was consequently dismissed.137 
In an attempt to protect the existing view from his property, the applicant in De 
Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere138 (“De Kock”) also focused on the 
exercise of a local authority‟s discretionary powers.139 The applicant reasoned that 
the local authority was obliged, in terms of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National 
Building Act, to reject the second and third respondent‟s building plans, since the 
execution of these plans would cause the obstruction of the pleasant view from his 
property, which would have the effect of causing a decrease in the value of his 
                                                          
137
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) 577. W Freedman “Paradise lost? The 
obstruction of a pleasant view and the law of nuisance” in SV Hoctor & PJ Schwikkard (eds) The 
exemplary scholar: Essays in honour of John Milton (2007) 162-184 at 172 asserts that the court in 
Clark was not hesitant to reject the interpretation of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act 
given by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Paola decision. 
138
 De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 
November 2006).  
139
 De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 
November 2006) paras 25 and 30-32. The applicant and the second and third respondents were 
neighbouring owners in the harbour town of Saldanha. In March 2004 the second and third  
respondents applied to the local authority (first respondent) for the approval of building plans. In 
response, the applicant made certain objections. These objections were based on the argument 
that the second and third respondents‟ proposed building work  would block the applicant‟s view 
of the ocean, harbour and town, and would thereby cause the value of his property to decrease. 
Despite these objections, the local authority granted its approval of the building plans. The 
applicant objected a second time but again the local authority rejected the objections because 
the building plans did comply with the municipality‟s building regulations and zoning scheme. 
The first respondent dismissed the applicant‟s objections because it was legally unfounded and 
untenable; no servitude of view or privacy was registered to the applicant‟s advantage; and 
because the disapproval of the building plans under these circumstances would deprive the 
second and third respondents of the right to develop their property. The applicant then applied 
for the review and setting aside of the local authority‟s decision to approve the building plans. 
He argued that the local authority‟s decision was unlawful because it did not apply its mind in 
order to give thorough consideration to the objections. Klopper AJ conceded that, in terms of s 
7(1)(b)(ii)(bb) of the National Building Act and in terms of PAJA, the first respondent was obliged 
to give consideration to the applicant‟s objections.  
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property.140 Klopper AJ concluded that, given the judgment in Clark and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal‟s decision in Paola, the value that is referred to in section 
7 of the National Building Act is the market value of a property. Market value is 
based on the price that an informed and willing buyer is prepared to pay to an 
informed and willing seller for the relevant property. The judge argued that an 
informed buyer would realise that a property owner does not have an inherent right 
to a view and would therefore not attach much value to the existing view from a 
property.141 He ruled that the local authority did give due consideration to the 
applicant‟s objection that the proposed building would cause a decrease in the value 
of his property in terms of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc), thereby confirming that the 
right to an existing view from a property is not indirectly acknowledged by this 
provision. 142 By implication, section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act 
does not compel a local authority to consider, when deciding whether or not to 
approve building plans, that the execution of such plans might interfere with a 
neighbour‟s existing view. Therefore, according to the De Kock court‟s interpretation 
of section 7 of the Act, a local authority is obliged to approve building plans if they 
                                                          
140
 De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 
2006) paras 36-50. The applicant attacked the local authority‟s decision to approve building plans in 
respect of a neighbouring property, arguing that the erection of the proposed building would obstruct 
the view from and hinder the flow of light to his property; cause the value of his property to decrease 
because of the obstruction of the existing view; and infringe upon his privacy. The court rejected the 
first argument on the basis that a property owner does not have an inherent right to an unobstructed 
view. It also rejected the applicant‟s third contention on the basis that privacy is not absolute and may 
be limited as long as the limitation is reasonable and justifiable. The court in De Kock considered the 
common law right to develop one‟s property in terms of municipal building regulations and zoning 
schemes to be a justifiable limitation of another owner‟s right to privacy. The applicants in Sergio 
Mateus Pais Mamede and Others v The Strategic Executive: Department of Housing, City Planning, 
Land and Environmental Planning of the City of Tshwane and Others (10864/02) [2009] ZAGPHC 37 
(25 February 2009) 10 raised a similar argument about the infringement of their privacy. They argued 
that once the fourth respondent‟s building works were completed, one would have a view from his 
property into and over their property. The court found this allegation to be unsubstantiated, since the 
fourth respondent fitted obscured glass in the windows that would overlook the applicants‟ property 
and thereby ensured that their privacy would remain intact. 
141
 De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 
November 2006) paras 43-45.  
142
 De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 
November 2006) paras 46-47. 
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comply with the relevant legal provisions.143 This finding is in line with the judgment 
in Clark. In both of these cases the respective courts refused to set aside properly 
approved building plans. Therefore, these judgments confirm that section 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act does not give a property owner a right 
to prevent the obstruction of a building that would obstruct the existing view from her 
own property.  
The court in Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others144 (“Searle”) 
evaluated the finding in Paola, considered the definition and implications of the word 
“value” in section 7 of the National Building Act and commented on the Constitutional 
Court‟s decision in Walele.145 It stated that the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s judgment 
in Paola was misunderstood inasmuch as it was considered authority for the 
proposition that section 7 absolutely prohibits a local authority from approving 
building plans if the execution of such plans would cause the obstruction of the 
existing view from a neighbouring property.146 According to the Searle court‟s 
interpretation of section 7, a local authority has a statutory duty to enforce the 
applicable legislation and zoning scheme when deciding whether or not to approve 
building plans.147 Furthermore, despite the fact that section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the 
National Building Act prohibits a local authority from approving building plans if their 
                                                          
143
 De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 
November 2006) para 46. 
144
 Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 February 
2009).  
145
 In Searle, the court was requested to grant an interdict that would prohibit the second and third 
respondents from continuing with their building works. The focus of this discussion is on the court‟s 
evaluation of previous case law to establish the scope and application of s 7(1)(b)(ii) of the National 
Building Act. 
146
 Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 February 
2009) para 14. See also AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 371. 
147
 Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 February 
2009) para 10. 
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execution will result in a decrease of another property‟s value, this provision does not 
indirectly afford a property owner a right to the existing view from her property.148  
The argument that section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) does not indirectly give a property 
owner a right to a view was strengthened by the court‟s definition of the word “value” 
as it appears in this particular provision. Referring to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
decision in Paola, the Searle court decided that for these purposes, the value of a 
property is its “market value”. “Market value”, it was held, is determined on the 
assumption that a notional willing seller and purchaser would be informed about the 
existing or potential advantages and disadvantages of the relevant property. A 
notional willing buyer of a property with a view of the ocean will therefore take the 
possibility that this view may be obstructed into consideration before determining the 
price that she is willing to pay.149 
The court‟s interpretation of “market value” resembles that of the court in De 
Kock. In the latter case, the court also considered that the word “value” in section 7 
of the National Building Act refers to the market value of property, which is based on 
the price that an informed and willing buyer is prepared to pay to an informed and 
willing seller of a specific property. Similar to the court‟s contention in Searle, namely 
that a notional informed buyer would be aware of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of the property that she wishes to buy, the court in De Kock argued 
that a willing and informed buyer would be aware of the fact that the owner of 
                                                          
148
 Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 February 
2009) para 12. 
149
 Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 February 
2009) para 13. See also True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another  (Ethekwini Municipality 
as Amicus Curiae) 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) paras 30 and 120, and AJ van der Walt The law of 
neighbours (2010) 376. 
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property does not have an inherent right to or protection of the view from a property 
and would therefore not attach much value to it.150  
The Constitutional Court confirmed this definition and implications of the word 
“value” in section 7. In Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and 
Another v Harrison and Another,151 it explained the applicability of the word “value” 
within the context of this provision, confirming that it refers to “market value”. Market 
value, it was held, is determined by the price that an informed buyer will pay an 
informed seller, taking into account the potential risks that threaten the subject 
property. The Constitutional Court specifically referred to the potential risk that the 
view from a property may be obstructed by later development on a neighbouring 
property. Where such a view directly affects the value of the property (for example, a 
sea fronting property), the informed buyer would give due consideration to the 
potential that it may be obstructed and adjust the price that she is willing to pay 
accordingly. The court continued that an informed buyer would also consider the 
limitations that may be applicable to such a potential new development. However, 
limitations that restrictive conditions, town planning and zoning schemes and 
legislation impose on a neighbour‟s building works would usually not affect the 
market value of a property, because it would effectively be a realisation of a risk that 
was already accounted for. The Constitutional Court concluded that this 
interpretation of the word “value” in section 7 implies that development (building 
work) on property A that affects an attribute that was previously enjoyed from 
property B will not, in itself, diminish the value of property B.152 It held that section 
                                                          
150
 De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 
November 2006) paras 44-45. 
151
 Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and Another v Harrison and Another  2011 
(4) SA 42 (CC) paras 38-40. 
152
 The court added that this would be the case as long as the new development complies with 
legal restrictions. 
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7(1)(b)(ii) only comes into play when a new building complies with legally imposed 
restrictions, but its unattractive or intrusive appearance exceeds the legitimate 
expectations of the parties to the hypothetical sale. In other words, this provision will 
not protect a property owner if the value of her property has depreciated because of 
reasonable and lawful development on a neighbouring property, but only if such a 
development exceeds her legitimate expectations.153 
In Muller,154 the applicants also raised an argument based on section 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act in an attempt to prevent building 
works on a neighbouring property that would interfere with the existing view from 
their property. Besides objecting against their neighbour‟s approved building plans 
on certain substantive and procedural grounds,155 the applicants in Muller reasoned 
that the first respondent acted in breach of its obligations, provided for in section 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act, when it approved the plans. They 
argued that this provision prohibits the approval of building plans if their execution 
will cause a decrease in the value of a neighbouring property. They contended that 
the approved plans would indeed affect the value of their property negatively, since 
they provided for building works that would, once constructed, interfere with the view 
from their property.156 
Yekiso J held that although ownership is an extensive right, it is nevertheless 
subject to law of general application, such as the various town planning ordinances, 
                                                          
153
 Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and Another v Harrison and Another  2011 
(4) SA 42 (CC) para 40.  
154
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
155
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 5, 20, 31-33, 
36, 62, 68 and 76. The applicants‟ right to prevent their neighbour‟s building works, which was based 
on the fact that they were denied an opportunity to see the plans before they were approved, is 
discussed in 3 2 3 and their argument that the building plans should not have been approved because 
the proposed building would exceed the lawful height restriction is examined in 3 3 2. 
156
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 32. 
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the National Building Act, as well as the applicable zoning scheme regulations.157 He 
stressed that one property owner cannot be deprived of the right to develop her 
property to its optimal level because another owner insists on the continued 
enjoyment of a pleasurable amenity. He added, however, that a property owner may 
not contravene the law or affect the rights of a neighbouring property owner when 
she exercises the right to develop her property. Neighbouring owners‟ rights include 
“an amenity which may lawfully be enjoyed therefrom”.158 Since the second 
respondent‟s building plans proposed building works that exceeded the prescribed 
height restriction, he contravened the applicable zoning scheme in the exercise of 
his right to develop his property. Therefore, although he was entitled to develop his 
property to its optimal level, the approved building plans provided for a development 
(building extension) that would exceed this “optimal level”. The court accordingly 
upheld the applicants‟ contention that the building plans should not have been 
approved because the proposed building would decrease the value of their property 
insofar as it will exceed the prescribed height limitations.159Van der Walt argues that 
the decision in Muller is a case-specific decision  
                                                          
157
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 72-74. 
158
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 74. This 
remark was made within the context of assessing whether or not the building plans should have 
been approved. It appears as if Yekiso J implied that the view from a property may be regarded 
as an amenity that enjoys a form of protection against the development of a neighbouring 
property. 
159
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 75. The 
court concluded that the decision to approve the building plans was in contravention of s 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act. It reasoned that s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) prohibits 
the approval of building plans if their execution will probably or in fact cause a decrease in the 
value of a neighbouring property. The execution of the building plans in Muller would have 
resulted in building works that exceeded the height limitation and obstructed the view from the 
applicants‟ property. The court therefore concluded that the first respondent failed to have 
regard to the provisions of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) when it approved the plans. If it did consider this 
provision, it would have realised that the value of the applicants‟ property would decrease 
because the part of the building work that would have exceeded the height limitation would 
obstruct the view from the applicants‟ property. The approval of the building plans was 
consequently declared invalid, since it did not comply with the procedure set out in s 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc). 
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“to the effect that a decision to approve building plans that had been taken in a 
procedurally invalid manner and that allow for deviations from the applicable 
legislative and regulatory framework should be invalidated and set aside if the 
affected owner can show that the building, once completed, would detract from 
the value of her property”.160  
The decision therefore indicates that the approval of building plans that would cause 
a decrease in the value of a neighbouring property may be set aside if it was 
procedurally invalid or if the plans depart from the applicable legislation or zoning 
scheme. Van der Walt emphasises that the approval of building plans will only be set 
aside on the ground that they will cause a decrease in the value of a neighbouring 
property (in terms of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act), if there 
was an irregularity in the approval process or if the plans do not comply with 
applicable legislation and regulations.161 Therefore, the Muller ruling does not imply 
that section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the Act prohibits the approval of building plans 
purely because they will result in the erection of a building that will obstruct the view 
from a neighbouring property.  
In terms of the Constitutional Court‟s interpretation of section 7 in Walele, a 
decision-maker may only approve building plans when it is satisfied that the relevant 
legal requirements have been adhered to, and that none of the disqualifying factors 
in section 7(1)(b)(ii) will ensue once the proposed building has been erected. 
Furthermore, the approval of any plans that facilitate the erection of a building that 
will cause one of the unwanted outcomes, for example if the building would 
depreciate a neighbouring property, may be set aside on review.162 Accordingly, in 
order to have the approval of building plans set aside, an applicant would for 
                                                          
160
 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 369. 
161
 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 369. 
162
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 54-55. 
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instance only have to prove that the erection of the proposed building would diminish 
the value of her property. This approach to section 7 sets a low benchmark for 
rejecting building plans, since it prohibits a decision maker from approving building 
plans unless she is satisfied that the necessary legal requirements are met and that 
none of the disqualifying factors will be triggered by the erection of the proposed 
building.163 Furthermore, it sets a light burden of proof for property owners wanting to 
have their neighbour‟s building plans set aside on review.164  
The court in Searle considered the two-phase inquiry used in Walele.165 If 
satisfied that the relevant building plans comply with the applicable legislation and 
regulations, a decision maker would make an second inquiry in terms of section 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa) of the National Building Act. Binns-Ward AJ (in Searle) reasoned that 
the nature of this second step is that of a “sensitivity assessment” because it entails 
that consideration is given to the interests of neighbouring property owners in order 
to ensure that the erection of the proposed building would not negatively affect their 
properties. It is aimed at determining whether or not an applicant‟s use of her 
property, as provided for in the building plans, is reasonable in terms of the effect 
that it will have on her neighbours. He rejected the minority decision in Walele to the 
extent that it held that building works that comply with the applicable legislation and 
zoning regulations would not cause derogation from the value of neighbouring 
properties.166  
                                                          
163
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) para 55. 
164
 The court in Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) para 55 suggested that 
an applicant is only required “to prove to the satisfaction of the reviewing court” that the erection of the 
proposed building on a neighbouring property will reduce the value of her own property. 
165
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC). In Searle v Mossel Bay 
Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 February 2009) para 13 n 2, the 
Walele approach to s 7 of the National Building Act is discussed in detail.  
166
 Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 February 
2009) para 13 n 2; Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 130-
132. In Camps Bay Residents’ and Ratepayers’ Association and Others v Augoustides and 
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3 3 3 2 Remedies 
In the New Adventure Investments judgment,167 the court indirectly acknowledged 
that in certain circumstances the view from a property may contribute to the 
property‟s market value. However, the court a quo in Paola,168 as well as the courts 
in Clark169 and De Kock170 ruled that section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National 
Building Act does not compel a local authority to consider the possibility that the 
execution of building plans may obstruct the view from a neighbouring property. By 
implication, this provision does not create a substantive right to prevent the approval 
of building plans, and consequently the erection of building works on a neighbouring 
property, if such plans comply with any applicable legislation, building regulations 
and the relevant zoning scheme. Nevertheless, the Muller decision171 created the 
impression that there is a qualification to this rule in the sense that section 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) does indeed prohibit the approval of building plans if they 
contravene legislation or the applicable zoning scheme and their execution will result 
in the obstruction of the view from neighbouring properties (and therefore cause a 
decrease in the value of the property). In Muller, the court decided that the relevant 
building plans would cause neighbouring properties to depreciate because they did 
not comply with the prescribed height limitations. It therefore only accepted that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Others 2009 (6) SA 190 (WCC) para 13 the court referred to the “sensitivity assessment” that 
the court in Searle explained with reference to the Walele approach to s 7 of the National 
Building Act. See also AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 354-355. 
167
 New Adventure Investments193 (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for the time being of the SAS Trust  
[2002] 3 All SA 544 (C). See the discussion of this ruling in 3 3 3 1.  
168
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D). This decision is discussed in 3 3 3 1. 
169
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C), examined in 3 3 3 1. 
170
 De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 
2006), discussed in 3 3 3 1. 
171
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). See 3 3 3 1. 
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proposed building would cause the neighbouring property to depreciate insofar as it 
would exceed the prescribed height limitations.172  
The Muller decision should be considered carefully. In this judgment, the 
decision to set aside the approval of the relevant building plans was based on the 
irregular approval of the plans,173 and not on the fact that the completed building 
would possibly cause the value of a neighbouring property to depreciate.174 The 
decision does not imply that the approval of building plans may be refused on the 
basis that such plans would cause a depreciation of neighbouring properties. It 
merely confirms that a formal shortcoming in the process of approving building 
plans175 or building plans that contravene the applicable legislation, zoning scheme 
or building regulations may render the approval of such plans unlawful.176  
The decision of the court a quo in Paola177 as well as the rulings in Clark178 and 
De Kock179 indicate that courts have been reluctant to acknowledge the obstruction 
of the existing view from a property as a factor that may decrease the value of the 
property and therefore render building plans that will cause such an obstruction unfit 
for approval.180 These rulings indicate that there is no remedy for a property owner 
who attempts to prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbouring property with an 
attack on the relevant local authority‟s decision to approve building plans. Local 
                                                          
172
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 75.  
173
 See 3 3 2 2 and 3 2 2 3. 
174
 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 368-369. Van der Walt reasons that the court 
in Muller protected the applicants against the negative impact that the unlawful approval 
procedure had and not the impact of the obstruction of their view. He adds that even if their view 
was not blocked by the construction, the plans could have been reviewed because they were 
wrongfully approved. 
175
 See the discussion of this case in 3 3 2 2. 
176
 See the discussion in 3 2 2 3. 
177
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D). This decision is discussed in 3 3 3 1. 
178
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C). 
179
 De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 
2006). 
180
 See the discussion of Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) and De Kock v 
Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 2006) in 3 3 3 1. 
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authorities do not consider the fact that such building plans may amount to a 
depreciation of the value of neighbouring properties, since property owners do not 
have a substantive right – nor is such a right created by section 7 of the National 
Building Act – to prevent the erection of buildings on neighbouring properties if they 
are not entitled to do so in terms of a servitude, restrictive condition, legislation, 
building regulations or the applicable zoning scheme. To the extent that some 
decisions181 seem to indicate that a property owner (A) has indeed been successful 
in preventing the erection of a building on a neighbouring property (B) because such 
a building would cause a decrease in the value of her (A‟s) property they have in 
actual fact been decided on a different basis, namely the unlawfulness of the building 
plans themselves or an irregularity in the approval of the plans.182 Section 7 of the 
National Building Act does therefore not create a substantive right to prevent the 
erection of buildings purely on the basis of the fact that such buildings would 
interfere with the existing, unobstructed view from a neighbouring property. 
 
3 4 Conclusion 
In the absence of a servitude to protect the undisturbed, existing view from a 
property, alternative strategies can be used to prevent the erection of buildings that 
will interfere with such a view. Case law shows that South African property owners 
mainly use one of three alternative strategies that may result in the protection of their 
existing views. The effectiveness of these strategies depends on whether or not they 
are based on a substantive right to prevent building works on a neighbouring 
                                                          
181
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) and Paola v Jeeva 
NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) 
182
 See the discussion of Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) 
and Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) in 3 3 2 2. 
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property; a purely procedural shortcoming during the approval of a neighbour‟s 
building plans; or an attack on the discretion exercised when a decision maker 
approved such plans. 
The most successful alternative strategy to prevent the obstruction of the view 
from one‟s property is to rely on a substantive right, flowing from one‟s right of 
ownership, to be informed of, to comment on, and sometimes to object against or 
even prevent the erection of building works on a neighbouring property. Such a 
substantive right can be enforced when a neighbour‟s application for the approval of 
her building plans involves the removal or amendment of a restrictive condition; 
would require the re-zoning or subdivision of land in the vicinity; entails a departure 
from the applicable zoning scheme; or when a property owner that would be affected 
by such an approval has a statutory duty to protect the direct line of view to or from a 
specific property. In these circumstances, a property owner is entitled to be informed 
of and to comment on (and possibly to object against) applications for the approval 
of neighbours‟ building plans. In some cases, where the approval of a building plan 
may only be granted with the consent of affected property owners, it also entitles an 
affected owner to withhold permission for the approval of a neighbour‟s building 
plans. Therefore, such a substantive right gives an owner the opportunity to raise 
objections against and, in some instances, to refuse to consent to proposed building 
plans that may interfere with the existing views from their properties. A substantive 
right also entitles the beneficiary landowner to appeal against the approval of 
neighbours‟ building plans if they had been denied such an opportunity.  
A substantive right to prevent the erection of building works on neighbouring 
properties may be an effective remedy to permanently protect the existing view to or 
from a property if the holder of such a right can provide sufficient reasons why the 
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proposed building works should not be erected. In Muller NO and Others v City of 
Cape Town and Another,183 the court indicated that a substantive right to prevent the 
erection of buildings on a neighbouring property can indeed be employed to prevent 
the obstruction of the existing view from a property, at least insofar as the applicable 
building regulations, zoning scheme or restrictive conditions prohibit building works 
that would interfere with such view. Furthermore, the decision in Transnet Ltd v 
Proud Heritage Properties184 shows that a court will be prepared to enforce a 
substantive statutory right or duty to protect an undisturbed, existing view even if it 
will permanently prevent neighbouring owners from exercising their right to develop 
their properties.  
A less effective strategy to prevent the obstruction of the existing view from 
one‟s property is to object to the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans on the 
ground that there was a procedural shortcoming in the approval process. In both 
Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another185 and the Supreme Court 
of Appeal‟s decision in Paola v Jeeva NO and Others,186 the approval of building 
plans was declared unlawful and set aside on the basis of procedural irregularities in 
the approval processes. The irregular approval of building plans does not entitle 
neighbouring owners to raise objections that may result in an absolute prohibition 
against the proposed building works. Therefore, an objection to a procedural 
shortcoming will merely temporarily stall building works and prevent the obstruction 
of neighbours‟ views until the irregularity has been rectified. This strategy is therefore 
less effective than the strategy based on a substantive right to prevent the erection 
                                                          
183
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
184
 Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008). 
185
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
186
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). The court a quo’s decision is discussed in 
3 3 3.  
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of building works, since it can only result in the temporary protection of the existing 
view from a property.  
The least useful strategy to prevent the erection of a building that would 
obstruct the view from one‟s property is based on an attack of a local authority‟s 
discretion to approve building plans. This attack is based on the argument that the 
existing view from a property contributes to the property‟s market value and that 
section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act prohibits a local authority to 
approve building plans that will cause a decrease in the value of a neighbouring 
property. This strategy has been rejected in the court a quo in Paola v Jeeva NO and 
Others187 as well as in the rulings in Clark v Faraday and Another188 and De Kock v 
Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere.189 However, in an obiter remark in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal‟s judgment in Paola v Jeeva NO and Others190 the court 
suggested that building plans should, according to the wording of section 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act, not be approved if it is clear that their 
execution will cause a decrease in the value of an adjoining property. This may have 
created the impression that a property owner has an indirect right to the existing view 
from her property. Furthermore, in Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and 
Another,191 the court upheld the applicants‟ argument that their neighbour‟s building 
plans should not have been approved because the proposed building would cause a 
decrease in the value of their own property. Nevertheless, the court only accepted 
                                                          
187
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D), discussed in 3 3 3 1. 
188
 Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C), discussed in 3 3 3 1. 
189
 De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 
November 2006), discussed in 3 3 3 1.  
190
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA).  
191
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
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that the proposed building would cause the neighbouring property to depreciate 
insofar as it would exceed the prescribed height limitations.192  
A property owner who wants to protect the existing view from her property will 
only attack a local authority‟s discretion to approve a neighbour‟s building plan as a 
strategy of last resort. Her first option will be to rely on a substantive right to prevent 
a neighbour‟s building works, or an attack on a procedural irregularity in the approval 
of her neighbour‟s building plans. The strategy based on a substantive right is based 
on a pre-existing property right to prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbouring 
property, while the strategy in terms of which a procedural irregularity is attacked is 
based on the right to lawful administrative action. Both a pre-existing right to prevent 
building and a right to lawful administrative action must be enforced by courts. 
Conversely, the strategy to question an administrator‟s decision to approve building 
plans relies on a court‟s willingness to pass judgment on an administrator‟s exercise 
of her discretion. Courts are generally unwilling to acknowledge the existing view 
from a neighbouring property as a factor that should be considered when a decision 
maker decides whether or not to approve building plans. Therefore, the latter 
strategy is the least effective way of protecting the view from a property in the sense 
that there can be no certainty that a court will order that approved building plans 
should be set aside or re-approved on the basis of the discretion exercised by a 
decision maker. 
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 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 75.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
120 
Chapter 4:  
Comparative law 
 
4 1 Introduction 
Like South African law, neither English nor Dutch law recognises an inherent right to 
the existing view from a property. However, like South African law, property owners 
in both of these foreign legal systems may have substantive rights to prevent 
obstruction of the existing views from their properties. In South African law, a 
servitude or a restrictive condition may give a property owner a substantive right to 
prevent the obstruction of the existing view from her property.1 Similarly, a restrictive 
covenant in English law2 and a praedial servitude (erfdienstbaarheid) in Dutch law,3 
both of which are based on agreements between the property owners, may entitle 
the beneficiary property owners to prevent the obstruction of the existing views from 
their properties. Furthermore, English case law suggests that there may be 
exceptions to the rule that a property owner does not have an inherent right to the 
existing view from her property. The possibility of such an exception in South African 
case law is considered in chapter 2. In Dutch law, a property owner can also rely on 
the existing view from her property insofar as the current situation is protected by 
statutory building regulations.4 Moreover, a property owner in Dutch law may use an 
alternative strategy, based either on a claim in nuisance (hinder)5 or on an action in 
                                                          
1
 The substantive rights created in terms of servitudes and restrictive conditions are discussed in Ch 2 
and Ch 3 respectively. 
2
 See 4 2 2 1. 
3
 See 4 3 2 1. 
4
 See 4 3 2 2. 
5
 See 4 3 2 3. 
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terms of the doctrine of abuse of rights (misbruik van recht),6 to prevent the 
obstruction of the existing view from her property.  
English law and Dutch law were chosen for a comparative study of the right to a 
view because these two systems have the same point of departure as South African 
law, namely that a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing 
view from her property. In this chapter, the possibility of protecting the unobstructed, 
existing view from a property in these foreign systems is considered using the same 
methodology that was used to establish how the existing view from a property may 
be protected in South African law. This methodology involves that the general 
position regarding the right to a view is established and that possible substantive 
rights or alternative strategies to prevent the obstruction of a pleasant view are 
investigated. These aspects regarding the protection of an unobstructed, existing 
view from a property in English and Dutch law are considered to establish to what 
extent they confirm the position regarding the protection of a right to a view in South 
African law and whether these systems also provide alternative strategies, in the 
absence of an inherent right to the existing view from a property, to protect the 
unobstructed, existing view from a property.  
 
4 2 The right to a view in English law 
4 2 1 No inherent right to a view 
English law does not recognise an inherent right to the existing view from a 
property.7 This rule is based on the reasoning that an unobstructed view across 
                                                          
6
 See 4 3 2 4. 
7
 This was established in early case law, such as Bland v Moseley (1587) 9 Co Rep 58a; William 
Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b, 77 ER 816; Butt v Imperial Gas Company (1866) 2 Ch App 158 
and Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL), and confirmed in later decisions such as Hunter v 
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neighbouring properties is an incidental benefit8 and that the recognition of an 
inherent right to the existing, unobstructed view from a property would inhibit urban 
development. The principle that a right to the existing view from a property does not 
naturally flow from the right of ownership is therefore based on similar grounds in 
South African and English law.9  
Early English case law established and justified the position that a property 
owner does not have an inherent right to the existing view from her property. 
According to the ruling in William Aldred’s Case10 (“Aldred’s case”), the obstruction of 
prospect is not actionable, since prospect is not a necessity but only a matter of 
delight.11 Conversely, the court considered the obstruction of the flow of light and air 
to a property as actionable because the flow of light and air constitutes a necessary 
attribute of property. It was therefore ruled that the erection of a pigpen on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 and Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27. In determining 
whether or not interference with a television signal should be acknowledged as constituting private 
nuisance, the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 
considered the argument that such an interference is similar to the obstruction of a pleasant view. The 
court considered authorities on the matter of having an undisturbed prospect from one‟s property and 
confirmed that English law does not recognise a right to a view. K Gray & SF Gray Land law (6
th
 ed 
2009) 536-538 discuss the protection of a beautiful prospect in the context of the public regulation of 
land. Their discussion involves an overview of contrasting features of “property absolutism”, which 
characterised property law in the Victorian era, and community-oriented practices of land use that are 
applied in modern times. They explain that, historically, a private landowner could use her property 
without considering community interests. An example of the effect of the absolutist concept of 
ownership is that a property owner was free to do on her property as she pleased. She could 
therefore erect a building without considering the fact that this may obstruct the pleasant prospect 
from her neighbour‟s property. The common law did not provide for the preservation of the delightful 
view from one‟s property by means of an easement of an undisturbed view. It could only be protected 
by way of a “bargained restriction” in terms of which one neighbour undertook not to develop her 
property in a way that would cause the view from the other‟s property to be obstructed. However, 
since the socially beneficial use of land is regarded as an important aim of modern English land law, 
public and private regimes ensure much wider protection for community or neighbour interests. This is 
illustrated by the fact that planning controls may now have the effect of protecting a beautiful vista in 
certain circumstances, as was the case in Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27, discussed in 
4 2 2 1. 
8
 See Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24C. This decision is discussed below. 
9
 The justifications for not recognising the existing view from a property as an inherent part of the right 
of ownership are discussed in Ch 2 and Ch 6. The concept of ownership is not recognised in English 
law as such. However, in the context of English law, this chapter refers to “ownership” when 
describing that which is the closest equivalent to the civil law concept of ownership. See K Gray 
“Property in thin air” (1991) 50 Cambridge LJ 252-307; K Gray & SF Gray Land law (6
th
 ed 2009) 56; 
and AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 106 and 135. 
10
 William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b, 77 ER 816.  
11
 William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b at 59a, 77 ER 816 at 821.  
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property adjoining that of the applicant‟s was actionable, since it obstructed the flow 
of air and light to the applicant‟s property.12 Lord Chelmsford LC‟s reasoning in Butt v 
Imperial Gas Company13 confirmed that interference with an existing, unobstructed 
view from a property is not actionable. He argued that the obstruction of the view to a 
specific property is analogous to the obstruction of the view from a property, which is 
not considered a legal injury.14  
In Dalton v Angus,15 Lord Blackburn also concluded that a right to a view 
cannot arise ex lege and that such a right can only be established by an agreement 
between property owners.16 Although this case primarily concerned lateral support, 
the court drew interesting comparisons between the right to lateral support and the 
right to light and it considered the differences between the right to light and the right 
to a view.17 Lord Blackburn relied on the reasoning of Wray CJ in Bland v Moseley18 
as authority for the argument that the right to light is inherently different from the right 
to a view and that these two “attributes” are therefore not to be afforded the same 
degree of protection.  
Wray CJ, in Bland v Moseley,19 admitted that it is “a great commendation of a 
house” to have a large undisturbed outlook, but contended that whilst a free flow of 
                                                          
12
 William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b at 59a-59b, 77 ER 816 at 821-822. The court referred 
to the decision in Bland v Moseley (1587) 9 Co Rep 58a, where it was held that the obstruction of the 
flow of air and light to a property is actionable because the flow of light and air to a property 
constitutes a necessary attribute of property. 
13
 Butt v Imperial Gas Company (1866) 2 Ch App 158.  
14
 Butt v Imperial Gas Company (1866) 2 Ch App 158 at 161. In this judgment it was held that the 
erection of a gasometer on the defendant‟s property was not unlawful, despite the fact that it 
obstructed the view to the applicant‟s business premises and advertising board. Lord Chelmsford 
rejected the plaintiff‟s argument that the obstruction of the view to his workplace will harm his 
business, arguing that the view to his premises would only have attracted passers-by and that he 
would therefore not lose any established customers.  
15
 Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL). 
16
 Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24G.  
17
 Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 10B-C, 20A-C, 23D–I, 25A-I, 26A, 31H–I and 32-33. 
18
 Bland v Moseley (1587) 9 Co Rep 58a. In Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24A-C, Lord 
Blackburn referred to the judgment of Wray CJ in Bland v Moseley (1587) 9 Co Rep 58a. 
19
 Bland v Moseley (1587) 9 Co Rep 58a. See also Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24A-C. 
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light and air to a property is a necessity, an unobstructed view is merely a delight. He 
therefore confirmed that a property owner does not have a right to an unobstructed 
view.20 Accordingly, he held that the obstruction of prospect is not actionable, despite 
the fact that damages may be recovered for obstructing the flow of air or light to a 
property. Even though Lord Blackburn reached the same conclusion in Dalton v 
Angus,21 his reasoning differed from that of Wray CJ. Lord Blackburn argued that a 
right to light can ensure the protection of the flow of light to a property by merely 
imposing a burden on one adjacent property. However, the protection of a pleasant 
view often requires that burdens should be imposed on an undefined and large 
number of properties that are in the line of sight of such a view. Since a right to light 
can mostly be defined easily without imposing a burden on too many properties, it 
can be acquired by way of prescription. Conversely, a right to have an unobstructred 
prospect cannot be acquired through prescription, because such a right would 
impose a vague burden on a multitude of properties.22 These contrasting features of 
the right to a view and the right to light caused Lord Blackburn to infer that the right 
                                                          
20
 Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24A–D. 
21
 Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL). 
22
 Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24D-G. Lord Blackburn based his reasoning on that of 
Lord Hardwicke in Attorney-General v Doughty (1752) 2 Ves Sen 453. Lord Hardwicke reasoned that 
the flow of light through a window can be protected by only prohibiting or regulating building works 
located close to such a window. However, the view from a property can often only be protected if 
owners of properties in a large and undefined area are prohibited from erecting structures that would 
spoil such a view. Consequently, the recognition of a right to a view would inhibit urban development. 
See also Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24B–D, 25A–I, and 26A for the reasoning that 
supports Lord Blackburn‟s opinion, namely that the right to lateral support is more analogous to the 
right to light than to the right to a view. He concluded that both the flow of natural light to and lateral 
support of properties are necessary for the enjoyment of properties and should therefore be protected 
as rights that may be acquired through prescription. Conversely, the right to a view is not essential for 
the enjoyment of a property. Furthermore, lateral support and a natural flow of light to a property only 
require that burdens be placed on properties that are directly adjacent to the dominant tenement. 
However, the right to have a view may entail a prohibition against the erection of structures on 
properties not only directly adjacent to but also in the line of sight of the pleasant view. 
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to a view would only originate from an agreement between property owners, and 
would not arise ex lege.23  
The court in Re Penny and the South Eastern Railway Co24 held that the 
obstruction of the view from a property is not actionable, and thereby implied that a 
property owner does not have an inherent right to the undisturbed, existing view from 
her property.25 In this decision, the court drew a comparison between the loss that an 
owner suffers when the existing view from her property is obstructed by later 
constructions on a neighbouring property and the infringement of a property owner‟s 
privacy when her property is overlooked from a neighbour‟s property. It reasoned 
that if a claim for compensation for such overlooking was successful, a property 
owner would be equally entitled to damages if the existing view from her property 
was spoiled by development on a neighbouring property.26  
                                                          
23
 Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24G. The decision in Easton v Isted (1901) E 1151 
illustrates how an actual agreement between neighbours can create a right to a view. In this case, 
neighbouring property owners concluded an agreement in terms of which the one owner 
acknowledged that his neighbour allowed him to “overlook” (in)to his property by annually paying him 
an amount of money. The agreement was therefore aimed at recognising a property owner‟s right to 
the existing, unobstructed view over (into) her neighbour‟s property and not at preventing the erection 
of structures that would obstruct an existing prospect. The possibility of protecting the existing view 
from a property by way of an agreement is examined in 4 2 2. 
24
 Re Penny and the South Eastern Railway Co (1857) 119 ER 1390. 
25
 Re Penny and the South Eastern Railway Co (1857) 119 ER 1390 at 1395. The court had to 
determine whether a property owner‟s right to have a view overlooking her neighbour‟s premises 
unlawfully infringed upon such neighbour‟s privacy. Mr Penny, the owner of some properties adjacent 
to the North Kent Railway, claimed damages from the constructors of the railroad. He alleged that his 
privacy was being disturbed by the view that people had from the railway over his back windows and 
garden. Mr Penny‟s claim for damages was also based on contentions that the passing trains caused 
constant noise, vibration and annoyance. He argued that these injuries, together with the fact that his 
premises - as well as that of his tenants - were overlooked by passengers and workmen on the 
railway and railway platform, caused a decrease in the value of the rentals he received and 
necessitated repairs to the houses. The court ruled that there is no action for overlooking into another 
owner‟s premises in English law. In a judgment that also concerned the overlooking of another 
property, Tapling v Jones (1865) 144 ER 1067 at 1074, it was also established that a property owner 
does not have a right against a neighbour who has an (overlooking) view of her garden or “pleasure-
grounds”. The court explained that such overlooking was acceptable because the owner whose 
premise was being overlooked had the right to erect a structure that would shut out windows with 
such an intruding view. See also K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law (5
th
 ed 2009) 109-110 and K 
Gray & SF Gray Land law (6
th
 ed 2009) 537.  
26
 Re Penny and the South Eastern Railway Co (1857) 119 ER 1390 at 1394-1395. In this case, the 
“development” on the relevant neighbouring property was the construction of a railway. Lord Campbell 
CJ held that although compensation could be claimed for actual injury caused to the plaintiff‟s 
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In a more recent judgment, Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd,27 (“Hunter”) the House 
of Lords (now the Supreme Court) revisited the principles that are applicable when 
right-of-view questions arise. The right to a view was not directly at issue in this 
case, but the Lords regarded the obstruction of a pleasant view to be analogous to 
interference with television reception, which was the basis of one of the claims. In a 
comparative investigation, the court considered the rules regulating the protection of 
an undisturbed prospect and confirmed that these rules are still applicable.28  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
property during the construction of the railway, damages could not be claimed in respect of a 
decrease in a property‟s value due to it being overlooked by persons from a railway or a railway 
platform. Lord Campbell CJ reasoned as follows:  
“Where would you draw the line? Would the obstruction, by the railway, of a view from the 
windows of a house, entitle the owner to compensation, on the ground that his property 
was „injuriously affected by the execution of the works‟?” 
Wightman J was also of the opinion that compensation need not be paid because of the injury the 
property suffered due to it being overlooked by the railway. Crompton J followed the same reasoning 
as Campbell CJ. He also compared the claim for compensation for overlooking with a claim for 
compensation for “the obstruction of a distant prospect,” concluding that if the compensation for 
overlooking was awarded, it would make it impossible to determine “where such claims would end”. 
See the discussion of this decision by K Gray “Property in thin air” (1991) 50 Cambridge LJ 252-307 
at 262-263. 
27
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677. The case was also heard by the Court of Appeal in 
Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) AC 655. 
28
 The plaintiffs occupied dwellings in the London Docklands area. This area was designated as an 
“urban development area and enterprise zone” for the benefit of the environment. Building and 
construction work in the area led to two actions being instituted by the plaintiffs. The first action was a 
claim in nuisance against Canary Wharf Ltd. In the original actions it was alleged that the erection of a 
tower by Canary Wharf Ltd interfered with the plaintiffs‟ television reception, which caused damage for 
them, since they suffered a loss of enjoyment of television and their licence fees were wasted. The 
second action, a claim for damages for negligence and nuisance, was instituted against the London 
Docklands Development Corporation in respect of deposits of dust on their properties. These dust 
deposits were the result of the construction of a link road. Appeals in both actions were heard by the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. This chapter focuses on the question of whether or not 
interference with television reception is capable of constituting an actionable private nuisance. In 
determining the answer for this question, the courts investigated the similarities between the 
obstruction of a pleasant view and interference with television reception. Their reasoning involved an 
exposition of the rules and principles regarding the right to a view. In the Court of Appeal, Hunter v 
Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) AC 655 at 664H and 665-666, Pill LJ dismissed the plaintiffs‟ appeal in the 
action based on the interference with their television reception. The defendants argued that the 
obstruction of a television signal is analogous to the loss of a view and that neither of these 
“disturbances” is actionable. Pill LJ considered the analogy between the obstruction of a television 
signal and the obstruction of a pleasant view to be “compelling” and concluded that neither is 
actionable. In both instances the users or owners of property are deprived of something that they 
previously enjoyed as “a part” of their property. If a television signal is obstructed, the enjoyment of 
television reception is lost. Similarly, when a pleasant view is obstructed, the enjoyment of such an 
amenity of one‟s property is lost. Pill LJ recognised that television plays an important role in modern 
society but nevertheless dismissed the argument that interference with television reception constitutes 
an actionable nuisance. He concluded that the old authorities‟ justifications for not giving the 
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The plaintiffs29 were dissatisfied with the Court of Appeal‟s ruling that 
interference with television reception does not constitute an actionable private 
nuisance. Consequently, they argued before the House of Lords that there is no 
authority for the notion that the law of nuisance does not provide protection for 
matters of recreation or entertainment.30 They criticised the Court of Appeal‟s 
comparison between interference with television reception and the obstruction of a 
pleasant view, arguing that an action for nuisance for an interference with television 
reception would not be against public policy in the same way that such an action for 
interference with view would be. Television signals, they reasoned, are “consumed” 
by the public and replaceable, while a (specific) prospect is unique and 
irreplaceable.31 The “protection” of a television signal therefore does not prevent 
development because it can be replaced or restored without prohibiting development 
or demolishing the building(s) that disrupt(s) it. Conversely, the effective protection of 
the view from a property requires a perpetual prohibition on the development of 
properties that might obstruct such a view. Accordingly, a successful action for 
nuisance for the obstruction of view would be against public policy, since it would 
impede development, while the same action for interference with a television signal 
would not be against public policy because it would not hinder development.32 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
undisturbed view from a property the protection of an enforceable right are both sound and applicable 
to modern conditions.  
29
 Hunter and Others, the plaintiffs in the original action regarding the interference with television 
reception will be referred to as “plaintiffs” in the discussion of the decisions of the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords, while Canary Wharf Ltd, the defendant in this original action, will be referred to as 
“defendants” throughout the discussion. 
30
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 680H and 681A. 
31
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 680H, 681A–E and 682. In the Court of Appeal, the 
plaintiffs argued that the analogy between the loss of television signal and the loss of a view is 
misconceived. They reasoned that interference with a television signal can constitute an actionable 
nuisance although the obstruction of a view cannot. Conversely, the defendant argued that these two 
situations are similar and that interference with a television signal is not capable of constituting an 
actionable nuisance for the same reason that the obstruction of a pleasant view is not unlawful. 
32
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 680H and 681A–E. 
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The defendant remained steadfast in its argument that interference with 
television reception is analogous to interference with view. It argued that neither of 
these interferences should be actionable in nuisance because both can be caused 
without an action being performed on another‟s property. If the mere presence of a 
building that interferes with a neighbour‟s pleasurable amenity is considered to 
constitute an actionable nuisance, too heavy a burden would be placed on urban 
developers.33 
In the judgment of the House of Lords, Lord Goff reiterated that a property 
owner has the right to erect structures on her property as she pleases.34 Referring to 
Attorney-General v Doughty35 and Fishmongers’ Co v East India Co,36 he confirmed 
that this entitlement is not restricted by the fact that building works on one owner‟s 
property may cause the obstruction of the view from a neighbour‟s property.37 He 
further established that the mere presence of a building on a neighbouring property 
cannot constitute an actionable nuisance.38 By implication, the erection of a building 
that causes the obstruction of the existing view from a neighbouring property or an 
                                                          
33
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 682B–E. 
34
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 685-686. Lord Goff qualified this statement by 
mentioning that the entitlement to build on one‟s property is subject to planning regulations. In Hunter 
v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 709B–H, Lord Hoffmann, referring to William Aldred’s Case 
(1610) 9 Co Rep 57b, 77 ER 816 and Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL), stated that the 
enjoyment of a pleasant prospect cannot be protected as a right that is acquired by prescription and 
emphasised that a landowner‟s entitlement to erect structures as she pleases is only restricted in very 
specific circumstances.  
35
 Attorney-General v Doughty (1752) 2 Ves Sen 453.  
36
 Fishmongers’ Co v East India Co (1752) 1 Dick 163. 
37
 In Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 685C–F, Lord Goff ruled that a property owner may, 
within the limits posed by planning controls (and in the absence of easements in the cases of the flow 
of air and light), erect any structure on her property, even if such structure(s) will obstruct her 
neighbour‟s view or restrict the flow of air or light to her neighbour‟s property. This illustrated the 
“scope” of an owner‟s right to erect buildings on her property. A landowner who wants to develop her 
property therefore does not have to take into consideration the possibility that such a development 
may interfere with a neighbour‟s enjoyment of her property. 
38
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 685G–H and 686A–C. This is the position if there is no 
easement that protects the attribute that is lost by the presence of such a building. Should there be an 
easement, neighbouring owners may be restricted in the actions that they are allowed to perform on 
their properties. 
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interference with a neighbour‟s television signal is not actionable in nuisance.39 
Accordingly, it was ruled that the obstruction of a television signal does not constitute 
an actionable harm and the appeal was dismissed. 
English case law therefore indicates that a property owner does not have an 
inherent right to the existing, undisturbed view from her property.40 In English law, 
                                                          
39
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 685G–H and 686A–C. Lord Goff of Chieveley 
concurred with the Court of Appeal, ruling that interference with a television signal that is caused by 
the mere presence of a building is not capable of constituting private nuisance. Lord Lloyd of Berwick 
agreed with the Court of Appeal and with Lord Goff on this point. See Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd 
(1997) HL 677 at 699B–H and 700A-C. Lord Lloyd specifically agreed with the Court of Appeal in the 
sense that there is a close analogy between a building that interferes with view and a building that 
interferes with television reception. According to him, the obstruction of the view from a property is an 
example of “damnum absque injuria”. VG Hiemsta & HL Gonin Trilingual legal dictionary (3
rd
 ed 2006) 
174 translate “damnum absque injuria” as “damage without an unlawful act, without legal injury”. Lord 
Lloyd explained that a property owner does not have a right to a view unless such a view is protected 
by way of a restrictive covenant. Therefore, as described by this maxim, the obstruction of a pleasant 
view may cause a property owner to suffer a loss without infringing upon her rights. Lord Hoffmann 
was also of the opinion that there are similarities between interference with television signal, 
interference with the flow of light, air or the passage of radio signals, and the obstruction of view. See 
Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 708H and 709A–B. Although Lord Cooke of Thorndon 
agreed that in this case the action for nuisance allegedly caused by the interference with the plaintiffs‟ 
television reception should not succeed, his reasoning was not based on the analogy between the 
loss of view and the loss of television reception. Instead, his judgment focused on the principles of the 
reasonable user and give and take. He argued that the limitations imposed on the height of buildings 
by modern town planning instruments make it inaccurate to state that a property owner enjoys rights 
to her property “usque ad coelum et ad inferos” (“the owner of the land is the owner of the sky above 
and everything contained in the soil below the surface…”). According to Lord Cooke, the acceptable 
community standard for building works in a modern planning regime can be ascertained by 
considering the actions instituted against neighbouring developers that exceed the applicable height 
restrictions. It appears that Lord Cooke suggests that if a developer complied with planning controls 
when she erected a building, but the presence of the building nevertheless hinders a neighbour‟s 
television reception, the nuisance caused by the loss of television signal is not actionable, since the 
developer acted reasonably. See Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 719F–H and 720-723A 
for Lord Cooke‟s discussion of whether or not interference with television reception constitutes an 
actionable nuisance. Lord Hope of Craighead also regarded the obstruction of view as similar to the 
interruption of radio and television signals. Since a property owner is entitled to build on her property 
as she pleases, the landowner‟s loss of amenity due to the presence of a building on a neighbouring 
property does not constitute an actionable nuisance. See Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 
at 726B–H and 727A–E for Lord Hope‟s opinion on the interference with a television signal. 
40
 This rule was stated explicitly in Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) and implied by 
decisions such as William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b at 59a, 77 ER 816 at 821; Butt v 
Imperial Gas Company (1866) 2 Ch App 158; Re Penny and the South Eastern Railway Co 
(1857) 119 ER 1390 and Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677, which determined that the 
obstruction of an existing view does not constitute an actionable nuisance. See also RA Buckley 
The law of nuisance (2
nd
 ed 1996) 37 and J Pugh-Smith, G Sinclair & W Upton Neighbours and 
the law (5
th
 ed 2009) 56, where the principle that the obstruction of an existing view does not 
amount to an actionable nuisance was stated with reference to the following judgments: William 
Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b at 59a, 77 ER 816 at 821; Butt v Imperial Gas Company 
(1866) 2 Ch App 158; Harris v De Pinna (1886) 33 Ch D 238 at 262 CA; Leech v Schweder 
(1874) 9 Ch App 463 at 474-475 and Browne v Flower (1911) 1 Ch 219 at 225, per Parker J. 
According to J Murphy The law of nuisance (2010) 6, there are various forms of actionable 
nuisance. K Kennedy Neighbour disputes: Law and practice (2009) 98-99 distinguishes between 
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the existing view from a property does not form part of the right of ownership and any 
interference with this aesthetically pleasing attribute is classified as damnum absque 
injuria – “damage without an unlawful act and without legal injury”.41 Nevertheless, 
there are instances where a property owner in English law, like in South African law, 
will have a substantive right to prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbouring 
property and thereby prevent the obstruction of the existing, unobstructed view from 
her own property. Restrictive covenants and easements may possibly be applied to 
regulate building works on a neighbouring property in a way that would protect an 
existing view. These measures are considered below to establish which of them, if 
any, may create a pre-existing substantive right to prevent the erection of building 
works that will interfere with the existing view from a property. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
two different types of nuisance. The consequences of one owner‟s unreasonable use of her 
property that has an adverse effect on another owner‟s property constitute one category of 
nuisance, while interferences with rights or easements benefitting a property fall into a second 
category of nuisance. However, there is no numerus clausus of nuisance, in other words 
nuisances are not restricted to these categories. Kennedy explains that the detriment that was 
allegedly suffered determines how a court deals with a specific nuisance. The damage that was 
caused can either involve physical damage to a neighbouring property, or that a neighbour‟s 
enjoyment of her property is reduced without physical damage to the property itself. Kennedy 
argues that a court will carry out a balancing exercise when it considers a nuisance claim that is 
based on the fact that a property owner suffered damage in her enjoyment of  her property. In 
terms of such an exercise, a court will consider, amongst other things, whether or not the 
defendant used her property in a normal way. Referring to Southwark London Borough Council v 
Mills (2001) 1 AC 1, Kennedy explained that a court is unlikely to find that nuisance has been 
caused by an owner who used her property in a way that is “recognisable and acceptable to 
most people”. One could therefore probably assume that a court would not easily conclude that 
a property owner who lawfully erected a building on her property caused a nuisance to her 
neighbour whose view is obstructed by such building works. 
41
 The court in Bland v Moseley (1587) 9 Co Rep 58a classified the obstruction of the existing 
view from a property as damnum absque injuria – “damage without an unlawful act and without 
legal injury” (transl VG Hiemsta & HL Gonin Trilingual legal dictionary, 3
rd
 ed 2006 at 174). In its 
justification, the court compared the obstruction of a pleasant view with the obstruction of the 
flow of air and light to a property. It reasoned that whilst a supply of light and air to a property is 
a necessity, the view from it is merely a pleasurable attribute. Therefore, interference with a free 
flow of light or air is actionable in nuisance, but no actionable right arises in instances where a 
pleasant view is obstructed. Following this principle, the court in William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 
Co Rep 57b at 58b, 77 ER 816 at 821 ruled that interference with or the flow of air to a property 
that was caused by the erection of a pigpen was actionable.  
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4 2 2  Protection of an existing, unobstructed view 
4 2 2 1 Restrictive covenants  
Gray and Gray define a restrictive covenant as 
“an agreement between two estate owners limiting the use of the land of one for 
the benefit of the other.”42  
A restrictive covenant is acquired through express grant by one owner to another.43 
The primary purpose of such agreements is to protect attributes of properties that 
promote “urban planning and civilised coexistence”.44 This device can therefore be 
used to protect the existing, unobstructed view from a property. However, the 
importance of restrictive covenants in the context of land-use planning has been 
reduced by the extension of planning controls that place restrictions on the use of 
land.45 Nevertheless, planning controls do not override existing restrictive covenants. 
A property owner wanting to develop her property must therefore ensure that her 
proposed development is in line with any applicable restrictive covenants and also 
with planning controls.46 A neighbouring property owner is not generally entitled to be 
informed of an application for planning permission. A right to be notified of such an 
application will only exist under certain circumstances.47 This corresponds with the 
                                                          
42
 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law (5
th
 ed 2009) 255. B McFarlane The structure of property 
law (2008) 883 and 840 describes a restrictive covenant as a persistent right against the servient 
freehold or lease that allows the owner of the dominant property to prevent the owner of the servient 
property from using her land in a specific way. 
43
 B McFarlane The structure of property law (2008) 883 and 840. 
44
 K Gray& SF Gray Land law (6
th
 ed 2009) 127. 
45
 C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade: The law of real property (7
th
 ed 2008) 1378. 
46
 C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade: The law of real property (7
th
 ed 2008) 1378. 
47
 Section 65(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides that “[a] development order 
may make provision requiring notice to be given of any application for planning permission ... “. In 
virtue of s 59 of this Act, a development order may either itself give planning permission, or may 
provide for such permission to be granted by a local authority; s 57(1) requires planning permission 
for any “development” of land and s 55(1) defines “development” as inter alia the carrying out of 
building. Consequently, building permission must be granted by or in terms of a development order, 
which may - but not have to – require that the public must be notified of the application. See also JC 
Blackhall Planning law and practice (3
rd
 ed 2005) 379. 
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position in South African law, where a property owner may only erect a building on 
her property if such a building will not contravene any restrictions imposed in terms 
of a private agreement, such as a servitude, or any restrictions in terms of public 
planning regulation, such as a restrictive condition, a zoning scheme, building 
regulations or other legislation prohibiting building works on the relevant property.48  
In English law a property owner (A) can protect the existing view from her 
property by way of a restrictive covenant that limits her neighbour‟s (B‟s) right to 
build on her (B‟s) property in a way that would obstruct the existing view from A‟s 
(dominant) property. However, a restrictive covenant that limits B‟s right to build can 
only be imposed with B‟s consent.49 If B does agree to the creation of such a 
covenant in favour of A‟s property, A and her successors in title will have a 
substantive right, in terms of the covenant, against B and her successors in title to 
prevent the obstruction of the existing view from the dominant tenement. Such a 
restrictive covenant will entitle A to prevent building works on B‟s property that would 
otherwise have been acceptable in terms of public planning controls. A similar rule 
applies in South African law where a privately imposed servitude or restrictive 
condition may place more restrictions on a property owner‟s right to build than are 
provided for in the applicable zoning scheme, building regulations and other 
legislation. Therefore, similar to the position in South African law, a property owner in 
English law who wants to have more protection for the existing view from her 
property than the protection that exists in terms of public planning controls can 
                                                          
48
 Restrictions on building works in South African law are discussed in Ch 3. 
49
 A restrictive covenant in English law can be created as an agreement between two private property 
owners or as a “section 106 agreement” between local planning authority and a private person. The 
purpose of a “section 106 agreement” is to restrict or regulate the development or use of specific land. 
See K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law (5
th
 ed 2009) 256-257 with regard to “section 106 
agreements”. 
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create a restrictive covenant that is similar to a restrictive condition and a servitude in 
South African law.50  
English case law confirms that a property owner can have a substantive right, 
based on a restrictive covenant, to protect the unobstructed, existing view from her 
property. In the Hunter decision, Lord Lloyd suggested that a restrictive covenant 
may give a property owner a legal right to a view.51 Similarly, Lord Hoffmann 
mentioned a covenant, together with an easement, as the only two ways of 
restraining a neighbouring owner‟s right to build on her property.52 Case law 
indicates that there have indeed been instances where property owners have 
employed restrictive covenants to protect amenities, including view, of their 
properties.53 The decision in Re Buchanan - Wollaston’s Conveyance54 (“Re 
Buchanan”) shows that attributes of property, such as the unobstructed view from a 
property, can be protected by way of a private agreement between property owners. 
In this case, four property owners jointly bought a piece of property adjacent to their 
houses in an attempt to preserve the amenities of their properties.55 They also 
executed a deed in terms of which the use of this parcel of land was restricted in 
                                                          
50
 C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade: The law of real property (7
th
 ed 2008) 1378. J van 
Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 309 and 319-322 argues that in a situation where there is a conflict 
between the provisions of a restrictive condition and a town planning or land use scheme, the 
restrictive condition will take precedence over the zoning and planning schemes. It should be kept in 
mind that a restrictive covenant in English law differs from restrictive conditions in South African law in 
the sense that an English law restrictive covenant constitutes an agreement between two private 
property owners while the term “restrictive conditions”, as it is used here with reference to South 
African law, refers to conditions that a township developer registers in the title deeds of properties 
during the process of township establishment. In this sense, English law restrictive covenants are 
similar to South African servitudes, which are also created in terms of agreements between two 
private property owners.  
51
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 699. 
52
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 709. An easement of light or air, which may be 
acquired by way of grant or prescription, will have the effect of limiting a neighbouring owner‟s (the 
owner of the servient property‟s) right to build. The possibility of using an easement to protect an 
existing view is discussed in 4 2 2 2. 
53
 Re Buchanan – Wollaston’s Conveyance (1939) 2 All ER 302; Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) 
Ch 27 and Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] EWHC 2961 (Ch). 
54
 Re Buchanan – Wollaston’s Conveyance (1939) 2 All ER 302. 
55
 Re Buchanan – Wollaston’s Conveyance (1939) 2 All ER 302 at 302 and 304. 
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order to prevent the other properties from suffering any nuisance or detriment.56 
Consequently, pursuant to that deed, the joint property was not to be used in a 
manner that would cause nuisance or annoyance to, or a depreciation of, the 
owners‟ respective properties. Furthermore, the deed prohibited the erection of any 
structure without consent from all the other parties to the contract.57 The deed 
effectively constituted a private agreement to protect the existing views from the 
properties. 
The decisions in Gilbert v Spoor and Others58 (“Gilbert”) and Dennis and 
Others v Davies59 (“Dennis”) confirmed that it is possible to preserve a specific view 
by way of a restrictive covenant. Both these cases illustrate how a restrictive 
covenant can protect the amenity of view by prohibiting a property owner from using 
her property in a manner that would cause nuisance or annoyance to a neighbour. 
Although the obstruction of a pleasant view would not naturally be regarded as an 
actionable nuisance, the annoyance and nuisance experienced because of such an 
obstruction will be considered unlawful if a restrictive condition specifically prohibits 
the acts causing the nuisance or annoyance.  
In the Gilbert case, the court acknowledged that an undisturbed view over a 
landscape may be valuable and advantageous to a landowner. This conclusion was 
reached in the context of a property development where a restrictive covenant 
benefitted owners of adjacent properties. The applicant was the owner of a piece of 
property in a building scheme. Properties in this scheme were subject to a covenant 
restricting the erection of buildings to one dwelling house per property. In 1976 the 
applicant was granted permission to erect two more houses on his property. He 
                                                          
56
 Re Buchanan – Wollaston’s Conveyance (1939) 2 All ER 302 at 302 and 304-305. 
57
 Re Buchanan – Wollaston’s Conveyance (1939) 2 All ER 302 at 305. 
58
 Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27. 
59
 Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] EWHC 2961 (Ch). 
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subsequently applied to the Lands Tribunal to have the covenant amended or 
discharged.60 However, a restriction imposed by a covenant may only be modified or 
discharged if it does not “secure to persons entitled to the benefit of it any practical 
benefit of substantial value or advantage ... ”.61 The tribunal held that the effect of the 
modification or discharge of the covenant and the subsequent erection of two 
additional buildings by the applicant would obstruct the view from other properties in 
the scheme. Such an obstruction would deprive the persons entitled to benefit from 
the covenants of a “practical benefit of substantial value or advantage”.  
On appeal, the applicant contended that the view was not a “practical benefit”, 
since it was not visible from the objectors‟ properties.62 The Court of Appeal rejected 
this argument, stating that the “practical benefit” requirement63 was not limited to 
restrictive covenants that applied to specific pieces of land. Therefore, the pleasant 
view did not have to be enjoyed from the objectors‟ properties to be considered a 
“practical advantage” to those objectors for purposes of this provision. According to 
the court‟s reasoning, the obstruction of the view would indeed have a negative 
effect on the objectors‟ properties, since it would be injurious to the estate as a 
whole.64  
The ruling in Gilbert65 indicates that courts may be willing to acknowledge that 
in certain circumstances, an undisturbed view over the property of another is 
valuable and to the benefit of a property owner. It also shows that an unobstructed 
                                                          
60
 Section 84 (1)(aa)(1A) of the Law of Property Act 1925 authorises the Lands Tribunal to, on 
application, modify or discharge a restriction “arising under covenant or otherwise”. Their power in this 
regard is subject to certain conditions, one of which is that the restriction to be modified or discharged 
may not have the effect of securing to the persons entitled to it “any practical benefits of substantial 
value or advantage to them”. 
61
 Section 84(1)(aa)(1A) of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
62
 Successors in title to the purchasers of other properties within the building scheme made objections 
to the applicant‟s application for the amendment or discharge of the covenant. 
63
 This requirement arises from s 84(1)(aa)(1A) of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
64
 Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27. 
65
 Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27 at 33 and 35. 
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view of a scenic landscape does not have to be enjoyed directly from a property to 
be considered valuable to the owner. A property can also benefit from a pleasant 
view even if such a view can only be observed from a nearby spot. Moreover, the 
decision indicates that restrictive covenants can be imposed to prevent the erection 
of buildings that would obstruct the existing views from neighbouring properties. 
Therefore, although a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing, 
unobstructed view from her property, she may, in terms of a restrictive covenant, 
prevent the erection of buildings that would obstruct such a view. 
Similarly, in the Dennis judgment66 the Chancery Division held that the 
defendant‟s proposed extension of the building on his property would interfere with 
the claimants‟ views of a river and cause them unwarranted annoyance.67 At first 
glance, this ruling appears to be in disagreement with the decision in Hunter,68 where 
                                                          
66
 Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] EWHC 2961 (Ch). This decision was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeal in Dennis and Others v Davies [2009] EWCA Civ 1081. The discussion of this case focuses 
on the ruling of the Chancery Division. The Court of Appeal dismissed the matter on appeal, without 
considering or deciding upon any new arguments. Therefore, it effectively confirmed the ruling of the 
Chancery Division.  
67
 Such an annoyance would be unwarranted because the properties were protected against, 
amongst other things, annoyance and nuisance. The facts of Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] 
EWHC 2961 (Ch) can be summarised as follows: Both the claimants‟ and the defendant‟s properties 
were situated in a building development on the banks of the River Thames. This development was 
characterised by views of the river that could be enjoyed from all the properties. (These facts appear 
somewhat similar to those in the South African case Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v 
Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004), 
discussed in 2 4, where the applicants‟ property was also situated on the bank of a river and the view 
of the river was considered to be a feature of the property. In Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] 
EWHC 2961 (Ch) paras 1-6 and 80-81, the defendant‟s plan to extend an existing building on his 
property posed a threat to the views enjoyed from the claimant‟s properties. Consequently, they 
claimed that the defendant‟s proposed building works was unwarranted since they would not comply 
with the applicable restrictive covenants. The court was asked to enforce the relevant restrictive 
covenants to prevent the defendant from building. These covenants prohibited the extension or 
erection of buildings without the prior approval of building plans by the so-called Management 
Company. Furthermore, they required houses to be used for residential or ancillary purposes only, 
and prohibited the use of properties in a manner that would cause annoyance or nuisance to other 
owners or occupiers in the estate or neighbourhood. It was submitted for the defendant that the 
common law position should be considered. However, Behrens J decided not to apply common law 
principles, since the claimants‟ claim was based on the enforcement of covenants. Instead, he argued 
that one has to apply a reasonability test when determining whether or not the defendant‟s proposed 
building plans would cause annoyance for the claimants. Considering how an “ordinary sensible 
English inhabitant” would experience the extension of the defendant‟s building, Behrens J ruled that 
such building works would have the prohibited effect of causing annoyance.  
68
 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 is discussed in 4 2 1. 
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the common law was applied to establish the principle that interference with the 
enjoyment of a property does not constitute nuisance. However, there were specific 
reasons why the court in Dennis decided not to apply the common law and 
consequently did not follow the principle laid down in Hunter. Firstly, the common law 
principle that a property owner may use (build on) her property as she pleases did 
not apply because the use of the relevant properties were regulated by restrictive 
covenants.69 Secondly, the buildings in the estate were specifically designed to 
provide each property with a view of the river. After considering the opinion of a 
reasonable person and specifically taking into account that the view of the river was 
an important feature of the properties in the estate, the court held that the obstruction 
of the claimants‟ views would cause them annoyance.70 Since the covenant 
proscribed any act that would cause other owners in the estate nuisance or 
annoyance, the defendant was prohibited from extending his building. 
It would be inaccurate to argue that the court in Dennis departed from the 
principle laid down in the Hunter ruling. The judgment in Dennis merely indicates that 
there may be an exception to the principle established in Hunter, namely that 
interference with a delightful attribute of property does not constitute an actionable 
nuisance. In terms of this exception, there may be instances where a pleasurable 
characteristic of property is protected in such a way that interference with it does 
indeed constitute an actionable nuisance. For example, restrictive covenants that 
restrict the uses of a certain group of properties may have the effect of preventing 
                                                          
69
 These covenants prohibited the use of one‟s property in a manner that may cause annoyance or 
nuisance for a neighbouring landowner. In Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 685D–H, 
686A–H, 699B–H, 700A–C, 708H, 709A–C and 727A–B, the House of Lords ruled that since a 
property owner is entitled to erect structures on her property as she pleases, the erection of a building 
will not constitute an actionable nuisance for interfering with the enjoyment of a neighbour‟s property. 
The court specifically stated that the obstruction of the view from a property due to the mere presence 
of a building on a neighbouring property is not actionable. 
70
 Behrens J ruled that the extension of the defendant‟s building would only interfere with the views 
from the properties of three of the claimants.  
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interference with the enjoyment of specific attributes of the properties in the group. 
Any acts that a court considers to be in contravention of such covenants, like the 
obstruction of the pleasant views from the other properties in the group, will be 
actionable. The case can therefore be read in one of two ways. Firstly, it can be seen 
as an example of an instance where a property owner (A) has a substantive right, in 
terms of a restrictive covenant, to prevent her neighbour (B) from using (building on) 
her (B‟s) property in a way that would obstruct the existing view from A‟s property. 
Secondly, the decision can be interpreted as an indication that there may be an 
exception to the principle that a property owner does not have an inherent right to 
the existing view from her property. In terms of this exception, there may be 
instances where a specific group of properties were designed to enhance 
surrounding views and where a property owner (A) in such a development may 
indeed have a substantive right, based on the specific design and lay-out of the 
properties in the development, to prevent a neighbour (B) from using (building on) 
her (B‟s) property in a way that would interfere with A‟s existing view. However, the 
exception dealt with in this case does not overrule the principle that the right to an 
existing, unobstructed view does not naturally flow from the right of ownership. The 
decision merely shows there may be exceptional circumstances, for example where 
a development is specifically designed to ensure that each of the property owners 
enjoy an unobstructed view of the surroundings, where the existing view from a 
property is indeed considered to be inherently part of the right of ownership. The 
South African decision, Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception 
Properties 572 CC and Others,71 seems to indicate that a similar exception to the 
                                                          
71
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) 
[2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004). 
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principle that a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing view 
from her property may exist in South African law.72 
The decisions in Hunter, Re Buchanan - Wollaston’s Conveyance,73 Gilbert v 
Spoor and Others74 and Dennis and Others v Davies75 show that the existing, 
unobstructed view from a property may be protected with a restrictive covenant in 
English law. They also illustrate that there are different ways of constructing this 
mechanism so as to protect a pleasant view. A restrictive covenant may for example 
place a height limitation on buildings to be constructed on a property or it may 
prohibit an owner from using her property in a way that would cause nuisance or 
annoyance for a neighbour.76 Any of these constructions may have the effect of 
preventing the obstruction of the view from a neighbouring property. However, 
although the obstruction of an existing view may be prevented by a restrictive 
covenant, the protection of such a view depends on how strictly the covenant is 
enforced by a court. If a restrictive covenant preventing the obstruction of a view is 
enforced absolutely, for instance if a court orders that the part of a building that 
exceeds the imposed height limitation should be demolished, the view enjoyed from 
a neighbouring property will be afforded protection in terms of a property rule. 
Conversely, if a court decides not to enforce such a restrictive covenant and only 
awards damages to the owner whose view was protected by such a covenant, that 
                                                          
72
 See the discussion of Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC 
and Others (2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) in 2 4.  
73
 Re Buchanan – Wollaston’s Conveyance (1939) 2 All ER 302. 
74
 Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27. 
75
 Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] EWHC 2961 (Ch). 
76
 The courts in Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27 and Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] 
EWHC 2961 (Ch) ruled that the obstruction of the views enjoyed from the properties in the respective 
cases were prohibited by the applicable restrictive covenants. These covenants prevented owners 
from using their properties in ways that would cause other owners nuisance or annoyance. The courts 
considered the obstruction of pleasurable views as having the prohibited effect of causing nuisance 
and annoyance to other owners. 
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view will only have been protected with a liability rule.77 In both the Gilbert and the 
Dennis rulings the courts enforced restrictive covenants preventing the obstruction of 
existing views absolutely. It therefore appears that in English law, a property owner‟s 
(A‟s) substantive right, which flows from a restrictive covenant, to prevent a 
neighbour (B) from erecting buildings that will obstruct the existing view from her 
(A‟s) property, is generally enforced with a property rule. 
 
4 2 2 2 Easements 
Easements have close affinities with restrictive covenants and restrictive covenants 
have been described as negative easements. However, easements differ from 
restrictive covenants in the sense that easements may be acquired by prescription, 
while it is not possible to acquire restrictive covenants in this way. Furthermore, the 
content of easements is relatively restricted, whereas the creation of restrictive 
covenants is less restricted as far as the permissible content of such devices is 
concerned.78 Easements are traditionally divided into three categories, namely 
positive easements; negative easements; and easements that confer a right to do 
something on one‟s own property that would otherwise be regarded as a private 
nuisance.79 These devices can be acquired through prescription or by way of an 
implied exercise of one owner‟s power to give another an easement.80  
                                                          
77
 The difference between protection of property rights in terms of property rules and liability rules is 
discussed in Ch 6. Even where amenities such as air or light are protected by way of (negative) 
easements, their protection will depend on courts‟ decisions. In a case where the flow of light to a 
property is obstructed despite being protected by an easement of light, such a flow of light will only be 
protected in terms of a property rule if a court absolutely enforces the easement, in other words, if the 
court were to order that a building that interferes with the flow of light must be demolished. 
78
 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law (5
th
 ed 2009) 597. Easements and restrictive covenants 
can also be distinguished from one another in the sense that easements are enforceable in law and in 
equity, while restrictive covenants are only enforceable in equity. 
79
 J Gaunt & J Morgan Gale on easements (18
th
 ed 2008) 3-4. The word “easement” stems from the 
old French word aisement, which has been replaced by the modern word “servitude”. The meaning of 
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A negative easement is part of an exceptional category of easements that 
prohibit the owner of the servient property from using her property in a particular way 
(rather than giving the owner of the dominant property the right to use the servient 
property).81 Gaunt and Morgan define a negative easement as a right to receive 
something from a neighbour‟s property without the neighbour interfering with or 
obstructing it.82 In terms of this definition, it seems as if a negative easement can be 
created to prevent a property owner from erecting buildings on her property that 
would interfere with the existing view from a neighbouring property. In South African 
law a negative servitude, similar to a negative easement in English law, can be 
created to give the owner of the dominant property a substantive right to prevent the 
obstruction of the existing view from her property.83 However, although there is 
strictly speaking no closed list of recognised easements in English law, there are 
strong indications that certain benefits of land, including the right to a view, cannot 
form the basis of an easement, and that in fact only a limited number of negative 
easements are recognised.84 This principle was confirmed by the court in Browne v 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
aisement is “convenience” or “accommodation”. B McFarlane The structure of property law (2008) 
837 defines easements as property rights that exist “only in relation to land”. An easement 
supplements one property owner‟s ownership by allowing her to make specific use of another owner‟s 
nearby land, which in turn results in a restriction of the latter owner‟s ownership. 
80
 B McFarlane The structure of property law (2008) 883 and 840. 
81
 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law (5
th
 ed 2009) 596. 
82
 J Gaunt & J Morgan Gale on easements (18
th
 ed 2008) 4. Rights to light, air and support of water 
are mentioned as examples of negative easements. 
83
 The categorisation of easements in English law, together with the fact that what is in English law 
referred to as an “easement” is called a “servitude” in French and Scottish law, appears to indicate 
that English law easements are similar to servitudes in South African law. See n 79. 
84
 K Gray “Property in thin air” (1991) 50 Cambridge LJ 252-307 at 261, referring to William Aldred’s 
Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b at 58b, 77 ER 816 at 821, argues that the right to protect a view is not 
recognised in the law of easements. K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law (5
th
 ed 2009) 617-619 
reason that the categories of negative easements are “virtually closed”. B McFarlane The structure of 
property law (2008) 838-839 agrees, arguing that easements of light, air and support are the only 
recognised negative easements. J Gaunt & J Morgan Gale on easements (18
th
 ed 2008) 3-4 mention 
certain “limiting characteristics” regarding an easement. These characteristics include that an 
easement is a right that cannot exist on its own, since it is appurtenant to “other land of the proprietor 
of the right”; an easement is a proprietary and not a personal right; an easement should be 
distinguished from a profit a prendre in the sense that an easement does not confer a right to take 
something from a servient tenement, whereas a profit a prendre gives one the right to take something 
that is capable of ownership from another‟s land; the proprietor is not given exclusive use of the 
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Flower,85 which ruled that the pleasant view from a property may not be protected by 
way of an easement of prospect. The court had to determine whether the erection of 
a staircase giving its users a view into bedrooms in the plaintiffs‟ flat breached a 
covenant for the quiet enjoyment of the neighbouring property.86 In his judgment, 
Parker J mentioned that it was difficult to find an easement that has been interfered 
with by the construction of the staircase, since English law does not recognise an 
easement of view or privacy.87 
According to McFarlane, courts will consider the content of a right to determine 
whether or not it constitutes an easement. If a court has previously recognised this 
type of right as an easement, the content question will be easily answered. In 
instances where a right is claimed to be an easement but has not been afforded 
such recognition by a court before, the court will consider whether certain 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
servient tenement in terms of an easement; and there are some advantages that cannot exist as 
easements. These advantages (that cannot exist as easements) include the right to a view; the right 
to privacy; protection from the weather and the right to television reception. Gaunt and Morgan 
mention that other measures, such as restrictive covenants or the law of nuisance, may provide 
protection for these advantages. However, case law has indicated that the existing view from a 
property cannot be protected in terms of the law of nuisance. See William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co 
Rep 57b at 59a, 77 ER 816 at 821; Butt v Imperial Gas Company (1866) 2 Ch App 158; Re Penny 
and the South Eastern Railway Co (1857) 119 ER 1390 and Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 
677 at 685G–H and 686A–C. See the discussions of these cases in 4 2 1. 
85
 Browne v Flower (1911) 1 Ch 219. 
86
 This staircase was erected on a neighbouring property. The facts of this case resemble those in Re 
Penny and the South Eastern Railway Co (1857) 119 ER 1390 (“Re Penny”) where it was held that 
the plaintiff, whose premises were overlooked by the users of a railway, did not have an action 
against the constructors of the railway. The court in Re Penny laid down the principle that no action 
lies for disturbing a property owner‟s privacy by overlooking her property. Indirectly, it also confirmed 
that the obstruction of the view from a property is not actionable. 
87
 Browne v Flower (1911) 1 Ch 219 at 225 and 227. Parker J mentioned that the fact that a property 
is developed before the development of neighbouring properties does not give the owner of such a 
property a right to the undisturbed view over undeveloped properties. Parker J explained that the 
buyer of property cannot reasonably expect the seller not develop the land she retained in a way that 
may interfere with the view from the land she sold to the buyer. It would indeed be “unreasonable” of 
a property owner to assume that the person from whom she bought the property “was undertaking 
restrictive obligations which would prevent his using land retained by him for a lawful purpose ... 
merely because his so doing might affect the amenities of the property he had sold”. Parker J 
reasoned that a buyer has the opportunity to bargain for the rights that she deems necessary for the 
comfort of her property. 
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requirements for an easement are met.88 McFarlane futher argues that the 
enjoyment of a view cannot be defined well enough to qualify as an easement.89 This 
reasoning is not entirely convincing because it indeed seems possible to define a 
specific view. The content of an easement of view can, for instance, state the 
specific “object” that has to be in the right holder‟s line of sight when standing on a 
specific place, and that the owner of the servient property is prohibited from erecting 
any structure on her property that might interfere with this sightline. Furthermore, 
land surveyors may circumscribe fairly easily the view that is sought to be protected. 
An easement of view can therefore specifically define the part of the servient 
property that is not to be used in order to protect the view from the dominant 
property. However, although it seems possible to circumsribe a specific view that 
should be protected, there is no example of a view being defined well enough to form 
a suitable content for an easement.90 
                                                          
88
 According to B McFarlane The structure of property law (2008) 838, a court would consider a right 
to be an easement if it has the following characteristics:  
“It allows B [one owner] to make specific, limited use of A‟s [another owner‟s] land; and [i]t 
enhances B‟s Freehold or Lease (ie it benefits B‟s land); and [i]t lasts forever (like a 
Freehold) or for a limited period (like a Lease); and [i]t is not a right to exclusive control of 
A‟s land; and [i]t does not impose a positive duty on A; and [w]hen created, it was not 
intended to be only a personal right against A ... ” 
89
 B McFarlane The structure of property law (2008) 839-841 argues that when determining whether a 
right should be protected as an easement, courts will consider whether the relevant right allows the 
right-holder to make use of the land of another; whether the use was related to adjacent land or 
whether it was specific and limited. Referring to the requirement that a right must allow one property 
owner to make a specific and limited use of another owner‟s property to be able to qualify for 
protection in terms of an easement, McFarlane discusses the ways in which such uses can be 
circumscribed. For example, using another owner‟s property for the passing of air to one‟s own 
property will only be considered an easement if the air passes through a defined channel. In the same 
way, an easement of light will only exist if it relates to light that “flows” over the servient property and 
enters a specific window of the dominant property. If the use cannot be defined in such specific terms, 
for example if there is only a general right to receive air flowing over one property to another, or a 
general right to a supply of light passing over another owner‟s property, it will not be possible to 
consider such rights as easements. Nevertheless, rights to light and air can give rise to easements if 
their contents are well defined. Accordingly, the content of an easement of air is the use of specific air 
(that “part” of the air that flows through the defined channel) and the content of an easement of light is 
the use of the specific light entering through a particular window. 
90
 Despite the fact that the view from a property cannot directly be protected by way of an easement, it 
may arguably be afforded indirect protection through an easement of light or air. Often the protection 
of a specific view from a property means that owners of a large area of land are prohibited from 
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4 2 2 3 Conclusion 
The position regarding the protection of an unobstructed, existing view from a 
property in English law corresponds with the position in South African law. In English 
law, a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing view from her 
property, but case law shows that a property owner may, in terms of a restrictive 
covenant, acquire a substantive right to prevent the obstruction of such a view.91 
Case law also indicates that there may be circumstances where the existing view 
from a property in a specific development forms such an important part of the use 
and enjoyment of the property that the owner of this property has an inherent 
substantive right, based on the specific design of the properties in the development, 
to prevent the obstruction of the view.92 It seems unlikely that the existing view from 
a property can be protected by a negative easement. The position in South African 
law is very similar. South African law does not acknowledge the existing view from a 
property as an inherent right that naturally flows from ownership either. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
erecting structures on their properties. However, there may be instances where a property owner only 
desires the preservation of a particular view or sight, which would only require that a burden be 
placed on a close-by property. In such circumstances, an easement of light or air that prevents the 
erection of buildings may have the concomitant and incidental effect of preserving this particular view. 
See J Gaunt & J Morgan Gale on easements (18
th
 ed 2008) 349 for a discussion of the effects that an 
easement of light may have. Easements of light and air may effectively prevent a landowner from 
having a view overlooking her neighbour‟s premises. Gaunt and Morgan explain that although a 
property owner generally has the right to erect a building on her own property that has windows 
overlooking her neighbour‟s property, she would not be entitled to erect such a building if her 
neighbour‟s land benefits from an easement that prevents such a building work. Furthermore, if there 
is no such an easement and a building with windows opening onto a neighbour‟s property is erected, 
the neighbour may obstruct the windows at any time during a period of 20 years. (The acquisition of a 
right to light through prescription can be prevented if a structure obstructing the light supply is erected 
within 20 years after the construction of the building that has the benefit of a supply of light.) 
Therefore, although the principle is that a property owner is entitled to a view overlooking her 
neighbour‟s property, such an entitlement is subject to the possibility that an easement may prevent 
her from having a view and it may be lost if the neighbour exercises her right to erect buildings on her 
property in a way that obstructs such a view. 
91
 The decisions in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 at 699, Re Buchanan – Wollaston’s 
Conveyance (1939) 2 All ER 302, Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27 and Dennis and Others v 
Davies [2008] EWHC 2961 (Ch) established that the existing view from a property can be protected 
with a restrictive covenant. See 4 2 2 1.  
92
 See the discussion of Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] EWHC 2961 (Ch) in 4 2 2 1. 
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Nevertheless, just as a property owner in English law can protect the existing view 
from her property with a restrictive covenant, a South African property owner can 
have a substantive right, based on a servitude, a restrictive condition, a zoning 
scheme or building regulations, to prevent the erection of neighbouring buildings that 
will obstruct her existing view.93 Furthermore, there are also indications that a South 
African property owner may indeed have an inherent right to prevent interference 
with the existing, unobstructed view from her property if such a view forms an 
important part of the use and enjoyment of her property.94 
 
4 3 The right to a view in Dutch law 
4 3 1 No inherent right to a view 
Dutch law does not acknowledge an inherent right to the existing, unobstructed view 
from a property either. However, in terms of the Dutch legal system a property owner 
(A) may have a substantive right to prevent a neighbouring owner (B) from using her 
(B‟s) property in a way that will interfere with the existing view from A‟s property. 
Such substantive rights can be based on praedial servitudes (erfdienstbaarheden)95 
and on statutory provisions.96 A can also prevent the erection of a building on B‟s 
property if she can prove that the erection of the building will cause unlawful 
nuisance for her, or that it will amount to abuse of B‟s property rights (misbruik van 
                                                          
93
 The possibility of protecting the existing view from a property with a servitude is discussed in 2 3 2. 
See Ch 3 regarding the protection of the existing view from a property in terms of a restrictive 
condition, a zoning scheme or building regulations. 
94
 See the discussion of Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC 
and Others (2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) in 2 4. 
95
 See 4 3 2 1. 
96
 See 4 3 2 2. 
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recht).97 Furthermore, and in contrast with both South African and English law, in 
terms of Dutch planning law A will also have the opportunity to protect the existing 
view from her property insofar as such protection may be implied by her right to be 
informed of, see and comment on B‟s building plans before they are approved.98 In 
Dutch law, a property owner can therefore rely on a servitude or on legislation or, in 
the absence of a servitude and legislation, she can use an action based on nuisance 
or on the doctrine of abuse of right, or her opportunity to comment on B‟s building 
plans, to prevent B‟s building works and consequently protect the existing, 
unobstructed view from her property if and insofar as such building works would 
have obstructed the existing view from such a property.  
Apart from protecting an existing view against obstruction caused by building 
works on a neighbouring property, a property owner may also have the opportunity 
to prevent her view from being obstructed by a neighbour‟s trees or hedges. In terms 
of neighbour law, a property owner may have the opportunity to prevent the planting 
or enforce the removal of trees and hedges close to the border lines of neighbouring 
properties and thereby protect the existing view from her property.99 Since trees and 
hedges may either obstruct or contribute to the existing view from a property, the 
statutory provisions100 that regulate the planting and removal of trees and hedges 
may be used to prevent the obstruction or preserve the existing view from a 
property.101 
                                                          
97
 The possibility of protecting the existing view from a property with an action based on nuisance is 
discussed in 4 3 2 3, and the possibility of protecting such a view with an action based on the doctrine 
of abuse of rights is discussed in 4 3 2 4. 
98
 See 4 3 2 5. 
99
 AC Wibbens-de Jong Burenrecht: Monografieën BW B26 (4
th
 ed 2009) 47. 
100
 BW 5:42 contains rules that regulate the planting of trees and hedges close to a border line.  
101
 BW 5:42.1 determines that trees may not be planted closer that two meters  from the border 
line between two properties, while a distance of half a meter apply to shrubs  and hedges. 
However, in terms of BW 5:42.3, a property owner may not protest against trees or hedges on a 
neighbouring property if their height is lower than the dividing wall between the properties. The 
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4 3 2 Protection of an existing, unobstructed view 
4 3 2 1 Praedial servitudes (Erfdienstbaarheden) 
A praedial servitude (erfdienstbaarheid)102 in Dutch law can be defined as a burden 
on one immovable property, the servient tenement (dienende erf), in favour of 
another immovable property, the dominant tenement (heersende erf).103 It may place 
an obligation on the servient owner to endure or not to perform a specific action on, 
above or beneath one or both of the properties, but it may not compel her to give or 
to do something.104 However, a praedial servitude may place an obligation on the 
servient owner to maintaining buildings, works (werken) or plants that are partly or 
entirely located on her property.105  
Property owners have a large measure of freedom to determine the contents of 
a praedial servitude; consequently, the contents of praedial servitudes often involve 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rules determining where trees and hedges may be planted do not apply when a property owner 
has permitted her neighbour to plant closer than the prescribed distances or when the 
neighbouring property is a public “water” or a public road. BW 5:42.2 explains how the 
prescribed distances should be determined and BW 5:42.4 determines how damages should be 
calculated when BW 5:42 has been violated. AC Wibbens-de Jong Burenrecht: Monografieën 
BW B26 (4
th
 ed 2009) 43-44 refers to justifications for prohibiting the planting of trees and 
hedges within a specified distance from the border of a neighbouring property. In terms of these 
justifications, such a specified distance protects the enjoyment of a view from and the flow o f 
light and air to a property, it limits the amount of leaves and fruit that are shed onto a 
neighbour‟s property and it prevents that the ground of a neighbouring property is stripped of 
food and water and consequently sterilised. 
102
 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (4
th
 ed 2007) 539 mention that, especially in 
older publications, the word servituut is used as a synonym for praedial servitude (erfdienstbaarheid).  
103
 This is the way that a praedial servitude is defined in BW 5:70.1. See KFM Berger Burenrecht, 
mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden (4
th
 ed 2001) 12 and HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot 
Goederenrecht (4
th
 ed 2007) 539. See also AC Wibbens-de Jong Mandeligheid en 
erfdienstbaarheden: Monografieën B27 BW (3
rd
 ed 2006) 23-25, where the creation of a praedial 
servitude is discussed.  
104
 KFM Berger Burenrecht, mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden (4
th
 ed 2001) 134–136 and 138 
argues that there are exceptions to the rule that a praedial servitude may not burden the owner of the 
servient property. These exceptions include that a praedial servitude may indeed compel the owner of 
the servient property to perform an action when the deed of grant (akte van vestiging) determines that 
there is an obligation on the owner of the servient tenement to erect buildings or other works or to 
plant. Should the contents entail such a burden, the relevant buildings, works or plants must be 
situated partly or entirely on the servient tenement. See BW 5:71.1. 
105
 BW 5:71.2 determines that a praedial servitude may involve an obligation to maintain the servient 
property. 
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a deviation from the rules of neighbour law.106 For example, a praedial servitude 
often prohibits the owner of the servient tenement from doing something on her 
property that she would otherwise have done or compels her to endure an act that 
the owner of the dominant tenement performs on her property that would otherwise 
have been unlawful.107 The creation of a praedial servitude may be subject to the 
requirement that the owner of the dominant tenement should pay the owner of the 
servient tenement an amount of money.108  
In Dutch law, praedial servitudes109 can be created to protect the existing, 
unobstructed views from properties. For example, a praedial servitude may give the 
owner of the dominant tenement (A) a substantive right to prevent the owner of the 
servient tenement (B) from erecting structures on her (B‟s) property that exceeds a 
certain height limitation. Such a servitude may have the effect of preventing the 
erection of buildings on B‟s property that will obstruct the existing view from A‟s 
property. A praedial servitude may also entitle A to have windows or other openings 
(allowing her to enjoy the view from her property) in her walls closer to B‟s property 
than the distance allowed in terms of the normal rules of neighbour law.110 Such a 
servitude entitles A to insert windows that would give her a view over B‟s property 
(and compels B to endure this act of A) and effectively gives A a substantive right to 
                                                          
106
 According to HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (4
th
 ed 2007) 543, neighbouring 
owners‟ respective entitlements with regard to the view from a property, a right of way, the flow of 
water and the flow of light may be regulated in the contents of a praedial servitude. 
107
 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (4
th
 ed 2007) 544. See also AC Wibbens-de 
Jong Mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden: Monografieën B27 BW (3
rd
 ed 2006) 32. 
108
 This requirement is set out in BW 5:70.2. See KFM Berger Burenrecht, mandeligheid en 
erfdienstbaarheden (4
th
 ed 2001) 129. This obligation will be provided for in the deed of grant (de akte 
van vestiging). See also HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (4
th
 ed 2007) 545. 
109
 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (4
th
 ed 2007) 543 mention that respective 
property owners‟ entitlements with regard to a view (uitzicht) is often set out in the contents of a 
praedial servitude. See also AC Wibbens-de Jong Mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden: 
Monografieën B27 BW (3
rd
 ed 2006) 20. 
110
 BW 5:50.1 prohibits a property owner from having windows; openings in walls; balconies or other 
similar structures within a distance of two meters from the border line of a neighbouring property. See 
WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp with GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Pitlo Het Nederlands 
burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht (12
th
 ed 2006) 445 and the discussion of this restriction in 
4 3 2 2. 
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have a view over B‟s property that she would otherwise not have had.111 
Furthermore, the view from A‟s property may be preserved with a praedial servitude 
that compels B to maintain her (B‟s) property.112 For example, A may have a 
substantive right, in terms of a praedial servitude, to compel B to maintain trees and 
hedges on her (B‟s) property to either ensure that they do not obstruct the existing 
view from A‟s property, or that they continue to contribute to the pleasant view from 
A‟s property.113.  
 
4 3 2 2 Statutory protection 
Statutory regulation prohibits a property owner from having windows; openings in 
walls; balconies or other similar structures within a distance of two meters from the 
border line of a neighbouring property.114 However, overlooking a neighbour‟s 
premises through or from such openings or structures will be lawful if the neighbour 
granted permission for such “building works”.115 There are also instances where the 
                                                          
111
 Apart from a praedial servitude that may give a property owner a view that she would not have had 
if she complied with the restrictions on inserting windows or other openings closer to a neighbouring 
property than the prescribed distance, a property owner who has an opening or a window that does 
not comply with the prescribed distances may acquire a right to keep the view from such (unlawful) 
windows or openings unobstructed through prescription. See WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp with 





 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (4
th
 ed 2007) 543 and 545. See BW 
5:71.2. See also AC Wibbens-de Jong Mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden: Monografieën B27 
BW (3
rd
 ed 2006) 32. 
113
 AC Wibbens-de Jong Burenrecht: Monografieën BW B26 (4
th
 ed 2009) 47. 
114
 BW 5:50.1. BW 5:50.3 explains how the distance referred to in this provision (two meters) must be 
measured. See further KFM Berger Burenrecht, mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden (4
th
 ed 2001) 
71.  
115
 BW 5:50.1 provides that  
“[o]ne is prohibited from having windows, other wall openings, balconies or similar 
building works closer than two meters from a neighour‟s border line, if such openings or 
building works provide a view of the neighbour‟s property. However, these openings or 
constructions may be erected if the affected neighbour consented to it.”  
(Tenzij de eigenaar van het naburige erf daartoe toestemming heeft gegeven, is het niet 
geoorloofd binnen twee meter van de grenslijn van dit erf vensters of andere 
muuropeningen, dan wel balkons of soortgelijke werken te hebben, voor zover deze op 
dit erf uitzicht geven.) 
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Dutch civil code provides that a property owner may not prevent her neighbour from 
having openings or structures within a distance of two meters from the border line.116  
This restriction on having windows or other openings within a certain distance 
from a neighbouring property prevents the act of overlooking a neighbour‟s premises 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Relying on case law, WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp with GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Pitlo Het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht (12
th
 ed 2006) 445 explain that the words “andere 
muuropeninge” in BW 5:50 probably refer to doors, while constructions like balconies and flat roofs 
that are visibly intended to be used as a roof terrace or garden may fall into the category of 
“soortgelijke werken”. In an older source that refers to a previous Dutch civil code, JPH Suijling 
Inleiding tot het burgerlijk recht Vol 5: Zakenrecht (1940) 221-222, it is mentioned that according to 
the old civil code, a property owner was prohibited from having an opening closer than a certain 
specified distance that would give her a view over her neighbour‟s property. Balconies and other open 
constructions that extended from a property were equated with openings (including windows) in the 
sense of providing a prospect over a neighbour‟s property and therefore also had to comply with 
certain requirements regarding where they should be erected. Interestingly, it was specifically 
commented that roof gardens did not have to comply with these requirements, since they could not be 
seen as “extending” from a property. In his discussion of the words “windows, other wall openings, 
balconies or similar building works” (vensters of andere muuropeningen, dan wel balkons of 
soortgelijke werken) in the context of BW 5:50, AC Wibbens-de Jong Burenrecht: Monografieën BW 
B26 (4
th
 ed 2009) 53–54 remarks that a roof garden is not considered to be a building work similar to 
a balcony. Furthermore, referring to Hof Arnhem 8 February 2005, LJN AS7586, Wibbens-de Jong 
states that case law indicates that it is not the intention of a property owner that determines whether a 
structure on her property should be regarded as a “other building work” in terms of BW 5:50. Instead, 
this will be determined by the purpose for which the relevant structure is useful with reference to its 
nature and construction. See FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot 
de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten (15
th
 
ed 2008) 192. See also RJJ van Acht Burenrecht (1990) 128–133 for a discussion of a property 
owner‟s entitlement to grant her neighbour permission to make openings or windows in her wall or 
plant trees and hedges within the prohibited distance of two meters from the borderline. See also AC 
Wibbens-de Jong Burenrecht: Monografieën BW B26 (4
th
 ed 2009) 51-52; FHJ Mijnssen, AA van 
Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 
Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten (15
th
 ed 2008) 191–192 and PC van Es De actio 
negatoria: Een studie naar de rechtsvorderlijke zijde van het eigendomsrecht (2005) 243 for 
discussions of BW 5:50. 
116
 BW 5:50.2. These circumstances include cases where the neighbouring property is public waters 
or a public road; where there is a public road or public waters between the properties; or where the 
view that can be observed from the openings or structures does not reach further that two meters 
(because it looks onto or is obstructed by a neighbour‟s wall that is fitted with opaque windows). BW 
5:50.2 also provides that if an opening or a structure is lawful in terms of the provisions of this section, 
it will stay lawful even if the neighbouring property loses its public function or if the wall (that is less 
than two meters away) that obstructs the view from such an opening or structure is demolished. See 
FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten (15
th
 ed 2008) 192. 
Furthermore, BW 5:50.4 determines that a property owner whose right to claim the removal of an 
overlooking opening or structure on a neighbouring property prescribed may not erect a structure 
within two meters from such a “point” of overlooking so as to cause the neighbour nuisance by 
disrupting her view. This prohibition does not apply when there is already a building within two meters 
from the overlooking opening or structure when the prescription period ends. See also KFM Berger 
Burenrecht, mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden (4
th
 ed 2001) 70; WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp 
with GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Pitlo Het Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht (12
th
 
ed 2006) 445–446 and AC Wibbens-de Jong Burenrecht: Monografieën BW B26 (4
th
 ed 2009) 52 
regarding the circumstances under which the restrictions on the placing of windows and other 
openings are not applicable. 
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and consequently protects the neighbour‟s privacy. However, it may have the 
concomitant effect of preventing the erection of structures that may obstruct the view 
from a property. For example: A wants to build a wall closer than two meters from 
B‟s property. The erection of this wall will obstruct the view enjoyed from B‟s 
property. However, A decides not to erect the wall because she is not allowed to 
place any clear windows in it. This illustrates how the statutory restriction on A‟s right 
to build on her property, which is aimed at protecting B‟s privacy, may also have the 
effect of protecting the view from B‟s property. Although the restriction does not give 
B an actionable right to prohibit the erection of structures that will obstruct her view, it 
may have the effect of preventing her from losing this attribute. 
The existing view from a property is further protected by provisions in the Dutch 
civil code insofar as the relevant statutory provisions regulate the planting of trees 
and hedges on neighbouring properties that “contribute” to such a view.117 These 
regulations are aimed at preventing the obstruction of the view from a property and 
the flow of air and light to neighbouring properties.118 If trees or hedges were planted 
within the prohibited distance, a property owner may demand the removal of these 
plants.119 A property owner therefore has a substantive right to prevent the planting 
of trees in contravention of these regulations and, if the existing view from her 
property will be obstructed by such planting, the obstruction of the existing view from 
her property will also be prevented.  
 
                                                          
117
 BW 5:42.1-4 regulates the planting of trees, shrubs and hedges. See the discussion of this 
provision in n 101.  
118
 See n 101 regarding the justifications for regulating the planting of trees, shrubs and hedges. 
119
 A property owner‟s claim for the removal of trees or hedges on a neighbouring property will 
be unsuccessful if her right to claim such removal has prescribed. See AC Wibbens -de Jong 
Burenrecht: Monografieën BW B26 (4
th
 ed 2009) 44. 
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4 3 2 3 Nuisance (Hinder) 
The obstruction of the pleasant view from a property may constitute an unlawful 
nuisance in Dutch law and therefore nuisance law can in some instances provide a 
way to protect the existing view from a property.120 However, nuisance will only be 
actionable if it is unlawful in terms of the Dutch civil code.121 Van Acht reasons that, 
in the absence of a single standard of acceptable conduct, the lawfulness of an act 
of nuisance will depend on the specific circumstances surrounding each case.122 
Most importantly, to be considered actionable, nuisance must cause a notable 
disturbance in the enjoyment of one‟s property.123 In establishing whether such a 
                                                          
120
 RJJ van Acht Burenrecht (1990) 207. Dutch law does not have a numerus clausus of actionable 
nuisances. The circumstances of a specific case are considered to establish whether or not the 
nuisance is unlawful. Therefore, the obstruction of the existing view from a property may indeed be 
considered an actionable nuisance in certain circumstances. 
121
 RJJ van Acht Burenrecht (1990) 192-193 and 207 argues that in terms of BW 5:37, an act of 
nuisance will only be actionable in Dutch law if it is unlawful according to BW 6:162. BW 6:162 
distinguishes between three categories of unlawfulness, namely acting in a way that violates a right, 
acting or failing to act in contravention of a legal duty and acting in a manner that is improper 
according to the unwritten rules of social norms. The first category is not applicable in cases of 
nuisance, since determining whether a nuisance is unlawful involves the question of whether or not a 
right has been violated. Therefore, a nuisance will be considered unlawful in a situation where a 
property owner acted in contravention of an applicable legal provision or - in instances where no legal 
rule applies - where the nuisance was caused in a way or to an extent that is unacceptable in terms of 
social norms. It is in cases that fall into this last category (therefore, cases where no legal rule is 
applicable) that courts consider factors such as the nature, seriousness, duration of, as well as the 
damage caused by a nuisance to determine whether such an act constituted an unlawful nuisance. 
Van Acht criticises BW 5:37 for not providing a standard of lawfulness. He argues that, in the absence 
of any substantive indication of how to determine whether or not a nuisance is lawful or not, this 
provision appears to be an “empty shell” (een lege huls). However, he concludes that BW 5:37 does 
have meaning in the sense of referring to BW 6:162, a provision that ensures that an owner is not 
held liable for causing her neighbour nuisance if she had no part in it. Furthermore, by generally 
referring to BW 6:162, BW 5:37 leaves scope to consider the specific circumstances of a particular 
case. See also FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de 
beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten (15
th
 ed 
2008) 55; KFM Berger Burenrecht, mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden (4
th
 ed 2001) 30 and HJ 
Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (4
th
 ed 2007) 145.  
122
 RJJ van Acht Burenrecht (1990) 202. 
123
 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten (15
th
 ed 2008) define 
nuisance as an instance where a person who is entitled to enjoy a property is disturbed in her 
enjoyment of it. According to KFM Berger Burenrecht, mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden (4
th
 ed 
2001) 32, a mere burden (last) on a property is not enough to constitute an unlawful nuisance – only 
an “overly heavy burden” (overlast) will amount to actionable nuisance. The Afrikaans word for 
“burden” is “las”, while the Afrikaans word for “nuisance” is “oorlas”, which corresponds with the Dutch 
terminology. Not every act where one owner causes a nuisance to another owner is actionable. 
Actions will only be considered unlawful and actionable if they go too far or if they contravene civil 
standards or legal provisions. FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot 
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disturbance occurred, a specific act of nuisance will be analysed with reference to 
the standard of acceptable emissions, the nature of the nuisance and its 
environment. Furthermore, the time at which a nuisance occurs, as well as its 
frequency, may affect its lawfulness.124 If an act that causes one property owner 
nuisance serves an important public interest, the property owner to whom damage is 
caused will be expected to endure the nuisance.125 However, a property owner who 
has to endure nuisance for the sake of protecting a public interest is entitled to claim 
damages from the person causing such a disturbance.126  
If the obstruction of the existing view from a property is considered unlawful in a 
specific case, it may be actionable in nuisance and consequently such a view will be 
afforded protection in terms of nuisance law.127 Generally, a property owner will not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten (15
th
 
ed 2008) 55–58 argue that, according to BW 5:37, one has to consider the criterion laid down in BW 
6:162 when determining whether or not a specific act of nuisance is unlawful. Referring to HR 21 
Oktober 2005, NJ 2006, 418, with reference to CJH Brunner, they mention that the Hoge Raad 
considers the public opinion (maatschappelike opvattingen) to be the decisive factor when 
determining whether the disturbance of a property owner‟s enjoyment of her property constituted an 
unlawful nuisance in a specific context. Furthermore, according to the Hoge Raad, the nature, 
seriousness and duration of a nuisance, the scope of the damage suffered due to a nuisance and 
other circumstances of a specific case, including the local circumstances, are important factors to 
determine whether or not a specific action constitutes an actionable nuisance. KFM Berger 
Burenrecht, mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden (4
th
 ed 2001) 31 argues that the extent to and the 
manner in which an act of one property owner caused nuisance for a neighbouring property owner will 
play a role in determining whether a nuisance is unlawful. The nature, seriousness, duration and 
scope of an act of nuisance and the damage caused by it are again mentioned as factors that the 
Hoge Raad deems important considerations when deciding whether a specific nuisance is actionable 
or not. PC van Es De actio negatoria: Een studie naar de rechtsvorderlijke zijde van het 
eigendomsrecht (2005) 224 also refers to the fact that an act has to be measured in terms of social 
norms (maatschappelijke betamelijkheidsnorm) to determine whether the owner‟s exercise of her 
ownership entitlements was lawful.  
124
 RJJ van Acht Burenrecht (1990) 202.  
125
 BW 6:168. See FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de 
beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten (15
th
 ed 
2008) 60 and KFM Berger Burenrecht, mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden (4
th
 ed 2001) 31.  
126
 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten (15
th
 ed 2008) 60.  
127
 In his discussion of the factors that affect the lawfulness of an act of nuisance, RJJ van Acht 
Burenrecht (1990) 207-208 mentions that the obstruction of a property owner‟s view may sometimes 
be considered to constitute an unlawful nuisance and that such a view will then be afforded protection 
in terms of nuisance law. Van Acht reasons that the nature of a nuisance may determine whether it 
should be tolerated by a neighbour. Certain disturbances, such as the deposition of smoke or dust, or 
the spreading of noise, will relatively easily be regarded as unlawful interferences with the enjoyment 
of a property. Conversely, it will be more difficult to prove that the nuisance caused by interference 
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lose her right to build on her property as she pleases merely because her building 
works will obstruct the view from a neighbouring property.128 However, there may be 
a specific instance where a property owner is prohibited from building, or where her 
right to build is restricted, because her building works will obstruct the view from her 
neighbour‟s property in a way that will cause a serious, unlawful and therefore 
actionable interference with the neighbour‟s enjoyment of her property.129  
 
4 3 2 4 Abuse of rights (Misbruik van recht) 
In Dutch law, the existing view from a property can also be protected in terms of the 
doctrine of abuse of rights (misbruik van recht). This doctrine is primarily concerned 
with the objectively unlawful exercise of one‟s ownership entitlements.130 Reehuis 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
with telecommunication reception or a diminution of the amount of light that enters a property is 
unlawful. Similarly, the obstruction of a pleasurable view from a property is considered a “lesser” 
nuisance than the loss of the enjoyment of one‟s garden because of a neighbour‟s beekeeping. 
However, the nature of a nuisance alone does not determine its lawfulness. Even though the loss of a 
pleasant view will, in terms of its nature, not be rendered an unlawful nuisance, the obstruction of a 
view may still constitute an actionable nuisance. This is possible because BW 5:37 does not provide a 
limited list of nuisances and because the circumstances of a specific case may indicate that the 
obstruction of the relevant view causes a serious interference with the enjoyment of a property and is 
therefore unlawful. When considering the nature of a nuisance in order to determine whether it is 
lawful, one should keep in mind that the nature (seriousness) of a specific nuisance changes over 
time. An attribute of property that is considered a necessity in our modern world may not have been of 
any value to a property owner a few centuries ago.  
128
 RJJ van Acht Burenrecht (1990) 207. 
129
 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten (15
th
 ed 2008) 54 refer to 
the spreading noise, vibrations, bad smells, smoke or gas, obstructing the flow of light or air and 
taking away support that was previously provided to a neighbouring property as examples of unlawful 
nuisances. They explain that these are only examples of possible nuisances, since there is an open-
ended list of possible nuisances. They also distinguish between two categories of nuisance. The first 
category is referred to as traditional nuisances (traditionele hinder) and includes the “distribution” of 
noise, vibrations, smells, gasses and water pollution. The second category includes instances where 
a property owner interferes with the support of her neighbour‟s building when she erects or 
demolishes a structure on her own property. Cases that were previously regarded as abuse of rights 
fall into the second category. PC van Es De actio negatoria: Een studie naar de rechtsvorderlijke zijde 
van het eigendomsrecht (2005) 223 categorises nuisance in the same way. He includes the 
interception of light and air in the second category (with the interference with support to a 
neighbouring property), and also mentions that this category consists of acts that were previously 
considered and treated as abuse-of-right cases.  
130
 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (4
th
 ed 2007) 144–145 specifically discuss the 
abuse of a property right, using the term “abuse of a (property) entitlement” (misbruik van 
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and Heisterkamp define this doctrine as a prohibition of use of property in a way that 
would be lawful in the ordinary course of events but is unlawful under specific 
circumstances.131 As far as property is involved, the doctrine means that a property 
owner may not use her ownership entitlements in an objectively unlawful manner.132 
For example, although a property owner is entitled to erect buildings and structures 
on her property, the erection of a water tower that is built purely to affect the use and 
enjoyment of a neighbouring property may be opposed in terms of the doctrine of 
abuse of rights.133 During the nineteenth century, the doctrine of abuse of rights was 
often explained with the example of a property owner who erects a chimney with the 
sole purpose of obstructing the view from a neighbouring property.134 In effect, a 
property owner (A) may rely on this doctrine to prevent the erection of a building on a 
neighbouring property that will obstruct the view from her (A‟s) property if she can 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
[eigendoms]bevoegdheid), which they understand to include “abuse of a [property] right” (misbruik 
van [eigendoms]recht).  
131
 WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp with GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Pitlo Het Nederlands 
burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht (12
th
 ed 2006) 399. In the context of property rights, an abuse of 
right occurs when a property owner uses her property in a manner that causes unlawful harm to 
another person. An abuse of right does not necessarily involve exercising a property right and is often 
used in the context of unlawful acts or delicts (de onrechtmatige daad), where it refers to instances 
where the specific circumstances of a case renders the (normally) lawful use of property unlawful. 
132
 BW 5:1.1 provides that ownership is the most comprehensive right that a person can have in a 
thing. Furthermore, in terms of BW 5:1.2, an owner may use her property insofar as such use does 
not violate the rights of others or contravene any legal provisions and acknowledges the limitations 
contained in unwritten law. In a case where circumstances render the usually lawful use of a property 
unlawful, a property owner will be prohibited from exercising the freedom granted to her by BW 5:1. 
See HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (4
th
 ed 2007) 137 for a discussion of BW 5:1.  
133
 WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp with GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Pitlo Het Nederlands 
burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht (12
th
 ed 2006) 399. 
134
 WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp with GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Pitlo Het Nederlands 
burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht (12
th
 ed 2006) 400–401. This example was based on a French 
decision, Hof van Colmar 2 Mei 1855, DP 1856, 2.9. In the Dutch case, HR 13 Maart 1936, NJ 1936, 
415; HR 2 April 1937, NJ 1937, 639, a similar set of facts had to be considered by the court. A 
property owner erected an unsightly water tower (watertoren) solely to spoil his neighbour‟s view, 
since it was not connected to a watering scheme and therefore without any use to him. In Dutch case 
law preceding 1970, judgments of the higher courts (hoogste rechtscollege) indicated that in terms of 
the doctrine of abuse of rights an act would be considered unlawful if it was performed with the 
purpose of causing another person damage or if it did not have a reasonable aim but was detrimental 
to another. Conversely, lower courts (lagere rechtspraak) followed a wider approach to this doctrine. 
However, these approaches changed with the decision in HR 17 April 1970, NJ 1971, 89. According 
to this decision, a property owner would be considered to “abuse” a right if she exercises her 
ownership entitlements in a way that is highly unreasonable towards another. The focus therefore 
shifted from whether or not a property owner caused another owner damage when she exercised one 
of her property entitlements, to establishing whether such an owner acted reasonably.  
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prove that her view will be obstructed by her neighbour‟s (B‟s) building works and 
that B herself will not derive any benefit from the building works. 
 
4 3 2 5 Public participation and the protection of property interests 
Dutch planning law creates an additional avenue through which the existing view 
from a property might be protected. A property owner (A) in Dutch law has an 
opportunity to prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbour‟s (B‟s) property that 
will interfere with the existing view from her (A‟s) property by participating in the 
process of approving B‟s building plans. The regulation and organisation of land use 
in the Netherlands are effected through a system of zoning plans 
(bestemmingsplannen), which lay down rules that regulate the use and erection of 
buildings on land. The process of creating or changing a zoning plan provides an 
opportunity for consultation with interested parties,135 while public participation is 
also part of the process regulating an application for a building permit 
(bouwvergunning).136 Therefore, in terms of the Dutch system for granting building 
permits, A will be notified of B‟s application for a building permit, since such an 
                                                          
135
 Section 3 of the Wet van 20 Oktober 2006, Wet Ruimtelijke Ordening regulates the creation, 
content, application and effects of zoning plans (bestemmingsplannen) and so-called 
inpassingsplannen. In terms of s 3(7)(7), notice of a planning decision (voorbereidingsbesluit), which 
precedes the approval of a zoning plan, has to be published in the government gazette and by way of 
electronic media. Furthermore, this provision provides that the public will be allowed to inspect such a 
decree and that s 3:42 of the Wet van 4 Juni 1992, Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht, will apply to 
regulate such an examination. According to J Robbe De bestemmingsplanprocedure en de 
zelfstandige projectprocedure (2000) 24, public participation in government is promoted by the fact 
that citizens have an opportunity to inspect and comment on zoning plans while they are still in their 
draft form. 
136
 The Wet van 29 Augustus 1991 tot herziening van de Woningwet (“Act of 29 August 1991”) 
regulates the approval of building plans. In terms of s 40(a)(1) of the Act of 29 August 1991, no 
building may be erected without complying with a building permit (bouwvergunning) that is specifically 
granted for such a construction. According to s 41 of the Act of 29 August 1991, the approval process 
for such a permit entails that notice of an application for a building permit must be published in a local 
paper within two weeks after the application was received by the relevant local authority. Furthermore, 
s 50 of the Act provides that public input must be considered when a local authority decides whether 
or not to grant a building permit. 
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application has to be advertised.137 A will also have the opportunity to make 
presentations to ensure that the effect that B‟s plans may have on her property 
interests is taken into account when the application is considered by the relevant 
decision maker. Furthermore, such a decision maker must consider certain aesthetic 
values when deciding whether or not to grant the requested building permit.138  
It is therefore possible for A to draw a local authority‟s attention to the fact that 
the proposed building works on B‟s property may obstruct the existing view from her 
(A‟s) property, at a very early stage when the building plans are still under 
consideration. The local authority will have to take A‟s interests into consideration 
when assessing the application for B‟s building permit. However, although affected 
property owners should be consulted when zoning plans are created or amended 
and before building permits are granted, they are not entitled to veto the erection of 
buildings that will interfere with the existing views from their properties. Information 
regarding zoning plans and other use restrictions on properties is readily available to 
citizens. A prospective property owner has a duty (and the opportunity) to ascertain 
the rules regulating and restricting the use of the property that she intends to buy. 
This duty implies that a local authority will not easily reject a building permit that 
otherwise complies with the applicable zoning plan and building regulations, despite 
the fact that affected parties have the opportunity to raise concerns while a local 
authority considers an application for a building permit. 
                                                          
137
 See n 136. 
138
 Section 12 of the Act of 29 Augustus 1991 provides that the aesthetic appearance of a proposed 
building should be considered in determining whether an application for a building permit should be 
granted and that a city council (gemeenteraad) is responsible for making policy that suggests criteria 
that the relevant decision making authority (the decision can be made by a burgemeester or 
wethouder) has to consider when it determines whether the outside appearance (uiterlijk) or location 
(plaatsing) of a proposed building complies with reasonable aesthetic demands. 
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The Dutch planning-law system therefore entitles property owners to be 
informed of and possibly to object against building plans prior to their approval.139 
Therefore, a Dutch property owner (A) has a substantive right to inform the relevant 
local authority of any negative effects that the approval of her neighbour‟s (B‟s) 
building plans may have on her (A‟s) property. Nevertheless, a local authority will be 
reluctant to reject B‟s building plans that are otherwise lawful merely because they 
will have a negative effect on A‟s property, since A had a duty – before she bought 
her property – to establish how her property could be affected by any lawful acts 
performed on neighbouring properties.  
 
4 4 Conclusion 
Like South African law, modern English and Dutch law does not acknowledge an 
inherent right to the existing, unobstructed view from a property. In South African 
law, a property owner may have a substantive right, based on a servitude, a 
restrictive condition, the relevant zoning plan, applicable building regulations or any 
other applicable legislation to prevent the erection of buildings that may have the 
effect of obstructing the existing view from her property.140 Furthermore, there are 
indications that there may be an exception to the rule that the existing view from a 
property does not naturally flow from the right of ownership. In instances where the 
existing view from a property forms an inherent part of the use and enjoyment of the 
properties in a specific vicinity, such a view may possibly be considered to indeed 
                                                          
139
 In terms of South African law, property owners will only have the right to see, object or sometimes 
approve a neighbour‟s building plans if the relevant plans require the removal or amendment of a 
restrictive condition, the relevant zoning plan, the applicable building regulations or any applicable 
legislation. See Ch 3 where the right to prevent building works in South African law is considered as 
an alternative strategy to protect the existing view from a property. 
140
 See Ch 2 and Ch 3. 
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form part of the right of ownership.141 However, there is no certainty that this 
exception will be enforced by courts generally. Prospective property owners have the 
opportunity and the obligation to ascertain whether the view from a property is 
protected either by way of servitude, or other building restrictions. Should the view 
not be protected in any of these ways and future protection not be possible, no 
monetary value should be attached to the view.  
In English law, interference with an existing view, which is considered merely a 
“matter of delight”, does not constitute an actionable nuisance and can probably not 
be protected by way of an easement. However, a restrictive covenant may be 
created by agreement to protect the unspoilt view from a property.142 Therefore, 
although the protection of view may not interfere with urban development, view may 
be preserved in instances where property owners or developers consider it to be so 
significant to the nature of a specific property that they contractually provide for its 
protection. English case law also indicates that there may be an exception to the 
principle that the existing view from a property is not inherently part of the right of 
ownership. It appears that courts may be willing to acknowledge an inherent right to 
the existing views from a group of properties within a specific development if such 
views form an integral part of the use and enjoyment of the properties and if the 
properties were specifically designed to enhance these views.143 
Similar to the position in South African and English law, Dutch law does not 
recognise an inherent right to the existing view from a property. In South African law, 
a property owner may have a substantive right, based on a servitude or a restrictive 
condition, to prevent building works on a neighbouring property, and in English law, a 
                                                          
141
 See 2 4 and 6 3. 
142
 See Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27 and Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] EWHC 2961 
(Ch), discussed in 4 2 2 1. 
143
 See the discussion of Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] EWHC 2961 (Ch) in 4 2 2 1. 
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restrictive covenant may create the same entitlement. A property owner in Dutch law 
may similarly have a right to prevent the erection of building works on a neighbouring 
property, based on a praedial servitude. Furthermore, unlike the situation in South 
African and in English law, where interference with the existing view from a property 
cannot constitute an actionable nuisance, it is indeed possible for a property owner 
in Dutch law to prove that the obstruction of the view from her property was unlawful 
and therefore resulted in an actionable nuisance.144 Dutch law also gives a property 
owner the opportunity to prevent or object against a neighbour‟s building works that 
may obstruct the existing view from her property in terms of the doctrine of abuse of 
rights. In terms of this doctrine, a property owner (A) will be able to indicate that her 
neighbour‟s (B‟s) building works was unlawful if she can, for example, prove that B‟s 
building was or will be erected purely with the intention of obstructing the view from 
her (A‟s) property.145  
South African law entitles property owners to be informed of, to comment on 
and sometimes to prevent the erection of a building on a neighbouring property in 
very specific, limited circumstances. If such a right exists, it may be employed as an 
alternative strategy to protect an existing view, since a property owner will have the 
opportunity to prevent the erection of a building that will interfere with the existing 
view from her property.146 Dutch property owners have a substantive right to be 
informed of and to comment on any application for the approval of neighbours‟ 
building plans and therefore have the opportunity to inform the relevant decision 
maker of the fact that the proposed building plans may have the effect of obstructing 
the existing views from their properties. However, in Dutch law, like in South African 
                                                          
144
 See 4 3 2 3. 
145
 See 4 3 2 4. 
146
 The possibility of using a substantive right to prevent building works on a neighbouring property as 
a strategy to prevent the obstruction of an existing view is discussed in Ch 3. 
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law, a prospective property owner has a duty to ascertain to what extent her future 
neighbours may use their properties and to determine how these possible uses may 
affect the enjoyment of the property that she wishes to buy. Local authorities in 
Dutch law will therefore not easily refuse to grant approval for a building plan merely 
because the erection of the proposed building will obstruct the view from a 
neighbouring property. 
Nevertheless, unlike Dutch law that provides property owners with the 
opportunity to see and comment on all applications for building permits, a property 
owner will, in terms of South African law, not be aware of the fact that a neighbouring 
owner has applied for a building permit, unless such an application involves an 
application for the removal or amendment of a restrictive condition, re-zoning, a 
departure from the applicable building regulations, or if it will contravene any 
applicable legislation. A property owner in South African law will therefore not have 
an opportunity to make representations regarding the effect that the proposed 
development on a neighbouring property may have on the use and enjoyment of her 
property. South African case law illustrates that this lack of opportunity for public 
participation can sometimes frustrate the effective protection of property interests in 
an existing view, especially in instances where building plans have been approved in 
conflict with a restrictive condition or the zoning scheme. It forces property owners to 
follow the expensive route of litigation in an attempt to have courts declare their 
rights and to force local authorities to enforce zoning and building regulations. These 
problems can be avoided if applications for the approval of building plans are, as in 
the Dutch system, open for inspection and comments by affected parties, without 
thereby necessarily creating a substantive right to veto approval of the plans. 
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Chapter 5:  
Constitutional aspects 
 
5 1 Introduction 
A South African property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing view 
from her property.1 Case law indicates that the view from a property can 
nevertheless be protected in a number of ways, some of which are direct, 
substantive and permanent while others are indirect, procedural and temporary.2  
Given the basic principle that a right to an existing view is not protected as an 
inherent property right, any substantive right or alternative strategy that results in 
protection of one owner‟s existing view inevitably implies that a neighbouring owner‟s 
right to develop her property is limited. For purposes of the constitutional analysis in 
this chapter it will be argued that such a limitation may (but will not always) constitute 
a deprivation of property as meant in section 25(1) of of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”). The unobstructed, existing view 
from a property can be protected by servitudes, restrictive conditions, zoning 
schemes, building regulations and legislation insofar as these devices restrict 
building works on a neighbouring property that will interfere with such a view. In 
some cases, for example where a property owner‟s right to build is restricted in terms 
                                                          
1
 This position is established in Ch 2. 
2
 See the discussion of case law in Ch 2 and Ch 3. These cases include Erasmus v Blom 2011 JDR 
0321 (ECP); Myburgh v Jamison (1861) 4 Searle 8; Lewkowitz v Billingham & Co (1895) 2 Off Rep 
36; Kruger v Downer 1976 (3) SA 172 (W); Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality 
and Others 2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C); Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) 
SA 415 (C); Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 
2008); Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and Another v Harrison and Another 2011 
(4) SA 42 (CC); Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D); Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 
2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA); Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C); De Kock v Saldanhabaai 
Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 2006) and Searle v Mossel 
Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 February 2009).  
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of a servitude, a statutory provision or a restrictive condition, the limitation or 
deprivation may specifically be aimed at the protection of the existing view from a 
neighbouring property. In other instances, for example where an owner‟s right to 
build is regulated by building restrictions or frustrated by procedural attacks, the 
limitation or deprivation may result in the protection of views from neighbouring 
properties although its aim is totally unrelated to the protection of an undisturbed 
view. Therefore, the protection of the existing view from a property may cause a 
limitation or deprivation of a neighbouring property owner‟s right to use her property, 
regardless of the intended aim of the device or alternative strategy that resulted in 
such protection. 
A property owner whose right to use her property is limited by any of these 
restrictions sometimes (but, as is argued below, not always) suffers a deprivation of 
her property for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Such a deprivation can 
be permanent or temporary and, depending on the extent of the restriction on the 
affected owner‟s right to use (build on) her property, it can be either a total (all forms 
of building on her property is prevented) or a partial (only the location, height, 
amount of building works is limited) deprivation. For example, if the existing view 
from a property is protected in terms of a servitude or a restrictive condition, such 
protection will mostly place an absolute and permanent restriction on a neighbouring 
owner‟s right to build in a way that will obstruct such a view. Nevertheless, a 
servitude and a restrictive condition is created in terms of an agreement between two 
property owners. Consequently, a property owner whose right to build is restricted by 
such a device would have consented to the deprivation of this right, which means 
that the restriction may not necessarily amount to a deprivation of property for 
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purposes of section 25(1).3 Should a property owner‟s existing view be protected 
insofar as the applicable zoning plan or building regulations limit her neighbour‟s 
right to build in a way that would obstruct such a view, the protection of her view will 
effectively be the result of a restriction of her neighbour‟s right to build that is more 
likely to amount to a deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1). Such a 
restriction will mostly cause a permanent but partial deprivation of the neighbour‟s 
right to build in the sense that she would be entitled to apply for a departure from the 
zoning scheme or building regulations and that the relevant restriction would not 
prevent her from erecting any buildings at all, but only place a limitation on the height 
or location of her building works. Nevertheless, a zoning plan or building regulations 
may cause an absolute and permanent deprivation of a property owner‟s right to 
build if an application for a departure from such a plan or regulations is refused. 
Legislation that prevents building works that will obstruct the existing view from a 
particular property or the line of sight to a specific object (such as a lighthouse) may 
cause a permanent, or temporary, partial or total restriction on neighbouring property 
owners‟ right to build. The nature of the deprivation will depend on what the 
particular statutory provision ordains and on the aim of such a stipulation. 
In this chapter, these deprivations are evaluated in terms of the methodology 
developed by the Constitutional Court in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance4 (“FNB”) to establish their validity. The chapter 
considers the constitutional validity of the restriction of one owner‟s right to use her 
property that results in the protection of the view from a neighbouring property. It 
                                                          
3
 See 5 2 3 1. 
4
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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focuses on the circumstances that justify such a limitation of an owner‟s right to 
develop her property and on the level of scrutiny that will be applied when 
determining whether a limitation of this kind is reasonable and justified under the 
specific circumstances. Section 25(1) of the Constitution and the decision in FNB 
serve as basis for evaluating the constitutionality of regulatory deprivations of 
property. Case law discussed in previous chapters is referred to as examples in the 
constitutional analysis and to illustrate the applicable legal principles. 
 
5 2 Section 25(1) of the Constitution 
5 2 1 Interpreting section 25 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that: 
“No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.” 
This section serves as a mechanism to ensure due process of law. It acknowledges 
that regulatory state interference with private property is sometimes unavoidable and 
permissible and it is aimed at ensuring that such interference with private property 
rights is in line with due process of law.5 Legitimate state interference with private 
property is generally referred to as “regulation”. This concept includes town planning, 
building regulations, physical planning, environmental protection, and health and 
sanitation measures.6 Gildenhuys7 uses the term “measures of control” 
(beheermaatreëls in Afrikaans) when referring to regulations that deprive owners of 
                                                          
5
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 218-219. See T Roux “Property” in S 
Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 7-8 for a 
discussion of the academic debate regarding the scope of the Constitutional property clause.  
6
 AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the law of property (6
th
 ed 2009) 310. 
7
 A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 24-25.  
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some of their property interests. Individual property owners are expected to endure, 
generally without compensation, the losses caused by legitimate regulatory 
measures that promote the public interest at large.8 
Section 25(1) provides a framework for the deprivation of property. It stipulates 
that deprivation must be authorised by law of general application and that no law 
may permit the arbitrary deprivation of property.9 However, the subsection does not 
indicate how the concepts “law of general application” and “arbitrary deprivation” 
should be interpreted and applied. In most cases it is fairly easy to establish whether 
a deprivation is authorised by legislation or by other sources of law of general 
application,10 but it is more problematic to determine when the deprivation may be 
arbitrary.11 
                                                          
8
 A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 22-25 draws a distinction between the losses that an 
owner suffers due to regulatory deprivation and those she sustains due to expropriation. The 
consequence of regulatory deprivation is that an owner‟s use of her property is restricted, while the 
loss suffered due to expropriation entails that property is taken away from the owner with the aim of 
advancing the public interest or serving public purposes.  
9
 A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg (2001) 23 gives the following interpretation of the deprivation clause in 
s 25(1) of the Constitution:  
“Beheermaatreëls, mits dit behoorlik by wetgewing gemagtig word, is regmatige 
owerheidshandelinge...‟n [a]rbitrêre ontneming is een wat willekeurig plaasgevind het, en 
nie gegrond is op rede of beginsel nie.”  
(Regulatory controls are lawful state actions, provided that they are properly authorised 
by law ... [A]n arbitrary deprivation is a deprivation that occurred at random and that is not 
based on reason or principle.) 
10
 On the definition of law of general application, see n 67 below. Importantly, this category includes at 
least both legislation and the common law; see the sources referred to in n 67. T Roux “Property” in S 
Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 21 comments 
that the s 25(1) requirement that a deprivation must be conducted in terms of law of general 
application places the emphasis on legislation, rather than on any other type of government action. 
He illustrates this point by referring to the following scenarios: In a case where an administrative 
action deprives a person of his property without the authority of law of general application, the action 
will be reviewable in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. An executive 
action that leads to the unauthorised deprivation of property will be regarded as an infringement of the 
principle of legality and will therefore be reviewable from the outset. Emphasis is placed on the fact 
that deprivation that is conducted in terms of law of general application is constitutionally valid – and 
not on the deprivation of property due to a different type of government action. 
11
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 334-335 argues 
that the requirement that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation is merely a repetition of the 
requirement that deprivations must be conducted in terms of law of general application. Nevertheless, 
he leaves room for the possibility that the term “arbitrary” is wider than “not general” and that 
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In FNB the Constitutional Court specifically addressed this difficulty and 
explained the meaning of the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation.12 The 
appellant in this case, First National Bank (“FNB”), attacked the constitutionality of 
section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964.13 This section authorised the 
seizure and forfeiture of a custom debtor‟s property and the property of third parties 
that was in the debtor‟s possession or under her control. The court specifically 
focused on the requirement in section 25(1) of the Constitution that a legal provision 
of general application may not authorise the arbitrary deprivation of property. 
Accordingly, it considered whether or not it was justified to infringe upon one 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“arbitrary” must be interpreted against the background of the general limitations clause in s 36 of the 
Constitution to ensure that it also refers to the accessibility, clarity and certainty of the law.  
12
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 61-109. AJ 
van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 237-245 discusses the requirement that a 
deprivation may not be arbitrary with reference to FNB and foreign law. AJ van der Walt 
“Constitutional Property Law” (2011) 3 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2 2 1 reasons that in Haffejee 
NO and Others v Ethekwini Municipality and Others 2011 (6) SA 134 (CC) para 28, the Constitutional 
Court confirmed that the FNB decision is still authority in cases concerning the meaning of s 25 of the 
Constitution. 
13
 The appellant‟s attack was based on s 25(1)-(2) of the Constitution. See AJ van der Walt “Striving 
for the better interpretation – A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court‟s Harksen and FNB 
decisions on the property clause” (2004) 121 SALJ 854-878 at 862 and 867 for a discussion of the 
decision of Goldstone J in Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) (“Harksen”). In the Harksen case, 
the constitutionality of s 21(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 was queried. The issue to be 
determined was whether this section had the effect of expropriating property owners, in terms of the 
definition of “expropriation” in s 28 of the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 
of 1993 (“the interim Constitution”). The Constitutional Court based its decision on three related ideas 
with regard to the nature and function of s 28 of the interim Constitution. Firstly, deprivation and 
expropriation were considered to be two distinct entities with distinguishable features. Accordingly, the 
distinction between them was considered to be categorical or institutional, with the effect that any 
state interference with private property is to be categorised as either expropriation or deprivation. 
Secondly, the distinction between these two concepts was based on the finality and duration of the 
transfer of ownership to the state. Transfer of ownership only constitutes expropriation if the state 
acquires the property permanently. Finally, the court ruled that a prospective litigant who wants to 
base her attack of state action on s 28 of the interim Constitution is faced with one of two choices. 
She must argue that there has been either an unconstitutional expropriation or an unconstitutional 
deprivation. These ideas illustrate the court‟s categorical approach. In the FNB decision, the 
Constitutional Court deviated from this categorical approach in the sense that it did not regard the 
concepts “deprivation” and “expropriation” as separate entities. Instead, deprivation was considered to 
be a wider category that includes the narrower category of expropriation. The court in FNB also 
introduced a new methodology. In future, in cases concerning property it first has to be established 
whether the relevant action constitutes a deprivation in terms of the requirements of s 25(1) of the 
1996 Constitution. If the result of this initial investigation is positive, it may further be determined 
whether the action also complies with the s 25(2) requirements, in other words whether the 
deprivation of property also expropriates the owner. Van der Walt concludes that the difference 
between the Harksen and FNB decisions comes down to this new approach. See also T Roux 
“Property” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 
18-19 in this regard. 
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person‟s right of ownership with the aim of recovering another person‟s (customs) 
debt.14 
Ackermann J comparatively analysed the position in different jurisdictions to 
establish their similarities and differences regarding the deprivation of property. He 
concluded that the formulation of property rights differs from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.15 His analysis indicates that despite the different formulations of property 
rights there are two generally applicable principles.16 Firstly, there are certain 
circumstances when it is in the public interest for legislation to deprive individuals of 
their property without paying compensation. Secondly, there is consensus that there 
must be an appropriate relationship between the means chosen (the “sacrifice” made 
by the individual) and the aim of the regulatory measure (the public interest to be 
served) for the deprivation to be valid.17 Ackermann J focused on the meaning of the 
word “arbitrary” in the context of section 25 and concluded that the deprivation of 
property will be arbitrary when the authorising provision does not provide sufficient 
reason for the deprivation or when the deprivation is procedurally unlawful.18  
The court introduced a methodology to guide the application of section 25 in 
issues concerning the constitutional protection of property.19 This methodology 
                                                          
14
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 100 and 108-
109. 
15
 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 71-98. 
16
 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 
2003) ch 46 23 criticises the Constitutional Court in FNB for conducting a lengthy study of 
comparative law and then not applying it. 
17
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 97-98. 
18
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
19
 The methodology was set out in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) 
SA 768 (CC) para 46. I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 535 refer to this 
“structural analysis” of s 25(1)-(2) of the Constitution, as it was expounded by the Constitutional Court 
in FNB. 
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entails a set of questions that will lead a court in its determination as to whether or 
not a property owner has been deprived of her property in a manner that is 
inconsistent with section 25(1). These directive questions are expounded upon 
briefly below, followed by a more detailed discussion of each. 
When faced with an attack on the legitimacy of a property deprivation, a court‟s 
consideration of the matter should commence with determining whether or not there 
is an identifiable property interest at stake. If it decides that it is indeed dealing with a 
property interest, the next step is to determine whether there has been a deprivation 
of such property. Should the answer to this question also be positive, the court has 
to decide whether the deprivation complies with the provisions of section 25(1). If it 
does, it is considered to be a legitimate limitation of the owner‟s property rights. 
However, if the deprivation does not comply with the provisions in section 25(1), the 
possibility of justifying the deprivation under section 36 of the Constitution should be 
considered. In instances where a deprivation is valid in terms of section 25 or 
justified in terms of section 36, the court further has to determine whether the 
deprivation also amounts to expropriation in terms of section 25(2). If it does 
constitute expropriation, the court must establish whether the requirements set out in 
section 25(2)(a) and (b) are complied with. If these conditions are not met, the court 
finally has to decide whether or not the expropriation is justified in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution.20 Therefore, should the deprivation neither be consistent with 
the provisions of section 25(1) or 25(2) and (3), nor be justified under section 36, it is 
unconstitutional and invalid. 
                                                          
20
 This structural analysis for the application of s 25 of the Constitution was expounded in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. T Roux “Property” 
in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 2-3 argues 
that the FNB methodology for interpreting s 25 of the Constitution will only survive at a formal level, 
since the question of whether the interference with the relevant property was arbitrary will dominate 
the enquiry. 
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In instances concerning a zoning scheme, building regulation, or any other 
legislation that prevents the obstruction of the existing view from a property because 
it restricts a neighbouring property owner‟s right to build, one can consider the 
legitimacy of the deprivation of such a neighbour‟s right to build according to the 
methodology that the Constitutional Court suggested in the FNB case, namely with 
reference to the so-called police-power principle. In terms of this principle, a 
regulatory measure that limits the use of property and causes a loss for a property 
owner will be justified, generally without compensation, if it protects public health and 
safety and benefits all citizens. In terms of the FNB decision, one could say that the 
protection of public health and safety would be the adequate reason that would 
justify deprivations brought about by regulatory measures of this kind. The rationale 
for this reasoning is that owners should not be compensated for any loss caused by 
the lawful regulation of their use of their properties, subject to two provisos: The 
regulation may not be implemented unlawfully and it may not have an unequal effect 
in the sense of causing an individual or a small group to carry a too heavy burden for 
the benefit of the public in general.21 In this context, the nexus requirement, as it was 
expounded in the FNB decision,22 means that there needs to be a rational (and 
sometimes even a proportionate) connection between the burden caused by the 
regulation and the public benefit (protection of public health and safety) derived from 
it.  
Although the state is authorised to regulate the use, enjoyment and exploitation 
of private property, even if the regulation restricts an owner‟s property entitlements or 
                                                          
21
 AJ van der Walt “Regulation of building under the Constitution” (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 40 and 
AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 213-218. 
22
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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causes financial loss,23 it must ensure that the deprivation is implemented in a 
reasonable and general manner and for a public purpose. This principle, as laid 
down by Holmes J in Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon,24 (“Pennsylvania Coal”) is 
aimed at promoting effective governance. In this decision it was said that it would be 
impossible to govern a country if the rights and values that are part of a property may 
never be limited through uncompensated regulation.25 There may therefore be 
circumstances where the regulation of property may be just, equitable and desirable 
despite causing (even great) loss for the affected landowner.26 
In the United States, regulatory deprivation of property is premised on the 
police-power principle.27 Van der Walt explains the police-power principle of 
regulated deprivation as a limitation of property that may cause loss or damage for 
the property owner but is nevertheless lawful, since it protects public health and 
safety. He argues that this uncompensated injury is lawful, even without 
compensation, since it affects all citizens equally and that compensation should only 
be an issue if the burden is unreasonable or not spread out evenly.28 In terms of the 
police-power principle, the uncompensated regulation of the use and enjoyment of 
private property is therefore justified even if it affects the owner‟s property quite 
severely and causes great financial loss. The only provisos are that the regulatory 
provision must be properly authorised by law of general application; aimed at the 
                                                          
23
 AJ van der Walt “Regulation of building under the Constitution” (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 39-40 
and AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 289. 
24
 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) at 413 and 415. 
25
 AJ van der Walt “Regulation of building under the Constitution” (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 40. 
26
 AJ van der Walt “Regulation of building under the Constitution” (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 40 and 
AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 341-344. In Van Rensburg and Another NNO v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Others 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE); Barnett v Minister of Land Affairs 
2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA); Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape 2007 (4) SA 26 
(C) and Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008), 
landowners or builders intentionally defied the law by violating certain regulatory measures. One may 
conclude that they accepted the inevitable loss they would suffer should the planning and building 
legislation be enforced properly.  
27
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 213-218. 
28
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 213-214. 
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protection of a legitimate public purpose (generally the protection of public health 
and safety); and that it may not have any disproportionate consequences.29 The 
police-power requirement for the limitation of ownership corresponds with the section 
25(1) constitutional requirement for non-arbitrary deprivation of property. 
Consequently, the police-power principle is part of South African law to the extent 
that it allows for regulatory deprivation of property, according to the requirements of 
section 25(1), under certain circumstances. 
The practical effect of this brief overview is that section 25(1) can be interpreted 
in such a way that regulatory deprivation of property that is brought about by zoning, 
planning and building laws that serve the general public purpose of protecting public 
health and safety could be justified, in terms of the FNB decision, to the extent that 
the restrictions that these laws place on one owner‟s right to build on her land will not 
be arbitrary, even when they also have the effect of protecting a neighbouring 
owner‟s existing view from her property. 
In what follows, the different strategies that can or have been used to protect an 
existing view by restricting building on neighbouring land are analysed according to 
the FNB methodology to establish whether and when each of these strategies will be 
justified in terms of section 25(1). 
 
5 2 2 The FNB decision 
5 2 2 1 An identifiable property interest 
In terms of the first step of the FNB test, one has to establish whether the deprivation 
complained of affects a property interest. Section 25(1) clearly states that “[n]o one 
                                                          
29
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 218.  
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may be deprived of property …”. Interference with a property interest is therefore a 
threshold requirement for determining the constitutionality of a deprivation in terms of 
section 25(1). Van der Walt argues that it is necessary to determine what constitutes 
property for purposes of section 25 of the Constitution in every case.30 He defines 
the constitutional concept of property as a “social construct that is subject to public 
interest amendment and regulation”.31 Accordingly, constitutional property is not a 
“pre-social, natural right”.32 
In the FNB decision, the Constitutional Court refrained from giving a conclusive 
definition of property interests.33 It concluded that constitutional property at least 
includes corporeal moveable things and ownership of land, that limited real rights in 
property will probably be regarded as property, and that neither the economic value 
of the right of ownership, nor an owner‟s subjective interests will be decisive in the 
matter.34 The Constitution itself indicates that land forms part of the constitutional 
concept of “property”. In section 25(4)(b) it provides that “property is not restricted to 
land”, from which one can infer that property, for purposes of section 25 of the 
                                                          
30
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 102-112 reasons that despite the 
argument made by T Roux “Property” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 
3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 2-5, 9-11 and 23-25 (namely that the methodology introduced by the 
Constitutional Court in the FNB case had the “vortex” effect of completely focusing a constitutional 
property challenge on the arbitrariness test), the analysis of a specific property challenge starts off 
with considering whether that which an owner claims to be deprived of constitutes a property interest. 
Although the arbitrariness question is often decisive in a constitutional property challenge, it would be 
impossible to even consider arbitrariness if no identifiable property right has been affected. 
31
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 102. 
32
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 101-102 explains the function of the 
constitutional property clause as a measure that was introduced to enable a balance between private 
property interests and the public interest. Accordingly, he argues, property as a constitutional right is 
different from the private law notion of property. Although property is constitutionally protected, private 
law property entitlements are not necessarily protected against state interference. The constitutional 
property clause in fact legitimises the regulatory deprivation of property under certain circumstances. 
Furthermore, the concept of constitutional property law is wider than that of private law property in the 
sense that constitutional property will protect “new” property interests if the protection of such 
interests will promote the aim of finding a balance between private property interests and the public 
interest. 
33
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 112. 
34
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 51-56. 
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Constitution, at least includes land.35 Common law principles provide that the owner 
of land is the owner of everything that is permanently attached to it.36 Therefore, land 
and any permanent buildings and improvements on it are included in the 
constitutional concept of property. Any restriction on the use and enjoyment of land 
and of permanent improvements (buildings) on land consequently constitutes a 
deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. The protection of 
the existing, unobstructed view from a property, whether it is based on a substantive 
right or an alternative strategy to prevent the obstruction of such a view, implies a 
restriction on neighbouring owners‟ rights to use (build on) their properties, to the 
extent that the neighbouring owners are prevented (either temporarily or 
permanently) from building on or developing their land. The content of property of 
land includes certain entitlements. Amongst these are the ius utendi, which gives a 
property owner the right (within the limits laid down by law) to use her property as 
she pleases.37 Accordingly, a property owner may build freely38 on her property, 
                                                          
35
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 112 argues that it is necessary to 
determine the content of “property” for purposes of s 25 of the Constitution in every property case and 
that s 25(4)(b) of the Constitution is the only guidance that the Constitution provides in this regard. 
36
 This principle is deduced from the maxim cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos 
(“the owner of land is the owner of everything above and below the ground”). In CG van der Merwe & 
MJ de Waal The law of things and servitudes (1993) 104-105, Van der Merwe reasons that in terms of 
this maxim, a landowner is the owner of the surface of the land, the space above the land and 
anything attached to or beneath the surface of the land. This principle is extensively discussed in Ch 2 
n 32. 
37
 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 173. The ius utendi emanates from the Roman law 
entitlement usus, which is, according to Van der Merwe‟s definition, the use of a thing in such a 
manner that it is not materially changed. The ius fruendi, ius abutendi, ius disponendi, ius possidendi, 
ius vindicandi and ius negandi are all considered to be entitlements that flow from ownership. 
According to VG Hiemstra & HL Gonin Trilingual legal dictionary (3
rd
 ed 1992) 215-216, ius utendi is 
the right to use property, ius fruendi refers to the right of enjoyment and the ius abutendi is the right to 
abuse one‟s own property at will. CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 173-174 refers to the fact 
that although the ius abutendi entitles an owner to vandalise and destroy her property, the limitations 
that are placed on property in modern times, restricts the entitlement to positively abuse one‟s 
property. The ius abutendi is often rather seen as the right to consume consumable things through 
normal use. The ius disponendi is the right of disposal, the ius possidendi is the right of possession, 
the ius vindicandi is the right to claim a thing as one‟s own and the ius negandi is an owner‟s 
entitlement to protect her property against infringement by another. Van der Merwe rejects the notion 
of describing property with regard to the entitlements that it entails for the following reasons: (i) The 
content of ownership is undetermined, which renders a strict categorisation thereof impossible. (ii) 
None of the entitlements of ownership is essential in the sense that the limitation or deprivation 
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within the limits of the law. This property entitlement was confirmed in Van der 
Heever v Hanover Municipality,39 where Jones J ruled that a property owner may 
build as high as she wants to on her property, within the limits laid down by law. 
Therefore, the right to erect buildings and structures on one‟s property is an 
identifiable property interest for purposes of a deprivation enquiry in terms of section 
25(1). This implies that the common law principle that a property owner does not 
have an inherent right to the existing view from her property recognises and upholds 
the right to use (build on) one‟s property. Any temporary or permanent restriction on 
the right to build, that may result in the protection of the existing view from a 
property, can therefore potentially establish a deprivation of the affected owner‟s 
right to use her property.  
By contrast, as is argued in the next section below, the landowner who claims 
protection of the existing view from her property will only succeed in proving the 
existence of a protected property right if she has a substantive right to that view. As 
was pointed out in chapter 2, the right to enjoy the existing view from a property is 
not recognised by the common law as an inherent part of the right of landownership, 
but such a right can be created by way of a servitude, a restrictive condition or 
legislation. 
Consequently, according to the first step in the FNB analysis a landowner will 
only succeed in proving the existence of a protected property right to the existing 
view from her land if such a right was explicitly created by servitude, a restrictive 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
thereof will deprive ownership of its character. He mentions, as an example, that a fiduciary is 
regarded as the owner of fideicommissary property, regardless of the fact that she does not have the 
right to dispose of such property. (iii) The entitlements that are considered to flow from ownership are 
not peculiar to property, for example, a usufructuary is also entitled to use property.  
38
 Ownership is not an absolute right and therefore this entitlement, just like all other property 
entitlements, is subject to external limitations. See the discussion of PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H 
Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 91-95 regarding the content 
and function of ownership. 
39
 Van der Heever v Hanover Municipality 1938 CPD 95. See Ch 2 for a discussion of this case. 
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condition or legislation; while a landowner will always be able to prove the existence 
of a protected property right to build on her land, unless that right was explicitly 
restricted by a servitude, a restrictive condition or legislation. Depending on which 
party initiates the litigation, the existence of a servitude, restrictive condition or 
legislation that restricts building will determine whether the plaintiff or applicant can 
prove a property right. 
 
5 2 2 2 Has there been a deprivation? 
According to FNB, section 25(1) of the Constitution does not only require that there 
must be an identifiable property interest at stake, but also that the limitation or 
restriction of the relevant property right must amount to a deprivation of that property. 
The Constitutional Court‟s decision in FNB clarified the meaning of “deprivation”. It 
held that more or less any significant interference with property will be regarded as a 
deprivation:  
“In a certain sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of 
private property involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title or 
right to or in the property concerned.”40 
The Constitutional Court‟s wide definition of “deprivation” in FNB means that section 
25(1) will be the starting point in any constitutional challenge concerning property, 
since any interference with property is categorised as a deprivation. Consequently, a 
                                                          
40
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. In this 
case a property owner was deprived of motor vehicles (moveable corporeal things), since they were 
attached for sale in execution. The Constitutional Court did not have to determine the specific scope 
of the word “deprivation” in s 25(1) of the Constitution, since it was fairly clear that the seizure of 
motor vehicles constituted an interference with private property that constituted a deprivation for 
purposes of s 25(1). See the reasoning of O‟Regan J in her concurring judgment in Mkontwana v 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality 
and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 86-87. 
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limitation of property rights that effectively expropriates a property owner will be 
considered both a deprivation and an expropriation.41 Van der Walt explains that this 
interpretation given by the FNB court means that “[a]ll expropriations are 
deprivations, but just some deprivations are expropriations”.42  
However, in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and 
another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and others; Transfer Rights 
Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others,43 (“Mkontwana”) the Constitutional 
Court went in a completely different direction. It ruled that an interference with 
property interests only amounts to a deprivation when it is too extensive, in other 
words, when it is not justifiable: 
“Whether there has been a deprivation depends on the extent of the interference 
with or limitation of use, enjoyment or exploitation ... at the very least, substantial 
interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use 
or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society would amount to 
deprivation.”44 
                                                          
41
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 57-60. 
42
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 204. The approach that the Constitutional 
Court introduced in the FNB decision, in terms of which expropriations are treated as a subset of 
deprivations, is completely different from the approach it followed in Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 
(CC). In the Harksen decision, deprivation and expropriation were considered to be two distinct 
entities with distinguishable features. Therefore, instead of deprivation (s 25(1) of the Constitution) 
being the starting point for any constitutional challenge regarding property, as the decision in FNB 
suggested it should be, the Harksen ruling implied that a litigant who wants to attack the constitutional 
validity of an interference with her property rights has to focus her argument either on an 
unconstitutional deprivation or on an unconstitutional expropriation. See AJ van der Walt “Striving for 
the better interpretation – A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court‟s Harksen and FNB decisions 
on the property clause” (2004) 121 SALJ 854-878 and n 13 in this regard. 
43
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive 
Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
44
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive 
Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 32 per 
Yacoob J. At paras 85-90, O‟Regan J, in a concurring judgment, reasoned that the constitutional 
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Van der Walt criticises the Constitutional Court‟s definition of deprivation in this 
judgment on the grounds that it is unclear, that it does not allow for section 25(1) to 
authorise and control normal regulatory deprivation, and that its application would 
render section 25(1) superfluous.45 He argues that section 25(1) provides a 
mechanism that both authorises the regulation of private property and renders such 
regulation capable of constitutional and judicial review. It therefore ensures that the 
state abides by the rules when it regulates the use and enjoyment of private 
property. If the Mkontwana court was correct, deprivation would only refer to 
regulation that goes beyond the state‟s normal, legitimate regulatory functions. 
Should this definition of “deprivation” be applied in a constitutional property 
challenge, the section 25(1) investigation will be reduced to the question of whether 
the state, while exercising a regulatory control over private property, “went further” 
than what is justifiable in an open and democratic society. Instead of serving the aim 
of authorising and controlling regulatory deprivations, section 25(1) would be 
considered as a prohibition against “undemocratic”, excessive regulation and as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
purpose of s 25(1) should be considered when determining the meaning of “deprivation” for purposes 
of this section. She concluded that  
“[i]f one of the purposes of section 25(1) is to recognise both the material and non-
material value of property owners, it would defeat that purpose were „deprivation‟ to be 
read narrowly”.  
45
 According to AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 204-206 it is unclear why the 
Constitutional Court specifically referred to the values of an open and democratic society when it 
defined “deprivation” in Mkontwana. State regulation of property is normal practice in any regulated 
society and not exclusive to democracies. He also argues that s 25(1) is aimed at reviewing the 
regulation of property. It therefore legitimises the deprivation of property in the usual course of events. 
However, if “deprivation” in s 25(1) only referred to excessive state regulation of private property, this 
provision would no longer serve the purposes of authorising “normal” regulation and making such 
regulation susceptible to review. Furthermore, s 25(1) would be redundant if the word “deprivation” in 
this section only referred to regulatory deprivations that exceed the standards that are acceptable in 
an open and democratic society, because state actions that are in conflict with the values of such a 
society can be rendered unconstitutional without even considering s 25(1). Van der Walt mentions 
three alternative constitutional provisions that will render undemocratic, illegitimate state actions (that 
concerns property) reviewable and unconstitutional. These provisions include the rule of law principle 
in s 1(c), the equality provision in s 9, and the administrative justice guarantee in s 33.  
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measure to determine when state actions have this unlawful effect, which is far more 
restrictive than the FNB interpretation.46  
In a subsequent case, Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public 
Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and Another,47 
(“Reflect-All”) the Constitutional Court followed the wider FNB definition of 
deprivation.48 It held that property rights are not absolute and may be regulated to 
promote essential public purposes. In terms of the FNB classification of deprivation, 
namely that almost all interferences with property constitute deprivations, the court in 
Reflect-All decided that section 10(1) and 10(3) of the Gauteng Transport 
                                                          
46
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 206 reasons that it is not s 25(1), but s 36 
of the Constitution that has to be applied when determining what constitutes acceptable interference 
with private property in an open and democratic state. If a regulatory control complies with s 25(1), it 
is a constitutionally valid deprivation of property. Only if the regulation does not comply with the 
requirements of s 25(1), must it be determined in terms of s 36 whether it is justifiable in an open and 
democratic society. If the definition of “deprivation” is applied as it was stated by the Constitutional 
Court in Mkontwana, it would be impossible to follow this logic for two reasons. Firstly, it would not be 
possible to determine whether a regulation is justifiable in terms of s 25(1) unless it has an excessive 
impact on the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property. Secondly, the enquiry as to whether the 
relevant deprivation is justifiable in an open and democratic society would already be asked when it is 
considered whether the regulation complies with s 25(1). This enquiry would therefore not be 
reserved for cases where the regulation is inconsistent with s 25(1). Van der Walt criticises the 
Mkontwana definition of “deprivation” for being unsatisfactory, since it “collapses a constitutional first 
stage issue (was there a deprivation of property, and was that deprivation in conflict with section 
25(1)?) into a second stage inquiry (is the unconstitutional deprivation justifiable in terms of section 
36(1)?)”. The logic that, in cases concerning property, s 36 of the Constitution is only considered if a 
deprivation is not consistent with s 25 originated in the Constitutional Court‟s judgment in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46.  
47
 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
48
 The Constitutional Court in Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and 
Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 35-36 referred to its 
previous decisions in FNB and in Mkontwana when it considered whether s 10(1) and 10(3) of the 
Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 deprived the applicants of their properties. Its 
reasoning indicates that it applied the FNB definition of “deprivation”, which is generally accepted as 
the wider (than the Mkontwana) definition of “deprivation”. However, O‟Regan J in her concurring 
judgment in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others 
v Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the 
Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) 
paras 85-90, argued that the purpose of s 25(1) of the Constitution should be considered when 
determining the meaning of “deprivation” for purposes of this section. Stating that s 25(1) is aimed at 
acknowledging both the non-material and the material value of property to owners, she concluded that 
the definition of “deprivation” should not be too narrow. The court in Reflect-All at para 36, referring to 
O‟Regan‟s reasoning in Mkontwana, followed a wide definition of deprivation, as introduced in the 
FNB judgment and supported by O‟Regan J in the Mkontwana decision. See AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 206-207. 
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Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 (“Gauteng Transport Act”) does have the effect of 
depriving the applicants of the use, enjoyment and exploitation of their properties.49 
Van der Walt argues that the wide interpretation of “deprivation”, as introduced 
by the Constitutional Court in the FNB judgment and applied in subsequent case law, 
should be followed when considering whether a specific action amounts to a 
deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. The implication is that the 
impact of a restriction on an owner‟s property rights is, for purposes of determining 
whether or not an interference with property rights amounts to a deprivation, only 
relevant if it is so insignificant that it cannot be considered to constitute a 
deprivation.50 He defines “deprivation” for purposes of section 25(1) as follows: 
“[E]very restriction that has a perceptible effect on the property holder‟s use and 
enjoyment of property, no matter how small or insubstantial, constitutes 
deprivation in terms of section 25(1) and is therefore subject to its 
requirements.”51 
Accordingly, although the de minimis rule should be applied, any more than minimal 
interference with property will be regarded as a deprivation.52  
                                                          
49
 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 28-38. In this case, the constitutional validity of 
s 10(1) and 10(3) of the Gauteng Transport Act was challenged. These provisions authorised a road 
planning scheme that restricted the applicants, who were owners of land affected by this scheme, in 
the use of their properties. The Constitutional Court, giving a wide interpretation to the word 
“deprivation” for purposes of s 25(1) of the Constitution, decided that s 10(1) and (3) of the Gauteng 
Transport Act does interfere with the applicants‟ use of their properties and consequently authorise 
deprivations. 
50
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 209. Since the de minimus rule applies 
here, insignificant interferences with an owner‟s property rights will not be considered a deprivation for 
purposes of s 25(1) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court‟s definition of “deprivation” in 
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive 
Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 32 
indicated that the scope (impact) of the interference with property is indeed an important factor when 
deciding whether a limitation amounts to a deprivation of property in terms of s 25(1) of the 
Constitution. The court, per Yacoob, reasoned that only “substantial interference” will constitute 
deprivation. 
51
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 209. 
52
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 209. 
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In chapter 2 it was established that according to South African common law a 
property owner does not have an inherent, substantive right to a view. This position 
protects neighbouring property owners‟ rights to build. If the situation changes, 
therefore, if the existing view from a property is indeed protected, whether it be in 
terms of a servitude, a restrictive condition, legislation or an alternative strategy 
based on the right to be informed of, to comment on and sometimes to prevent the 
erection of building works on a neighbouring property, such protection constitutes a 
deprivation of a neighbouring owner‟s right to build.53  
In the absence of a substantive right to an undisturbed view, no issue regarding 
the constitutional protection of property arises because no property right has been 
affected. For example, A buys a house with a magnificent view of the ocean. 
Subsequently, B erects a building that complies with all the relevant building 
regulations but that obstructs A‟s view. Is A deprived of a property right because of 
the obstruction of her existing view, and, if she is, is such a deprivation consistent 
with section 25(1) of the Constitution? In the absence of a servitude, restrictive 
condition, legislation or other measure that provides A with a substantive right to 
prevent building works that will obstruct the existing view from her property, A does 
not have a right to an unspoilt view.54 If B erected her house in terms of properly 
approved building plans that comply with the relevant building regulations, there is 
no basis for A‟s claim of suffering a deprivation because that which A claims to have 
been deprived of (the existing view from her property) does not form part of her 
property rights and she is consequently not deprived of an identifiable, legally 
                                                          
53
 Alternative strategies to prevent the obstruction of the existing, unobstructed view from a property 
are discussed in Ch 3. 
54
 In Ch 2 it is established that a property owner is not inherently entitled to the protection of an 
unobstructed view to or from her property. She will only have such a right if her property benefits from 
a servitude of view or a servitude not to build higher that is registered over a neighbouring property. 
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recognised property interest. It is impossible to conduct the test for deprivation in the 
absence of such an identifiable property right. 
The case law discussed in chapter 2 and chapter 3 suggests that the existing 
view from one‟s property may be protected with a servitude or a restrictive condition 
or by legislation, as well as through a number of other measures and strategies. As 
was pointed out in chapter 3, apart from the enforcement of a servitude, restrictive 
condition or legislation, the strategies to protect an existing view do not always 
establish a substantive right to enjoy that view. Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage 
Properties55 (“Transnet”) showed that the right to uphold an existing view from or to a 
property may be created by statute. In Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town 
and Another56 (“Muller”), the applicant succeeded with his application for the review 
and setting aside of a neighbour‟s approved building plans57 because the plans 
contravened the applicable zoning scheme.58 This judgment illustrates that a 
property owner may have the opportunity indirectly to protect the view from her 
property (sometimes merely temporarily) when she ensures the proper enforcement 
of building regulations and zoning plans. There are also a number of cases where 
property owners have used their rights to object to neighbours‟ building plans to 
prevent the construction of buildings on neighbouring properties. Their objections 
were mostly attacks either on the relevant local authorities‟ exercise of their 
discretion59 or on their non-compliance with formalities in approving the plans.60 
                                                          
55
 Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008). 
56
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
57
 The building plans were drawn up for the alteration and extension of the existing house on the 
second respondent‟s property. 
58
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 31 and 36. The 
applicant also contended that the erection of the proposed building would obstruct the view from his 
property, which would consequently cause a decrease in the value of his property. See 3 2 2 3 for a 
discussion of the applicant‟s arguments. 
59
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D); Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 
(C); De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 
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These objections are mostly unrelated to the effect that a building would have on the 
existing view from neighbouring land. Nevertheless, if successful, both of these 
arguments can have the result of stalling the building process, mostly only 
temporarily but sometimes even permanently, and consequently indirectly protect the 
existing view from a neighbouring property.  
As was explained above, the protection of an unobstructed view to or from one 
property means, in most cases, that a neighbouring owner‟s right to erect a 
structure(s) on her property is restricted. Despite the fact that the right to develop 
one‟s property is always regulated, at least in the sense that no person may erect a 
building without properly approved building plans,61 it is an important property 
interest. Therefore, any constraint on this right resulting from the protection of 
someone else‟s rights interferes with an owner‟s property rights in such a way that it 
constitutes a deprivation. Servitudes of prospect or servitudes not to build higher; 
restrictive conditions that prohibit or restrict building; zoning plans; building 
regulations and statutory provisions that prohibit or restrict building and procedural 
attacks on the approval of building plans may all restrict a property owner‟s right to 
build on her property. When they have this effect, they amount to deprivations of 
property interests that must comply with the section 25(1) requirements for 
constitutionally valid deprivations. 
Conversely, in the absence of a servitude, restrictive condition or legislation 
that effectively prevents building that would spoil an existing view, the owner whose 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2006) and True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another (Ethekwini Municipality as amicus curiae) 
2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA). 
60
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA); Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town 
and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C); PS Booksellers (Pty) Ltd and Another v Harrison and Others 2008 
(3) SA 633 (C) and Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and 
Another 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC). 
61
 Section 4(1) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 prohibits 
the erection of buildings without prior approval. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
185 
view is destroyed by building on neighbouring land would not be able to prove a 
deprivation because she would not succeed in proving the existence of a property 
interest of which she could be deprived. The owner who wants to protect an existing 
view from her property will therefore only succeed in proving a property interest and 
a deprivation if building on neighbouring land is allowed, despite the existence of a 
servitude, restrictive condition or legislation that prevents or restricts such a building 
and if the building will destroy the view. 
For purposes of the rest of the analysis below I focus on just one side of the 
conflict, namely deprivation of property that results from restrictions on building that 
are either intended to or have the effect of protecting an existing view from 
neighbouring land. 
 
5 2 2 3 Is the deprivation in line with section 25(1)?  
5 2 2 3 1 Section 25(1) requirements 
The protection of the existing, unobstructed view from a property, whether it be 
based on a servitude, restrictive condition, legislation or any other measure that 
restricts or even prevents any building works on a neighbouring property inevitably 
deprives the owner of such a neighbouring property of her right to use (build on and 
develop) her property. Deprivations of property, including restrictions on the right to 
use one‟s property,62 must comply with section 25(1) of the Constitution. Section 
25(1) sets two requirements: A deprivation must be authorised by law of general 
application and the law may not permit arbitrary deprivation. According to the FNB 
                                                          
62
 The right to use one‟s property is considered “property” for purposes of s 25 of the Constitution. 
See 5 2 2 1 in this regard. 
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decision, the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation includes two aspects: The 
deprivation may not be procedurally or substantively arbitrary.63  
Evaluating whether the deprivation is consistent with section 25(1) therefore 
entails that the following questions must be answered: Is there authority for the 
deprivation? Does the authorising legislation or the common law permit deprivation 
that is procedurally or substantively arbitrary?64 If any of these questions has a 
negative outcome, in other words if the deprivation is not authorised, or if the 
authorising law allows deprivations that are either procedurally or substantively 
arbitrary, the deprivation is in conflict with section 25(1). 
 
5 2 2 3 2 Is the deprivation authorised by law? 
The authorisation enquiry requires one to determine, firstly, whether a deprivation is 
authorised by law; and secondly, whether the authorising law constitutes law of 
general application in the sense that it is valid, generally applicable on all citizens 
and does not amount to the arbitrary treatment of certain individuals or specific 
members of a group.65 The question of whether an act of deprivation was authorised 
                                                          
63
 The Constitutional Court in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) 
SA 768 (CC) para 100 determined that a deprivation of property is arbitrary if the law that authorises 
such deprivation does not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation or if the deprivation is 
procedurally arbitrary. See AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 245. 
64
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 235 reasons that a deprivation dispute 
concerns the effect of the authorising legislation and not the act of deprivation itself.  
65
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 232-237 discusses the requirement that 
deprivations have to be authorised by law of general application with reference to the general rule-of-
law and legitimacy principles of the Constitution. He states that, in terms of this requirement, the 
authorising law must be formally valid, generally applicable, non-arbitrary and qualify as law of 
general application. 
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by law is central to a deprivation dispute, because section 25(1) forbids deprivations 
that are not in terms of law of general application.66 
For purposes of section 25(1), legislation, the common law and customary law 
constitute “law”.67 Furthermore, according to the reasoning of Woolman and Botha, 
subordinate legislation other than regulations, municipal by-laws, rules of the court 
and international conventions should also be considered as law of general 
application.68 Deprivations may therefore, for present purposes, be authorised by 
either legislation in the widest sense or the common or customary law. A deprivation 
that occurred without authorisation by any of these sources of law does not comply 
with the section 25(1) requirement that “[n]o one may be deprived of property except 
in terms of law” and is consequently unconstitutional and invalid. 
The law that authorises an act of deprivation must also be formally valid, since 
the requirement that a deprivation must be authorised by law of general application 
represents the constitutional legitimacy and rule of law principles.69 Furthermore, the 
                                                          
66
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 235 (author‟s emphasis indicated). In 
terms of the wording of s 25(1), deprivations that are not authorised by law are invalid. This provision 
further emphasises the importance of authorising law by stating that “no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation”. 
67
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 334 and AJ van der 
Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 234 argues that the s 25 reference to law of general 
application instead of a law, indicates that deprivations flowing from common law and customary law 
principles are also subject to the s 25(1) requirement that the law may not permit arbitrary 
deprivations. T Roux “Property” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 
ed OS 2003) ch 46 7-8 explains Van der Walt‟s approach with an example: A person who is deprived 
of her property by the attachment of her moveable property to the immovable property of another 
private individual may theoretically attack, in terms of s 25(1), the common law principle that the 
owner of immovable property becomes the owner of everything that attaches to her property. If a 
common law or customary law principle permits a deprivation that proves to be arbitrary, it would be 
unconstitutional. In S v Thebus and Another 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC) it was established that the 
common law is “law of general application”. However, I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights 
handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 412 follow a different approach. They attach a specific meaning to the 
concepts of “deprivation” and “expropriation” and argue that the requirements laid down in s 25(1)-(3) 
are limited to the state as sole role player. 
68
 S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 
2 (2
nd
 ed OS 2006) ch 34 51-53 conclude that there is no clarity about whether norms, standards and 
directives that are issued by government agencies or statutory bodies may be categorised as law of 
general application. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 233-234. 
69
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 232. 
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authorising law must be generally applicable in the sense that it must “be generally 
and equally applicable and ensure parity of treatment” and may not be arbitrary.70 
The investigation to establish whether an act of deprivation is permitted by a 
generally applicable law is an important step when confronted with a deprivation 
dispute. Van der Walt71 suggests that this enquiry should entail strict scrutiny 
regarding the existence of authorisation, the outcome of the deprivation, and 
especially the question of whether the deprivation “in its disputed form, scope and 
context, was foreseen and authorised”.72 It is therefore not merely required that a 
deprivation should be vaguely authorised by law of general application, but that the 
authorising law must specifically provide for (or at least anticipate) a deprivation in 
the way that it in fact occurred. 
 
5 2 2 3 3 Does the legislation permit arbitrary deprivation? 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that “[n]o law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property”. In FNB, Ackermann J focused on the meaning of the word 
“arbitrary” in the context of section 25 and concluded that the deprivation of property 
will be arbitrary when the authorising provision does not provide sufficient reason for 
the deprivation or when the deprivation is procedurally unfair.73 According to this 
distinction that the FNB court made between substantive and procedural 
arbitrariness, the first question is whether a deprivation was procedurally arbitrary. 
                                                          
70
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 232. 
71
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 236-237. 
72
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 237. 
73
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. Section 
25(1) of the Constitution does not explicitly distinguish between substantive and procedural 
arbitrariness. The division between these two “forms” of arbitrariness originated in the FNB decision. I 
Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 543-545 discuss the requirement of 
“procedural fairness” within the context of deprivation. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
189 
Despite Ackermann J‟s comprehensive reasoning about the factors to consider when 
determining whether there are sufficient reasons to justify a deprivation, he did not 
clarify what would render a deprivation procedurally unfair for purposes of section 
25(1) and the case was decided on the basis of substantive arbitrariness (insufficient 
reason for the deprivation).74  
The Mkontwana court defined procedural unfairness for purposes of section 
25(1) in the same way that it is defined for investigations in contexts other than 
section 25(1).75 In terms of this definition, a deprivation would be considered arbitrary 
for purposes of section 25(1) if it involves unjustified procedural irregularities. This 
notion of procedural fairness closely resembles the notion of just administrative 
action that is reviewed in terms of section 33 of the Constitution or PAJA.76 In terms 
of the subsidiarity principles, PAJA should be applied in cases where it has to be 
determined whether administrative action caused a procedurally arbitrary deprivation 
of property.77 Conversely, if a regulatory law directly (without involving any 
administrative action) deprives an owner of property it will be subject to direct 
                                                          
74
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100 per 
Ackermann J ruled that a deprivation of property will be arbitrary if the law that authorises it either 
does not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation, or if it (the law) is procedurally arbitrary. The 
judge then provided specific factors to be considered when determining whether there are sufficient 
reasons for a deprivation to be substantively justified, but he did not give any further guidance 
regarding how the procedural lawfulness of a deprivation should be determined. 
75
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive 
Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 65.  
76
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 265. 
77
 AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 1 CCR 
77-128 at 100-103 and AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 66-69 explains the 
set of subsidiarity principles that was developed by the Constitutional Court. These principles 
prescribe which source of law a litigant should select as a cause of action or as a defence. If there is 
legislation that gives effect to a right that is protected in the Constitution, an action or defence should 
be based on that legislation, and not on the Constitution itself. However, if the constitutional validity or 
efficacy of the legislation constitutes the cause of action, the attack may be based on the 
constitutional provision directly. The same rule applies when there is legislation that gives effect to a 
common law right. If a litigant wants to protect a constitutionally protected right, her attack must be 
based on legislation and not on the common law itself. 
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constitutional scrutiny in terms of section 25(1), because the constitutional validity of 
the legislation itself is attacked and PAJA does not apply.78  
Consequently, a deprivation will probably only be considered arbitrary because 
of procedural unfairness in terms of section 25(1) if the deprivation did not involve 
administrative action. The scope for finding that a deprivation is arbitrary for lack of 
procedural reasonableness is therefore probably limited to deprivations that are 
caused directly by law (either legislation or the common law), without involving 
administrative action.79 For instance, if a statute explicitly states that no structure 
may be erected closer than 20 meters from the ocean, without providing affected 
parties with an opportunity to make objections or to apply for special authorisation, 
the provision itself deprives an owner of a property interest. Since it does not provide 
for any administrative action, the litigant who wants to attack the deprivation caused 
by this provision cannot rely on PAJA (the application of which is restricted to 
administrative action), and will therefore have to rely on section 25(1) of the 
Constitution to protect her property rights against procedurally arbitrary deprivation.  
According to the FNB court‟s interpretation of “arbitrariness”, the second and 
probably most important form that arbitrary deprivation could assume is that of 
substantive arbitrariness.80 A deprivation is considered to be substantively arbitrary if 
it occurred without sufficient reason.81 The court in FNB laid down certain criteria as 
a basis for determining whether or not there are sufficient reasons for a deprivation 
                                                          
78
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 66-67 and 269 and AJ van der Walt 
“Procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property” (2012) 23 Stell LR 88-94 at 91-93. 
79
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 269 and AJ van der Walt “Procedurally 
arbitrary deprivation of property” (2012) 23 Stell LR 88-94 at 91-93. 
80
 The court in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
100 made a distinction between procedural and substantive arbitrariness. See n 73. 
81
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 99-100. 
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to be legitimate.82 These criteria include that the relationship between the means 
(deprivation) and the objective (public interest) must be evaluated; that the 
complexity of the relationships that are at stake must be taken into account; that the 
relationship between the aim of the deprivation and the person whose property it 
affects must be considered; and that the relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation, the nature of the property and the scope of the deprivation should be 
assessed. The nature of the relevant property is indicative of the level of scrutiny that 
a court must apply when determining whether there are sufficient reasons for the 
deprivation to be justified. For example, if an owner is only deprived of one 
entitlement, the justification does not have to be as strong as it would have to be if 
she was deprived of more than one entitlement or all entitlements. The complete 
deprivation of ownership of a corporeal movable thing will, according to the FNB 
decision, be justified only if the purpose for the deprivation was necessary. An 
important further consideration is the question of how extensive a deprivation is – to 
what extent is the owner deprived of her property? Ackermann J ruled that these 
criteria should be applied to each case individually.83 Therefore, the question of 
whether or not there are sufficient reasons for a deprivation not to be arbitrary is 
answered with reference to contextual criteria that would indicate the level of scrutiny 
on which the arbitrariness analysis takes place.84 
                                                          
82
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
83
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
84
 AJ van der Walt “Striving for the better interpretation – A critical reflection on the Constitutional 
Court‟s Harksen and FNB decisions on the property clause” (2004) 121 SALJ 854-878 at 866, 
referring to statements made in FNB regarding the purpose and scope of s 25 of the Constitution, 
emphasises that a single, abstract interpretation of this clause is impossible. A wide, contextual 
approach, in terms of which the characteristics and requirements of each case are considered 
individually, as followed by the court in FNB, would be more effective.  
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Establishing whether there is a sufficient nexus between the property which an 
owner is deprived of and the purpose of the deprivation is pivotal to this approach.85 
Accordingly, the limitation on the owner‟s property is examined to establish whether 
it promotes the purpose of the deprivation. Is there a clear purpose for the 
deprivation? Does the limitation indeed serve that purpose? Is there a relevant link to 
ensure that the limitation is legitimate? The absence of such a nexus indicates an 
arbitrary deprivation. 
The facts of the FNB case illustrate that the lack of sufficient reasons or 
“relationships” implicates that a deprivation is unreasonable, arbitrary and 
consequently invalid. In that case, FNB was the owner of cars (the property they 
claimed to be deprived of) bought in terms of hire-purchase agreements financed by 
FNB. These cars were seized by the Commissioner of the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS), in terms of section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 
(“Customs Act”), to satisfy the customs debt of third parties (the parties to the hire-
purchase agreements with FNB). Therefore, the cars were the property of an owner 
(FNB) that was completely unrelated to the customs debt. Section 114 of the 
Customs Act therefore authorised the deprivation of property under circumstances 
where there was an insufficient nexus between the objective of the authorising 
legislation (the enforcement of customs debts); the owner of the relevant property 
(the bank that is the owner of the motor vehicles and therefore a third party that was 
not at all related to or responsible for the customs debt); and the property (the motor 
vehicles that were not related to the customs debt). This provision therefore 
authorised an arbitrary deprivation of property, since an analysis of the complex set 
of relationships indicated an insufficient relationship to justify the effect of this 
                                                          
85
 This approach is aimed at establishing whether there are sufficient reasons for a deprivation to 
show that the limitation that it places on an owner‟s property is not arbitrary. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
193 
provision (namely that it deprives owners of property without a justified reason). The 
Constitutional Court declared section 114 of the Customs Act unconstitutional insofar 
as it authorised the Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service to seize 
and declare forfeit the property of third parties.86 
The protection of the existing, unobstructed view from a property usually 
requires some form of prohibition or regulation of subsequent building works on a 
neighbouring property or properties. A wide variety of restrictions on building works 
may preserve a pleasurable or necessary view. Servitudes, restrictive conditions and 
legislation may specifically prevent or restrict the erection of building works that will 
obstruct the existing view to a neighbouring property, while legislation may also 
create a statutory duty in terms of which a specific view must be protected.87 Zoning 
plans or building regulations may restrict or prevent building works and have the 
concomitant effect of preventing the obstruction of the existing view from a property. 
Furthermore, the right to be informed of, to comment on and sometimes to prevent 
the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans when such plans involve the removal or 
amendment of a restrictive condition, an application for re-zoning or a departure from 
the applicable building regulations, may temporarily stall or even permanently 
prevent the erection of a building and consequently prevent the obstruction of the 
existing view from a neighbouring property. Each one of these measures of 
                                                          
86
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 133. The 
“category” of third parties that is referred to here includes persons who are not liable to the state for 
payment of debts as explained in s 114 of the Customs Act. The reason for the ruling in the FNB case 
is that s 114 of the Customs Act authorises the arbitrary deprivation of property. In FNB, this section 
authorised the deprivation of property where there was an insufficient nexus between the objective of 
the authorising legislation (the enforcement of customs debts); the owner of the relevant property (the 
bank that is the owner of a motor vehicle in terms of a hire-purchase agreement – and therefore a 
third party that was not at all responsible for the debt); and the property (the motor vehicles that were 
not related to the customs debt). Section 114 of the Customs Act therefore authorised an arbitrary 
deprivation of property. 
87
 An example of such a statutory duty is mentioned in the discussion of Transnet Ltd v Proud 
Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008) in 5 2 3 3. 
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protecting unobstructed views involves the deprivation of a property right, namely the 
right to use (build on) one‟s property. Therefore, all the deprivations caused by the 
variety of “methods of preserving views”88 have to be scrutinised in terms of the FNB 
test to determine whether they are valid in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
The most interesting part of the deprivation enquiry will be the results of the 
substantive arbitrariness test.89 The test will involve an evaluation of the relationships 
between the owner who is deprived of her right to build, the nature and extent of the 
deprivation, and the method, purpose and actual effect of the deprivation in each 
case. The aim of evaluating these relationships is to determine whether there is 
sufficient reason to restrict a property owner‟s right to build on her property in each 
case. In terms of the proportionality requirement that the court in FNB referred to, 
there has to be a link between the impact of a deprivation and its aim.90 An extensive 
deprivation has to serve an essential purpose, while a less severe deprivation does 
not have to serve an equally important aim.91 Moreover, the level of scrutiny may 
vary in each case, depending on the contextual factors enumerated in FNB. 
Therefore, should a property owner be prohibited from building at all, there would 
have to be an essential or very good reason for this prohibition. However, if it is only 
                                                          
88
 See Ch 3 for a discussion of these various “methods” of preserving existing, unobstructed views. 
89
 Although the authorisation for and procedural fairness of deprivations are also important 
requirements for their constitutional validity, these requirements will not be the main focus when the 
constitutional issues that arise in situations where the views from properties are protected are 
considered.  
90
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100(g) per 
Ackermann J distinguished between situations where “a mere rational relationship” between the 
impact of a deprivation and its purpose will satisfy the requirement for “sufficient” reasons and 
circumstances when there must be a proportionate link between the effect of a deprivation and the 
aim that it serves. AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 238-245 explains that the 
FNB decision clarified the uncertainty that existed about whether the s 25(1) prohibition against 
arbitrary deprivations required a (thin) rational relationship or a (thick) proportionate relationship 
between means and ends. It suggested that the level of scrutiny should fit the relevant circumstances. 
91
 For example, in instances where building regulations regulate property rights, those regulations that 
serve an essential public purpose such as the regulatory protection of public health and safety will be 
subjected to a lower level of review than regulation of property rights that promotes a less essential 
public purpose such as the preservation of aesthetical attributes. 
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the place or height of building works that is restricted, or if the right to build is merely 
frustrated or postponed, the reason for the limitation of the right does not necessarily 
have to serve an essential or very strong purpose. The results of these enquiries will 
indicate when one owner‟s right to build may be restricted to specifically or 
incidentally advance another owner‟s property entitlements. They will also show what 
factors may influence the decision to apply either a thin rationality test or a strict 
proportionality test. 
 
5 2 3 Application of the FNB methodology: Deprivation of the right to 
develop one’s property 
5 2 3 1 Servitudes 
If the undisturbed view from a property is protected in terms of a servitude,92 the 
question arises whether this right to an unobstructed view restricts the neighbour‟s 
property rights in a constitutionally legitimate manner. Is the neighbour who may not 
build as she desires because of the servitude deprived of a property right? If she is 
deprived, is such a deprivation constitutionally valid? 
In terms of the FNB threshold requirement, it must be established whether the 
right to build freely on one‟s property constitutes property for purposes of section 
25(1). Is there a property right at stake if the right to a view is protected and the 
neighbour‟s right to build is thereby precluded or restricted? The court in Van der 
Heever v Hanover Municipality93 held that a property owner may indeed build as high 
as she wants to on her property. However, it should be kept in mind that the right to 
                                                          
92
 A property owner can protect the existing view from her property by registering a servitude of 
prospect or a servitude that restricts a neighbour‟s right to raise a building or a structure. See 2 3 2. 
93
 Van der Heever v Hanover Municipality 1938 CPD 95, discussed in 2 2 2 2. 
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develop one‟s property is always regulated, at least in the sense that no person may 
erect a building without properly approved building plans. The right to build on one‟s 
property is therefore always subject to restrictions in the form of building 
regulations.94 Moreover, it can also be restricted by agreement. 
A servitude of prospect and a servitude not to build higher may both have the 
effect of depriving an owner of her right to erect a building on her property where and 
to the height that she desires. Accordingly, where A‟s undisturbed view over B‟s 
property is protected with a servitude that burdens B‟s tenement in favour of that of 
A, there is a limitation on B‟s right to build on her property as she pleases. A 
servitude of prospect and a servitude not to build higher are both praedial servitudes 
created by way of agreement between the owner of the dominant tenement and the 
owner of the servient tenement.95 This means that B (or the previous owner of B‟s 
property) agreed to and effectively sold96 her right to erect a building in the manner 
                                                          
94
 Section 4(1) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977. 
95
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 332-334 explain that praedial servitudes can be created by state grant, agreement, statute or 
prescription. However, it is unlikely that the state will grant a servitude of prospect or a servitude not 
to build higher over state land or that it will grant land that is either burdened with or favoured by one 
of these servitudes. A servitude of prospect is arguably purely aimed at preserving a pleasant view 
from a privately owned property. If one considers the purposes for which land is usually granted by 
the state, for example for the development of housing or transportation, it is hard to imagine an 
instance where the state will grant land with a beautiful view that is already protected with a servitude 
of prospect. It is equally hard to think of a situation where the state will grant land that is burdened 
with a servitude of prospect in favour of another property and therefore burdened in a way that 
prevents or at least restricts development (which will be the aim of the grant in most cases). If there is 
an important reason why the view from land granted by the state should be preserved, it would be 
possible to protect such a view by way of building restrictions or in terms of zoning requirements. 
Accordingly, although servitudes may be created by statute, the aim of preserving a pleasant prospect 
will mostly be achieved through building regulations and zoning plans. There should be no need for 
the legislator to create a statutory servitude of prospect or a servitude not to build higher. Both a 
servitude of prospect and a servitude not to build higher are negative servitudes. It is rare and difficult 
for a negative servitude to be created by way of prescription because it is difficult to comply with the 
requirements for prescription where there is no specific prohibition. (It is difficult to prove that a 
servitude has been used continuously for a period of thirty years when such a servitude involves that 
the owner of the servient tenement refrained from building on her property for this period. There is no 
duty on a property owner to use her property in a specific manner.) Consequently, a servitude of 
prospect and a servitude not to build higher will mostly be created by an agreement. See also CG van 
der Merwe & MJ de Waal The law of things and servitudes (1993) 207 and 218-221. 
96
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 332 explain that the creation of a servitude by way of an agreement involves that the owner of 
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and to the height that she desires.97 The servitude restricting B‟s right to build could 
therefore be said to deprive her of a property right, but in that case the permission 
that she granted is a sufficient reason for the deprivation to be considered non-
arbitrary.98 Moreover, since the restriction resulted from agreement it was arguably 
not brought about by state action authorised by law, even though the common law 
regulates the contract that created the servitude and legislation regulates its 
registration and subsequent enforcement. In this case one could therefore argue that 
a servitude originating in contract either does not bring about a deprivation of 
property for purposes of section 25(1) or, if it does, results in a deprivation that is 
justified by the existence of the original agreement. 
The same argument would be applicable in a case where a restrictive covenant 
over one owner‟s property prevents the obstruction of the view from a neighbour‟s 
property. Restrictive covenants, which are the predecessors of statutory restrictive 
conditions, were used as planning tools to preserve the character of neighbourhoods 
prior to the enactment of provincial ordinances that now regulate township 
establishment.99 These covenants originated in contract and were imposed by 
township developers with the establishment of a new neighbourhood. Buyers of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the dominant tenement and the owner of the servient tenement come to an agreement about the 
extent of the servitudal rights, the amount payable to the owner of the dominant tenement, the 
duration of the servitude and the registration of the agreement. Therefore, a servitude is effectively 
“sold” to the owner of the dominant tenement. 
97
 B is also not completely deprived of her right to erect structures on her property; her right to build is 
merely restricted. 
98
 It can also be argued that the right to build is lost when the servitude is created. If this argument is 
followed, there is no property and the FNB threshold requirement, namely that the relevant property 
interest must constitute “property” for purposes of s 25(1) of the Constitution is not satisfied. However, 
this reasoning is debatable, since it can be argued that the servitude does not destroy the right to 
build permanently, but merely restricts it and may be removed. 
99
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 302-305. Restrictive covenants were agreements between a 
township developer and the purchasers of all the properties in a development and were inserted into 
the title deeds of these properties. Restrictive covenants were used to restrict undesired land-uses in 
a new township establishment before provincial ordinances were enacted to regulate township 
establishment at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Although restrictive covenants are not used in 
South African law any longer, questions regarding their operation may still arise, since restrictive 
covenants may still be applicable to erven in townships that were established before the ordinances 
were enacted. 
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properties that are subject to restrictive covenants agree to the limitations that these 
measures place on their ownership entitlements.100 A restrictive covenant that has 
the effect of protecting the view from a property is therefore similar to a servitude of 
view or a servitude not to build higher. The applicability of both a restrictive covenant 
and a servitude means that the owner whose right (to build) is restricted (or her 
predecessor in title) bindingly agreed to the limitation. Therefore, a restrictive 
covenant that protects one owner‟s view from her property because it restricts 
another owner‟s right to build does not arbitrarily deprive a property owner of the 
right to build either, since it was imposed in terms of an agreement.  
However, in cases where a restrictive condition was imposed by the state, the 
situation is different. Unlike a servitude or a restrictive covenant created in terms of 
an agreement between property owners, a property owner does not agree to or 
permit a restrictive condition that is imposed by the state. Such a state-imposed 
restriction on a property owner‟s right to build therefore resembles legislation that 
places a limitation on a property owner‟s right to use her property. It was argued 
above that a property owner cannot be deprived of her right to build on her property 
in terms of a servitude, a restrictive covenant or a restrictive condition that is created 
in terms of an agreement between property owners, since such an agreement 
implies that the right to build was effectively contracted away. However, a property 
owner whose right to build on her property is restricted by a restrictive condition that 
was imposed by the state is indeed deprived of her right to build on her property, 
since this right of hers was unwillingly restricted. 
The conclusion with regard to both servitudes and restrictive covenants is that 
the restrictions they may impose on building in order to protect an existing view do 
                                                          
100
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 302. 
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not constitute deprivation of property for purposes of section 25 and therefore do not 
have to be analysed further for arbitrariness. In both those instances the FNB test 
terminates at either the first (no property) or the second (no deprivation of property) 
step. However, restrictions on building imposed by restrictive conditions that are 
imposed by or in terms of legislation do constitute deprivation of property and must 
be analysed further. Since these restrictions are similar to those imposed by building 
regulations, they are considered in the next section below. 
 
5 2 3 2 Building regulations 
A building regulation may protect an owner‟s view either when it is specifically aimed 
at preserving a pleasant view, or when it is aimed at promoting some other public 
purpose and have the concomitant effect of preventing the obstruction of an existing 
view.101 For instance, building regulations may protect the unobstructed view from 
owner A‟s property incidentally insofar as they prohibit, for public health and safety 
reasons, owners B, C and D from building to the size, manner or height that they 
desire and that would obstruct A‟s view. Do owners B, C and D suffer deprivations 
because of these restrictions and are these deprivations constitutionally valid? To 
answer these questions, the limitation that a building regulation places on an owner‟s 
                                                          
101
 Section 17(1) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 lists 
aspects relating to the erection of buildings that may be regulated by building regulations. In terms of 
this section, building regulations may be imposed to provide, for example, requirements that buildings 
must comply with as precautionary measures against fires and to provide resistance against floods (s 
17(1)(e)-(f)). Building regulations “regarding the durability and other desirable properties of buildings” 
(s 17(1)(g)); “regarding the ventilation and the provision for daylight in respect of buildings, including 
the provision of open spaces in connection therewith” (s 17(1)(i)); and building regulations “to 
regulate, restrict or prohibit use to which any building or categories of buildings may be put” (s 
17(1)(l)) may be imposed by the Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology. It is possible that a 
building regulation may restrict the height of a building as a precaution against fires, to provide 
resistance against floods, to promote the desirable properties of the building (although it is unclear 
what will constitute a “desirable property” for purposes of this provision), or to enable sufficient 
ventilation or a flow of daylight to neighbouring properties. Such a height restriction may have the 
concomitant effect of protecting the unobstructed view from a neighbouring property.  
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right to use her property must be analysed in terms of the FNB test, with specific 
emphasis on the aims of the applicable regulatory deprivations. 
Building regulations generally satisfy the FNB threshold requirements because 
they do affect property rights102 and they do “interfere” with property interests in a 
way that deprives owners of property interests.103 However, from the outset, a 
property owner‟s right to build is subject to permission (approval of building plans) 
and regulation. Section 25(1) mandates the state to regulate private property for the 
public benefit. It provides certain procedural as well as substantive requirements104 
for the regulation of the use of property. State action that restricts an owner‟s use 
and enjoyment of her property through building must be authorised by law of general 
application, it may not be arbitrary and it must serve an essential public purpose.105 
A building regulation, as an example of such a regulation, must therefore serve a 
legitimate and justified public purpose. It must also be implemented in such a way 
that it is in line with the authorising provision and non-arbitrary.  
Section 17 of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 
of 1977 (“National Building Act”) authorises the Minister of Economic Affairs and 
Technology to regulate a property owner‟s use of her property. On the individual 
level, the effect of building regulations on individual landowners‟ right to build must 
                                                          
102
 As discussed in n 101, s 17 of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 
1977 authorises the Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology to regulate (effectively restrict) a 
property owner‟s use of her property. Since a building regulation has a direct effect on an owner‟s 
entitlement to use her property, it affects a property interest of hers. 
103
 According to the wide approached followed by Ackermann J in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57, almost any interference with property 
interests will constitute a deprivation for purposes of s 25(1) of the Constitution. The restriction that a 
building regulation places on a property owner‟s right to use (build on) her property amounts to a 
deprivation in terms of this definition. See 5 2 2 2. 
104
 Section 25(1) does not explicitly state a substantive public purpose requirement. However, AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 227-228, 231-232 and 238 argues that this section 
implicitly requires that deprivations must serve a public purpose or that it must be in the public 
interest. His argument is based on foreign jurisdictions‟ tendency to strictly enforce the requirement 
that a deprivation of property must serve a public purpose.  
105
 Protecting or promoting public health and safety is an example of such an aim.  
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be assessed on a case by case basis, with reference to the actual impact that 
regulatory prohibitions or controls have on an individual landowner. In terms of the 
FNB interpretation of the section 25(1) requirement that a provision may not be 
arbitrary, deprivations may neither be procedurally or substantively arbitrary.106 
Building regulations are imposed by way of administrative action, as prescribed by 
section 17 of the National Building Act,107 in the form of administrative decisions to 
approve or disapprove building plans or to enforce building regulations. Therefore, if 
there is any indication of procedural arbitrariness, such arbitrariness will relate to the 
administrative action and will be adjudicated in terms of PAJA and not under section 
25(1) of the Constitution. This situation should be distinguished from instances 
where a statutory restriction causes a procedurally arbitrary deprivation that does not 
involve administrative action.108  
The deprivation caused by a restriction on the right to build may not be 
substantively arbitrary either. Different measures are used to determine whether a 
deprivation is substantively reasonable or justified in terms of the aim that it serves. 
These tests differ according to the nature of the purpose that is served with the 
regulation and the impact that the regulation has on private property rights. In the 
case of building and planning regulations that serve the primary aim of promoting 
                                                          
106
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. See n 73. 
107
 According to s 17 of the National Building Act, the procedural requirements that must be complied 
with when a building regulation is imposed, entail the following: It must be imposed by the Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Technology, who must consult with the council (according to the definition of 
“council” in s 1 of the National Building Act, “council” refers to council as defined in s 1 of the 
Standards Act), and it must relate to one of the aspects that are listed in s 17(1)(a)-(w) of the National 
Building Act. Section 17(3)(a) requires that the Minister must also, together with the publication of the 
building regulation in the Gazette, publish a notice that invites interested persons to object to the 
building regulation. Furthermore, s 17(3)(b) sets procedural requirements regarding the date that a 
building regulation will come into operation; s 17(4) provides procedures for exempting an owner from 
the provisions of a specific building regulation; and s 17(5) imposes a procedure to be followed when 
removing servitudes or restrictive conditions to promote compliance with or the operation of any 
national building regulation. 
108
 The possibility of a procedurally arbitrary deprivation that does not involve administrative action is 
mentioned in 5 2 2 3 3. 
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public health and safety, something closer to a mere rationality test could be applied. 
However, building regulations that serve less essential social or aesthetic purposes 
may arguably be subject to stricter controls.109 Consequently, a building regulation 
that serves an overridingly important public safety aim will be considered a 
constitutionally valid deprivation of property if there is proof of a legitimate reason 
(such as protecting public safety) for the limitation. For example, if a building 
regulation serves as a precaution against fire, or if it provides resistance against 
floods, a low level rationality scrutiny will probably be enough to justify it. However, a 
building regulation that is purely aimed at aesthetical considerations or the protection 
of existing views will probably not be considered as an essential regulation that 
directly promotes or protects public health and safety and will therefore possibly be 
subject to stricter scrutiny. Should a building regulation serve an aesthetic purpose, it 
becomes more difficult to justify and consequently it is possible that a proportionate 
balance between the impact of the deprivation on the property owner and the aim 
that it serves will have to be established. The purpose of a specific building 
regulation will therefore determine the level of scrutiny that will be applied when 
deciding whether it constitutes a substantively arbitrary deprivation or not.  
A building regulation that restricts B‟s right to build on her property and has the 
concomitant effect of preserving the view from A‟s property may either be aimed at 
protecting public health and safety or it may be imposed to promote a “fringe public 
purpose” such as aesthetic preservation, for example to keep the buildings in a 
                                                          
109
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 289-290 argues that building and 
development controls that protect “fringe public purposes such as social and aesthetic building 
regulation” should be subject to a higher level of scrutiny, while “no more than a low level rationality 
scrutiny” is required when determining whether a building regulation that serves the function of 
protecting public health and safety is a justified deprivation of an owner‟s property. 
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specific development below a certain height.110 If it is aimed at protecting public 
health and safety, it will possibly be subject to a lower-level test that is closer to mere 
rationality. Therefore, the deprivation of B‟s right to build will probably be justified 
reasonably easily and the (indirect) protection that it provides to A‟s view is possibly 
going to be relatively strong. If the building regulation that restricts B‟s building works 
only serves a social or an aesthetic purpose, the deprivation of B‟s property will 
probably require stronger justification in the sense that the effect it has on her rights 
must be proportionate to this (less important) aim. Consequently, the limitation of B‟s 
right may be more difficult to justify and the (indirect) protection that it provides 
against the obstruction of A‟s view is possibly not very strong, since the deprivation 
that it causes for B may more easily be considered arbitrary. In the latter case, the 
nature and scope of the effect that the restriction has on B‟s right to build might be 
more relevant because the purpose of the deprivation is less compelling; in the first 
case, the public purpose may be so compelling that the impact of the restriction on 
B‟s right may be relatively unimportant. 
However, in all cases where mere rationality would not be enough and 
something closer to proportionality is required, the focus of the proportionality 
enquiry is on the deprivation suffered by B. The protection of A‟s view is merely a 
side effect of the regulation. Although the level of scrutiny that will be applied may 
determine whether A‟s view will be protected in future or not, she is not substantively 
entitled to such a view and therefore has no say in the matter. The benefit (view) that 
she might derive from the restriction on B‟s right to build will only be a continued 
advantage if a court finds, considering the importance of the purpose of the 
regulation and the effect that it has on B, that the building regulation does not 
                                                          
110
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 290 refers to social and aesthetic aims as 
“fringe public purposes”. 
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deprive B of a property entitlement in a way that is inconsistent with s 25(1) of the 
Constitution.  
Restrictive conditions have the same character as building regulations in the 
sense that they are imposed by provincial ordinances and that they may regulate a 
property owner‟s right to build.111 Building works must comply with the restrictive 
conditions that are applicable to the relevant property, just like they must comply with 
the applicable building regulations. Therefore, the question of whether a restrictive 
condition that restricts an owner‟s right to build causes an arbitrary deprivation 
should be treated in the same way as a building regulation that has the same effect. 
In most cases, restrictive conditions will satisfy the section 25(1) non-arbitrariness 
test reasonably easily since they are, by definition, legitimate planning tools that 
place justifiable restrictions on a property owner‟s use of her property. Even if the 
restrictions imposed in terms of restrictive conditions have a fairly harsh impact on 
affected property owners, the deprivation will most likely not be rendered arbitrary, 
since the purpose of such a deprivation is so strong. Nevertheless, the impact can 
become so excessive, especially if one property owner is singled out, that it will 
render the deprivation arbitrary despite the strong public purpose that it serves. 
It has been established that a property owner may derive an indirect benefit 
from the restrictions that building regulations place on neighbouring owners. The 
protection of the view from a property is an example of such a benefit. It has also 
been determined that the “strength” of the (indirect) “protection” of an unobstructed 
                                                          
111
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 305-317 reasons that restrictive conditions are planning 
tools that regulate the planning of a whole neighbourhood. She emphasises that they differ from 
servitudes because, inter alia, unlike servitudes that regulate the relationship between a dominant and 
a servient tenement, one property serves both as the dominant and as the servient property when a 
restrictive condition is applicable. Effectively, restrictive conditions have the effect that every owner in 
a township is simultaneously mutually and reciprocally bound to all other owners of erven in the 
township. 
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view depends on the purpose for which the building regulation that provides the 
protection has been imposed. If the building regulation serves an essential public 
health or safety purpose, it will be difficult to show that it arbitrarily deprives an owner 
of the right to use her property freely and therefore the limitation might provide quite 
strong protection to the view from neighbouring properties.112 However, if a social or 
aesthetic aim is served by the regulation, it will be easier to show that it arbitrarily 
deprives an owner of the right to use her property and the protection of the view from 
neighbouring properties will be weaker. Although a building regulation may protect 
the view from a neighbouring property, such protection is not the purpose of the 
regulation and therefore it is indirect and does not constitute a substantive or directly 
enforceable right. Nevertheless, property owners and prospective property owners 
rely on the continued existence of building regulations and zoning schemes. For 
example, A buys a property with a beautiful view over a vineyard on B‟s property. A 
knows that, in terms of the applicable zoning plan, B‟s use of the part of her property 
that is planted with vines is restricted to farming activities. Furthermore, building 
regulations prohibit B from erecting any buildings on the part of her property that lies 
between A‟s property and the vineyard. The restriction against the building works is 
aimed at reducing damage that may be caused by flooding, since that part of B‟s 
property is situated on a river bank. When A buys the property, she believes that the 
building regulations that apply to B‟s property will prevent B from erecting any 
building works on her (B‟s) property that will obstruct her (A‟s) view of the vineyard. 
She is also under the impression that the applicable zoning plan will prevent B from 
removing the vineyard, or at least, from erecting unsightly buildings or structures on 
                                                          
112
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 249 argues that zoning is a legitimate deprivation of property 
in terms of s 25(1) of the Constitution – provided that it is instituted in terms of law of general 
application and that it complies with the non-arbitrariness requirement – since it serves the public 
purpose of protecting health, safety and welfare. 
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that part of her property. The constitutional validity of the deprivation of B‟s right to 
use her property freely will depend on whether or not the building and zoning 
regulations are substantively justified. 
By imposing the building and zoning regulations that apply to B‟s property, the 
state plays the role of public protector. The question of whether the reasons that the 
state provides for these limitations are sufficient, depends on the specific public aim 
that is protected. The restriction on the use of the vineyard part of B‟s property to 
agricultural activities is a result of the specific zoning of B‟s land. According to J van 
Wyk, “[zoning] determines the specific uses to which specific land may be put”113 and 
serves the purpose of protecting public health, safety and welfare.114 Limiting the use 
of the vineyard part of B‟s property to agricultural activities ensures that farming 
activities and residential use are separated, which has certain health benefits. Policy 
considerations, such as the protection of food security and employment opportunities 
for unskilled labourers, and possibly even the preservation of visually pleasing 
landscapes, protect agricultural land against development.115 The restrictions that 
the zoning requirements place on B‟s property will therefore possibly be subject to 
something closer to a rationality test, since they serve a compelling purpose, namely 
the protection of public health and safety. Accordingly, it has to be determined 
whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation suffered by B because she 
cannot build freely. J van Wyk reasons that zoning is indeed a legitimate deprivation 
                                                          
113
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 252. 
114
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 249. 
115
 Although the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 does not specifically state these 
policy considerations, s 4(1)(a)(ii) of the Act determines that an application for the Minister of 
Agriculture‟s consent regarding the subdivision of agricultural land shall “be accompanied by such 
plans, documents and information as may be determined by the Minister” and s 4(2)(a) empowers the 
Minister to set further conditions that are not stated in the Act. These provisions have the effect that, 
in practice, submissions for the amendment of land zoned for agricultural purposes must include, 
amongst others, a visual impact and a heritage study. Accordingly, considerations such as the visual 
impact that a proposed re-zoning may have are taken into account before permission for such an 
amendment is granted. 
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of property, since it serves the purpose of protecting public health, safety, welfare 
and morals.116 Therefore, the restriction on B‟s right to use her property probably 
constitutes a valid deprivation of her property, since the purpose of the restriction is 
sufficient reason for the deprivation that she suffers. If the restriction on the use of 
B‟s property limits the development of her property for a purely social or aesthetic 
aim, something closer to a proportionality test will be applied to determine whether 
the deprivation suffered by B is proportionate to the social and aesthetic aims that it 
serves, but the building regulation that restricts B‟s right to build on the specific part 
of her property that is situated on a river bank serves a public health and safety 
purpose. It protects the health and safety of the public that is exposed to flooding in 
the river, either because of buildings on the river bank or nearby areas,117 or through 
drinking water that comes from the river. These reasons seem to be sufficient 
justification for the deprivation of B‟s property. 
Although these regulations limit B‟s use and enjoyment of her property, they are 
properly authorised by law of general application that is aimed at the protection of 
legitimate and important public purposes. B may still build on her property, provided 
that the building works are above the flood mark. She may for instance perhaps also 
use the property that lies below the flood mark, as long as she doesn‟t erect a 
structure or building on that part. Consequently, the deprivation suffered by B serves 
                                                          
116
 J van Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 249 refers to J Dukeminier & JE Krier Property (3
rd
 ed 1993) 
1005, who describe zoning as “the power of government to protect health, safety, welfare and 
morals”. Van Wyk qualifies her statement that zoning constitutes a valid deprivation of property, 
stating that zoning is a valid deprivation provided that it is done in terms of law of general application 
and complies with the non-arbitrariness requirement. 
117
 Structures that are erected under a determined flood mark expose current property owners, as well 
as future buyers and tenants, to possible flood damage. A future buyer or tenant may be unaware of 
the fact that their residence exceeds the flood mark and suffer the financial damage that is caused by 
floods. 
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an important public purpose, which can be balanced with the relatively light burden 
(restriction) that it places on B‟s right to use her property.118 
Deprivations must serve an essential aim if the affected right is ownership in 
land.119 B‟s right is ownership of land in this example, but the applicable building 
regulations and zoning restrictions serve the essential aims of protecting public 
health and safety. Furthermore, the restrictions imposed by building regulations and 
the zoning plan neither deprive B of ownership, nor does it deprive her of all uses of 
her property. The building restriction merely prohibits the erection of buildings on a 
specific part of her property, while the zoning plan limits the use of her property. The 
building and zoning regulations are therefore not comprehensive deprivations of B‟s 
property rights. In terms of the FNB criteria, a deprivation will be justified in 
circumstances where the restriction that it causes is not disproportionate to the aim 
that it serves and where it does not cause an imbalance in the complex set of 
relationships that are at play. There is a proportionate relationship between the 
                                                          
118
 The restriction of B‟s property rights is justified in terms of the police-power principle because, 
although it restricts the use of her property and its enforcement may cause financial loss, the 
regulations do not place an unreasonable burden on B. Her right of ownership is merely balanced with 
the public‟s interests. In terms of the US approach, the restriction is not too heavy because it does not 
deprive the owner of all economic use of the property. AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 
ed 2011) 215-216 and 355-359 and AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative 
analysis (1999) 427-440 explains that according to the US approach, a regulation is considered to go 
“too far” and becomes a per se regulatory taking that requires compensation when it involves a 
permanent physical invasion or occupation of the property; deprives the owner of all economic use of 
her property; or destroys a core property right. If a regulation does not have any of these effects it 
may nevertheless be considered a regulatory taking based on certain case-specific considerations. 
German law also requires that a regulatory limitation on private property must be validly authorised 
and must comply with the proportionality principle. According to AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 365-366 n 109, the proportionality principle that applies with regard to 
regulatory limitations requires a proportionate balance between the interests of the individual and the 
social interest. Furthermore, this principle  
“is applied with attention for the relative proximity between the right and personal liberty: 
the closer the property right is involved in securing personal liberty of its holder, the fewer 
opportunities there are for the legislature to interfere with it; the further a specific property 
right is removed from the personal liberty of its holder, the easier it is to regulate it ... ”. 
Insofar as B‟s use of the part of her property that is planted with vineyard is involved with agricultural 
activities, it is not directly involved with B‟s personal liberty (it does not affect the use of her home) 
and restrictions on it would, in terms of the German approach, more easily be justified.  
119
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100(e). 
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objectives of the restrictions on B‟s right of ownership and the relatively small impact 
that they have on her property rights. Therefore, the deprivation of B‟s property rights 
amounts to a justified exercise of the state‟s police-power.120 
The constitutionality of a deprivation suffered by a property owner whose right 
to build on her property is restricted by building regulations depends on the specific 
circumstances of a given case. The point of departure is that the right to build is 
subject to permission and regulation in any event and that regulatory measures are 
therefore generally easily justified. However, factors such as the purpose of a 
building regulation and the impact that it has on an individual property owner will be 
considered to determine, firstly, which test should apply when deciding whether there 
are sufficient reasons for the deprivation and, secondly, whether the result of the test 
indicates that the deprivation is in line with section 25(1). 
 
5 2 3 3 Other legislation  
Apart from the National Building Act, other legislation may also restrict a property 
owner‟s right to build on her property, thereby directly or indirectly protecting the view 
from or to a specific property. An example of such legislation is section 74 of the 
National Ports Act 12 of 2005 (“the National Ports Act”) in terms of which the 
National Ports Authority is, inter alia, responsible for maintaining adequate and 
efficient lighthouses to assist in the navigation of ships. The statute creates a 
statutory duty that obliges the National Ports Authority to operate and maintain 
lighthouses. According to the ruling in Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties121 
                                                          
120
 The police-power principle is discussed in 5 2 1. 
121
 Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008). 
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(“Transnet”), this duty includes an obligation to prevent the obstruction of the view 
from the sea to a lighthouse signal.122  
Does a statute like the National Ports Act that limits a property owner‟s right to 
develop her property (to protect the existing view to or from a specific property or 
object) deprive this owner of property in a way that is inconsistent with section 25(1) 
of the Constitution? If legislation has the effect of prohibiting a property owner from 
building on her property, such as the relevant provision in Transnet, such a property 
owner‟s right to build on her property is affected. This right (to use, build and develop 
one‟s property) constitutes a property interest for purposes of section 25(1) and if 
such a right is restricted, the property owner suffers a deprivation of property. The 
FNB methodology requires that, in instances where there is a deprivation of property, 
it must be established whether such a deprivation is in line with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. 
The requirements for a constitutionally valid deprivation of property is, in terms 
of section 25(1) of the Constitution, that the deprivation must be authorised by law of 
general application and that the deprivation may not be procedurally or substantively 
arbitrary. The first respondent in Transnet suffered a deprivation of its property 
because it was prohibited from developing its property in the way that it wanted to. 
This deprivation was authorised by section 74(1)(f) of the National Ports Act. This 
provision authorises the National Ports Authority to maintain lighthouses and 
navigational aid to ensure safe and effective port traffic control. It constitutes law of 
general application because it is national legislation that is formally valid, clear and 
generally applicable.  
                                                          
122
 Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008) paras 
11 and 13. 
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The question of whether a statutory provision that deprives an owner of a 
property right is procedurally arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution 
depends on its specific wording. In certain instances, a statutory provision may 
arguably be considered procedurally arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. This will be the case where such a provision directly, without involving 
any administrative action, deprives a property owner of a property right.123 For 
example, if legislation prohibits the erection of any buildings or of buildings of a 
certain height in a certain radius from lighthouses, without giving affected owners a 
right to object or to apply for exceptions, it may be considered to constitute a 
procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property without involving administrative action. 
However, if a deprivation is authorised by legislation but executed through 
administrative action - for example, in Transnet the National Ports Authority had a 
statutory duty to take steps to maintain the views to lighthouses; these steps would 
constitute administrative action - its constitutional validity will, according to the 
subsidiarity principle, be determined in terms of PAJA and section 33 of the 
Constitution and not in terms of section 25.124 A deprivation of property by a statutory 
provision will therefore only be considered procedurally arbitrary in terms of section 
25(1) of the Constitution if it places a restriction on an owner‟s property right without 
providing for any administrative involvement. 
When determining whether a statutory provision that deprives a property owner 
of a right is substantively arbitrary, it has to be established, in terms of the criteria 
laid down in FNB, whether there is sufficient reason for such a deprivation. The court 
in FNB argued that a complex set of relationships has to be considered to establish 
                                                          
123
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 269 argues that although it is unclear 
what will constitute as “procedurally unfair” deprivations in terms of s 25(1), deprivations that are 
directly caused by legislation will probably fall into this category (and not in the category to be 
adjudicated in terms of PAJA and s 33 of the Constitution). 
124
 See n 77 for a discussion of the subsidiarity principles. 
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whether there is indeed sufficient reason for a deprivation.125 If this reasoning is 
applied to the facts in Transnet, the deprivation of the first respondent‟s right to 
develop its property probably does not constitute a substantively arbitrary 
deprivation. In this case, the first respondent was prohibited from erecting an 
apartment building in front of the Richmond beacon, because such a development 
would interfere with the navigational aid provided by the beacon and therefore make 
it unsafe for ships to enter the Port Elizabeth port. In terms of section 74(1)(f) of the 
National Ports Act, the National Ports Authority is statutorily enjoined to ensure the 
“safety of navigation and shipping in ports ... and [to] maintain adequate and efficient 
lighthouses and other navigational aids”. The prohibition on the first respondent‟s 
proposed development was in terms of this provision and it was specifically aimed at 
maintaining adequate and efficient navigational aids. 
The relationship between the deprivation (building restriction) and its aim 
(maintaining an unobstructed view to the Richmond beacon to ensure safe port 
traffic) shows that there is sufficient reason for the deprivation. Furthermore, there is 
a vertical relationship between the state (National Ports Authority) and the individual 
property owner,126 in terms of which the state acts in a regulatory capacity. In this 
case, the state acts as public protector and therefore the question of whether the 
reasons for the deprivation are “sufficient” depends on the specific public purpose 
that is protected. The object of the National Ports Act is to promote “an effective and 
productive ports industry”.127 The National Ports Authority aims to achieve this 
purpose by performing its duties in a manner that “does not jeopardise the national 
                                                          
125
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
126
 The first respondent, Proud Heritage Properties. 
127
 Section 2(a) of the National Ports Act 12 of 2005. 
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interest”.128 It also aims “to enable port users to access the port in the most effective 
way possible”129 and “to promote and undertake the necessary measures to enhance 
safety and security of life and property in ports”.130 The provision that authorises the 
deprivation of the first respondent‟s right to develop its property therefore serves an 
essential public safety aim. Consequently, there is a sufficient rational link between 
the purpose of the deprivation (safety of port traffic) and the means chosen to 
promote it (a restriction on building works in the vicinity of a lighthouse) to justify the 
deprivation. Given the overriding importance of the public purpose, the deprivation 
would in this case probably be justified by something approaching mere rationality, 
since the effect that the deprivation would have on the affected landowner is 
probably irrelevant in view of the goal of the regulatory scheme. 
The Transnet decision shows that a deprivation of the right to develop one‟s 
property that is caused by an explicit or an implicit statutory duty requiring an 
unobstructed view to or from a property or a specific object, may be justified in terms 
of section 25(1) of the Constitution if the relevant provision satisfies the non-
arbitrariness test. 
 
5 2 3 4 Departures from building regulations or a zoning scheme 
A prospective property owner often relies on the continued existence of the building 
regulations and zoning scheme that regulate building works on properties in the area 
where she wants to buy. This may create the expectation that the existing views 
observed from properties in such an area will continue to exist insofar as they are 
                                                          
128
 Section 12(a) of the National Ports Act 12 of 2005. 
129
 Section 12(c) of the National Ports Act 12 of 2005. 
130
 Section 12(h) of the National Ports Act 12 of 2005. 
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protected in terms of the applicable building regulations and zoning scheme.131 For 
instance, when A buys a property, she knows that her neighbour (B) is restricted, in 
terms of building regulations and the relevant zoning scheme, to erect buildings on 
her (B‟s) property that would obstruct the existing view from her (A‟s) property. A 
therefore relies on the continued existence of the restrictions that the building 
regulations and zoning scheme impose on the use of B‟s property for the protection 
of the existing view from her own property. Will A suffer a deprivation if there is a 
change in the relevant building regulations or zoning scheme? In other words, does 
A have any right to enforce her expectation of the continued existence of the building 
regulations and zoning scheme? 
In terms of section 3(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(“PAJA”), procedural fairness is required for any administrative action that “materially 
and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person”.132 
Therefore, if A can prove that this previously existing situation (the application of the 
building regulations and zoning scheme on B‟s property) gave her a right or a 
legitimate expectation that the existing building regulations or zoning scheme would 
remain unchanged, the decision to approve such changes would be scrutinised in 
terms of PAJA to establish whether it complied with the requirement of procedural 
fairness. Since it is hard to conceive of a reason why anybody would have the right 
that an existing zoning scheme or set of building regulations should remain 
unchanged, the protection that owners enjoy in this regard is restricted to 
                                                          
131
 In Erasmus v Blom 2011 JDR 0321 (ECP) para 37, Revelas J reasoned that although the general 
position is that a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing view from her 
property, such a right may be enforced in circumstances where the views from a properties in a 
specific development are the primary reasons for buying the properties. However, he qualifies this 
statement, arguing that in such circumstances, there would be regulations in place that protect the 
existing views from the properties in the development. This reasoning confirms that a property owner 
may enforce the right to the existing, unobstructed view from a property insofar as it is protected in 
terms of building regulations.  
132
 Section 3(1) of PAJA. See C Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 390-398. 
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administrative law and probably to situations where they can prove a legitimate 
expectation that a certain regulatory or zoning scheme or rule would remain 
unchanged. 
However, the situation is different when it comes to re-zonings and departures 
from the existing zoning scheme. A, as an affected property owner, indeed has the 
right to be informed of, to comment on or to object against a neighbour‟s application 
for the re-zoning of her property or for a departure from the applicable zoning 
scheme or building regulations.133 However, she (A) does not have a right to prevent 
such changes and will therefore not be deprived of any property rights if B‟s 
application for any of these changes is approved. Nevertheless, if B‟s application is 
approved without any notice to A or without giving A the opportunity to comment on 
or to object against such approval, A would have been deprived of her right to be 
heard. The approval of B‟s application might consequently be set aside. If A provides 
sufficient reasons why the property should not be re-zoned or why the applicable 
zoning scheme should not be departed from, B‟s application may fail and the 
obstruction of the existing view from A‟s property might be prevented permanently. If 
she does not provide sufficient reasons, B‟s application for re-zoning or for a 
departure may be approved, possibly with qualifications or restrictions. In the latter 
instance, A could at most succeed in temporarily stalling the building works that 
would obstruct the existing view from her property, but she would not be entitled to 
the continued existence of such a view.134  
                                                          
133
 Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 130 and 136. See also J van 
Wyk Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 354, 357 and 395-396 and the discussions in 3 2 2 2 and 3 2 2 3.  
134
 See 3 2 3 for a more extensive discussion of how a property owner can protect the existing view 
from her property by relying on alternative strategies to prevent building works on neighbouring 
properties. 
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According to Corbett CJ in Administrator, Transvaal and Others v Traub and 
Others,135 a  
“[l]egitimate, or reasonable, expectation, may arise either from an express 
promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular 
practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue.” 
If A can prove that the relevant local authority had expressly promised not to approve 
any application for a departure from the building regulations or zoning scheme that is 
applicable to B‟s property, or if she can prove that there is an existing regular 
practice that applications for such departures regarding property in the vicinity of B‟s 
property are not granted approval, she (A) can argue that the approval of B‟s 
application to have her (B‟s) property re-zoned or for a departure from the applicable 
zoning scheme deprived her of the legitimate expectation that the pre-existing 
situation (the way B‟s property was zoned and building regulations applied to her 
property) would continue. Should A successfully prove that the approval of B‟s 
application “materially and adversely” affected her right to be heard or her legitimate 
expectation that the building regulations and zoning scheme would not change, the 
relevant decision maker would have to indicate that the approval complies with the 
procedural fairness requirement of section 3(1) of PAJA.  
A change in building regulations or zoning plans may indeed deprive property 
owners, to whose properties they apply, of certain property rights. For example: A 
buys a property on which she wants to erect an eight meter high building. The 
applicable building regulations stipulate that houses in A‟s neighbourhood may not 
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 Administrator, Transvaal and Others v Traub and Others 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) 756H-I. C Hoexter 
Administrative law in South Africa (2
nd
 ed 2012) 394-396 discusses the development of the legitimate 
expectation doctrine in the context of procedural fairness of administrative action. See also J van Wyk 
Planning law (2
nd
 ed 2012) 177. 
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exceed a height of ten meters. After A bought the property but before she submits 
buildings plans, the building regulations change. The implication of the amended 
regulations is that A may now only construct a house of six meters high. Does A 
suffer a deprivation of a property right that is inconsistent with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution? 
The first question relates to the time when A acquires a right to erect a building 
of ten meters high. Does she acquire this right in terms of the zoning scheme (when 
she buys the property) or in terms of her approved building plans (when her building 
plans are approved)? If the change in the building regulations or zoning scheme 
occurs after A‟s building plans have been approved, the change will indeed deprive 
her of a property right. However, if the change occurs after A has bought the 
property but before her building plans are approved, the question of whether she 
suffers a loss of a property right is moot. A zoning scheme arguably only entitles a 
property owner to apply for approval of building plans that comply with the prescribed 
limitations. If this is the case, an affected property owner is probably not deprived of 
a right or a legitimate expectation if the building regulations or zoning scheme 
changes before she submitted an application for the approval of her building plans. 
However, it may also be argued that a property owner does already acquire a 
legitimate expectation to build within the parameters of the existing legal framework 
when she buys a property. 
The amended regulation may therefore affect a property right and deprive a 
property owner of the right to use her property freely. The determining question in 
such a deprivation inquiry is whether or not the change in the regulation promotes an 
important public purpose. If such a change serves an essential public purpose such 
as public health and safety, something approaching a thin rationality test will apply. 
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The change, although depriving A of her right to use her property in the way that she 
expected that she would, will probably be considered justified in terms of section 
25(1) of the Constitution as soon as it is proven that it serves an overriding public 
purpose such as public health and safety. However, if the change in the building 
regulation or zoning plan serves a less important aim such as aesthetic preservation, 
something closer to a proportionality test will apply and the effect that the change 
has on A‟s rights must be taken into account. It will be more difficult to show that the 
deprivation that A suffers is proportionate to the (less important) aims that it serves 
and the reasonableness of the deprivation will be subject to stricter scrutiny. 
 
5 2 3 5 Procedural difficulties 
Property owners have the right to be protected from unlawful building works on 
neighbouring properties.136 However, the phraseology of section 7(1)(b) of the 
National Building Act creates confusion in this regard.137 According to this provision, 
a building control officer must refuse to approve building plans if she is of the opinion 
that the proposed building will “probably or in fact” disfigure the area,138 be unsightly 
or objectionable,139 or derogate from the value of neighbouring properties.140 The 
section creates the impression that property owners have the right to object to 
building plans of neighbouring owners if the proposed buildings would have any of 
these effects. This is problematic. Case law indicates that objections based on 
section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(aaa), 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(bbb) or 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National 
                                                          
136
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 294 argues that the state‟s police power 
includes a duty to protect neighbours‟ rights against unlawful building. 
137
 Section 7(1)(b) of the National Building Act is also considered in 3 3 3, with regard to the fact that it 
has been used as an alternative strategy to prevent building works on neighbouring properties in 
attempts to protect the existing view from a property.  
138
 Section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(aaa) of the National Building Act. 
139
 Section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(bbb) of the National Building Act. 
140
 Section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National Building Act. 
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Building Act are often used in an attempt to frustrate neighbouring property owners‟ 
rights to build on their properties, sometimes with the incidental effect of protecting 
an existing view from the objector‟s property.141 These sections seem to give a wide 
and undefined discretion to a building control officer. Consequently, it is seemingly 
possible for a property owner who wants to prevent the erection of a building on a 
neighbouring property, in an effort to protect her existing view, to object against the 
discretion exercised by the building control officer in terms of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa). 
Conflicting judgments about the proper interpretation of the grounds for refusing 
a building plan in terms of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa) complicate the matter. In Walele v 
The City of Cape Town and Others142 (“Walele”), the Constitutional Court interpreted 
section 7 to mean that a decision-maker may only approve building plans when it is 
satisfied that the relevant legal requirements have been adhered to, and that none of 
the disqualifying factors in section 7(1)(b)(ii) will ensue once the proposed building 
has been erected.143 The court further stated that approval of any plans that facilitate 
the erection of a building that will cause one of the unwanted outcomes may be set 
aside on review. Accordingly, in order to have the approval of building plans set 
aside, an applicant would, for example, only have to prove that the erection of the 
proposed building might possibly diminish the value of her property. Therefore, this 
approach protects the interests of neighbouring property owners very strongly in that 
they only have to raise the possibility that the negative effects enumerated in the Act 
may result from the building being completed.144  
                                                          
141
 See 3 3. 
142
 Walele v The City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC). 
143
 Walele v The City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 54-55. 
144
 The Constitutional Court‟s interpretation of s 7 of the National Building Act in Walele v The City of 
Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) is also discussed in 3 2 1. 
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The Constitutional Court‟s interpretation of section 7 in Walele145 created the 
impression that a landowner has the right to have the approval of building plans 
reviewed if she merely raises a reasonable prospect that the erection of the 
proposed building will affect the market value of her property detrimentally.146 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation in True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v 
Madhi and Another147 (“True Motives 84”). Deciding that the Constitutional Court‟s 
interpretation of section 7 was obiter,148 the court in True Motives 84 determined that 
a local authority may only reject building plans on the basis of section 7 if it is 
satisfied that, once the proposed building is erected, it will definitely or probably have 
one of the undesirable effects. The implication of this approach is that a 
neighbouring owner will not be able to attack a local authority‟s approval of building 
plans by merely proving that there exists a possibility that one of the undesirable 
effects would eventuate. The Constitutional Court in Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and 
Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and Another149 (“Camps Bay 
Ratepayers”) acknowledged that the interpretation of section 7(1) of the National 
Building Act is an important constitutional matter, since it concerns the exercise of a 
vital public power, namely the approval of building plans.150 Although it was faced 
with the conflicting decisions in Walele and True Motives, the court refused to clarify 
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 According to the majority judgment of the Constitutional Court in Walele, the correct interpretation 
of s 7(1)(b) of the National Building Act prohibits a local authority from approving building plans if 
there is a possibility that the proposed building would, for example, affect the market value of 
neighbouring properties. Therefore, even if a local authority is merely concerned that the building 
might have one of the negative outcomes that is provided for in s 7(1)(b)(ii), the plans have to be 
rejected. 
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 AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 352-353. 
147
 True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another (Ethekwini Municipality as amicus curiae) 2009 (4) 
SA 153 (SCA) paras 21-23, 33 and 35-39. 
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 The Supreme Court of Appeal in True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another (Ethekwini 
Municipality as Amicus Curiae) 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) paras 35-39 specifically mentioned that paras 
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 Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and Another 2011 (4) 
SA 42 (CC). 
150
 Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and Another 2011 (4) 
SA 42 (CC) para 27. 
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what the interpretation of section 7(1)(b) should be, since it had to decide upon 
objections based on a different provision.151 
These cases illustrate that there is uncertainty about the correct interpretation 
and application of section 7(1). They also show that section 7(1)(b)(ii) creates the 
opportunity for a property owner to prevent or delay building works on a 
neighbouring property. In terms of the decision in Walele, an owner who does not 
have a substantial ground to prevent her neighbour from erecting a building on her 
property may permanently or temporarily prevent the construction with an attack on 
the discretion exercised in terms of section 7(1)(b)(ii).152 This decision has the effect 
that property owner A can successfully object to the approval of neighbour B‟s 
building plans if she can prove that the erection of the proposed building will possibly 
diminish the value of her property. Such an objection would halt B‟s building project 
and consequently hinder her right to build on her property. This interpretation of 
section 7(1)(b)(ii) creates room for a property owner (A), who does not have any right 
to prevent the erection of a building on a neighbour‟s (B‟s) property, to nevertheless 
delay and consequently frustrate B‟s right to build. Van der Walt reasons that  
“Protecting the rights of neighbours against unlawful building is an important part 
of the state‟s police power in the sphere of regulatory control over development 
and building. At the same time it is important not to allow lawful building work to 
                                                          
151
 The applicants in Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and 
Another 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC) based their attack on s 7(1)(a) of the National Building Act. See AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 295 fn 346. 
152
 The Walele court‟s interpretation of s 7 of the National Building Act may have the effect that a 
property owner may temporarily or permanently prevent the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans 
that proposes building works that would obstruct the existing view from her own property. 
Nevertheless, it is argued in 3 3 3 2 that, as was indicated in subsequent decisions, s 7 of this Act 
does not provide a remedy for a property owner who attempts to prevent the erection of buildings on a 
neighbouring property with an attack on the relevant local authority‟s decision to approve building 
plans. Accordingly, this provision in the National Building Act does not create a substantive right to 
prevent building works purely on the basis of the fact that such buildings would interfere with the 
existing, unobstructed view from a neighbouring property. 
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be held up, perhaps indefinitely, by spurious and litigious objections of 
neighbours.”153 
It has to be established whether the (temporary or indefinite) restriction of B‟s right to 
use (to build on) her property that is caused by A‟s objection to B‟s building plans 
amounts to a deprivation of B‟s property rights. If it does, is it a justified deprivation in 
terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution?  
The FNB test requires that a deprivation enquiry must start with the questions 
of whether a property right has been affected, and whether this interference amounts 
to a deprivation. B‟s right to use (build on) her property will be affected if a court 
upholds A‟s objection against the approval of the relevant building plans.154 The 
effect of the court upholding A‟s conduct (objection to the approval of her building 
plans) certainly interferes with B‟s property interests to such a degree that, in terms 
of the wide approach introduced in FNB, it amounts to a deprivation (of her right to 
build on her property).155  
To determine whether such a deprivation is in line with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, it must be established whether it is procedurally or substantively 
arbitrary. The first question is whether a specific deprivation is procedurally arbitrary 
in terms of section 25(1). A statutory provision that authorises a deprivation will only 
be considered procedurally arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution if it 
directly deprives an owner of a property right, without involving any administrative 
                                                          
153
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 294. 
154
 The right to build on one‟s property is considered “property” for purposes of s 25(1) of the 
Constitution. See 5 2 2 1. 
155
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57 per 
Ackermann J, suggested that a wide approach should be followed when deciding whether a specific 
interference with a property interest amounts to a deprivation. According to his reasoning, almost any 
interference with property interests will constitute a deprivation for purposes of s 25(1) of the 
Constitution. See 5 2 2 2. 
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action.156 If such an authorising provision does involve administrative action, the 
deprivation cannot be rendered procedurally arbitrary in terms of section 25(1), but it 
may be considered procedurally arbitrary in terms of PAJA.157 In the case where a 
property owner suffers a deprivation of her right to build because a neighbour 
attacked the approval of her building plans, administrative action is involved in the 
form of the exercise of the administrative discretion to either approve or reject the 
plans. Consequently, the deprivation of a property owner‟s right to build because of a 
neighbour‟s objections to the approval of her building plans would not be 
procedurally arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution, although it may in 
a given case be procedurally arbitrary in terms of PAJA.  
The second question is whether a specific deprivation is substantively arbitrary. 
In terms of FNB, a deprivation of a property owner‟s right to build will be 
substantively arbitrary if the authorising provision does not provide sufficient reason 
for it.158 The FNB decision also indicates that a complex set of relationships has to 
be evaluated in every individual case to establish whether there is sufficient reason 
for a deprivation not to be considered substantively arbitrary. This evaluation 
involves that the purpose of every deprivation has to be considered. If the purpose of 
the deprivation of an owner‟s right to build is very important, something approaching 
a mere rationality test can be applied to determine whether there is sufficient reason 
for a deprivation not to be considered arbitrary.159 Such a rationality test will only 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 269. See 5 2 2 3 3. 
157
 C Hoexter Administrative law in South Arica (2
nd
 ed 2012) 390-406 discusses the requirement, set 
out in s 3(1) of PAJA, that administrative action must be procedurally fair. 
158
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. See 
5 2 2 3 3. 
159
 In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100(g), 
Ackermann J distinguished between situations where “a mere rational relationship” between the 
impact of a deprivation and its purpose will satisfy the requirement for “sufficient” reasons and 
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require a rational link between the purpose of the deprivation and the means chosen 
to promote it. The effect that the deprivation has on the owner is not taken into 
account and a balance between the purpose and impact is not sought. However, if a 
deprivation does not serve an all-important aim, for example if a property owner‟s 
right to build on her property is restricted to create a visually pleasing 
neighbourhood, something approaching a stricter proportionality test will be applied 
to determine whether there are sufficient reasons for the deprivation not to be 
considered substantively arbitrary. A proportionality test requires a proportionate 
balance between the impact of a deprivation and its purpose. Accordingly, an 
extensive deprivation must serve an important purpose, whereas a less severe 
deprivation does not have to serve an equally essential aim.160 
The deprivation suffered by a property owner whose building works are stalled 
because a neighbouring owner attacked the approval of her building plans on the 
basis of section 7 serves the purpose of re-evaluating the relevant local authority‟s 
decision to approve such plans. Effectively, such an attack is primarily aimed at 
promoting the attacker‟s personal interest in having the exercise of a local authority‟s 
discretion set aside in order to ensure that the effect that the approval of the relevant 
building plans may have on the enjoyment and value of her (the attacker‟s) property 
is taken into account.161 Such a deprivation therefore does not serve an essential 
purpose, for example the protection of public health and safety, but is aimed at 
preserving the alleged aesthetic enjoyment or market value of one or a few 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
circumstances where there must be a proportionate link between the effect of a deprivation and the 
aim that it serves. See AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 238-245. 
160
 The difference between a rationality test and a proportionality test for determining whether there is 
sufficient reason for a deprivation not to be rendered arbitrary is discussed in 5 2 2 3 3. 
161
 Such attacks are based on the reasoning that in exercising its discretion to approve building plans, 
a local authority should, in terms of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(aaa), (bbb) and (ccc) of the National Building Act, 
consider the effect that the approval of the plans will have on the aesthetic enjoyment and value of 
neighbouring properties. 
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neighbouring properties. Because of the relatively unimportant aim that the 
deprivation serves, something closer to a proportionality test has to be applied in 
these cases to determine whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation to be 
justified in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the impact of the 
deprivation has to be considered to establish whether there is a proportionate 
balance between the aim of the deprivation and the effect that it has on an affected 
property owner. 
If the effect of the attack on the approval of building plans is that a property 
owner‟s (A‟s) right to build is merely temporarily frustrated (because she is prevented 
from commencing with building works), A does not necessarily suffer a severe 
deprivation of her property rights. Therefore, there may well be a proportionate 
balance between the rather unimportant aim of the deprivation (the personal interest 
in preserving the aesthetic enjoyment and value of a property) and the relatively 
slight impact that the deprivation has on A‟s property rights (her right to build is 
frustrated temporarily).  
Perhaps more important in this regard is the fact, established in several recent 
decisions,162 that the interpretation of section 7 on which this whole argument is 
based may be faulty because the market value of property is not affected by the loss 
of an unprotected, existing view from that property. If the logic of these decisions is 
followed, the argument considered above might possibly collapse altogether and a 
section 25(1) analysis would be unnecessary. 
Property owners have also attacked the approval of neighbours‟ building plans 
on the ground that there was a procedural irregularity in the approval of such plans. 
If evaluated in terms of the FNB methodology, the deprivations caused by these 
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 See 3 3 3. 
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attacks will have the same results as those focused on a decision maker‟s discretion 
with regard to the questions of whether an identifiable property interest is involved, 
whether there has been a deprivation and whether the deprivation is procedurally 
arbitrary. However, the primary aim of an attack based on a procedural irregularity is 
to ensure proper administrative procedure, which will benefit the public at large. An 
attack on the approval of building plans on the ground of a procedural irregularity 
therefore serves a more important aim than an attack based on the exercise of a 
local authority‟s discretion. However, although a deprivation (restriction of the right to 
build) that is aimed at ensuring proper administrative procedure may benefit the 
public at large it does not override the primary aim of protecting public health and 
safety (which building regulations and legislation promote). Therefore, the 
deprivation of a property owner‟s right to build due to an attack on the approval of 
her building plans based on a procedural irregularity will probably be scrutinised in 
terms of something closer to a proportionality test, taking full account of the effect 
that the deprivation has on the affected owner. The proportionality test applied in 
such an instance will at least be less strict than that which will be applied when an 
attack on the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans based on the exercise of a 
discretion deprives such a neighbour of her right to build. Accordingly, the 
deprivation of a property owner‟s right to build (the fact that her building works is 
stalled pending the evaluation of such an attack) that is caused by an attack, based 
on a procedural irregularity, on the approval of her building plans will only be 
legitimate in terms of section 25(1) if there is a proportionate balance between the 
impact that it has on the individual owner (the temporary restriction of her right to 
build and the loss caused by it) and the purpose that it serves (ensuring proper 
administrative procedure). Nevertheless, because the purpose of ensuring proper 
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administrative procedure is more important than the purpose of preserving aesthetic 
considerations through an attack on the exercise of a local authority‟s discretion, a 
deprivation caused by an attack based on a procedural irregularity will be more 
easily justified than an attack based on the exercise of a discretion. 
In Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison,163 the first 
respondent, Ms Harrison, bought a property with the idea to demolish the existing 
single storey cottage and erect a three storey house. She submitted building plans, 
which were approved by the Municipality of the City of Cape Town. After she had 
commenced with building works in accordance with the approved building plans, the 
applicants164 objected to the Municipality‟s decision to approve the plans. They were 
successful with proceedings to stop the building works and Ms Harrison submitted 
revised building plans that were again approved by the local authority. The 
applicants turned to the courts to have approval of the revised plans set aside but 
they were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed their application to 
have the approval of the final set of revised plans set aside and the Constitutional 
Court refused to grant them leave to appeal.165 
The Supreme Court of Appeal166 considered a complex set of relationships that 
were relevant to the circumstances under which Ms Harrison constructed the 
building works. It considered the fact that Ms Harrison acted in reliance upon the 
approval of building plans, that she had already built a substantial structure, and the 
fact that the litigation costs she incurred because of the applicants‟ attack “was quite 
                                                          
163
 Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison [2010] 2 All SA 519 (SCA). 
164
 The first applicant, the Camps Bay Ratepayers‟ and Residents‟ Association, is an association that 
safeguards the interests of residents in certain neighbourhoods of Cape Town. The second applicant, 
PS Booksellers (Pty) Ltd, is the owner of a neighbouring property, diagonally behind Ms Harrison‟s 
property. 
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 AJ van der Walt “Constitutional property law” (2010) 4 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2 3 1.  
166
 Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison [2010] 2 All SA 519 (SCA). 
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unrelated to the encroachment over the building line”.167 It decided that there was not 
a proportionate relationship between the impact that the deprivation brought about 
by strict enforcement of the regulations would have on the first respondent (the 
frustration of her right to build and an order to demolish completed building works) 
and the aim of the deprivation (to enforce building regulations and title deed 
conditions). It held that “there is not the slightest prospect that the infraction 
[completed building works that encroached upon the building line] will impact in any 
meaningful way on the aesthetics or the future development of Camps Bay”.168 
Therefore, the deprivation (forcing her to demolish completed building works that 
constitute an “infraction”) was not considered proportionate to the aim (the protection 
of aesthetics through the enforcement of building regulations and title deed 
conditions) that it would serve. In terms of FNB, a deprivation is substantively 
arbitrary if there is not a sufficient reason for it. In Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and 
Residents’ Association v Harrison169 the court applied a proportionality test to 
establish whether there was sufficient reason for the relevant deprivation, because 
the deprivation did not serve an all-important objective. This decision confirms that a 
deprivation aimed at aesthetic preservation does not serve an essential purpose and 
would therefore only be considered to satisfy the section 25(1) non-arbitrariness 
requirement if it satisfies a fairly strict proportionality test, rather than a thin rationality 
test.  
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 Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison [2010] 2 All SA 519 (SCA) para 62. 
168
 Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison [2010] 2 All SA 519 (SCA) para 62. 
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 Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison [2010] 2 All SA 519 (SCA). 
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5 3 Concluding the FNB test 
The FNB methodology requires that, if a deprivation does not comply with the 
requirements of section 25(1), one has to determine whether it may nevertheless be 
a justifiable limitation of a property right in terms of section 36(1). In theory, a 
deprivation that does not comply with section 25(1) may still be considered a valid 
deprivation of property if it complies with section 36(1) of the Constitution.170 
However, it is unlikely that a deprivation that is considered arbitrary for purposes of 
section 25(1) will be a justified limitation of an owner‟s constitutional property rights 
in terms of section 36.171 If the deprivation is arbitrary because it does not comply 
with the section 25(1) requirement that deprivations must be imposed by law of 
general application, it will also fail to satisfy the section 36 provision that “[t]he rights 
in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application”. A 
deprivation that fails the section 25(1) non-arbitrariness test for lack of sufficient 
reason will probably not satisfy the section 36(1) requirement that a limitation of a 
right in the Bill of Rights must be “reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society” either.172 Therefore, a restriction of a property owner‟s right to 
build that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 25(1) will probably 
not be justified in terms of section 36(1). For example, building regulations and other 
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 According to the decision in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) 
SA 768 (CC) para 46(g), if it has been established that if a deprivation does not comply with s 25(1), it 
must be considered whether it is justifiable in terms of s 36(1) of the Constitution. 
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 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 
2003) ch 46 26-28 and AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2012) reason that although 
a deprivation that does not comply with s 25(1) may theoretically be justified under s 36(1), it is 
unlikely that such a deprivation will comply with the requirements for a justified limitation in terms of s 
36(1).  
172
 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 
2003) ch 46 27 argues that the test determining whether a limitation of property rights is justified in 
terms of s 36(1) will address the same questions as (would have been already addressed) in the s 
25(1) arbitrariness test. AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 287 considers the 
possibility of justifying an arbitrary deprivation under s 36 as an effective methodological device to 
ensure “substantive and critical debate that could give meaning to the Constitution (and the property 
clause)”. 
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legislation that restrict a property owner‟s right to build but that serve an essential 
public purpose, such as promoting public health and safety, will be considered a 
valid deprivation of her property in terms of section 25(1) and will in principle also be 
justified in terms of section 36(1). However, if a deprivation of a property owner‟s 
right to build is not justified in terms of the section 25(1) requirements, it will not be 
justified in terms of the section 36(1) requirements either. The implication is that a 
measure that deprives an owner of her right to build and that does not comply with 
section 25(1) is invalid. 
If a deprivation satisfies the section 25(1) non-arbitrariness test or is justifiable 
in terms of section 36(1), it must be established whether the (lawful or justified) 
deprivation also amounts to an expropriation for purposes of section 25(2). The 
methodology introduced in FNB has the effect that all interferences with property will 
first be considered as deprivations. Only if such interference is a valid deprivation in 
terms of section 25(1) will it be determined whether it also amounts to an 
expropriation.173 Deprivation is based on the state‟s police power to regulate the 
exercise of an individual owner‟s property rights, while expropriation occurs when the 
state exercises its authority to expropriate in terms of its statutory power of eminent 
domain.174 A deprivation may occur in terms of servitudes, building regulations, 
restrictive covenants, legislation, conditions of establishment or procedural attacks. 
However, authority for a deprivation does not imply that an expropriation is also 
authorised. Authorisation for expropriation has to be established separately and 
explicitly. Unlike authority for a deprivation that can flow from the common law, for 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 344 reasons that expropriation only 
comes into question when the state was authorised to expropriate. 
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instance where a servitude authorises a deprivation of a property owner‟s right to 
build, expropriation must be authorised by legislation. 
A property owner may suffer a deprivation of her right to build in terms of a non-
arbitrary regulation of this right175 or because of a building restriction that results from 
an agreement between two private parties. Neither of these devices that limit the 
right to build involves the state‟s power of eminent domain or authorises the 
expropriation of a private property owner. Therefore, it is irrelevant to consider 
whether a deprivation of a property owner‟s right to build constitutes an 
expropriation. Simply put, the kinds of restrictions on building that may protect an 
existing right of view do not usually have anything to do with expropriation and 
therefore the final stages of the FNB test are irrelevant for present purposes. 
A deprivation that does not comply with section 25(1) of the Constitution 
because it is substantively arbitrary may, at least in some instances, theoretically still 
be considered a valid regulation of private property rights, even when it does not 
constitute a formal expropriation, in terms of the notion of constructive expropriation. 
This is especially relevant when the deprivation is substantively arbitrary because its 
impact on the affected landowner is excessively restrictive in the absence of 
compensation. Constructive expropriation refers to regulatory deprivation that has 
such a severe impact on a private property owner that it cannot be justified in terms 
of the purpose that it serves and therefore requires compensation.176 It will occur 
when the state exercises its power to regulate the use of private property in such a 
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 The application of the non-arbitrariness test indicated that the restriction of an owner‟s right to build 
that is caused by building regulations, restrictive conditions, legislation or procedural difficulties 
constitute non-arbitrary regulatory deprivation of an owner‟s property rights. 
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way that the impact of the regulation has the effect of an expropriation.177 For 
example, if legislation such as the National Ports Act would prohibit an owner who 
bought property for development purposes from erecting any buildings on her 
property, she may be deprived of all economic use of her property. The impact of 
such a regulation might be so severe that it is considered to have the effect of an 
expropriation.178 In cases of that kind the notion of constructive expropriation might 
be considered as a strategy to avoid the deprivation being declared arbitrary and 
invalid. However, according to the Constitutional Court in Reflect-All179 constructive 
expropriation would probably not “be appropriate in our constitutional order”,180 since 
it would “cripple” regulatory deprivation in its aim of promoting effective 
governance.181 This possibility is therefore not considered for present purposes. As a 
result, a deprivation of property that is substantively arbitrary according to the FNB 
test will probably simply be invalid. 
 
5 4 Conclusion 
A right to the existing, unobstructed view from a property does not naturally flow from 
the right of ownership because, amongst other reasons, a property owner may build 
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 Constructive expropriation is not relevant in instances where the state exercises its authority to 
expropriate because in those cases there is real expropriation and not merely regulation that has the 
effect of expropriation.  
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 However, because the use of her right is regulated by the state‟s exercise of its authority to 
regulate private property (and not in the exercise of its authority to expropriate), it is not an 
expropriation. 
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 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 64-65. 
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 Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 65.  
181
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2012) 287-288 and 383-384 argues that 
constructive expropriation should not form part of South African law because the effect that is has, 
namely to transform a regulatory action into expropriation, is not compatible with the way that 
expropriation is treated as a subset of deprivation. 
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on her property as she pleases.182 By implication, any substantive right or alternative 
strategy that protects the existing view from a property must specifically be proven. If 
such a substantive right does exist, it restricts the erection of buildings on 
neighbouring properties.183 According to the FNB decision, the right to build on one‟s 
property is considered “property”184 and any restriction on this right is a deprivation of 
property for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution.185 Therefore, any form of 
protection of the existing view from a property, whether it be by way of a substantive 
right or an alternative strategy, involves a deprivation of a neighbouring owner‟s right 
to build and has to be justified in terms of the requirements for a valid deprivation of 
property in terms of section 25(1). 
This chapter assessed the constitutional validity of servitudes, restrictive 
covenants, building regulations, restrictive conditions, other legislation, departures 
from building regulations and zoning schemes and attacks on the approval of 
building plans that are either aimed at or that results in the protection of the existing 
view from a property because all these constructs limit a neighbouring owner‟s right 
to build and therefore deprive her of property for purposes of section 25(1). The 
application of the FNB methodology for determining whether a deprivation is justified 
in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution indicates that in instances where a 
property owner‟s right to build is restricted by a servitude or a restrictive covenant 
created by contract, the arbitrariness question arguably does not arise, since the 
deprived property owner (or her predecessor in title) permitted the limitation of her 
right to build.186 Despite the fact that there is a restriction on such an owner‟s right to 
build, there are no circumstances in which such a limitation will be considered an 
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unjustified deprivation, since the owner who “suffers” the deprivation voluntarily 
agreed to have her right restricted. 
In cases where a property owner‟s right to build is either permanently or 
temporarily limited in terms of building regulations or other legislation, or because of 
procedural attacks on the approval of building plans, the validity of the deprivation of 
such an owner‟s right to build is determined with reference to the question of whether 
it satisfies the section 25(1) non-arbitrariness requirement. According to the decision 
in FNB, a deprivation will only satisfy this requirement if it is neither procedurally nor 
substantively arbitrary.187  
The question of procedural arbitrariness is fairly easily answered, since building 
regulations, other legislation or statutory provisions that provide for attacks on the 
approval of building plans will only be considered procedurally arbitrary for purposes 
of section 25(1) if they directly deprive property owners of their rights to build without 
involving any administrative action. Given the nature of regulation of planning, 
development and building on land, this prospect seems unlikely. On the other hand, 
if a deprivation that is suffered in terms of any of these devices does involve 
administrative action, it may still constitute a procedurally arbitrary deprivation in 
terms of section 3(1) of PAJA.188 Building regulations are usually implemented in 
terms of administrative action and therefore can probably not constitute procedurally 
arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 25(1).189 Legislation that limits a property 
owner‟s right to build may cause a procedurally arbitrary deprivation in terms of 
section 25(1), but only if it restricts building works directly and without making 
provision for any administrative action. The example mentioned in this chapter, 
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namely the National Ports Act, which is, inter alia, aimed at protecting the existing 
view to a lighthouse and consequently restricts building works on surrounding 
properties, does not cause a procedurally arbitrary deprivation of the surrounding 
property owners‟ rights to build in terms of section 25(1), since it involves 
administrative action.190 A statutory provision that provides an opportunity for 
property owners to delay and frustrate a neighbour‟s right to build, for example 
section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the National Building Act, always involves administrative action 
in the sense that a local authority or court may refuse to halt the neighbour‟s building 
works while considering the objections against the approval of her building plans. 
Such a statutory provision will only cause a procedurally arbitrary deprivation for 
purposes of section 25(1) if it provides for the suspension or termination of building 
works on a relevant property in terms of a procedure that fails to comply with the 
procedural fairness requirements in PAJA. This possibility is not explored here. 
The question regarding whether or not a deprivation was substantively arbitrary 
has to be answered with reference to the specific circumstances of a given case. 
The FNB decision suggests that a deprivation will satisfy the requirement for 
substantive reasonableness if there is sufficient reason for it.191 It proposes a 
complex set of relationships that has to be considered in order to determine whether 
sufficient reasons exist in a particular case. If a deprivation serves an essential 
purpose, something closer to a mere rationality test is required to indicate whether 
there is sufficient reason for a deprivation. Accordingly, it has to be indicated that 
there is a rational link between the purpose of the deprivation and the means 
employed to promote it (the restriction that causes the deprivation). However, if a 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. See 
5 2 2 3 3. 
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deprivation serves a less compelling aim, something closer to a proportionality test 
has to be applied, in terms of which it must be indicated that there is a proportionate 
balance between the purpose of the deprivation and the impact that it has on an 
individual owner. 
Building regulations and legislation, such as the National Ports Act, that serve 
important and overriding public health and safety purposes will therefore justify 
deprivations more easily, in terms of something closer to a mere rationality test. If it 
can be proven that there is a rational link between the deprivation that they cause 
(restrictions on building works) and the aims that they serve (protecting public health 
and safety), these “devices” that have the effect of protecting the existing view from a 
property may satisfy the section 25(1) requirement of substantive reasonableness 
more or less regardless of the effect on the affected landowner and therefore the 
deprivation of property owners‟ right to build that they bring about will be valid more 
often than not. However, building regulations and legislation that restrict property 
owners‟ rights to build but serve less compelling objectives, such as preservation of 
aesthetic values, will have to satisfy a stricter proportionality-type test. In terms of 
such a test it would have to be indicated that there is a proportionate balance 
between the impact that the deprivation has on an individual property owner 
(restriction on her right to build) and its purpose (the preservation of aesthetic 
values). Only if such a balance is proven will the deprivation of the limitation on the 
property owner‟s right to build be considered a valid deprivation in terms of section 
25(1). 
Many property owners have attempted to prevent building works on 
neighbouring properties, and consequently to protect the existing views from their 
own properties, by attacking the approval of their neighbours‟ building plans. These 
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attacks are either focused on procedural irregularities in the process of approving 
such building plans or on a local authority‟s exercise of its discretion to approve the 
plans. In most cases the attacks have at best resulted in the temporary protection of 
the existing views from properties by a temporary suspension of the building 
process. A property owner whose building works are stalled because the approval of 
her building plans is being revised suffers a deprivation of her right to build. If a 
request for such a revision is purely aimed at an attack on a local authority‟s 
discretion to approve the plans, probably to ensure that the attacker‟s personal 
interests are taken into account, the deprivation (limitation on a property owner‟s 
right to build) does not serve a compelling reason and will consequently have to 
satisfy a stricter proportionality test. However, if the object of such an attack is to 
rectify a procedural irregularity in the original approval process, the deprivation 
serves a slightly more important aim in the sense that it benefits the public (ensuring 
proper administrative procedures) and the test to determine whether the deprivation 
is substantively reasonable should at least be less strict than the one that is applied 
for a deprivation that is purely aimed at attacking a discretion. Therefore, in both the 
instance where the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans is attacked on the basis 
of the discretion exercised by the relevant decision maker and on the ground of a 
procedural irregularity, a proportionality-type test will apply. Accordingly, the impact 
of the deprivation (a temporary restriction on the right to build and possibly costs 
incurred because building works are stalled) will be taken into account to consider 
whether there is a proportionate balance between this impact and the aim that the 
deprivation serves (purely attacking a discretion to promote self-interests or ensuring 
proper administrative procedures for the public benefit). In instances where the 
purpose is purely to promote self-interests in protecting an existing view, the 
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deprivation will only be justified if it does not have a very severe impact on the 
individual owner whose right to build is restricted. However, if the aim involves the 
public interest in proper administrative procedures, the deprivation will be justified 
even if it has a more severe effect on the individual property owner, but case law192 
suggests that even then the procedures and formalities will not be enforced strictly if 
the public benefit is slight while causing a severe negative impact on a landowner 
who has acted in good faith. 
Strategies to protect the existing view from a property are sometimes based on 
various methods to prevent the erection of buildings on a neighbouring property. 
When successful, these methods deprive such a neighbour of her right to build on 
her property. Evaluation of the deprivations caused by these methods indicate that 
the protection of the existing view from a property will indeed be legitimate – even if it 
deprives a neighbour of her right to build – if the device in terms of which building 
works on a neighbouring property is restricted serves an important or overriding 
public purpose. The protection of the existing view from a property will therefore be 
justified in such a case, despite the deprivation caused to a neighbour, insofar as it is 
the result of legislation or building regulations that serve essential and overriding 
public objectives. However, the deprivation (restriction on a property owner‟s right to 
build) caused by building regulations that do not serve an important public health and 
safety aim and attacks on the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans will only be 
justified if there is a proportionate balance between the purpose of the deprivation 
(for example, preservation of aesthetics either through building regulations or a local 
authority‟s discretion; or ensuring proper administrative procedures) and the impact 
                                                          
192
 Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others  2001 (3) BCLR 265 (C). 
See also AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 350; 3 2 2 2; 3 2 3 and specifically Ch 3 
n 65. 
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that it has on the neighbour (the restriction of her right to build). This indicates that, 
although the existing view from a property can be protected through alternative 
strategies to prevent building works on neighbouring properties, such protection – 
and the concomitant restriction on a neighbour‟s right to build – will only be justified 
in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution if it serves an essential, overriding or 
primary public protection aim. If the method that protects one‟s view does not serve 
such an important purpose, it will only be valid if there is a proportionate balance 
between its aim and the impact that it has on the neighbour who is deprived of her 
right to build.  
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Chapter 6:  
Conclusions  
 
6 1 Introduction  
It has been established that a South African property owner does not have an 
inherent right to the existing view from her property.1 Analysis of the English and 
Dutch legal systems indicates that a right to view is not acknowledged in these 
jurisdictions either.2 This chapter shows that most of the justifications for this position 
are rooted in rational and legitimate policy considerations. Policy dictates that the 
recognition of a generally applicable, natural right to a view is undesirable, since it 
will imply that a property owner has an inherent entitlement in the property of 
another, namely to restrict that owner‟s right to build. Furthermore, such a right will 
inhibit development and will be inconsistent with the rule that a development on your 
own land that is prior in time does not give a property owner a stronger right over 
another person‟s adjoining land. Law and Economics theory also provides a 
justification for the rule against recognising the right to a view. In terms of the logic of 
this theory, imposing a general right to a view will constitute an inefficient exchange 
of entitlements.  
Nevertheless, the existing, unobstructed view from a property can be protected 
with a servitude, a restrictive covenant, a restrictive condition or in terms of 
legislation. Furthermore, the existing view from a property is protected insofar as 
building regulations restrict building works on neighbouring properties that will 
                                                          
1
 In terms of the South African common law, which is discussed in Ch 2, the right to a view is not 
considered as an entitlement that naturally flows from the ownership of property. This position is 
confirmed by the discussion of recent case law in Ch 3. 
2
 See Ch 4.  
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obstruct such a view, and an attack on the approval of a neighbour‟s building plans 
may have the effect of stalling her building works and consequently result in the 
temporary protection of the existing view from one‟s property.3 If the existing view 
from a property is protected in one of these ways, it necessarily implies that a 
neighbouring owner suffers a deprivation of her right to develop (build on) her 
property. Constitutional analysis indicates that such a deprivation is justified in terms 
of section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(“Constitution”) if it serves an important purpose and if there is at least a rational link 
between the deprivation and the purpose. However, if the deprivation does not serve 
an essential aim it will only be justified in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution if 
there is a proportionate relationship between the aim promoted by the deprivation 
and the impact that it has on an individual property owner.4  
This chapter examines the principle against acknowledging a right to a view 
with reference to policy considerations, including Law and Economics arguments, 
that traditionally consider the preservation of the existing view to or from a property 
as less important than the entitlement to develop (erect buildings or structures on) a 
property. It also explores the possibility of recognising a right to a view in situations 
where the existing view contributes to the utility of a property. This possibility is 
considered from policy and Law and Economics perspectives to determine why such 
(specific) circumstances may require that one owner‟s entitlement to build should be 
made subject to another‟s right to a view. Moreover, instances where the principle 
against the recognition of a right to a view is amended to acknowledge exceptions 
are examined to establish whether such amendments are justified in terms of section 
                                                          
3
 See 2 3 2 with regard to the protection of the existing view from a property in terms of a servitude 
and Ch 3 regarding the other ways of protecting such a view. 
4
 The constitutional aspects regarding the protection of the existing view from a property are 
considered in Ch 5. 
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25(1) of the Constitution. Apart from general policy considerations, Calabresi and 
Melamed‟s paradigm5 for the protection of property rights is applied to illustrate how 
entitlements are allocated in the common law position regarding the right to a view, 
and how they could be either assigned differently or transferred when a specific 
situation requires that an existing, unobstructed view should be protected.  
 
6 2 Rationales for not recognising a right to a view 
6 2 1 The perception of “view” 
Traditionally, the enjoyment of an unobstructed view to or from a specific property is 
generally perceived as a “matter only of delight, and not of necessity”6 that one 
owner enjoys because of a specific state of affairs on a neighbouring property. The 
advantage of enjoying a beautiful view from one‟s property is considered an 
“incidental” benefit, which courts are reluctant to treat as an inherent property right.7 
The distinction between the loss of a merely incidental advantage that a property 
owner enjoys and real damage that an owner suffers originated in Roman law and 
was received and applied in Roman-Dutch law.8 However, despite the fact that the 
                                                          
5
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 developed a theory to explain the protection of property 
rights that is generally applied in Law and Economics literature. 
6
 The principle that the view (prospect) from one property over another is only a matter of delight and 
that its obstruction therefore does not constitute an actionable nuisance was laid down in Bland v 
Moseley (1587) 9 Co Rep 58a and later confirmed in William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b at 
59a, 77 ER 816 at 821 and in Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24. J Church & J Church 
“Nuisance” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC Harms (eds) The law of South Africa Vol 19 (2
nd
 ed 2006) 
para 193 categorise the pleasant view from a property as a “source of delight” and suggest that 
aesthetics are irrelevant in the context of the law relating to neighbours and nuisance. See also W 
Freedman “Paradise lost? The obstruction of a pleasant view and the law of nuisance” in SV Hoctor & 
PJ Schwikkard (eds) The exemplary scholar: Essays in honour of John Milton (2007) 162-184 at 163-
164. 
7
 In Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) 383 Comrie J warned that, as a matter of 
policy, courts should not venture into the area of aesthetics.  
8
 In D 39 2 26, interference with the flow of water or light to a property was not considered to cause an 
actionable harm for the affected property owner, because the flow of water and light to a property was 
regarded as mere incidental benefits of a property. The Roman legal system did not specifically 
mention the existing view from a property as an incidental benefit of property. See 2 2 1 2 and 2 2 1 3. 
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existing, unobstructed view from a property was not expressly categorised as an 
incidental benefit in Roman or Roman-Dutch law, there are indications that the 
enjoyment of such a view was indeed considered to be an incidental advantage in 
Roman-Dutch law.9 Today, this distinction forms part of South African law and, as 
was confirmed in Dorland and Another v Smits10 (“Dorland”), the view from a 
property is an example of a purely (incidental) aesthetical attribute, which means that 
it is not regarded as an inherent aspect of a landowner‟s entitlements.11 According to 
Crombie J in Dorland and Another v Smits,12 
“The trouble with aesthetics, visual or other, is that they are notoriously subjective 
and personal ... I consider this to be an area into which as a matter of judicial 
policy the courts should not venture. As it was put by the California Court of 
Appeal, third district, in Oliver et al v AT&T Wireless Services et al (1999) 76 Cal 
App 4th 521 (90 Cal Rptr 2d 491):  
'Otherwise, one person's tastes could form the basis for depriving another 
person of the right to use his or her property, and nuisance law would be 




In the US case of Oliver et al v AT&T Wireless Services et al,14 to which Crombie J 
referred, the California Court of Appeal referred to its earlier decision in Haehlen v 
                                                          
9
 The existing, unobstructed view from a property is not mentioned when Voet 39 1 1 refers to 
examples of incidental advantages of properties, such as the flow of light and water to a property, but 
Voet 8 2 12 encourages one to apply the same principles to a servitude of view as those that are 
applicable to a servitude for the free flow of light and air. Furthermore, in the discussion of the servitus 
altius tollendi in Voet 8 2 6, the blocking of openings for light and air (interferences with incidental 
benefits of property) is categorised together with view. See also W Freedman “Paradise lost? The 
obstruction of a pleasant view and the law of nuisance” in SV Hoctor & PJ Schwikkard (eds) The 
exemplary scholar: Essays in honour of John Milton (2007) 162-184 at 165-166. See 2 2 1 3. 
10
 Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C). 
11
 See 2 2 1 1. 
12
 Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) 383. 
13
 Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) 383. 
14
 Oliver et al v AT&T Wireless Services et al (1999) 76 Cal App 4th 521 at 535 (90 Cal Rptr 2d 491 at 
501). 
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Wilson,15 where it rejected a claim that the unsightly appearance of a wooden fence 
constituted a nuisance for the plaintiff. The court‟s reasoning illustrates that the view 
from a property (whether it be across or onto a neighbouring property) is categorised 
as part of the aesthetic attributes of a property, and that things that contribute to a 
property‟s aesthetic attributes are considered luxurious attributes that are 
unnecessary for the use of a property.16  
The California Court of Appeal also ruled, in Oliver et al v AT&T Wireless 
Services et al,17 that the obstruction of a pleasant view does not affect the use and 
enjoyment of a property to such a degree that it constitutes an actionable nuisance:  
“In short, the displeasing appearance of an otherwise lawful structure on one side 
of a boundary cannot be deemed to substantially interfere with the enjoyment of 
that which is on the other side of the boundary without significantly diminishing 
the rights associated with both sides of the boundary.”18 
This reasoning emphasises two reasons why courts consider it undesirable to 
acknowledge the right to a view as an inherent right to property ownership. Firstly, a 
pleasant view onto or across a neighbouring property does not serve an important 
purpose, but merely contributes to the enjoyment of one‟s property.19 Secondly, the 
                                                          
15
 Haehlen v Wilson (1936) 11 Cal App 2d 437 at 441. 
16
 In Haehlen v Wilson (1936) 11 Cal App 2d 437 at 441, the California Court of Appeal, quoting 
Varney & Green v Williams (1909) 155 Cal 318 at 320 reasoned that  
“[i]n the absence of some legislative action the courts cannot set up [a]esthetic standards 
to which builders must conform ... „No case has been cited, nor are we aware of any 
case, which holds that a man may be deprived of his property because his tastes are not 
those of his neighbo[u]rs. [A]esthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence 
rather than a necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of police 
power to take private property without compensation.‟” 
17
 Oliver et al v AT&T Wireless Services et al (1999) 76 Cal App 4th 521 at 535 (90 Cal Rptr 2d 491 at 
501). 
18
 Oliver et al v AT&T Wireless Services et al (1999) 76 Cal App 4th 521 at 535 (90 Cal Rptr 2d 491 at 
501). 
19
 In William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b at 58a and 59a, 77 ER 816 at 817 and 821 the court 
reasoned that there are four things that are desired in a house, namely habitatio hominis (the 
residence of men), delectatio inhabitantis (the delight of inhabiting a property), necessitas luminis 
(necessary light), and salubritas aëris (salubrity of air). It emphasised that interference with a person‟s 
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acknowledgment of a right to have an unobstructed view from one‟s property would 
inevitably limit development on neighbouring property and therefore extend an 
owner‟s entitlements beyond the borders of her own property. Consequently, a right 
to a view would entitle a property owner to command her neighbour to perform 
certain actions on her property, or enjoin her from performing such actions. 
 
6 2 2 The right to develop one’s property 
A property owner has an inherent right to develop (build on) her property.20 In 
chapter 5 it is argued that any form of protection of or the recognition of a right to the 
existing view from a property results in the deprivation of a neighbouring owner‟s 
right to build for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution.21 The recognition of a 
right to the existing, unobstructed view from a property would imply that a property 
owner (A) is given rights over someone else‟s (B‟s) land in the sense that A‟s right to 
the view from her property would inevitably restrict B in the use of her land. This 
situation would be in conflict with the principle that rights over the land of another 
may only be acquired by way of legislation or by way of a real right based on an 
agreement, like a servitude.22 Rights over the land of another cannot be acquired by 
first use of one‟s own land. Should a right to the existing, unobstructed view from a 
property be acknowledged, A would have a right over B‟s land, purely based on the 
fact that she developed her own property first. The recognition of the right to a view 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“habitation” is an actionable nuisance, since that is “the principle end of a house” and that the 
hindrance of the supply of light and air to a property is also actionable in nuisance, because of the 
historic significance of the action against the interference with the light and air supply to a 
neighbouring property. Recent case law, such as Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) 
and Oliver et al v AT&T Wireless Services et al (1999) 76 Cal App 4th 521 (90 Cal Rptr 2d 491), 
illustrates that view is still considered to form part of the aesthetics of a property, which is considered 
a luxurious attribute and not a necessity for the use of property.  
20
 See 2 2 2. 
21
 See 5 2 2 2. 
22
 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 175-185 and CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal The law 
of things and servitudes (1993) 98-101. See also 2 2 2. 
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would consequently prevent the later development of neighbouring properties and be 
in conflict with the basic principles of property law. 
From as early as 1752, English courts have reasoned that it is undesirable to 
acknowledge a right to the existing view from a property, since it would inhibit urban 
development.23 Epstein argues that if all views were to be protected equally, it would 
be impossible to use (develop) the land over which such views are to be enjoyed:24 
“That right [against the blocking of light] is not recognized, for, as in the view 
case, its uniform protection would either prevent the development of all land or 
hopelessly cloud the conditions under which it might take place.”25 
An unobstructed view normally requires a relatively large area of vacant land.26 
Therefore, if a general right to a view is recognised, it would inevitably restrict the 
erection of buildings on a large and undefined area. Furthermore, a right to an 
unobstructed view to or from a property inevitably depends on the time when such 
property is developed and the place where it is situated. Consequently, the 
                                                          
23
 The principle that prospect is a matter of delight and not a necessity was established in William 
Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b, 77 ER 816 and has been confirmed in Bland v Moseley (1587) 9 
Co Rep 58a. However, it was only in Attorney-General v Doughty (1752) 2 Ves Sen 453 that a court 
provided a policy reason for not giving property owners an actionable right to a view. In this judgment, 
Lord Hardwicke LC ruled that the obstruction of the prospect from another owner‟s property is not a 
nuisance, since the recognition of a right to have an undisturbed view from one‟s property would 
inhibit urban development. This principle was again applied by Lord Hardwicke LC in Fishmongers’ 
Co v East India Co (1752) 1 Dick 163, where he ruled that the possibility of obstructing the view from 
a neighbouring property does not prevent a landowner from erecting buildings on her own property. In 
Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 24 the principle was confirmed by Lord Blackburn. Lord 
Blackburn held that the rule against the protection of view is justified because view is purely a matter 
of delight and since a right to a view would impose burdens on a “large and indefinite area”. In Hunter 
v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) AC 655 at 666E–F, Pill LJ applied the old principles that relate to the right 
to a view in a modern context to illustrate that these rules have sound policy grounds that are still 
applicable today. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the obstruction of the view from a property is still 
not actionable. In the South African case Myburgh v Jamison (1861-1863) 4 Searle 8, it was 
submitted for the defendant that a servitude of prospect is odious because it hinders development and 
is therefore in conflict with public policy.  
24
 RA Epstein “Nuisance law: Corrective justice and its utilitarian constraints” (1979) 8 The Journal of 
Legal Studies 49-102 at 60-61. 
25
 RA Epstein “Nuisance law: Corrective justice and its utilitarian constraints” (1979) 8 The Journal of 
Legal Studies 49-102 at 62. 
26
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recognition of a general right to a view would inhibit development, since it would 
imply that developers later in time would be forced to take the views from prior 
developed properties into account. This situation would be inconsistent with the rule 
that an earlier development does not give a property owner a stronger right purely by 
virtue of her building works preceding the development of neighbouring properties. 
This rule entails that different owners‟ property rights should comprise the same 
entitlements regardless of when the owners acquired or developed them.27  
The German principle of the social context or situation of land 
(Situationsgebundenheit)28 correlates with the principle that a property owner does 
not have stronger property rights than her neighbours merely because she 
developed (built on) her property before they developed their properties. Van der 
Walt defines Situationsgebundenheit as the way in which the context and situation of 
property interests determine its nature, content and limits.29 He concludes that, 
according to German case law,30 some of the effects of this principle regarding the 
social context or situation of land are the following:  
“Beneficial characteristics of the situation, such as the presence or absence of 
developments or development plans, can generally not be relied upon as of right 
... Such beneficial characteristics clearly do not form part of the property if the 
                                                          
27
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 289-290 argues, in his discussion of 
Nyangane v Stadsraad van Potchefstroom 1998 (2) BCLR 148 (T) at 160E-G, that general rules 
regulating planning law allow for restrictions that only apply to certain erven within a development, as 
long as they promote the conservation of the character of the area by reciprocally obliging owners to 
adhere thereto. This case concerned limitations on property rights within the context of a specific 
neighbourhood or development. Rules regarding the size and character of homes were found to serve 
a legitimate town planning purpose, because although these restrictions only applied to certain erven 
within a development, it promoted the conservation of the character of the area. 
28
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 154. 
29
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 154-155. 
30
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 154-155 specifically 
mentions the decisions in BVerwGE 38, 209 [1971] and BGHZ 23, 235 [1957]. 
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reasonable user would have refrained from exercising them or from relying upon 
their permanence.”31  
In terms of this principle, the view from a building that was erected before the area 
was fully developed cannot be regarded as a right if the reasonable prospective 
property owner would have realised that subsequent development of the area might 
lead to the loss thereof.32  
The application of this rationale for not recognising a right to the existing view 
from a property is evident in chapter 3, where cases concerning attacks on the 
approval of neighbours‟ building plans are discussed to illustrate how these attacks 
are used as an alternative strategy to prevent building works that may obstruct the 
existing views from properties. In some cases, these attacks focus on purely 
procedural irregularities in the approval of such plans, while the exercise of a local 
authority‟s discretion to approve the relevant building plans are attacked in other 
                                                          
31
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 155. A similar 
principle applies in Swiss law. AJ van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: A comparative 
analysis (1999) 374-375 explains that practice and theory show that factual interests (faktische 
Interessen) is not protected by the Swiss property guarantee that was inserted in article 22ter of the 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 1874 in 1969. (A new version of this Constitution was 
adopted in 1999. See AJ van der Walt “The property clause in the New Federal Constitution of the 
Swiss Confederation 1999” (2004) 15 Stell LR 326-332 for a discussion of the development of the 
Swiss property clause and the protection of property rights under the Swiss Constitution.) This was 
illustrated in the Blaser Case, BGE 105 Ia 219 (1979), where the court ruled that a proposed 
development that would interfere with the property owners‟ (complainants‟) “rights of” access to the 
water of a nearby lake was not unlawful, since the complainants were not entitled to have direct 
access to the lake. The Swiss principle that the factual interests of a specific property are not 
protected as guaranteed rights correlates with the German principle that the benefits of a property that 
flows from its social context or situation of land (Situationgebundenheit) do not form part of the 
entitlements of that property. The beneficial characteristics that a property derives from its locality and 
surrounding circumstances, such as the applicable zoning scheme, are subject to change. Property 
owners (and prospective owners) should realise that these advantages are not part of the property‟s 
entitlements and that they cannot rely on the continuation of these favourable characteristics.  
32
 M Kidd “„The view I behold on a sunshiny day‟: Paola v Jeeva NO” (2005) 122 SALJ 556-562 at 
561-562 refers to the argument, based on this rule, that was raised by the third respondent 
(municipality) in the Paola case in order to take the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s judgment on appeal to 
the Constitutional Court. The municipality argued that the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s finding would 
infringe upon a person‟s right to property because the effect of recognizing the right to a view would 
be that neighbouring property owners would have to yield to the right of the person who developed 
first. The right to a view would therefore lead to the unequal and arbitrary treatment of property 
owners. 
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instances.33 In Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another34 (“Muller”) 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s ruling in Paola v Jeeva NO and Others35 
(“Paola”), purely procedural irregularities rendered the approval of building plans 
unlawful. However, the irregular approval of building plans does not entitle 
neighbouring property owners to object against such approval in a way that would 
result in an absolute prohibition against the proposed building works. It may merely 
have the effect of stalling irregularly approved building works and therefore 
temporarily prevent the erection of buildings that would obstruct the existing views 
from neighbouring properties.36  
Attacks on the discretion exercised when a local authority approved building 
plans are based on the reasoning that section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the National 
Building Regulation and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (“National Building Act”) 
compels a local authority to refuse to approve an application for building plans if it is 
satisfied that the erection of the proposed building “will probably or in fact derogate 
from the value of adjoining or neighbouring properties”. These attacks focus on the 
discretionary power that this provision gives a local authority and are aimed at 
preventing the approval of building plans that would allow the erection of buildings 
that are otherwise completely lawful but will interfere with the existing views from 
neighbouring properties. However, these attacks have been unsuccessful in most 
                                                          
33
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
33
 In Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) and Paola v 
Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA), discussed in 3 3 2 1, property owners attacked 
the approval of their neighbours‟ building plans on the ground of alleged procedural irregularities 
in the approval of such plans. Attempts to have the approva l of neighbours‟ building plans set 
aside on the basis of the exercise of a local authority‟s discretion to approve such plans were 
rejected in Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D); Clark v Faraday and Another 
2004 (4) SA 564 (C) and De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] 
ZAWCHC 56 (28 November 2006), discussed in 3 3 3 1. 
34
 Muller NO and Others v City of Cape Town and Another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
35
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). 
36
 See 3 3 2 2. 
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cases, indicating that courts are not willing to acknowledge the loss of an existing 
view from a property as a factor that may cause such a property to depreciate.37  
According to the courts‟ reactions on attacks based on the discretion exercised 
in the approval of building plans, section 7 of the National Building Act does not 
create a substantive right to prevent the erection of buildings purely on the basis of 
the fact that such buildings would interfere with the existing, unobstructed view from 
a neighbouring property. This provision therefore does not create an exception to the 
principle that the existing view from a property is merely an incidental benefit and 
that otherwise lawful interference with it is not actionable. The fact that neither 
attacks of building plans based on purely procedural irregularities nor attacks 
focused on the discretion exercised when such plans were approved would result in 
an absolute prohibition on the right to build (and the consequent protection of the 
view from a neighbouring property), confirms the principle that a property owner 
does not have an inherent right to the existing view from her property. Moreover, 
courts‟ reluctance to set the approval of building plans aside on the basis that the 
approval of such plans would lead to the obstruction of the view from neighbouring 
properties and cause them to depreciate, can be explained in terms of the rationale 
for not recognising an inherent right to the existing view from a property. Building 
plans should not be set aside merely because it may result in the obstruction of the 
existing view from a property, since view is an incidental advantage of property and 
its protection (which may be the result of the rejection of building plans) would inhibit 
development. 
 
                                                          
37
 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D); Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 
(C) and De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 
November 2006), discussed in 3 3 3 1. 
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6 2 3 An economic justification  
The economic approach to property law focuses on the role of the law in promoting 
an efficient allocation of resources.38 This allocation takes place within a legal 
framework where legal rules define and protect property rights. According to Law 
and Economics thinking, efficient allocation of resources will only be achieved 
through the creation and protection of property rights that encourage exchange and 
investment.39  
Calabresi and Melamed40 argue that a legal system is primarily concerned with 
balancing out different entitlements. In terms of this balancing act one has to 
determine which of the parties will succeed in enforcing their entitlements. State 
intervention plays a determining role in selecting the prevailing entitlement. Because 
of this intervention it is not simply a task of deciding which entitlement enjoys the 
strongest protection.41 To address this difficulty, Calabresi and Melamed developed 
an economic theory of rules that regulate voluntary transfers and provide remedies 
for infringements (involuntary transfers).42 In terms of these rules, the question of 
which of the parties‟ entitlement will prevail requires an analysis of the effects that 
                                                          
38
 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 at 246 defines the role of property rules with reference to the assignment of property rights, the 
transfer and violation of these rights, and the optimal scale of ownership. 
39
 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 at 246. 
40
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 at 1090. R Cooter & T Ulen Law and Economics (4
th
 ed 
2004) 76-77 argue that economic analysis can be used to explain some fundamental questions in 
property law. 
41
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 at 1090-1092.  
42
 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 at 249. 
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will be brought about by any given exchange (transfer) of existing property 
entitlements.43  
The framework developed by Calabresi and Melamed suggests two alternatives 
for protecting property rights.44 They distinguish entitlements protected by property 
rules from entitlements protected by liability rules.45 Entitlements protected by 
property rules are the least affected by state intervention. These entitlements may 
only be transferred in terms of a “voluntary transaction” where the right-holder 
determines the terms of the transfer and the value of the relevant entitlement.46 
Conversely, the transfer of entitlements that are protected by liability rules is only 
subject to the requirement that the party who acquires or destroys them must be 
willing to pay the monetary compensation as determined by an organ of state. The 
right-holder‟s consent is not required for the transfer of such an entitlement, nor does 
                                                          
43
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 at 1092. 
44
 L Fennell The unbounded home: Property values beyond property lines (2009) 17-18 argues that, 
according to Calabresi & Melamed‟s theory, once a court has decided which party holds the relevant 
entitlement and how the law protects that entitlement, it has to determine how the entitlement will be 
protected. G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 at 1092-1093 provide a third alternative as well, namely 
inalienable entitlements. These entitlements are the most affected by state intervention. The state 
may determine the first holder of the relevant entitlement, the compensation to be paid if the 
entitlement is taken away or destroyed, and it may prohibit its sale. 
45
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 at 1092. L Fennell The unbounded home: Property values 
beyond property lines (2009) 17 explains that Calabresi & Melamed‟s economic theory provides a 
“systematic look at the alternatives available to a court adjudicating a conflict between two 
neighbouring parties”.  
46
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 at 1092 reason that the transaction that takes place when 
entitlements protected by property rules are transferred is voluntary in the sense that the state allows 
right-holders to decide upon the value of the relevant entitlements themselves. TJ Miceli “Property” in 
JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 at 249 refers to the 
distinction that Calabresi and Melamed make between property rules and liability rules for protecting 
legal entitlements. He argues that a property rule allows a right-holder to prohibit other parties from 
acquiring the property right without her consent, while a liability rule would only allow her to claim 
monetary compensation (as determined by a court) for the transfer of her entitlement. L Fennell The 
unbounded home: Property values beyond property lines (2009) 18 explains that in terms of Calabresi 
and Melamed‟s “protection regimes”, a right-holder who is protected by a property rule will be entitled 
to injunctive relief and punitive damages if her right is seized. Conversely, a right-holder who is 
protected by a liability rule will only be entitled to compensatory damages.  
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the right-holder have a say in the determination of the value.47 Therefore, the 
exchange of an entitlement protected by a property rule requires the right-holder‟s 
consent, while the transfer of an entitlement protected by a liability rule does not 
require such consent.48 Although a right-holder‟s consent guarantees mutually 
beneficial transfers,49 the process of obtaining such consent may be so costly that it 
prevents an efficient transfer. According to Miceli,50 this trade-off suggests that if 
transaction costs are low, property rules are preferred because they ensure mutually 
beneficial bargaining between private parties. However, if transaction costs are high, 
property rules are not able to facilitate efficient bargaining and liability rules, which 
allow court intervention to coerce transfers, are preferable.51 
Calabresi and Melamed52 apply the distinction between property and liability 
rules to demonstrate how their theory can help resolve legal disputes in the context 
of nuisance. Their illustration concerns a situation where emissions from one owner‟s 
(A‟s) property cause nuisance to another owner (B). Property rules and liability rules 
are respectively considered to determine which should be applied to achieve the 
most efficient outcome. In terms of rule one, B is entitled to be free of pollution and A 
may only pollute with B‟s permission. Rule two assumes that A may pollute, but is 
responsible to pay B for any damages that she may suffer as a result of the pollution. 
                                                          
47
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 at 1092 and TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The 
Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 at 249. 
48
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 at 1092; TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar 
companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 at 249. 
49
 Consent will guarantee a mutually beneficial transfer, since the party requesting the transfer will 
obviously derive some benefit from it while the initial right-holder will not give her consent if the 
exchange will not benefit her. 
50
 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 at 249. 
51
 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 at 249.  
52
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 at 1092; TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar 
companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 at 1115-1116. 
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According to the third rule, A is entitled to pollute. She may only be stopped if B buys 
her out. The fourth rule holds that A may pollute and may only be stopped by B if B 
compensates her for not polluting. Although both rule one and rule two consider B to 
be the holder of the entitlement to be free of pollution, they are protected differently. 
Rule one protects B‟s entitlement to be free of pollution with a (strong) property rule, 
while rule two protects it with a (weaker) liability rule. In terms of rules three and four, 
A has the entitlement to pollute. Rule three protects this entitlement with a property 
rule, since B may prevent the pollution only if she buys A out on terms that A finds 
acceptable. A liability rule protects A‟s entitlement in terms of rule four, because A‟s 
right to pollute may only be taken away from her if B compensates her for the loss 
that she may suffer from not being able to perform the act that causes the pollution. 
The property rule and liability rule paradigm may be applied to explain the 
position of the right to a view in South African law from a Law and Economics 
perspective. A dispute concerning the protection of the existing, unobstructed view to 
or from a property involves the balancing out of two opposing entitlements, namely 
the right to develop one‟s property and the right to have an undisturbed view to or 
from one‟s property. South African law does not recognise an inherent right to a 
view. Therefore, this “entitlement” does not enjoy any protection as a property right in 
terms of Calabresi and Melamed‟s theory; the initial entitlement is therefore assigned 
to the owner who wants to build on her land. South African case law indicates that 
courts use a property rule to protect an owner‟s right to develop her property when 
neighbours attack the proposed construction of buildings in attempts to protect the 
unobstructed views to or from their own properties.53 Protecting the right to develop 
                                                          
53
 In Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D) the applicant urged the court to set the 
approval of his neighbours‟ building plans aside, arguing that the proposed building would obstruct the 
existing view from his property. The court dismissed the application on the basis that upholding a right 
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with a property rule entails that a property owner (A) may build on her property as 
she pleases (within the limits laid down by zoning schemes, building regulations and 
other legislation) and that a neighbouring owner (B) would only be able to prevent A 
from building (and prevent the obstruction of her existing view) if she (B) negotiates 
with A and obtains A‟s consent, at a price that she is willing to accept. The “transfer” 
of A‟s entitlement will therefore only take place if A consents and on the terms that 
she deems acceptable. Such a transfer, which resulted from negotiation and 
agreement between A and B, may be cast in the form of a servitude or a restrictive 
covenant “bought” by neighbour B who wants to protect her existing view. 
Alexander and Peñalver54 argue that in terms of utilitarian property theory, 
“entitlements”55 should be assigned to the person who values them most and should 
only be transferred with the consent of this (initial) rights-holder.56 These rules for 
allocating and exchanging entitlements are aimed at achieving the most efficient 
outcome. Therefore, property rights are kept in the hands of those who value them 
most. In terms of the South African common law rule against recognising a right to 
the existing view from a property, the entitlement (property right) is initially assigned 
to the owner who has a right to build on her property. This allocation is efficient in 
terms of the efficiency model, since it keeps transaction costs low. A property owner 
who wants to prevent the obstruction of the existing view from her property knows 
with which neighbour (the rights-holder) to negotiate to have the entitlement 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to a view would have unwanted effects. The court therefore used a property rule to protect the 
respondents‟ right to build. The court in Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) also 
protected the right to build with a property rule, since it refused to prohibit the respondent from 
continuing with the building works on her property. The fact that such building works would obstruct 
the view from the applicant‟s property did not motivate the court to provide less extensive protection to 
the respondent‟s right to build. Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D) and Clark v 
Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) are discussed in 3 3 3 1. 
54
 GS Alexander & EM Peñalver An introduction to property theory (2012) 30. 
55
 GS Alexander & EM Peñalver An introduction to property theory (2012) 30 use the term “particular 
legal rights” for that which G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: 
One view of the cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 at 1089 refer to as “entitlements”. 
56
 GS Alexander & EM Peñalver An introduction to property theory (2012) 30.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
256 
transferred. If the entitlement was allocated differently, in other words if property 
owners were inherently entitled to the preservation of the existing views from their 
properties, the transaction costs would be higher. A property owner who wanted to 
erect a building on her property that would interfere with the existing view from her 
neighbour‟s property would first have to establish which of her neighbours‟ rights to 
the existing views from their properties would be affected by her building works. This 
would be nearly impossible, since her building works might have obstructed or at 
least interfered with a large and undefined area of land. Consequently, the South 
African common law principle that a property owner does not have an inherent right 
to the existing view from her property ensures that transaction costs in matters 
concerning a conflict between the views from a property and building works on 
neighbouring properties are kept to a minimum and therefore promotes an efficient 
outcome. 
South African courts rely on assumptions that are similar to the efficiency model 
to justify the rules that govern conflicts between a property owner‟s right to build and 
her neighbouring owner‟s (right) to have an unobstructed view. They consider the 
utility of being able to develop one‟s property as a more efficient outcome than the 
enjoyment of a pleasant view from one‟s balcony (and over another‟s property). 
Accordingly, in such a dispute, the right to develop one‟s property prevails and a 
property rule is assigned to the owner who wants to build (A). In terms of this 
protection, A‟s right to build on her property is protected in the most extensive way. 
This right will only be transferred to the owner (B) who wants to prevent the 
obstruction of her existing view if B is willing to buy it from A on A‟s terms. Therefore, 
there will only be an exchange of entitlements if B values the protection of her 
unobstructed view more highly than A values her right to build and if the parties can 
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agree on a transfer. The establishment of a servitude or a restrictive condition that 
either protects the existing, unobstructed view from B‟s property or restricts building 
works on A‟s land is usually the result of such a voluntary exchange of entitlements 
between A and B.  
The South African common law position regarding the right to a view shows 
that policy considerations dictate that the right to develop (build on) one‟s property is 
more important than the right to have an unobstructed view. Consequently, in a 
situation where a property owner‟s (A‟s) right to develop her property interferes with 
the existing view from her neighbour‟s (B‟s) property, A‟s right to develop is afforded 
stronger protection and will mostly be protected with a property rule. B would only 
have the right to prevent A from building in a manner that will obstruct the view from 
her (B‟s) property if A has granted her permission (sells her the right) to do so. This 
permission will be cast in the form of a servitude or a restrictive covenant that either 
protects the view from B‟s property, or that restricts building works on A‟s property. 
The constitutional analysis in chapter 5 indicates that there is no deprivation of A‟s 
right to build for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution in such circumstances, 
because A agreed to the limitation of her right.  
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6 3 Rationales for recognising exceptions to the rule against the protection 
of view 
6 3 1 Public health and safety 
The protection of public health and safety forms an important part of state 
governance and enjoys priority over the protection of private property.57 This was 
illustrated in Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties58 (“Transnet”), where the 
public interest in the safety and navigation of ships justified the substantive 
protection of the existing view towards lighthouses.59 The decision in Transnet is an 
example of a situation where the state decided, for an overridingly important public 
purpose, to assign the initial entitlement to an owner who had a duty to prevent 
building, rather than the owner who wants to build. In terms of the National Ports Act 
12 of 2005 (“National Ports Act”), the National Ports Authority is responsible for 
maintaining adequate and efficient lighthouses to assist in the navigation of ships. 
According to the judgment in Transnet, this statutory duty entitled the National Ports 
Authority to prevent the erection of buildings that would obstruct the views towards a 
lighthouse. The National Ports Act therefore effectively embodies a policy decision, 
in order to promote a public purpose, namely the safety and navigation of ships, to 
assign the initial entitlement to the protector of the existing view and not to the 
builder. The fact that the legislation denied the property owner‟s (Proud Heritage 
Properties‟) entitlement to build in this case implies that this reverse assignation of 
the initial entitlement serves an important and overriding public purpose. The 
                                                          
57
 Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that the use and enjoyment of private property may be 
regulated by the state, provided that such a regulation is in terms of law of general application and 
that it is not arbitrary. The constitutional validity of a situation where private property (the right to build 
on and develop one‟s property) is regulated to promote a public purpose is considered in Ch 5.  
58
 Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008) . 
This decision is also discussed in 3 2 2 4. 
59
 This protection was granted in terms of the National Ports Act 12 of 2005. 
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decision in Transnet indicates that a property owner‟s (A‟s) normal right to build may 
not be recognised in a particular instance if the state decides to do so (for example, 
through legislation) to promote a public purpose. Since the initial entitlement in this 
case was vested in B, A will have to buy a right to build from the owner or authority 
(B) that is now entitled to prevent building works, but will only be allowed to do so if 
she carries the cost of ensuring that the public purpose is still served in another way, 
for instance by paying for the lighthouse to be moved. Depending on the 
circumstances, the initial assignment of the entitlement may implicate that it is 
protected by an inalienability rule60 in this case. 
Building regulations that are specifically aimed at preventing the erection of 
unsafe building works, for example building regulations that restrict the height of 
buildings or limit buildings‟ proximity to boundaries, might indirectly prevent the 
obstruction of the existing view from a neighbouring property. Such regulations that 
primarily serve the purpose of maintaining safe building standards might effectively 
protect an existing, unobstructed view. Therefore, according to public policy 
considerations, public health and safety purposes may justify the substantive 
protection of the view to or from certain properties or may have the unintended result 
of protecting the existing, unobstructed view from a property.61 In other words, there 
may be instances where a property owner‟s right to develop her property may be 
restricted either by another owner‟s right or duty to protect a view or by the public 
interest in regulating building works.  
                                                          
60
 See n 44. 
61
 In Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) 
[2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 48, Rampai J, referring to the decision of Hoexter JA in 
Malherbe v Ceres Municipality 1951 (4) SA 510 (AD) at 517–518, reasoned that public policy ordains 
that a property owner whose private individual comfort and convenience is disturbed by a 
neighbouring owner‟s activities must endure such interference if the neighbour‟s activities are aimed 
at promoting public welfare. 
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Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that the use and enjoyment of private 
property may be regulated by the state provided that such regulation is in terms of 
law of general application and that the deprivation of property it brings about is not 
arbitrary. In chapter 5, the constitutional validity of a situation where private property 
(the right to build) is regulated (right to build is restricted) to promote a public 
purpose (for example to prevent the obstruction of the view towards a lighthouse), 
was considered. It was established that the regulation (deprivation) of a private 
owner‟s property would only comply with the non-arbitrariness requirement if it was 
justified by its purpose.  
The existing view from a property can be protected with a servitude, a 
restrictive condition or legislation that either expressly protects the view or prevents 
building works on a neighbouring property that would interfere with the view. 
Furthermore, restrictive conditions, zoning schemes, building regulations and 
legislation that are primarily aimed either at preventing unsafe building works 
(protecting public health and safety) or preserving the aesthetic attributes of a 
neighbourhood may have the concomitant effect of preventing the erection of 
buildings that would obstruct the existing views from neighbouring properties. 
However, the existing, unobstructed view from a property will only be protected 
(indirectly) through legislation, zoning schemes and building regulations insofar as 
these measures cause a valid deprivation of property (limitation on the right to build) 
in terms of section 25(1).  
In chapter 5 it was concluded that servitudes and restrictive covenants that 
restrict property owners‟ right to build do not cause an arbitrary deprivation (or in fact 
any deprivation) of their rights to build in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution, 
since a property owner whose right to build is restricted by a servitude or a restrictive 
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covenant voluntarily permitted the creation of this limitation.62 By contrast, the 
constitutional validity of legislation, zoning schemes and building regulations that 
result in the protection of an existing view has to be evaluated with specific reference 
to the aims that these restrictions on building serve. Legislation, building regulations 
and zoning schemes that restrict building works on a property for an important 
purpose such as public health and safety will be considered to cause a justified 
deprivation of the owner‟s right to build if something like a rational link between the 
deprivation of the right to build and the (important) purpose of such a deprivation can 
be proven. However, legislation and building regulations that restrict a property 
owner‟s right to build and that are primarily aimed at an arguably less essential 
purpose, such as the preservation of the aesthetic attributes of a neighbourhood, will 
only be a considered to cause a justified limitation of the right to build if it can be 
indicated that there is a proportionate balance between the deprivation (restriction on 
the right to build) and the impact that it has on the individual property. A limitation 
that serves a relatively unimportant or irrelevant purpose will therefore only be 
considered a justified limitation in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution if such a 
proportionate balance can be proven.  
 
6 3 2 A significant “advantage” in a special development context 
It has been established above that the existing, unobstructed view from a property is 
generally perceived to be purely a matter of delight and an incidental advantage of 
property.63 Roman texts considered in chapter 2 indicating that certain attributes of 
property are mere incidental advantages and that interferences with them are not 
                                                          
62
 See 5 2 3 1. 
63
 See 6 2 1 above and 2 4 1. 
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actionable were not applied rigidly in Roman law.64 This shows that the South African 
common law principle that a property owner does not have an inherent right to the 
existing view from her property might arguably be applied as a guideline and not as 
an absolute principle. In cases where the existing, unobstructed view from a property 
forms part of the property‟s use and enjoyment and is considered more than a 
merely incidental advantage of the property, the principle that interferences with such 
a view is not actionable could possibly not apply or may be applied flexibly.65 Both 
South African and English case law have examples of cases where prospective 
property owners have, seemingly reasonably, relied on the continued existence of 
the views from their properties in exceptional cases. Therefore, similar to the position 
in Roman law where an interference with an advantageous attribute of property was 
indeed actionable in certain circumstances, a property owner in South African law 
might arguably, for policy reasons, have an inherent right to the existing, 
unobstructed view from her property in situations where such a view is a significant 
advantage of her property. 
The ruling in Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 
572 CC and Others66 (“Waterhouse”) suggests that, in instances where the 
interference with the view from a (neighbouring) property “has a material and 
negative influence on the intended use, enjoyment and purpose for which the 
neighbouring property was purchased, developed and improved”,67 such interference 
                                                          
64
 These Roman texts specifically referred to the flow of water and light to a property as an incidental 
advantage of a property. In this regard, see 2 4 1 for a discussion of commentary on these Roman 
texts as per A Rodger Owners and neighbours in Roman law (1972) 38-89 and D van der Merwe “‟n 
Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, ongeag die negatiewe gevolge 
daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-233. 
65
 This was concluded in 2 4 1. 
66
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) 
[2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004). 
67
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) 
[2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 33. 
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may be unlawful. Rampai J reasoned that, because of the specific nature and 
location of the applicant and respondent‟s river fronting properties, the view from 
these houses was an “essential part” of the purpose for owning them.68 He held that 
the applicant‟s69 use and enjoyment of the view from its property over the river 
formed part of its right of ownership and that the first respondent interfered with this 
right when it erected a thatched structure that obstructed the applicant‟s view.70  
This decision implies that in certain instances the view from a property may be 
considered an attribute that forms part of the ordinary use and enjoyment of a 
property. Accordingly, if the surroundings of a specific property is of such a nature 
that the view to or from it is considered more than a mere incidental benefit, one 
property owner‟s right to erect a building or structure on her property may be limited 
to accommodate another owner‟s right to have an unobstructed view. Considered 
purely in terms of the South African position with regard to the right to a view, the 
court‟s reasoning in the Waterhouse case appears to be flawed. The applicants 
should not have succeeded with their action if the court followed the default logic that 
a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing view from her 
property, and that a property owner has the responsibility to ensure that the view 
from her property is adequately protected by a servitude or similar right if it forms an 
important part of the use, enjoyment and convenience of her property.71  
                                                          
68
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) 
[2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 29. 
69
 The first applicant is a close corporation that owned a river front property on the Free State side of 
the Vaal River. The second and third applicants are the only two members of the closed corporation. 
See Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) 
[2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) paras 2 and 3 for factual information regarding the respective 
parties. 
70
 Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) 
[2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) paras 34 and 57. 
71
 In Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and Others (2198/04) 
[2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) para 9 the court mentioned that the applicants did not propose 
that every landowner has an inherent right to a view. Instead, they argued that the respondents used 
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There therefore seems to be some basis for the development of such a flexible 
principle in South African law. Despite the Roman law principle that certain attributes 
of property are merely incidental advantages, this legal system did prevent 
interference with an incidental advantage of a property in certain circumstances.72 
The Waterhouse decision shows that, in South African law, courts may depart from 
the main rule that a property owner does not have an inherent right to the existing 
view from her property, when the reason for the rule, namely that the view from a 
property is merely an incidental benefit, does not apply. For example, the view from 
a property will not merely be an incidental advantage if it is an essential part of the 
property and its use and protecting it would enhance instead of prevent development 
of the surrounding area. If the location and surroundings of a property form such an 
important part of its utility that the protection of the enjoyment of these attributes from 
one‟s property (by way of protecting the unobstructed view) is more valuable than 
the protection of a neighbour‟s right to develop her land, the obstruction of the views 
of these surroundings might be prevented. Therefore, as indicated by the ruling in 
Waterhouse, there is a possibility of an exception to the rule against the recognition 
of an inherent right to the existing view from a property. It may be that this flexible 
approach should only apply in the context of a specific development, where all the 
properties were planned and built around specific views. 
In the English case of Gilbert v Spoor and Others,73 (“Gilbert”) the Court of 
Appeal also acknowledged the possibility that an undisturbed view over a landscape 
may be valuable and advantageous to a landowner. Importantly, this conclusion was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
their property “in a manner which unreasonably interferes with their ordinary use, comfort, 
convenience and enjoyment of their [applicants‟] own property.” By implication, the applicants 
reasoned that their unobstructed view over the river formed part of the normal use and enjoyment of 
their property and that they were therefore (inherently) entitled to its continued (undisturbed) 
existence. 
72
 See 2 4 1. 
73
 Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27. 
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reached in the context of a property development where a restrictive covenant 
benefitted owners of adjacent properties. The applicant was the owner of a piece of 
property in a building scheme. Properties in this scheme were subject to a covenant 
restricting the erection of buildings to one dwelling house per property. In 1976 he 
was granted permission to erect two more houses on the property. He subsequently 
applied to the Lands Tribunal to have the covenant amended or discharged.74 A 
restriction imposed by a covenant could only be modified or discharged if it did not 
“secure to persons entitled to the benefit of it any practical benefit of substantial 
value or advantage...”.75 The tribunal held that the effect of the modification or 
discharge of the covenant and the subsequent erection of two additional buildings by 
the applicant would obstruct the view from other properties in the scheme. Such an 
obstruction would deprive the persons entitled to benefit from the covenants of a 
“practical benefit of substantial value or advantage”.76  
On appeal, the applicant contended that the view was not a “practical benefit”, 
since it was not visible from the objectors‟ properties.77 The Court of Appeal rejected 
this argument, stating that the “practical benefit” requirement was not limited to 
restrictive covenants that applied to specific pieces of land. Therefore, the pleasant 
view did not have to be enjoyed from the objectors‟ properties to be considered a 
“practical advantage” to those objectors for purposes of this provision. According to 
the court‟s reasoning, the obstruction of the view would indeed have a negative 
effect on the objectors‟ properties, since it would be injurious to the estate as a 
                                                          
74
 Section 84 (1)(aa)(1A) authorises the Lands Tribunal to, on application, modify or discharge a 
restriction “arising under covenant or otherwise”. Their power in this regard is subject to certain 
conditions, one of which is that the restrict ion to be modified or discharged may not have the 
effect of securing to the persons entitled to it “any practical benefits of substantial value or 
advantage to...” 
75
 Section 84(1)(aa)(1A) of the Law of Property Act 1925.  
76
 Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27 at 33 and 36. 
77
 Successors in title to the purchasers of other properties within the building scheme made 
objections to the applicant‟s application for the amendment or discharge of the covenant.  
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whole.78 Gilbert v Spoor and Others79 is therefore an example of an instance where 
a court was willing to acknowledge that an undisturbed view over the property of 
another may be valuable and to the benefit of a property owner. The court‟s decision 
also illustrates that an unobstructed view of a scenic landscape does not have to be 
enjoyed directly from a property to be considered valuable to the owner. A property 
can also benefit from a pleasant view even if such a view can only be observed from 
a nearby spot. However, this judgment has to be examined with reference to the 
particular circumstances that were present in Gilbert v Spoor and Others.80 The court 
recognised the respondents‟ right to a view because it was indirectly provided for in a 
restrictive covenant. Importantly, the court ruled that the restrictive covenant was 
used as a device to preserve the specific character of the relevant building scheme 
and that the unimpeded views, whether observed from houses or elsewhere in the 
development, formed part of this character. Therefore, the court was willing to 
protect the views that the respondents enjoyed when they were in the development, 
because it regarded the value that they derived from the enjoyment of these views to 
be higher than the value and gain that the applicant would obtain if he developed his 
property. 
Generally, the right to the existing, unobstructed view from one‟s property is not 
recognised as an inherent property right. This principle is based on the reasoning 
that the recognition of a right to the unobstructed view from a property would not 
promote an essential factor in the use and enjoyment of a property, but would restrict 
an important part of the use (right to develop) of neighbouring properties. As a matter 
of policy, the right to develop one‟s property is considered to override the possibility 
                                                          
78
 Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27. 
79
 Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27 at 33 and 35. 
80
 Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27 at 33 and 35. 
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of acknowledging a right to the existing view from a property. However, as was 
indicated by the Waterhouse ruling and the English Gilbert decision, the existing, 
unobstructed view from a property may indeed form an essential part in the use and 
enjoyment of a property under certain circumstances. The fact that the Roman rule 
against protecting merely incidental attributes of property was context sensitive, in 
the sense that interferences with such attributes were indeed actionable in some 
circumstances, might suggest that the view from a property may sometimes form a 
significant part of the use of a property. Therefore, there may be room for an 
exception to the general rule against the recognition of the right to a view if the 
development of properties in a specific area is enhanced and not restricted by the 
protection of the views of the surroundings. This might be the case where land in a 
specific location is very expensive because of the surrounding views, or where the 
whole development was planned and built around certain views. Prospective 
property owners will only be willing to pay the high prices if they have the insurance 
that building works on neighbouring properties will be regulated so as to prevent 
significant interferences with those views from their properties. The development of 
such an area will therefore be enhanced if view is protected (because it is 
recognised as an important part of the use of the properties).  
This kind of special exception may also be justified in terms of Law and 
Economics analysis. In Law and Economics theory, the assignment of property rights 
is aimed at maximising utility.81 Traditionally, in a dispute between the protection of a 
property owner‟s view and her neighbour‟s right to develop her property, the 
neighbour‟s right to develop will prevail. The protection of the right to develop one‟s 
property is justified in terms of an efficiency argument, which holds that the 
                                                          
81
 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 at 246 and GS Alexander & EM Peñalver An introduction to property theory (2012) 30. 
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development of property is generally considered to maximise economic and social 
utility while view is perceived not to have any use other than mere “enjoyment”. The 
facts in the Waterhouse and Gilbert cases show that under certain circumstances, 
the view to or from a property may indeed contribute to the “use” of a property in a 
way that it becomes an essential aspect of that property. Although an unobstructed 
view cannot necessarily be utilised in economic or social terms, the planned 
exposition of houses and the role of the view in creating the overall character of a 
specific development may create the impression - which may be confirmed if the 
erection of buildings is restricted by a restrictive covenant or other regulations - that 
the existing views from properties should be protected. A prospective property owner 
may therefore be motivated to pay a higher price for a property in such a 
development because she considers the unobstructed views as part of the lifestyle 
(use) that a property in such a development offers. 
Law and Economics theory also suggests that, in any given dispute, the 
property right of the person who places the highest value on her entitlement should 
prevail.82 In terms of this logic, property rights are assigned to the “highest valuer”. In 
cases such as Waterhouse and Gilbert, the value of an unimpeded view may indeed 
be higher than the value that would be “earned” from erecting more buildings on 
one‟s property. Consider the example where a river fronting area of land is 
developed so as to ensure that the owner of each respective plot has a view of the 
river from her house and that views of the river may also be enjoyed from elsewhere 
in the development. A prospective property owner wanting to buy a property in such 
a development will most probably attach a higher value to the beautiful views than 
merely regarding it as an “incidental advantage”. Her assumption (or, if restrictive 
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 GS Alexander & EM Peñalver An introduction to property theory (2012) 30. 
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conditions, servitudes or other rules or regulations restrict building works in the 
development, her informed belief) that the views are more than “incidental” would be 
correct to the extent that the development of the properties was planned in a specific 
way to optimise the views. Therefore, and in contradistinction to the normal case 
where a buyer would take into account the possibility of building that might destroy 
an existing view, it would not be unreasonable for a buyer to assume that the views 
will be preserved and to include the value of the unimpeded views in the price that 
she is willing to pay for the property.  
The right to develop one‟s property is traditionally protected by a property rule, 
which may, in terms of Calabresi and Melamed‟s paradigm, be transferred to a 
person who attaches a higher value to it and is therefore willing to “pay” for the 
transfer.83 However, in a case where a buyer “reasonably” includes the value of the 
unimpeded views from her property in a specific development, all the buyers in the 
development arguably effectively already paid for a transfer of development rights in 
order to have their reciprocal interests in the views from their respective properties 
protected. Despite the fact that the right to develop is usually protected with a 
property right, circumstances where view forms an integral part of the character of a 
development may indicate that everyone who buys property in the development 
voluntarily consents to the transfer of their rights to develop their properties and at 
the same time acquires the right to an unobstructed view. Every owner therefore 
derives reciprocal obligations and benefits, since each owner‟s right to build is 
collectively restricted (because the other owners acquired the right to a view) and 
each is collectively entitled to the right to an unobstructed view (because the others 
consented to the limitation of their right to build). In other words, this example shows 
                                                          
83
 See 6 2 3 above. 
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that the existing views from properties in such a development may be protected as a 
property right (with a property rule), because it was included in the properties by 
consent, arguably even in cases where the arrangement is not formalised by the 
registration of servitudes or restrictive conditions. The protection of an existing view 
(by consent) in these cases would nevertheless be similar to the protection of a right 
to a view in terms of a servitude or a restrictive covenant, which also arises from an 
agreement in terms of which one property owner consents to the restriction of her 
right to build in favour of the protection of the unobstructed view from her neighbour‟s 
property. 
The facts of the Gilbert case illustrate that there may be instances where the 
development of properties in a specific area is aimed at enhancing the enjoyment of 
the surroundings that is observed from each individual property. Such an area will be 
developed with the idea that the individual properties will be valuable because of 
their beautiful surroundings and not so much for their potential to be developed. It 
may be argued that a buyer of property in such an area reasonably considers the 
optimal enjoyment of the view from her property as part of the entitlements flowing 
from ownership of the property. She therefore already “pays” for this attribute when 
she buys the property. Despite the fact that a neighbouring owner‟s right to build 
would normally be considered to prevail in a dispute regarding the protection of view, 
the fact that an area was specifically developed to maximise the enjoyment of the 
view from each individual property may indicate that all the buyers of properties in 
the development place such high values on the protection of the beautiful views that 
they are willing to exchange their right to develop for the protection of the views. In 
such a building scheme, property owners therefore have reciprocal rights for the 
protection of unimpeded views.  
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Law and Economics arguments are useful both when a court has to decide 
whether or not the circumstances of a case necessitates the recognition of a right to 
a view, and when it has to determine how this right should be protected. It has 
already been established that Calabresi and Melamed‟s property rights paradigm 
may assist a court in the latter decision, since it limits a court‟s decision to two 
alternatives. In terms of this paradigm, a court will have to decide whether it should 
protect a right to a view with a property rule that will “allow rightholders to enjoin all 
attempts to acquire the right on terms that they deem unacceptable”,84 or whether 
protection with a liability rule that “only allow rightholders to seek monetary 
compensation (as set by a court) for seizures of the right”85 will be more effective.86  
A property rule will provide the strongest protection to the existing view from a 
property. If a court orders that a specific view is protected with a property rule, any 
person wishing to act in violation of the right would be required to negotiate with the 
right-holder and would only be allowed to “perform” the infringement if the right-
holder gave her consent, probably against payment of an agreed sum of money. No 
interference (obstruction) of the view will be tolerated in the absence of such 
consent. A court would most likely protect the existing view to or from a property with 
a property rule (an order for demolition) in cases where the protection of such a view 
would serve an important public purpose. This form of protection will ensure that no 
violation (obstruction) of the view is tolerated. For example, if the existing, 
unobstructed view to a lighthouse is necessary for the navigation of ships, as was 
the situation in the Transnet case, and a court recognises a right to an unobstructed 
                                                          
84
 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 at 249. 
85
 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 at 249. 
86
 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 at 249. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
272 
view of the lighthouse, no development on surrounding properties that will interfere 
with the view towards the lighthouse will be allowed, except if the right-holder gave 
her permission. Therefore, a property owner who attempts to exercise the right to 
develop her property will be prohibited from erecting any buildings or structures that 
will interfere with the unobstructed view towards the lighthouse. If she has already 
commenced with building works, she will be ordered to demolish that which violates 
the right-holder‟s entitlement. 
The Waterhouse decision creates the impression that South African law may 
possibly allow for an exception to the common law principle that a property owner 
does not have an inherent right to the existing, unobstructed view from her property. 
This ruling implies that, in circumstances where the views of the surroundings of a 
property forms an integral part of the property‟s use and enjoyment, such views 
should be protected as an inherent property right.87 An exception of this kind is 
possible in the sense that historically, in Roman law, although an interference with 
an attribute of property that was usually considered to be a mere incidental 
advantage was not actionable, interference with such an advantage was actionable 
in certain circumstances.88 English law also indicates that the existing view from a 
property may possibly be protected in cases where it is a significant advantage of a 
property.89  
However, the possibility for an exception of this kind is probably much smaller 
than it appears on the surface. Insofar as Waterhouse suggests that the existing 
view from a property could be protected as an inherent property right in certain 
                                                          
87
 See the discussion of Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC 
and Others (2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) in 2 4 2. 
88
 See 2 4 1. 
89
 See the discussions of Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27 and Dennis and Others v Davies 
[2008] EWHC 2961 (Ch) in 4 2 2 1. 
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circumstances, this protection (and consequent exception to the common law 
principle) must be based on implied consent between neighbouring property owners. 
A property owner (A) would only be entitled to the existing views from her property in 
terms of implied consent by neighbouring property owners (B and C) to refrain from 
obstructing such views if either planning or development of the specific area occurs 
simultaneously. If such a form of explicit or implied consent could be construed, an 
argument that resembles the situation where view is protected by reciprocal 
servitudes or restrictive covenants becomes possible. However, in the absence of 
registration of implied or express consent, it would not be binding on B and C‟s 
successors in title and they would consequently not be prohibited from interfering 
with the views from A‟s property. Without an actual real right, such as a servitude or 
restrictive covenant, that is based on the original consent, this construction therefore 
seems unlikely to succeed in South African law. Moreover, English law suggests that 
the possibility of an “exception” to the rule against recognition of an inherent right to 
the existing view from a property only features in cases where the protection of the 
views from properties in a specific development is regulated by rules or other 
devices such as restrictive conditions. An exception to the common law principle that 
the existing view from a property does not form part of an owner‟s property rights is 
therefore not possible without a registered real right that is based on implied or 
express consent in terms of restrictive covenants, rules that regulate building works 
in a specific development, or servitudes. 
Consequently, although the recognition of an inherent right to the existing view 
from a property appears to be possible and useful in some cases, it is not workable 
in the absence of registration of some form of real right based on consent, either 
between neighbours among themselves or between a property owner and a 
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developer. Prospective property owners and developers who want to protect the 
existing views from properties therefore have to ensure that these views are properly 
protected through registration of servitudes or restrictive conditions. In the absence 
of a workable exception to the common law principle that a property owner does not 
have an inherent right to the existing view in situations where view is a significant 
advantage in a specific development, the position regarding the constitutional 
aspects also remains unchanged. In a special property development where the 
developer registers restrictive conditions or a prospective property owner registers a 
servitude to ensure the preservation of specific existing views, owners who are 
consequently deprived of their rights to build (in a manner that would obstruct such 
views) do not suffer an unjustified restriction of their property rights in terms of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution.90  
 
6 4 Conclusion 
It is traditionally believed that the recognition of a right to a view will constitute an 
imperfect balance of property rights. This reasoning flows from the perception that an 
unobstructed, beautiful view across an undeveloped neighbouring property is an 
incidental benefit that contributes to the value of only one property, while the 
development of property promotes the public interest at large. The limited enjoyment 
that an individual property owner will derive from the protection of the view across a 
neighbouring property will therefore not justify the negative effect that it will have on 
property owners‟ rights to develop their properties and the public‟s interest in the 
economic stimulation brought about by property development. Accordingly, the law 
                                                          
90
 A servitude or a restrictive condition that restricts a property owner‟s right to build does not cause a 
deprivation of property for purposes of s 25(1) of the Constitution. See 5 2 3 1. 
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attaches more value to the right to build and develop on one‟s land than to the 
incidental enjoyment of a view across neighbouring land. 
This perception does not acknowledge the possibility that protection of the view 
to or from a specific property may serve an important public purpose. It has been 
demonstrated above that there are strategies by which an existing view can be 
secured so that it may not be obstructed by building works on neighbouring land. 
When the right to a view has been secured through a servitude, restrictive 
conditions, zoning or building regulations, the concomitant restriction on the 
neighbouring owners‟ right to build either does not constitute a deprivation of their 
property or is justifiable as a non-arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. Other, procedural strategies that focus on the procedure by which 
building plans had been approved or on the discretion that is exercised to approve 
building plans can never really restrict the right to build permanently and therefore do 
not really constitute a deprivation of property. 
Strictly protecting the right to build rather than the enjoyment of incidental views 
does not allow for the possibility that a particular property development may be 
designed to enhance the unimpeded views that can be observed from there and that 
the protection of these views may enhance instead of restrict development of the 
surrounding area. Case law indicates that there may indeed be instances where the 
recognition of an inherent right to the existing, unobstructed view would promote an 
essential public purpose91 or would enhance instead of restrict development.92 In 
these exceptional circumstances, a transfer of entitlements may arguably take place 
                                                          
91
 See the discussion of Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties  (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 
(5 September 2008) in 6 3 1. This decision is also discussed in 3 2 2 4.  
92
 See the discussions of Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 
CC and Others (2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) and Gilbert v Spoor and Others 
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to ensure that the entitlement of the highest valuer, namely the owner wanting to 
prevent building works to protect views, is protected. The exceptional cases where a 
right to a view is acknowledged because it would enhance development would only 
apply in specific developments planned around certain views and would involve 
reciprocal duties and entitlements similar to those that are usually protected by 
servitudes or restrictive conditions. The protection of view in these instances would 
not cause arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 25(1), since the right to continue 
enjoying the existing view will have to be registered, either as servitudes or as 
restrictive covenants, for the sake of legal certainty and enforceability against 
successors in title. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
277 
List of abbreviations 
 
BW   Burgerlijk Wetboek 
Cambridge LJ Cambridge Law Journal 
CCR   Constitutional Court Review 
Harv LR   Harvard Law Review 
JQR   Juta‟s Quarterly Review 
LAWSA  The Law of South Africa 
SALJ   South African Law Journal 
Stell LR  Stellenbosch Law Review 






















Alexander GS & Peñalver EM An introduction to property theory (2012) New York: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
B 
Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5th ed 2006) Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths 
Berger KFM Burenrecht, mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden (4th ed 2001) 
Deventer: Kluwer 
Blackhall JC Planning law and practice (3rd ed 2005) Abingdon: Cavendish 
Publishing 
Buckley RA The law of nuisance (2nd ed 1996) London: Butterworths 
 
C 
Calabresi G & Melamed AD “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One 
view of the cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089-1128 
Church J & Church J “Nuisance” in Joubert WA, Faris JA & Harms LTC (eds) The 
law of South Africa Vol 19 (2nd ed 2006) Durban: Butterworths 
Cooter R & Ulen T Law and Economics (4th ed 2004) Boston: Pearson 
Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights handbook (5th ed 2005) Cape Town: Juta 
 
D 
Delport H “The value of a neighbour‟s view” (2004) 25 Obiter 91-100 
Dukeminier J & Krier JE Property (3rd ed 1993) Boston: Little, Brown & Co 




Epstein RA “Nuisance law: Corrective justice and its utilitarian constraints” (1979) 8 
The Journal of Legal Studies 49-102 
 
F 
Fennell L The unbounded home: Property values beyond property lines (2009) New 
Haven: Yale University Press 
Freedman W “Paradise lost? The obstruction of a pleasant view and the law of 
nuisance” in Hoctor SV & Schwikkard PJ (eds) The exemplary scholar: essays in 
honour of John Milton (2007) Cape Town: Juta 162-184 
 
G 
Gaunt J & Morgan P Gale on easements (18th ed 2008) London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Gildenhuys A Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) Durban: Butterworths 
Gray K & Gray SF Elements of land law (5th ed 2009) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Gray K & Gray SF Land law (6th ed 2009) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Gray KJ “Property in thin air” (1991) 50 Cambridge LJ 252-307 
Grotius H Inleiding tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid (transl Maasdorp AFS The 
introduction to Dutch jurisprudence of Hugo Grotius, 3rd ed 1903) Cape Town: Juta 
 
H 
Harpum C, Bridge S & Dixon M Megarry & Wade: The law of real property (7th ed 
2008) London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Hiemstra VG & Gonin HL Trilingual legal dictionary (3rd ed 1992) Cape Town: Juta  
Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2nd ed 2012) Cape Town: Juta 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
280 
Huber U Heedensdaegse rechtsgeleertheyt (transl Gane P The jurisprudence of my 
time, Vol 1 1939) Durban: Butterworths 
 
K 
Kaser M Roman private law (transl Dannenbring R, 2nd ed 1968) Durban: 
Butterworths 
Kennedy K Neighbour disputes: Law and practice (2009) London: The Law Society 
Kidd M “„The view I behold on a sunshiny day‟: Paola v Jeeva NO” (2005) 122 SALJ 
556-562 
Knobel JC “Inbreukmaking op die estetiese as oorlas: Dorland v Smits 2002 5 SA 
374 (K)” (2003) 66 THRHR 500-505 
Kritzinger KM “Right to a view? Paola v Jeeva NO case no 475/2002 (SCA)” (2004) 
67 THRHR 150-153  
 
L 
Levy E “West Roman vulgar law, the law of property” in Memoirs of the American 
philosophical society Vol 29 (1951) Philadelphia: Independence Square 
 
M 
McFarlane B The structure of property law (2008) Oxford: Hart Publishing 
Miceli TJ “Property” in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar companion to Law and 
Economics (2005) Edward Elgar: Cheltenham 246-260 
Mijnssen FHJ, Van Velten AA & Bartels SE Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de 
beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte 
rechten (15th ed 2008) Deventer: Kluwer 
Murphy J The law of nuisance (2010) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
281 
N 
Nathan M The common law of South Africa Vol 1 (2nd ed 1913) South Africa: The 
Central News Agency Limited 
 
P 
Posner RA Economic analysis of law (8th ed 2011) New York: Wolters Kluwer 
Pugh-Smith J, Sinclair G & Upton W Neighbours and the law (5th ed 2009) 
London: Sweet & Maxwell  
 
R 
Reehuis WHM & Heisterkamp AHT with Van Maanen GE & De Jong GT Pitlo Het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) Deventer: Kluwer 
Robbe J De bestemmingsplanprocedure en de zelfstandige projectprocedure (2000) 
doctoral thesis University of Utrecht 
Rodger A Owners and neighbours in Roman law (1972) Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Roux T “Property” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional law of 
South Africa Vol 3 (2nd ed OS 2003) Cape Town: Juta ch 46 
 
S 
Schorer W Aantekeningen over de Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid 
van Hugo de Groot (1797) Middelburg-Amsterdam 
Scott S “Recent developments in case law regarding neighbour law and its influence 
on the concept of ownership” (2005) 16 Stell LR 351-377 
Scott SP The civil law: The digest or pandects Vol 2; 5; 8; 11 (1932) Cincinnati: The 
Central Trust Company Publishers 
Snijders HJ & Rank-Berenschot EB Goederenrecht (4th ed 2007) Deventer: Kluwer 
Strydom J A hundred years of demolition orders: a constitutional analysis (2012) 
unpublished LLD dissertation University of Stellenbosch 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
282 
Suijling JPH Inleiding tot het burgerlijk recht Vol 5: Zakenrecht (1940) Haarlem: De 
Erven F Bohn NV 
 
T 
Thomas JAC The Institutes of Justinian: Text, translation and commentary (1975) 
Cape Town: Juta 
 
V 
Van Acht RJJ Burenrecht (1990) Deventer: Kluwer 
Van der Linden J Supplementum ad Voet Commentarius ad pandectas (transl 
Gane P The selective Voet being the commentary on the pandects by Johannes 
Voet and the supplement to that work by Johannes van der Linden Vol 2 1955; Vol 6 
1957) Durban: Butterworths 
Van der Merwe CG & De Waal MJ The law of things and servitudes (1993) Durban: 
Butterworths 
Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) Durban: Butterworths 
Van der Merwe D “‟n Lastigheid in die oorlasreg: Optrede wat uiteraard regmatig is, 
ongeag die negatiewe gevolge daarvan” (1983) 16 De Jure 218-223 
Van der Merwe D Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (1982) unpublished LLD thesis 
University of Pretoria 
Van der Walt AJ & Pienaar GJ Introduction to the law of property (6th ed 2009) 
Cape Town: Juta 
Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional property law” (2009) 1 JQR 
Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional property law” (2010) 4 JQR 
Van der Walt AJ “Constitutional property law” (2011) 3 JQR 
Van der Walt AJ “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” 
(2008) 1 CCR 77-128 
Van der Walt AJ “Procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property” (2012) 23 Stell LR 
88-94 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
283 
Van der Walt AJ “Regulation of building under the Constitution” (2009) 42 De Jure 
32-47 
Van der Walt AJ “Striving for the better interpretation – A critical reflection on the 
Constitutional Court‟s Harksen and FNB decisions on the property clause” (2004) 
121 SALJ 854-878 
Van der Walt AJ “The property clause in the New Federal Constitution of the Swiss 
Confederation 1999” (2004) 15 Stell LR 326-332 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: A comparative analysis (1999) 
Cape Town: Juta 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (3rd ed 2011) Cape Town: Juta 
Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) Cape Town: Juta 
Van Es PC De actio negatoria: Een studie naar de rechtsvorderlijke zijde van het 
eigendomsrecht (2005) Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 
Van Leeuwen S Het Rooms-Hollandsch recht (1708) Amsterdam 
Van Wyk J Planning law (2nd ed 2012) Cape Town: Juta 
Vinnius A Institutionum imperialum commentarius (1726) Leyden 
Voet J Commentarius ad pandectas (transl Gane P The selective Voet being the 




Wibbens-de Jong AC Burenrecht: Monografieën BW B26 (4th ed 2009) Deventer: 
Kluwer 
Wibbens-de Jong AC Mandeligheid en erfdienstbaarheden: Monografieën B27 BW 
(3rd ed 2006) Deventer: Kluwer 
Woolman S & Botha H “Limitations” in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa Vol 2 (2nd ed OS 2006) Claremont: Juta ch 34 
 
 






Hof van Colmar 2 Mei 1855, DP 1856 
 
Germany 
BGHZ 23, 235 (1957) 
BVerwGE 38, 209 (1971) 
 
South Africa 
Administrator, Transvaal and Others v Traub and Others 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) 
Barnett v Minister of Land Affairs 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 
Camps Bay Ratepayers Association v Minister of Planning Western Cape 2001 (4) 
SA 194 (C) 
Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and 
Another 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC) 
Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison [2010] 2 All SA 519 
(SCA) 
Camps Bay Residents and Ratepayers Association and Others v Augoustides and 
Others 2009 (6) SA 190 (WCC) 
Clark v Faraday and Another 2004 (4) SA 564 (C) 
De Kock v Saldanhabaai Munisipaliteit en Andere (7488/04) [2006] ZAWCHC 56 (28 
November 2006)  
Dorland and Another v Smits 2002 (5) SA 374 (C) 
Erasmus v Blom 2011 JDR 0321 (ECP) 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
285 
Erf 167 Orchards CC v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 CLR 91 
(W) 
Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) 
SA 768 (CC) 
Haffejee NO and Others v Ethekwini Municipality and Others 2011 (6) SA 134 (CC)  
Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) 
Hayes v Minister of Finance and Development, WC 2003 (4) SA 598 (C) 
Kruger v Downer 1976 (3) SA 172 (W) 
Lewkowitz v Billingham & Co (1895) 2 Off Rep 36 
Malherbe v Ceres Municipality 1951 (4) SA 510 (A) 
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and 
Others v Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and 
Others v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, 
Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC)  
Muller NO v City of Cape Town 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) 
Myburgh v Jamison (1861) 4 Searle 8 
Ndlambe Municipality v Lester and Others (92/2011) [2012] ZAECGHC 33 (3 May 
2012) 
New Adventure Investments 193 (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for the time being of the SAS 
Trust [2002] 3 All SA 544 (C) 
Nowers NO v Burmeister (EL 1038/08, ECD 2338/08) [2011] ZAECELLC 8 (2 August 
2011)  
Nyangane v Stadsraad van Potchefstroom 1998 (2) BCLR 148 (T) 
Odendaal v Eastern Metropolitan Local Council 1999 CLR 77 (W) 
Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2002 (2) SA 391 (D) 
Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
286 
PS Booksellers (Pty) Ltd and Another v Harrison and Others 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) 
Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 
Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) 
Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (A) 
Resnekov v Cohen 2012 (1) SA 314 (WCC) 
Richardson and Others v South Peninsula Municipality and Others 2001 (3) BCLR 
265 (C) 
Rocher v Registrar of Deeds 1911 TPD 311 
S v Thebus and Another 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC) 
Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others (1237/09) [2009] ZAWCHC 10 (13 
February 2009) 
Sergio Mateus Pais Mamede and Others v The Strategic Executive: Department of 
Housing, City Planning, Land and Environmental Planning of the City of Tshwane 
and Others (10864/02) [2009] ZAGPHC 37 (25 February 2009) 
Tergniet and Toekoms Action Group and 35 others v Outeniqua Kreosootpale (Pty) 
Ltd and others unreported case no 10083/2008 (23 January 2009) (C) 
Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 
September 2008) 
True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and Another (Ethekwini Municipality as amicus 
curiae) 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) 
Van der Heever v Hanover Municipality 1938 CPD 95 
Van Rensburg and Another NNO v Naidoo and Others NNO; Naidoo and Others 
NNO v Van Rensburg NO and Others 2011 (4) SA 149 (SCA) 
Van Rensburg and Another NNO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and 
Others 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE) 
Vanston v Frost 1930 NPD 121 
Walele v City of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
287 
Waterhouse Properties CC and Others v Hyperception Properties 572 CC and 
Others (2198/04) [2004] ZAFSHC 97 (28 October 2004) 
 
Switzerland 




HR 13 Maart 1936, NJ 1936, 415  
HR 2 April 1937, NJ 1937, 639 
HR 17 April 1970, NJ 1971, 89 
Hof Arnhem 8 February 2005, LJN AS7586 
HR 21 Oktober 2005, NJ 2006, 418 
 
United Kingdom 
Attorney-General v Doughty (1752) 2 Ves Sen 453 
Bland v Moseley (1587) 9 Co Rep 58a 
Browne v Flower (1911) 1 Ch 219 
Re Buchanan – Wollaston’s Conveyance (1939) 2 All ER 302 
Butt v Imperial Gas Company (1866) 2 Ch App 158 
Dalton v Angus & Co (1881) All ER 1 (HL) 
Dennis and Others v Davies [2008] EWHC 2961 (Ch) 
Dennis and Others v Davies [2009] EWCA Civ 1081 
Easton v Isted (1901) E 1151 
Fishmongers’ Co v East India Co (1752) 1 Dick 163 
Gilbert v Spoor and Others (1983) Ch 27 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
288 
Harris v De Pinna (1886) 33 Ch D 238 
Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) AC 655 
Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997) HL 677 
Leech v Schweder (1874) 9 Ch App 463 
Re Penny and the South Eastern Railway Co (1857) 119 ER 1390 
Southwark London Borough Council v Mills (2001) 1 AC 1 
Tapling v Jones (1865) 144 ER 1067 
William Aldred’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b, 77 ER 816 
 
United States 
Haehlen v Wilson (1936) 11 Cal App 2d 437 
Oliver et al v AT&T Wireless Services et al (1999) 76 Cal App 4th 521 (90 Cal Rptr 
2d 491) 
Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922)  
Varney & Green v Williams (1909) 155 Cal 318 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
289 
Legislation, Constitutions and Codes 
 
South Africa 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 
Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 
National Ports Act 12 of 2005 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 
 
Switzerland 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 1874 
 
The Netherlands 
Burgerlijk Wetboek 1992, Boek 5 
Wet van 29 Augustus 1991 tot herziening van de Woningwet 
Wet van 4 Juni 1992, Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht 
Wet van 20 Oktober 2006, Wet Ruimtelijke Ordening 
 




Law of Property Act 1925 
Town and Country Planning Act 1990 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
